Plаintiff, a union representing classified civil service employees of the Department of Corrections (doc), appeals from the trial court’s order granting summаry disposition in favor of defendants pursuant to MGR 2.116(C)(4), lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
This case arises out of an action taken by the State of Michigan in response to a consent judgment entered in a federal civil rights lawsuit filed against the state by the United States Attorney General in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan alleging that the delivery of mental health services to prison in *575 mates was below constitutional standards. See United States v Michigan, Docket No. G-84-63 (WD Mich, 1986). Pursuant to that federal court judgment, the state closed the Riverside Psychiatric Hospital in Ionia, established a new correctional mental health facility in Ypsilanti, and transferred responsibility for inmate mental health services from the doc to the Department of Mental Health (dmh). As a result, several doc employees at the Riverside facility were to be reassigned to the dmh in Ypsilanti effective October 1, 1993.
On September 21, 1993, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Ionia Circuit Court seeking an injunction against the allegedly unconstitutional movement of employees from the doc to the dmh. Plaintiff alleged that the mandate in Const 1963, art 11, § 5, that the Civil Service Commission (esc) retain exclusive authority over all personnel transactions and employmеnt conditions, had been violated by the use of the relocation procedure that had not been established by the esc. As a result, plaintiff argued, doc emplоyees had been forced to accept an undesired geographic reassignment without the employee performance protections that would have been available if esc procedures had been utilized. Plaintiff asserted that § 5 afforded it the right to ask a circuit court to enjoin the relocation рrocedure without the need to first exhaust all administrative remedies.
In response, the esc, the doc, and the dmh argued that plaintiff failed to meet its burden of showing cause for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and that there were administrative remedies available to plaintiff that had not been exhausted or even pursued. The esc also stated that the relocation plan did not violate esc procedure. The doc, joined by the dmh and the esc, moved for summary disposition on the basis that *576 the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to exhaust the remedies available through the grievance procedure of either the doc or the esc. The circuit court granted the motion.
Pursuant to Const 1963, art 11, §5, the esc, among other things, shall make rules and regulations covеring all personnel transactions, and regulate all conditions of employment in the classified service. The provision also requires the esc to establish a grievance procedure for aggrieved employees. The provision concludes with the following language: "Violation of any of the provisions hereof may be restrained or observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of the state.”
On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendants’ relocation procedure violates the state constitution because it is not in compliance with the csc’s established procedures. Plaintiff assеrts that because the esc has no procedure to enjoin two departments from making an interdepartmental contract that affects employeе rights, injunctive relief can be sought immediately in circuit court. Plaintiff does not dispute that both the doc and the esc have established grievance procedures tо handle the Underlying claims. Nor does plaintiff offer any argument or factual circumstance suggesting that the pursuit of this claim through the esc would be an exercise in futility. Rathеr, plaintiff argues that, because the constitution has been violated, the exhaustion requirement is obviated and the circuit court is able to enjoin the ongoing constitutional violation.
Premised on the doctrine of separation of powers,
1
it is well settled that where an administrative
*577
grievance procedure is provided, exhaustion of that remedy is required before the circuit court can review the case. MCL 24.301; MSA 3.560(201);
Mollett v Taylor,
The question before this Court is whether the alleged existence of a constitutional violation fits within one of these two exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. This is a point of some confusion. See generally LeDuc, Michigan Administrative Law, § 10:38, pp 65-67. This Court has stated that our constitution permits any сitizen to seek injunctive or mandamus relief to assure that
any
of the provisions of Const 1963, art 11, § 5 are complied with.
Calcatera v Civil Service Comm,
Thus, this "constitutional violation” exception to the exhaustion requirement seems to be an outgrowth of the "futility” exception. There is no sense in forcing a plaintiff to plod through the lengthy administrative process when only the courts have the authority to resolve the controlling constitutional issue. Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement is displaced only when there are no issues in controversy other than the constitutional challenge.
Jones v Dep’t of Corrections,
On the basis of this analysis, we hold that the firmly established doctrine requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies controls this case. The trial court appropriately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not dispute that there are at least two administrative avenues for the resolution of its primary grievance. Nor does plaintiff claim that the existing grievance procedures have been exhаusted or are inadequate to appropriately handle the sought-after remedy of procuring the employee rights granted by the esc. Indeed, plaintiff statеs in its brief that the constitutional problem might be avoided if the employees it represents were afforded the rights normally provided by the esc procedure. Thus, therе is a factual predicate to plaintiff’s constitutional argument regarding what rights the doc employees are provided and whether the contested reassignment contravenes esc policy and control.
We note in conclusion that plaintiff has cited cases invoking a due process argument. However, the cases plaintiff cites found such a violation because the aggrieved civil service employee lost a particular right without being protected by adequate procedural safeguards. Such an argument is inapplicable to this case because plaintiff does not dispute the existence of procedures to air and resolve the involved grievance.
Affirmed.
Notes
See
Viculin v Dep’t of Civil Service,