33 A.2d 586 | N.J. | 1943
This is a workmen's compensation case. N.J.S.A.
The meager facts which give rise to the stated question are stipulated. From the stipulated facts we learn that at the time of the accident (January 6th, 1938) and for two years prior thereto decedent, whose sole dependent was his wife (respondent here) with whom he lived in Paterson, New Jersey, was engaged and worked for prosecutor railroad company as a baggage porter at its terminal in Jersey City, New Jersey. Decedent worked six days a week from 10:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M., at the rate of fifty cents an hour and earned $24 a week. His rate of pay was the same as that of any employee living in Port Jervis, New York, or in Jersey City, New Jersey. His duties were confined entirely to Jersey *450 City and consisted of handling, sorting, routing and loading of mail, newspapers and baggage arriving at Jersey City from New York and destined to points within and without the State of New Jersey.
On January 6th, 1938, decedent completed his work at his usual time (7:00 A.M.) and promptly thereafter boarded one of prosecutor's public trains which traveled from Jersey City to Paterson, New Jersey. As the train was moving into the Paterson station, at 7:33 A.M., at a speed of approximately fifteen miles an hour, decedent was seen to jump off the train, run along the platform holding on to a grab handle, lose his footing, fall and roll under the train. He sustained fatal injuries.
At the time of the accident decedent had in his possession a railroad pass which had been given to him by prosecutor at the time of his employment. The pass reads as follows:
Not good on trains 1 and 2 except between Hornell and Buffalo, N.Y. 1937-1938 Pass Mr. Joseph Micieli Account Extra Baggage porter (AIK) Between stns. Jersey City, N.J. and Paterson, N.J. Until December 31st, 1938. Valid when countersigned by A.E. Hoffman.
Countersigned Unless otherwise ordered and subject to A.E. Hoffman. conditions on back.
W.M. White, General Manager."
This pass is not transferable, and if presented by any other than an individual named thereon, the conductor will take up pass and collect fare. This free pass is accepted and used upon the above conditions.
(Signed) Joseph Micieli.
This pass will not be honored unless signed in ink or indelible pencil by the person or persons to whom issued."
Although the parties by their stipulation reserved the right "to introduce evidence in connection with the conditions under which the pass was issued," nonetheless, for reasons not made to appear, no such evidence was introduced.
On the facts as stipulated, the deputy commissioner in the Bureau, on the holding in the cases of Rubeo v. ArthurMcMullen Co.,
On appeal to the Passaic County Court of Common Pleas, the judge of that court affirmed in all things the determination and rule for judgment in the Bureau. 20 N.J. Mis. R. 494; 29 Atl.Rep. (2d) 412. Prosecutor was allowed a writ of certiorari.
Although we do not seem to have a case "directly in point" (Cf. Fisher v. Tidewater Building Co.,
Thus whatever may be the rule of law elsewhere (see Tallon v.Interborough Rapid Transit Co.,
Before considering the facts in the case at bar, we desire to digress long enough to observe that we would ordinarily remand the case to the Bureau to take testimony, in accordance with the stipulated reservation, as to the conditions under which the pass was issued. But since no such testimony was supplied in the first instance, we assume that it was not available. Hence nothing is to be gained in so doing. At all events, respondent, represented by counsel, chose to submit her cause as stipulated. She stands or falls on that stipulation.
We turn to the facts. Our careful study of the facts as stipulated and the proper inferences to be drawn therefrom, admeasured by the judicial yard stick of the "preponderance of probabilities according to the experience of mankind" (Cf.Gilbert v. Gilbert Machine Works, Inc.,
Concededly, prosecutor gave decedent the pass at the time he was employed about two years prior to his death. Prosecutor knew, or is charged with the knowledge, by the very words of the pass, that decedent lived in Paterson, New Jersey. It is, moreover, conceded by counsel for the parties in their respective briefs, notwithstanding the conflicting language of the pass, that "it [the pass] was for use between Jersey City and Paterson only." And although it is stipulated that the basic salary of the decedent was the same *454 wherever he chanced to live, prosecutor charged the issuance of the pass to its "extra baggage account" between the stations for which it was to be used. As so issued and treated, the pass was accepted and used by decedent.
Apart, however, from the amount ($24) of decedent's weekly wage, common experience of mankind preponderates the probability that decedent used that pass during his employment while going to and from his work prior to the accident with the knowledge and acquiescence of prosecutor, and that he so used it at the time of his fatal accident.
We need hardly labor the point that the pass was financially beneficial to decedent. It relieved him of his transportation costs. Again common experience of mankind preponderates the probability that the issuance of the pass was beneficial to prosecutor's business as a common carrier. It necessarily attracted workers of decedent's limited earning power, even if they lived some distance away from their place of work. It undoubtedly created and helped to maintain that humane relation between employer and employee which is beneficial and vital to their mutual social and economic welfare. If it were otherwise, common experience, common sense dictates that the pass would not have been issued to decedent.
We do not share the view that the obligatory use of the pass was, as urged, a condition precedent to the requisite relation of master and servant between the parties. The issue here is not whether decedent could have used the pass while returning home from his work. The issue here is whether the fatal injury which decedent suffered while so using the pass is compensable. Decedent had the unquestionable right to use the pass as he did use it. He was in prosecutor's public train by virtue of a condition incidental to and part of his contract of employment as evidenced by his pass. Thus he was where he had a right to be under his contract of employment. Cf. Bryn v. Central RailroadCompany of New Jersey,
We are, therefore, of the opinion, and so hold, that, under the circumstances exhibited, the issuance of the pass and its use by decedent did not create the relation "analogous to that of bailor and gratuitous bailee" (see cases collated in Demarest v.Palisades Realty, c., Co.,
Nor does the fact that the pass reads that it was given "gratuitously and furnished no part of the consideration for [decedent's] services" lead to a contrary result. The pattern of the pass does not appear to us to have been designed to determine the status of an employee under our Workmen's Compensation Act. Obviously, it seeks to exclude the value of the pass in determining decedent's weekly wage, it provides against liability for prosecutor's negligence, and against its being considered as a common carrier as to the transportation furnished by the pass. The pattern of the pass seems to us to have been designed to determine the status of the employee under the Federal Employers Liability Act. U.S.C.A., Title 45, § 51. In this connection, it is interesting to observe that prosecutor argued below, among other things, that the Bureau was without jurisdiction because the "work of decedent was interstate in character," and, therefore, the claim petition should have been dismissed.
But be that as it may, the award of compensation to the widow, notwithstanding the aforestated provisions of the *456 pass, does not, as suggested, impair the obligation of contract or deprive prosecutor of its property without due process of law either under our state or federal constitution.
Our Workmen's Compensation Act was not designed "to impose" nor does it impose "workmen's compensation" upon employer and employee "against their will." In re Spencer Kellogg Sons, 52Fed. Rep. (2d) 129, 133. Both are free to contract extra all of its provisions. This they did not do. Hence it "is presumed" that they have "accepted" its elective compensation provisions and "have agreed to be bound thereby." N.J.S.A.
Decedent was not, at the time of the fatal accident, actually engaged in interstate commerce. Fury v. New York and LongBranch Railroad Co.,
The judgment is affirmed, with costs. *457