*1
18
488 Mich
18
MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION v SECRETARY OF STATE
(Calendar
7).
Argued
5,
Docket No. 137451.
November
No. Decided
29,
rehearing,
December
2010. Vacated on
the nomination
statutory
tion,
question.
passage,
a ballot
or defeat of
“expenditure,”
of “contribution” includes the term
definition
establishment,
specifically
expenditures for the
which
excludes
administration,
separate
to a
or solicitation of contributions
segregated
the one at issue. The definition of “contri-
fund like
anything
bution” also includes a transfer of
of ascertainable
influencing
monetary
purpose
nomination
value for the
of
qualification, passage,
a
or for the
or election of
candidate
question.
not define “trans-
defeat of a ballot
The statute does
fer,”
plain meaning
convey
is to
or remove from one
but its
MCFA,
entity
In the context of the
“contribution”
to another.
conveyance
anything
interpreted
require
must be
a net
of
of
monetary
interpreting it
services that
value because
to include
fully paid
interpreta-
are
for would lead to absurd results. This
provision
comports
portion
tion
with that
that excludes
returned,
rejected,
are
or refunded from the
contributions that
statutory
also in-
definition of “contribution.” “Contribution”
granting
cludes the
of discounts or rebates not available to the
general public,
implies
products
provided
which
or services
price
at full
are not contributions under the MCFA. Addition-
ally,
public
payroll-deduction
school’s administration of
system
impermissible
under the MCFA
is not an
contribution
system
purpose
because the
is not administered for the
of
influencing the nomination or election of a candidate or for the
rather,
question;
qualification, passage,
or defeat of a ballot
system
public body required to do
is administered because the
contract,
merely
part
else
so as
of a labor
and it
allows someone
influencing political
purpose
to make a contribution for the
of
issue.
who a service without and the MEA-PAC anticipates prepayment of administration costs. Reversed. Corrigan joined by Justice Justices Young, Markman, dissenting, judgment Appeals affirm would of the Court of ground on the that the school district’s administration of the plan in this case constitutes both a contribu- expenditure public tion and an as defined MCFAbecause being political objectives resources are used to advance the public MEA-PAC services and facilities in assistance objectives being provided. these same are He would hold that the MEA-PAC’soffer to reimburse the school district expenses incurred its administration of the does not remedy 169.257, an otherwise clear violation MCL which public body states that a shall not use or authorize the use of its expenditure. resources to make a contribution He majority’s contrary interpretation further stated that the un- 57, legislative objective dermines the which is to mandate *3 separation government politics from in order governmental neutrality elections, preserve maintain fair processes, prevent taxpayer being democratic and funds from partisan political used to subsidize activities. Campaign Michigan — —
Elections Finance Act Contributions to Political — —Payroll Action Committees Public Bodies Deduction Plans. public system A school’s administration of a that money segregated remits to a action committee that is a precluded statutory prohibition against using fund is not public expenditure, contribution, resources to make an make a provide personal volunteer certain services in connection with (MCL 169.257). campaign financing 169.204[3], 169.255, White, Schneider, Chiodini, Young (by & EC. Kath- leen Corkin for Boyle), petitioner. Cox, General, Attorney Restuccia,
Michael A. B. Eric General, Solicitor and Heather Meingast, S. Denise C. Barton, Sherman, and Ann Assistant Attorneys Gen- eral, for respondent. Ed Ass’n v State Opinion of the Court
Amici Curiae:
Foster, Smith, Swift, Collins Eric (by & EC. E. Doster), the Michigan for Chamber of Commerce. Waldman,
Sachs EC. Andrew (by Nickelhoff), for Michigan AFL-CIO; State SEIU Michigan State Council; Union, and International United Automo- bile, Aerospace, Agricultural Implement Workers of America.
Eatrick Wright for the Mackinac Center Public Policy.
HATHAWAY, J. At issue in case this is whether a school may administer payroll deductions for its em- ployees remit who funds to the Michigan Education Association Political (MEA-PAC), Action Committee fund segregated under MCL 169.255.
We that conclude the Court of Appeals clearly erred holding administration of a payroll deduction system is not allowed Michigan under law. We reverse of Appeals’ Court judgment a public because school’s administration of a (the system) that remits funds to fund segregated 169.257(1) not precluded by any prohibition MCL and is therefore permitted. 169.257(1), commonly referred to as 57 of
the Michigan Campaign (MCFA),1 specifi- Finance Act cally prohibits public body from using public re- (1) (2) sources to three things: do make an expenditure, (3) contribution, make a “provide per- volunteer *4 sonal that are services excluded from the definition of 4(3)(a)” MCFA, contribution under section MCL 1 et MCL 169.201 seq. 488 MICH 18
22 Opinion the Court 169.204(3)(a).2 sys- of such a First, administration MCFA because under the “expenditure” tem is not an “expenditure is cost of administration of contri- administration, or solicitation establishment, independent fund or segregated a separate butions to the exception an enumerated committee,”3 which is Second, adminis- statutory “expenditure.” definition of as defined system is not a “contribution” tration of the conveyance no net because there is by the MCFA purpose made for the monetary value anything a candidate or or election of influencing the nomination of a ballot or defeat qualification, passage, for the of a Last, administration school’s question. “provide does not volunteer system payroll the definition are excluded from services that personal 4(3)(a)”4 defined section as of contribution under fully anticipates prepay- the MEA-PAC MCFA because Thus, the adminis- administration costs. ment for by public school tration of under the MCFA. permitted AND PROCEEDINGS I. FACTS Association Petitioner, Michigan Education (MEA), voluntary, organiza- labor incorporated is a by public represents employed tion that members Michi- schools, throughout and universities colleges, committee, MEA- MEA’s action gan. § 55 of the PAC, segregated fund under separate is a MEA, the According 169.255. MCFA. MCL MEA member part by MEA-PAC is funded affiliates) (or MEA its has entered deductions. The various bargaining agreements with into collective 169.257(1). MCL 169.206(2)(c), MCL 169.257(1). *5 Secretary Ed Ass’n v of State Opinion op the Court school districts the throughout require state that the school district employer to administer a deduc- payroll plan for tion contributions to the MEA-PAC.The current case involves such an agreement between the County Kalamazoo Education Lake Association/Gull Education Association and the Gull Lake Public Schools. The Gull Lake bargaining agree- collective ment also the Lake requires Gull Public Schools to deductions, make other payroll payment such as the MEA dues and service The MEA plans fees. to pay Schools, Gull advance, the Lake Public in for all anticipated costs Gull Lake Public Schools attrib- utable to administering payroll deductions any MEA-PAC or other separate segregated fund affiliated with the MEA. The MEA contends that under this Gull proposal, Lake Public Schools would not incur in expenses costs administering the requested deductions the because Gull Lake Public Schools would be paid for advance such costs and expenses.
As a to implementing condition the collective bar- gaining agreement, a representative of Gull Lake Public requested Schools that the MEA obtain a declaratory ruling on the validity of the payroll system. On August MEA filed 22, 2006, request for a declaratory ruling respondent, with the Secretary of State. MEA The detailed its proposal payroll for deductions to be made Gull Lake Public Schools asserted the administration payroll of the deductions by the school district would not be an “expenditure” under the MCFA and would MCFA, violate 57 MEA 169.257. requested that the Gull Lake Public be Schools al- lowed make payroll transmit deductions re- quested by MEA long members to MEA-PAC as as the members had filled voluntary out consent forms and Mich 18 Opinion Court had the school paid the MEA-PAC the MEA or
either with admin- advance, any costs associated district, in MEA also asked the deductions. The istering those costs it declaratory ruling on what of State for a Secretary costs attributable to determining consider should trans- that are to be administering deductions MEA-PAC. mitted to the 20, 2006,
On November could not Lake Public Schools ruled that the Gull *6 requested deductions payroll make and transmit § 57 of the the MEA-PAC because MEA members to making expendi- from public body MCFA prohibits action political contributions for a collecting tures or Department that the of ruling The noted committee. Attorney previously had both State and the General body prohibited is from public concluded that committee remitting contributions to a collecting of a through payroll its administration that 55 of the MCFA plan. ruling explained The make private expenditures allows named entities to and administration and solici- for the establishment fund. separate segregated contributions to a tation of However, ruling explicit provision the stated that no body to do so and in the MCFA authorizes prohibited the school district from concluded that de- payroll resources for a expending governmental wages employees that deducts from its duction behalf of the MEA-PAC. on further concluded Secretary ruling of State’s the administering payroll the costs of paying that effectively in avoid a deductions advance would not on an §of 57. This conclusion was based violation of the analysis opinion of this issue in a recent 2005-2006, 7187, OAG, p No Attorney General. Secretary Mich Ed v of Ass’n State Opinion of the Court (February Because the 2006). 16, that payroll concluded administration of a MCFA, would the ruling violate did not what be address costs should considered attributable to administering deductions or the dollar amount that should prepaid. be petitioned
The MEA for review of the declaratory ruling Ingham 4, in the Circuit On September Court. 2007, the trial issued court an opinion setting aside the declaratory ruling on the grounds that it was arbitrary, capricious, and an of abuse discretion. The trial if opined court costs administration in are paid advance, of payroll administration deduc- tions does result in transfer of money to a union’s and, action therefore, committee an “expen- diture” has not been made within meaning Thus, MCFA. court trial held that a public body may administer as deductions long as all costs making deductions are paid advance.
The Secretary of State applied for leave to appeal Court which Appeals, was granted. split In a decision, the Court Appeals reversed the trial court’s opinion that, and held regardless of advance payment *7 for the a costs, public associated school’s administration of a payroll system deduction is still “expenditure” under the MCFA and prohibited.5 thus Judge WHITBECK dissented, and would have held that of a administration payroll system deduction “expenditure”6 not an as the MCFA defines it.
The MEA sought to appeal leave in this This Court. Court granted argument oral on grant whether to the 5 State, Secretary Mich Ass’n v 486-487; Ed App 477, 280 Mich 761 of (2008). NW2d 234 6 Id. at 490. 18 488 MICH
26 Opinion of the Court ap- leave subsequently granted and application7 peal.8
II. ANALYSIS
MCFA,
§
of the
is whether
57
in this case
The issue
from admin-
169.257(1),
school
prohibits
MCL
that remits funds
deduction
istering
payroll
statutory construc-
is an issue of
MEA-PAC. This
the
de novo.9
tion,
we review
which
MCFA,
the established
apply
the
we
interpret
To
“Assuming that
statutory
of
construction.
rules
author-
its constitutional
has acted within
Legislature
is to discern
construction
statutory
of
ity,
purpose
Legislature.”10
the intent of
give
effect to
7
(2009).
State,
Secretary
1001
The Court
483 Mich
Mich Ed Ass’n v
parties
to brief
directed
(1)
government
resources
a school district’s use of
whether
plan
members of
payroll
for contributions made
(MEA)
politi-
Michigan
to MEA’s
Education Association
the . . .
“expenditure” or a “contribu-
either an
cal action committee is
(MCFA),
Michigan Campaign
Act
Finance
under 6 of the
tion”
§57(1)
(2)
MCFA,
169.206;
MCL
whether
expending govern-
169.257(1), prohibits a
district from
school
plan if the
costs
for such a
ment resources
(3)
MEA;
a school
prepaid
whether
are
authority
deduc-
to collect and deliver
district has the
contributions, [id.]
tions for such
8
(2010).
State,
In the order
In applying these established rules statutory con- struction, we start our analysis with a review of the statutory language. MCFA, relevant Section 57 of the 169.257(1), MCL prohibits public using bodies from contributions, resources to make expenditures, provide or volunteer services that are excluded from the 4(3) (a) definition of act, “contribution” under of that 169.204(3)(a). provides statute in pertinent part: public body
A
acting
public body
individual
for a
funds,
personnel,
shall
use or authorize the
use
office
11 Potter, 484
411.
Mich at
12 Id.
410.
at
13
Valley,
Sun
Opinion the Court software, property, statio- space, computer hardware *9 public other vehicles, equipment, supplies, or nery, postage, expenditure provide or or make a contribution resources to from the that are excluded personal services volunteer 4(3)(a). [MCL under section of contribution definition added).] 169.257(1) (emphasis body from public a Thus, prohibits § specifically of, to do resources authorizing public the use using, or (2) (1) make a an expenditure, make things: three (3) that are services contribution, provide or volunteer “contribution” under definition of from the excluded 4(3)(a). the does not language of statute plain Therefore, if the adminis- activity. other any prohibit is not tanta- system tration the adminis- things, these three doing one of mount Michigan under law. system permissible tration of the A. EXPENDITURE adminis- a school’s first examine whether We that remits funds tration of a under expenditure impermissible the MEA-PAC is an defined is specifically § 57. “Expenditure” apply- for MCFA, purposes definition controls so this under “expenditure” definition of general § 57. The ing 6, perti- §in provides MCFA is set forth which part: nent
(1) donation, loan, payment, or “Expenditure” means a money anything of ascertainable payment of or promise of services, materials, goods, or facilities monetary for value to, of, opposition or nomination in assistance or candidate, passage, or qualification, of a election includes, Expenditure but is not question. defeat of a ballot to, following: any of the limited (a) anything of ascertain- or a transfer of A contribution influencing the nomi- monetary purposes of value for able Ed Ass’n v Opinion of the Court qualification, nation or election of a candidate or the passage, question. or defeat of ballot
(2) Expenditure following: does not include (a) expenditure by person An for communication with person’s paid members or shareholders and those individuals who can be solicited for to a contributions separate segregated [MCL 169.255]. fund under n (c) establishment, administration, expenditure An separate or solicitation segregated contributions to fund independent (emphasis [MCL committee. 169.206 added).] *10 169.206(1) Thus, general MCL details the definition of “expenditure,” which expansive. is It includes a payment, donation, loan, promise or payment of of money anything or of ascertainable value monetary goods, materials, services, or facilities in of, assistance or in to, opposition the nomination or election of a candidate, qualification, or the passage, or defeat of a ballot question. The definition also includes a contribu- tion or a transfer of anything of monetary ascertainable value for of purposes influencing the nomination or election of a qualification, candidate or the passage, or However, defeat of a ballot question. despite expan- its scope, sive statutory definition of “expenditure” contains explicit exceptions under 169.206(2), MCL outlining items cannot be considered expendi- ture under though the MCFA even they may qualify under the expansive general definition in outlined MCL 169.206(1).
We now consider whether a school’s adminis- tration of a payroll system “expendí- deduction is an 488 Mich Opinion the Court of The administration the MCFA. defined
ture” as arguably provide does system payroll a facilitating MEA-PAC MEA and the services per- by providing from members deductions payroll The allows services. computer and sonnel automati- the school to members to authorize MEA remit and money paychecks from their cally deduct The MEA-PAC is to the MEA-PAC. the funds MCL 169.255 be- fund under segregated separate MEA, a labor established cause it has been to, expendi- to make contributions organization, committees, of, ques- ballot behalf candidate tures on committees, political committees, party tion Thus, committees.18 committees, independent member contri- system administers Although fund. this segregated to a separate butions “expendi- definition of general falls within the process 169.206(1), the administration ture” under MCL statutory excluded from system explicitly such a 169.206(2)(c). reiterate, To MCL definition under MCL 169.206(2)(c) “expendi- excludes from the definition establishment, adminis- any “expenditure for ture” tration, separate of contributions to a or solicitation A public committee”19 independent or segregated fund deduction falls administration school’s statutory exception. sys- within the squarely 169.255(1) part: provides, pertinent basis, profit nonprofit corporation organized A on a for dependent sovereign, joint company, a labor a domestic stock *11 organization the laws of this or another state or formed under country may expenditure foreign for the establishment make separate of contributions to a and administration and solicitation separate political purposes. segregated A fund to be used for segregated shall be limited to fund established under this section of, to, making expenditures candidate and on behalf contributions committees, party committees, question commit- ballot committees, independent tees, political committees. and 169.206(2)(c). Secretary Mich Ed Ass’n v of State Opinion of the Court up tem to MEA is set facilitate member contributions to fund, their separate segregated the MEA-PAC. There- fore, of the system “expen- the administration is not an diture” under the MCFA. Secretary argues
The the statutory 169.206(2)(c) exception MCL not be applied should to public Legislature bodies because the intended treat differently bodies from private po- entities and However, litical action committees under the MCFA. this argument disregards plain the the language of 169.206(2)(c) statute. MCL is contained the within provisions definitional of the MCFA and includes no language limiting application its to sections of the MCFA that deal only private with entities and political action 169.201(2), committees. MCL on hand, the other explicitly mandates that “[e]xcept as otherwise defined act, in this and phrases words defined in [MCL shall, 169.202 to act, 169.212] of this purposes have the meanings ascribed to them those sections.” Thus, statutory definition of “expenditure” controls and applies MCFA, including 57,§ entire excep- tions and all.
The Court of Appeals clearly by holding erred that a public school’s administration of system an expenditure. providing any Without inde- pendent statutory analysis, the Court of con- Appeals cluded that system administration is an expenditure by solely on relying of State’s prior interpretation of the term. The Court of Appeals reasoned: Secretary previously interpretive issued an state- indicating department interprets
ment that “the the term ‘expenditure’ collecting include costs with associated delivering to a “[a] contributions committee” and that is one collecting method of *12 Mich 18 488 32 Opinion of the Court Mr. Interpretative Statement delivering contributions.” 2005).[20] (November 14, LaBrant Robert Court statutory analysis, the any independent Without in the nothing find then concluded: “We Appeals of indicates reimburse- of the MCFA that plain language that otherwise constitutes negates something ment expenditure.”21 by considering erred whether Appeals
The Court of cured without could be illegal expenditure supposedly Secretary of State’s inter- analyzing first whether the with the “expenditure” comported of the term pretation Secretary interpretation statute. The of State’s and the Court of binding judiciary, MCFA is not on the considered whether independently should have Appeals system deduction is an payroll the administration of 22 Secretary of importantly, Most “expenditure.” “expenditure” of is incorrect be- interpretation State’s statutory with the relevant directly cause it conflicts Secretary interpretation The of State’s language. collecting includes costs associated with “expenditure” But, to a committee. as delivering contributions statutory “expen- definition of previously explained, result, these costs. As a explicitly diture” excludes clearly by respondent’s erred Appeals adopting Court of “expenditure.” plain language interpretation costs at the statute dictates that administration statutory “expendi- from the term issue are excluded ture.” system is an
Administration of establishment, administration, or “expenditure for the 20 Ass’n, App at Mich Ed 280 Mich 486. 21Id. 22 Secretary interpretations of State’s This Court is not bound City by Attorney opinions. Traverse Dist v General See Sch law (1971). 390, 412; General,
Attorney
384 Mich
185 NW2d
Ed
Ass’n v
Opinion of the Court
separate segregated
solicitation of
to a
contributions
independent committee,”
fund or
and thus is an enu-
exception
statutory
“expen-
merated
definition of
Therefore,
diture.”
the administration of the
is not an
defined
“expenditure”
as
the MCFA and is not
on that
prohibited by
ground.
*13
B. CONTRIBUTION
next examine
We
whether a
school’s adminis-
tration of a payroll
system
impermis-
deduction
is an
“Contribution,”
sible “contribution” under the MCFA.23
like
defined
“expenditure,”
specifically
by MCFA,
the
and this definition
purposes
controls for
of application
§to
57. The definition of “contribution” under
the
169.204,
MCFA is set forth in MCL
provides:
which
(1)
payment, gift, subscription,
“Contribution” means a
assessment,
contract,
services,
expenditure,
payment for
dues, advance, forbearance,
loan,
money
or donation of
or
anything
monetary value,
of ascertainable
or a transfer of
anything
monetary
person,
ascertainable
value
a
made
of
purpose
influencing
the nomination or election
for
of
of
candidate,
qualification,
passage,
or
or
defeat of
question.
ballot
(2)
purchase price
Contribution includes the
of
full
payment
tickets or
of an attendance fee for
such as
events
dinners,
luncheons, rallies, testimonials, and other fund-
raising events;
money
property
an individual’s own
or
other than the individual’s homestead
on
used
behalf of
candidacy;
granting
that
individual’s
of discounts or
general public;
granting
rebates not
available
or the
by
newspapers
discounts or rebates
broadcast media and
23Although
Appeals
the Court of
did not consider whether administra
payroll
system
contribution,
tion of the
is a
we nevertheless
statutory
argument
discuss the issue because it is another
basis for an
system might
imper
that the administration of a
be
litigants
argued
missible and the
have briefed and
issue
before this
Court.
not extended on an basis to all candidates for the office; endorsing guaranteeing same and the or of a loan for guarantor the amount the endorser or is liable.
(3) following: Contribution does not include (a) personal provided Volunteer services without com- pensation, payments or incurred costs of less than year by in personal $500.00 a calendar an individual for expenses voluntarily travel if the costs are incurred with- any understanding agreement out or the costs shall be, directly indirectly, repaid.
(b) beverages, Food and not to exceed $100.00 value during year, a calendar which are donated an individual and for given. which reimbursement is not (c) An expressly tender contribution offer if unconditionally rejected, returned, or in whole or refunded part days within 30 receipt. [Emphasis business after added.] statutory definition of “contribution” includes “expenditure.” “expenditure” the term plicitly Because is ex- statutory MCFA, defined definition already explained why controls.24Wehave the adminis- “expen- *14 tration of a deduction is not an diture” under the MCFAand thus cannot be a contri- only way bution on that basis. The other that the system administration of the could be a “contribution” administering system under the MCFA if would be anything resulted in a “transfer of of ascertainable monetary purpose influencing value . . . made for the the nomination or candidate, election of a or for the qualification, passage, question.” or defeat aof ballot Secretary argues
The
of State
that the actual and
intangible costs associated with the administration of a
system
constitute a contribution be-
something
cause there is a transfer of
of ascertainable
24 Tryc,
monetary value from the school district to the MEA-PAC transfer, and the made although pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, is made for the purpose of influ- encing the nomination or election of a candidate or for the qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot question. Secretary of State asserts that the labor and computer resources that are expended administer the value, have an monetary ascertainable and the fact that are they expended for the benefit of the conveys MEA-PAC value to the MEA-PAC.The of State further argues prepayment that for the services negate does not the transfer because MEA-PAC still receives the benefit of the services. disagree with interpretation
We this of the word in “transfer” the statute. Because “transfer” is a non- technical statute, word that is not defined within the we first look to the plain meaning of the term to ascertain the Legislature what intended by using “transfer” to define a “contribution.”25 The first dictionary definition of “transfer” is convey “to or remove from one place, etc., person, to another.”26 In order for there to be a contribution, “anything of ascertainable monetary value” must conveyed be from one entity to another.
There are two
in
competing ways which to interpret
word “transfer”
the statute. The
way
first
to read
the statute would
require
any conveyance of value
provided
services
to a campaign,
regardless of
for,
whether the
paid
services are
would constitute a
contribution.
way
The second
to read the statute would
require
conveyance
a net
value
order to be a
anything
“transfer of
monetary
ascertainable
value.”
8.3a;
Prop
Oakland Co Bd
Rd Comm’rs v Mich
& Cas
(1998).
Guaranty Ass’n,
590, 604;
456 Mich
36
Weconcludethat the statute must be read to conveyance monetary opposed value, a net of as to a exchange Any interpretation mere of value. other of result, “contribution” would lead to an absurd prevent statutes must be construed to absurd results.27 example, interpreted For if the statute were to be in the Secretary suggests, print manner the then a shop signage campaign that sells to a in the normal making of course business would be a contribution to campaign something the monetary because it has transferred of campaign, though shop
value to the even compensated providing has been signage. for the cost of interpretation Such an of “contribution” would defy sense, common and we do not read the statute this Instead, manner. we conclude that the statute requires conveyance “anything monetary a net campaign value” order for there to be a contribution. administering If costs for paid conveyance are in advance, there is no net anything monetary value, and there is no contribu- tion.
Furthermore, our conclusion that a “contribution” 169.204(1) requires under a net transfer of comports value with the section, remainder of that specifically statutory which excludes from the defini- expressly tion of “contribution” if “contribution unconditionally rejected, returned, or refunded part days in whole or in within 30 business after 169.204(3)(c). receipt.” MCL words, In other if the rejected, returned, contribution is refunded, it is longer no a “contribution” under the MCFA. More- 169.204(2) explains over, MCL that a “contribution” granting includes “the of discounts or rebates not 27 McAuley Corp, v Gen Motors 513, 518; 457 Mich NW2d (1998). *16 Mich Ed Ass’n v Opinion of the Court that implies . . . This general public available to or services at full entity provides products when an Thus, a entity making is not contribution. price, there be a net clearly the statute requires in order for there to be a contribu- transfer of value tion under the MCFA. MEA district for all plans prepay
The
the school
costs associated with the administration
ascertainable
and in fact asked the
payroll
system,
of a
deduction
declaratory
for a
ruling regarding
State
to be
The administration of the
prepaid.
payroll
costs
system
deduction
will not result
a net transfer of
anything
monetary
of ascertainable
value as all costs
be
there is no
prepaid. Accordingly,
will
ascertained
MCFA,
under the
and a public
contribution
school’s
system
administration of a
deduction
is not
payroll
ground.
§ 57 on that
prohibited
a
Additionally,
public school’s administration of a
system
deduction
is not an
payroll
impermissible con-
tribution under
system
the MCFA because the
is not
purpose
influencing
administered “for the
the nomi-
candidate,
nation or election of a
qualifica-
or for the
tion, passage,
question.”28
or defeat of a ballot
When a
public body
administers a
deduction
it
plan,
does not do so in an
a
attempt
political
influence
race
Rather,
or a
question.
administering
plan
ballot
step
merely
one
removed: it
allows someone else to make
purpose
influencing
contribution for the
a political
issue.
public body
administers
simply
required
because it is
to do so as
of a
part
labor contract
public body
between the
and its employees. Conse-
quently,
public
because a
school’s administration of a
system
is not done for the purpose of
169.204(1).
influencing the administration of the system is not contribution under the MCFA.29
C. VOLUNTEER PERSONAL SERVICES Lastly, we examine whether a school’s admin- istration of a payroll impermissibly “provide[s] personal volunteer services that are ex- cluded from the definition of contribution under section 4(3)(a)” 4(3) of the above, § MCFA. As noted provides:
Contribution does not following: include (a) personal provided Volunteer services without com- *17 pensation, payments or of costs incurred of less than year by $500.00 in a calendar personal an individual for expenses voluntarily travel if the costs are incurred with- any understanding agreement out or that the costs shall be, directly 169.201(3).] indirectly, repaid. [MCL or Although such services are thus not considered a contribution for purposes MCFA, of the rest of the specifically indicates that public bodies cannot use public resources provide to volunteer services that are not compensated. However, the administration of the payroll deduction system at issue does not involve volunteer by public services employees because the 29 public body authority A payroll has the to administer deduction plans. wages fringe act, 408.477, and provides benefits [elxcept required expressly for permitted those deductions . ..
by bargaining agreement, employer a collective an shall not deduct wages employee, directly from indirectly, any of an amount including employee separate an segregated contribution to a fund full, [MCL established... 169.255] under without free and employee written consent of the .... Thus, plain language 408.477, public under the of MCL bodies have the authority payroll to administer a money deduction that contributes to the MEA-PAC if the MEA bargaining agree- enters into a collective expressly permits ment that the deductions. y Secretary Mich Ed Ass’n Opinion of the Court for all services rendered. Be- prepay MEA intends to statute, are not defined cause volunteer services meaning of the terms to again plain we look to definitions of legislative Dictionary discern the intent. person performs include “a who a service “volunteer” willingly pay.”30Willingness perform and without activity enough scope is not to fall within the of this subsection; activity performed must also be without case, fully anticipates payment In this the MEA pay. a administration costs. As plans prepay result, public payroll school’s administration of a “provide personal does not volunteer the definition services that are excluded from of contri- 4(3)(a)” under section of the MCFA and bution Therefore, § 57 on this final prohibited ground. system by administration of a public permitted school is under the MCFA.
III. CONCLUSION A public may school administer deductions for its employees MEA-PAC, who remit funds to the 169.257(1) only body because MCL prohibits public (1) using from resources to do three things: make (2) (3) an expenditure, contribution, make a pro- vide volunteer personal services that are excluded from definition “contribution” under MCL 169.204(3)(a). First, the administration of the system at *18 “expenditure” issue is not an under the MCFA because the cost of “expenditure administration is an for the establishment, administration, or solicitation of contri- separate segregated butions to a fund or independent committee,”31 is an exception which enumerated statutory Second, definition “expenditure.” adminis-
30 (1997). Dictionary College Random House Webster’s 169.206(2)(c). 488 Mich Dissenting Opinion Markman, J.
tration of the system is not a “contribution” as defined by the MCFA because there is no conveyance net anything of monetary value made for the purpose of influencing the nomination candidate, or election of a for the qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot Last, question. a public school’s administration of a system does not “provide volunteer personal services that are excluded from the definition 169.204(3) (a)]” of contribution under [MCL because the fully MEA-PAC anticipates prepayment for any admin- Thus, istration costs. the administration of a payroll by public school permitted under MCFA, and the Court of Appeals erred conclud- ing that it is not. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Reversed. KELLY, C.J., JJ., concurred DAVIS, CAVANAGH and J. Hathaway, with MARKMAN, The (dissenting). issue in this case Legislature’s concerns the mandated separation of the government politics from in order to maintain govern- mental neutrality elections, preserve fair democratic processes, and prevent taxpayer funds from being used partisan subsidize political activities. The Michigan (MCFA) Campaign Finance Act prohibits “public body” from using public resources to make any “contri- bution expenditure” purposes. MCL 169.257(1). majority concludes that a school dis- trict’s administration of a payroll deduction plan remits funds to the Michigan Education Association’s (MEA-PAC) Political Action Committee “is pre- 169.257(1) cluded by any prohibition in MCL and is Ante at 21.1 respectfully dissent, permitted.” therefore and believe that a school district’s administration of a *19 Mich Ed Ass’n v Dissenting by Opinion Markman, plan partisan that remits funds to a (a) political action committee constitutes a “contribu- being tion” because resources are used to ad- public (b) vance the of the committee and political objectives an “expenditure” public constitutes because “services” and in of” political “facilities assistance these same Thus, are objectives being provided. the school district’s by § prohibited 57 MCFA, MCL 169.257. This is consistent interpretation statute, only language with the of the but also with 57, § purpose the evident which is to mandate the separation government politics from order to elections, governmental neutrality preserve maintain fair processes, prevent democratic funds taxpayer being from used to subsidize partisan political activi- ties. I Accordingly, judgment would affirm the Court of Appeals.
I. FACTS AND HISTORY Petitioner, the Michigan Education Association (MEA), voluntary, is a incorporated organization labor represents 136,000 approximately members em- ployed by public schools, colleges, universities throughout Michigan. The MEA-PAC is a separate segregated fund by established the MEA in MCFA, accordance with 55 of MCL 169.255. The MEA-PAC is significantly by payroll funded deductions of MEA members who have authorized the deductions. The purpose of the MEA-PAC is to facilitate and coor- dinate the MEA in politics, by involvement of the electing candidates favored the MEA and further- the enactment MEA ing legislative and executive policy initiatives. public-employee organization,
As a the MEA labor bargaining agreements has entered into collective with 488 Mich Dissenting Opinion by Majrkman, J. various school districts across the state. Some agreements, number of these including that between the MEA’s locally affiliated Kalamazoo County/Gull Lake Education Associations and the Gull Lake Com- (the *20 munity district), Schools school require that a school district administer a payroll deduction plan for the contributions of MEA members to the MEA-PAC. In return, the MEA pays the school district the costs of the plan’s administration. 22,
On August 2006, the MEA filed a request for a declaratory ruling respondent, with the Secretary of State, to determine whether the school district could continue to make and transmit payroll deductions to the MEA-PAC.1 Respondent that, ruled absent ex- press statutory authority, the school district pro- hibited from expending public resources for a payroll plan on behalf of the MEA-PAC. The MEA appealed court, to the circuit which held that respon- dent’s ruling “arbitrary, was capricious and an abuse discretion,” that, reasoning although the school district’s administration of the plan constitutes an “expenditure” MCFA, under when the costs of admin- istering plan reimbursed, have been “no transfer of money to the MEA-PAC occurred, has and therefore ‘expenditure’ has not been made within meaning the MCFA.”
In a split decision, the reversed, Court of Appeals § holding that 57 of MCFA prohibits “public body,” such as a district, school from using public resources “to make a contribution expenditure.” According to the Court, the costs associated with the constitute an “expenditure,” and the reimbursement of such costs does not alter that conclusion. Mich Ed Ass’n v Secre- 1 Secretary The declaratory of State is rulings authorized to issue implement Michigan Act, seq., Campaign MCL 169.201 et Finance Act, accordance with the Administrative Procedures MCL 24.201 to 24.328. Mich Ed Ass’n v 43 Dissenting Opinion Markman, State, 477, 486; Mich 761 234 tary App NW2d (2008). MEA in this sought appeal The then leave to 5, 2009, arguments Court. On November we heard oral later application, nearly on the seven months we granted application appeal.2 the MEA’s for leave to STANDARD OF REVIEW
II.
of statutes constitutes a
interpretation
question
this Court
de
on appeal.
law
reviews
novo
Detroit,
v
Eggleston
Inc,
Bio-Med
Applications of
(2003).
29, 32;
The shall enact to laws elections, secrecy ballot, preserve guard to of the to against franchise, provide abuses of the elective and to registration voting. of voter and absentee Charged preserve “purity of elections” and to franchise,” “guard against abuses of the elective 2 part opinion. See the discussion in VI of this 18 MICH Dissenting Opinion by Markman, J. 169.257,
Legislature commonly enacted MCL referred prohibits body” to as 57 of MCFA. Section 57 a “public using public from resources to “make a contribution or expenditure” purpose influencing for the the nomi- candidate, nation or election of a or for the qualifica- tion, passage, or defeat of a ballot question. clear 57,§of in purpose as reflected its language, mandate the separation government of the from politics in governmental order to maintain neutrality in elec- tions, preserve fair democratic processes, prevent taxpayer being funds from used to subsidize partisan political activities.3
IV ANALYSIS 169.257(1) MCL provides, in pertinent part: public body acting A or an public body individual for a funds, shall not use or authorize the personnel, use of office space, computer software, property, hardware or statio- nery, postage, vehicles, equipment, supplies, or other expenditure resources to make a contribution or provide personal volunteer services that are excluded from the 169.204(3)(a)]. definition of contribution under [MCL question There is no that a school district constitutes a “public body” within the meaning §of 57.4 Accord- also, e.g., political by public act, See employees activities seq. (providing employee 15.401 et that an of the state or local unit of government may engage political during hours); not in working affairs Michigan Gaming Act, seq. Control and Revenue MCL 432.201 et (providing members, employees, agents Michigan Gaming may engage political activity Control Board for the duration of employment); their (prohibiting and Civil Service Rule 1-12.6 state employees participating during from working activities *22 hours). “public body” county, city, MCPA a township, “[a] defines to include village, intercounty, intercity, regional governing body; council, or district, district, special board, municipal corporation; school or or a Ed Ass’n v Dissenting Opinion by Markman, J. the issue in this case is a school district’s ingly, whether that remits plan administration of funds to a action committee constitutes meaning “contribution expenditure” or within does, If it is provision. plan expressly same prohibited.
A. “CONTRIBUTION” 169.204(1) MCL defines a “contribution” as follows: payment, gift, subscription, “Contribution” means a assessment, contract, services, expenditure, payment for dues, advance, forbearance, loan, money or donation of or anything monetary value, of ascertainable or a transfer of anything monetary person, of ascertainable value to a purpose influencing made for the the nomination or election of a defeat of a ballot candidate, question. or for the [5] qualification, passage, An “in-kind contribution” is defined as a “contribu- 169.209(3). money.” tion . . . other than The school district’s administration of the payroll that facilitates to the MEA- payments First, PAC a prohibited constitutes “contribution.” school variety district uses a resources to plan. administer For the school district example, paper, must use its pens, copiers develop execute payroll forms; deduction authorization school personnel collect, enter, must and monitor the data of MEA participating members into and ac- computers software, counting all of specifically which must be configured record, track, and transmit deduc- commission, department, agency board, department, or council or an of a 169.211(6)(c). commissioner, or council.” MCL because, fund, “person” separate segregated The MEA-PAC is a as a organization group persons acting it functions as the result of an 169.211(1). jointly. See MCL *23 488 MICH18 Dissenting Opinion by Markman, tions MEA-PAC; personnel school must then be prepared respond to to individual teachers who find it necessary from time to adjust time to or correct or withdraw their authorizations; own deduction and this process must necessarily involve the use of office space, equipment, employee time.
Second, the school district’s administration of the something constitutes of “ascer- tainable monetary value” because there is inherent value to the in having MEA-PAC payroll deductions automatically taken from members’ wages as opposed to requiring individual solicitations the MEA-PAC. That there is such “ascertainable monetary value” is self-evident very from the fact that the MEA-PAC has affirmatively sought out the assistance of the school district and litigated has highest court of this state an appeal asserting its right to enter into the agreement instant with the school district. Parties do not typically enter into contracts absent a belief that rights or benefits accorded them under the contract have some “ascertainable monetary value,” and the instant contract seems no different. Such value can (a) almost certainly be identified as the sum of additional contributions resulting from the ease of the payroll deduction process compared political con- process tribution in which individual solicitations must (b) be undertaken and the reduced administrative transactional costs of the process former compared to the latter process. The MEA obviously prefers the payroll deduction process it efficient, because is a more and a productive, more process by which to secure funding for its activities. The school district is not incidental to process, this but constitutes an indis- pensable element. Without school district’s services, contracted-for some lesser amount of contri- Ed Ass’n v State Dissenting Opinion by Markman, J. presumably butions would be raised on behalf of the MEA-PAC, greater and at a cost.
Third,
the services undertaken on behalf of the
MEA-PAC
purpose
influencing
are “made for the
candidate,
quali-
nomination or election of a
or for the
fication,
passage,
question,”
defeat of ballot
169.204(1), because,
earlier,
purpose
as discussed
the MEA-PAC is to facilitate and coordinate the involve-
MEA in partisan
Thus,
ment of the
the school
politics.6
*24
district’s administration of the deduction
consti-
plan
“contribution,”
tutes a
as that term is defined MCL
169.204(1).7
employs public
Because the school district
6
majority
public body
payroll
“[w]hen
The
states that
a
administers a
plan,
attempt
political
in
deduction
it does not do so
to influence a
race
However,
question.”
majority
recognize
or a ballot
Ante at 37.
the
fails to
169.204(1)
payment...
that MCL
defines “contribution” as “a
made for
purpose
influencing
candidate,
the
of
the nomination or
election of
qualification, passage,
question.” (Emphasis
the
for
or defeat of a ballot
added.) Therefore,
pertinent question
“public
is not whether the
body”
attempting
political
question,
is
influence
race or ballot
itself
payments
but whether the
that result from its administration of the
plan
purpose.
deduction
are intended for that
It is obvious here
“payment[s]
purpose
influencing
[are]
that
made
for
candidate,
qualification, passage,
nomination or election of a
or for the
question.”
purpose
defeat of a ballot
This is
individual MEA
they
payments,
members have in mind when
authorize
and it is the
purpose
payments
that the MEA-PAC has in mind when it receives
from
equally
the school district. It is
that the
obvious
school district itself must
fully cognizant
purpose
payments
be
of this
both when it receives
from
payments
MEA
individual
members and when it delivers
to the MEA-PAC.
might
payments
The fact that the
district
school
itself
not care whether such
political
question
will influence a
race or ballot
alter that
does not
purpose
payments
precisely
is
these
to do
that.
majority
analysis
further
in
errs
its
when it concludes that
plan “merely
administration of the
allows someone else to make a
issue,”
purpose
influencing
political
contribution for the
ante
37at
i.e.,
(emphasis
original),
the MEA member who has authorized the
Instead,
payroll deduction.
the school district
makes both a “con
itself
tribution,”
contribution,” by providing
and an “in-kind
valuable services
is,
political
to the MEA-PAC in aid and furtherance of its
activities. That
resources to make this its administra- tion of the deduction is a straightforward violation §57 ofMCFA.
Moreover, the administration deduc tion plan contribution,” also constitutes an “in-kind 169.209(3), defined MCL as a “contribution . . . other money.” than it Although clearly possible is to quantify spent by the time employees and the resources ex pended by the school district in administering the plan, and thereby to ascertain the cost of such a itself, “contribution” to the school district it is considerably more quantify difficult to the intangible benefits that the MEA receives from the deduction plan. Moreover, it quite certain that these benefits substan tially outweigh the district, costs to the school therefore cannot be simply by calculated reference to the school district’s significant costs. The most of these is simply the extent of access to a district’s MEA membership that is afforded to the MEA-PAC by the plan. Such access avoids need on part of the MEA-PAC to establish its own administrative apparatus fundraising, vitiates its need to engage costly mailings and alternative forms of *25 communications members, with its and dispenses with its burden having checks, of to process money orders, or credit contributors, cards from as would have been quite independently members, of the contributions of individual MEA the something school district monetary contributes of “ascertainable further value” to the MEA-PAC. 8 Respondent supporting significant and the amici curiae her a devoted portion arguments explaining of their briefs and time at oral how the plan school district’s administration of the deduction amounts an contribution,” yet majority “in-kind fails to even address this argument. Although majority provides explanation justification no or omission, sympathetic just for this plight. I am nonetheless to its It is too argue duck, difficult sometimes to that an animal that looks like a walks duck, squawks like a like a duck not a is “duck.” Ed Ass’n v Dissenting Opinion by Markman, contribu necessary other solicitor of argument MEA’s counsel at oral acknowl tions. As an “effective” means to edged, proved this method has certainly, marginal administra money. raise Almost to the school plan tive costs of district, already may have in a mechanism place which taxes and charitable contributions can be which be than employees’ paychecks, deducted from will less marginal equivalent plan administrative costs of MEA, a mechanism to the which does have similar ad place. respective The difference between these “in-kind fairly ministrative costs can be described as an MEA-PAC, contribution” the school district may quantify however difficult it be to in dollars. It is a “contribution.. . other than money” made for “purpose influencing the nomination or election candidate, of a or for the or qualification, passage, question.” defeat of a ballot
B. “EXPENDITURE” Section 57 of MCFA also prohibits “public body” using from “expenditure.” resources to make an An “expenditure” is defined as donation, payment, loan, promise payment money or anything monetary goods, of ascertainable value for
materials, services, of, or facilities in assistance or in to, opposition candidate, the nomination or election of a qualification, passage, question. or defeat of a ballot 169.206(1).] [MCL
The school district’s administration
the de-
duction
on behalf of the MEA-PAC
constitutes
prohibited “expenditure” because the school district
directly provides “services” and “facilities in assistance
of” the
provides
MEA-PAC. The school district
“ser-
vices” to the MEA-PAC in its administration of the
*26
deduction and developing executing payroll forms; by deduction collecting, entering, authorization and monitoring the data of MEA members into comput- accounting software, ers and all of which must be record, track, configured to and transmit deduc- MEA-PAC; tions to the and accommodating indi- find necessary vidual teachers who it from time time to adjust or correct or withdraw their deduction autho- Further, rizations. the school district provides “facilities in assistance through of” MEA-PAC the use of public office and space equipment. These “services” “facilities in are, assistance of” the MEA-PAC once again, made purpose for the of “the nomination or candidate, election of a or the qualification, passage, or defeat question,” 169.206(l)(a), ballot MCL be- cause, as previously, discussed the purpose of the MEA-PAC is to facilitate and coordinate the involve- ment MEA in politics, by electing candidates favored the MEA and by enacting MEA legislative and policy Thus, initiatives. the school district’s administration plan consti- tutes an “expenditure” as that term is defined by 169.206(l)(a) specifically prohibited.
The majority concedes that the school district’s ad- ministration of the deduction plan “falls within the general definition ‘expenditure’ under MCL 169.206(1) . . ..” Ante at However, 30. the majority holds that plan also falls specific within a statutory exclusion from the definition of an “expenditure.” See ante at 30. exception This provides that an “expendi- ture” does not include expenditure “[a]n for the estab- lishment, administration, or solicitation of contribu- tions a separate segregated fund or independent 169.206(2)(c). committee.” MCL According ma- jority, a school district’s administration of a payroll payments remits to a Mich Ed Ass’n v Dissenting Opinion by Markman, “expenditure constitutes an for the action committee *27 establishment, administration, or solicitation of contri- to a fund or separate segregated independent butions is, therefore, § and allowed under 57. Ante committee” However, at majority “’public overlooks that 32-33. district, body,” such as a school is not authorized to “establish” a fund under MCFA separate segregated 6(2) (c) and, therefore, may rely § on the exclusion. Instead, this clearly designed exclusion is to apply only corporations organizations and labor that pos- create, establish, administer, the authority sess or fund separate segregated place. funds the first This 6(2)(c) interpretation, § limiting corpo- exclusion to and organizations, necessary rations labor is a implica- tion from the structure of MCFA for three reasons. First, MCFA, § 54 the same 169.254, imposes rule, prohibiting making of a “contribution or on and expenditure,” corporations organizations labor § In imposes on bodies. pertinent part, provides: §
Except
respect
exceptions
with
and conditions
corporation,
joint
[MCL
in..
. section 55
169.255]. .. a
company,
dependent
stock
sovereign,
domestic
or labor
organization shall not
expendi-
make a contribution or
169.254(1)
added).]
(emphasis
[MCL
ture ....
Second,
57, §
unlike
54 does not constitute an
§
absolute prohibition against making a “contribution or
rather,
expenditure;”
pursuant
55, §to
corporation organized
basis,
profit
nonprofit
[a]
on a for
joint
company,
dependent sovereign,
stock
a domestic
organization
a labor
formed under the laws of this or
foreign country may
expenditure
another state or
make an
for the establishment and administration and solicitation
separate segregated
of contributions to a
fund to be used
political purposes.
separate segregated
A
fund estab-
Third, § there is no similar counterpart 57 that a “public body” allows to make “an expenditure for the establishment and administration and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated Thus, fund ....” 55,§ under only entities allowed to establish a separate segregated fund are corporations, joint stock companies, domestic dependent sovereigns, or labor organizations, such as the MEA. together, Considered 6(2) (c) § 55 and the exclusion that permits “expen- establishment, administration, diture for the or solici- *28 tation of contributions to a separate segregated fund” a provide limited mechanism allowing entities such as create, establish, the MEA to administer, or fund a separate segregated fund purposes for that would oth- erwise be contrast, § disallowed 54. In “public a body,” such district, as school create, not entitled to establish, administer, or fund a separate segregated fund, § under other provision, may and thus 6(2)(c) § on the rely exclusion from the definition of an “expenditure.” 6(2)(c) if,
Even majority claims, § as the exclusion entities, is not limited to 55 the majority’s application of the exclusion utterly remains illogical. majority The concludes that although a school district’s administra- tion of the plan constitutes an “ex- penditure,” it is nevertheless explicitly statutory excluded from the definition under 169.206(2)(c). [, .. which] excludes from the defini- “expenditure” any
tion “expenditure for the establish- ment, administration, or solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated independent fund or committee.” A Secretary Ed v Ass’n Dissenting Opinion by Markman, school’s administration of a deduction falls squarely statutory exception. system within the is set up to MEA sepa- facilitate member contributions to their fund, segregated Therefore, rate the MEA-PAC. the admin- “expenditure” istration of the is not an under the MCFA. importantly, interpre-
. .. Most of State’s “expenditure” directly tation of is incorrect because it statutory language. conflicts with the relevant The Secre- tary interpretation “expenditure” of State’s includes collecting delivering costs associated with contribu- statutory tions to a committee. But... definition of “expenditure” explicitly plain excludes these costs.. .. The language of the statute dictates that the administration costs at statutory “expen- issue are excluded from the term omitted).] (emphasis diture.” at [Ante 30-32 The majority thus concludes that the administration of a payroll falls “squarely within the statutory exception.” 169.206(2)(c), Under MCL “expenditure” encompass does not what other- would (a) an “expenditure” wise be establishment of (b) separate segregated committee, fund or independent administration of a separate segregated fund or inde- (c) committee, pendent solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated independent fund or commit- Thus, tee. in order fall within the of this purview exception, “public body” must engaged be one of case, however, these enumerated activities. In this *29 school in engaged district is none.
First, the school district is not making
“expendi-
ture” for the establishment of a separate segregated
fund or independent
separate
committee because the
fund, MEA-PAC,
the
segregated
already
has
been estab-
lished
In
any event,
the MEA.
the school district
could not establish a separate segregated fund first place, authority because that is limited to § entities enumerated in 55 (corporations, joint stock companies, domestic dependent sovereigns, and labor organizations).
Second, the district making school is not an “expen- diture” for the administration of a separate segregated fund or independent committee because the school district is not “administering” MEA-PAC; rather, the school simply district is administering that remits funds to the MEA-PAC. That is, the school district makes no determinations at all concerning amounts of funds to be raised from MEA members or other funding sources; the nature and substance of MEA communications members and other funding sources about the need and urgency of contributions; such the identification of political candi- dates and causes as beneficiaries MEA-PAC, amounts; in what or strategies for im- optimizing the pact of MEA-PAC participation political campaigns and causes. The majority, however, holds that “[t]he plain language of the statute dictates that the adminis- tration costs at issue are excluded from the statutory ” term ‘expenditure.’ Ante at In 32. so asserting, majority misinterprets statute, because the only administrative costs that are excluded under this exclu- sion are those associated administering with a “sepa- rate segregated fund or independent committee.” MCL 169.206(2)(c). That the school district is administering a process by payments which are remitted to such a fund hardly is the equivalent of administering itself, the fund 6(2)(c) such that exclusion apply. would majority badly confused in regard. this
Third, the school district is making an “expendi- ture” for the solicitation contributions a separate *30 Mich Ed Ass’n v Dissenting Opinion Maekman, J. committee; fund segregated independent rather, the school using public pro- district is resources for cessing payments to the MEA-PAC. As discussed earlier, the school district’s “expenditure” consists of personnel, space, use of office soft- computers, ware, and public other resources to remit payments not, to the MEA-PAC. The school district example, maintaining an advertising campaign on MEA-PAC, members, behalf of the MEA cold-calling or preparing mailers or brochures to enlist contribu- such, tors. As the school district’s use of resources for processing payments to the MEA-PAC soliciting contributions, cannot be viewed as but only as facilitating contributions, such an entirely distinct It concept. follows that because the school district’s of the payroll plan administration deduction does not fall within of the three enumerated exclusions set 169.206(2)(c), forth in MCL it is not excluded from the definition of an “expenditure.”9
C. RELEVANCEOP ADVANCEPAYMENTS
Having determined that the school district’s admin-
istration of
that
plan
remits
payments to the MEA-PAC constitutes both a “contri-
bution” and an “expenditure,” the question remains
preparedness
whether the MEA’s
in
pay
advance the
school district’s costs associated with the plan remedies
what would otherwise constitute a violation of 57.1 do
not believe that it does.
assuming arguendo
Even
that the school district’s administration of
expenditure
constitutes “an
for the establish
ment, administration,
separate
or solicitation of contributions
to a
segregated
committee,”
independent
plainly
fund or
which we believe it
not, by
terms,
only applies
“expenditure,”
does
its
the exclusion
not to “contribution.”
The Court of
held
“nothing
language
that
there is
in the
plain
MCFA that
negates
indicates reimbursement
some-
thing
expenditure.”
otherwise constitutes
Ass’n,
Ed
280 Mich
at 486. A court’s
App
primary
purpose
interpreting a statute is to ascertain and
legislative
effectuate
intent. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v
*31
Homes, Inc,
511, 515;
Marlette
456 Mich
611
NW2d
(1998).
may
“Courts
not speculate regarding legislative
intent beyond
Hence,
the words
in a statute.
expressed
nothing may be read into a statute that is not within the
manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the
Fin,
Shacks,
act
Inc,
305,
itself.” Omne
Inc v
460 Mich
(1999) (citations omitted).
311;
violation of 57 is belied by the terms of the statute.
Section 57 provides that
public body.
“[a]
. . shall not
use or authorize the
public
use” of
resources to make a
169.257(1)
“contribution or expenditure .. . .” MCL
added).
(emphasis
The use of “shall” in a statute
generally
mandatory
“indicates a
and imperative direc
tive.” Burton v
745,
Reed City Hosp Corp,
752;
471 Mich
(2005) (citations omitted).
day is to the interests of school district and each greater portion day partisan is devoted to the organization, taxpayers, interests of labor and parents, Although students suffer. pay- advance may ment recompense employees’ school district its spent salaries for the time on the plan administration of and supplies public resources, for use of and other reimbursement, monetary or paid advance other- wise, simply is insufficient to recover the time that is obligations diverted from the primary of the school district.
Moreover, because neither payments advance nor prevent reimbursements prohibited “use” occurring resources from place, the first the act is as punishable a misdemeanor subject to a fine that may “equal be to the amount of the improper contribu- 169.257(2)(b). tion expenditure.” or MCL The fact that penalties one of the an making improper “contribu- expenditure” tion or requires the pay violator to amount that “equal the amount of improper contribution or expenditure” strongly indicates such a payment, whether in form of a “penalty” or a “reimbursement,” does not transform an improper “contribution or expenditure” into a one. proper Had the Legislature otherwise, intended the misdemeanor likely statute would more have read that the criminal paid sanction be is “equal amount improper contribution or expenditure, less reim- bursement such contribution or expenditure.”12 argues regard The MEA also with to reimbursements that since the expenses, school district is all reimbursed costs and its administration of expenditure” the deduction does not amount to a “contribution or encompass “[a]n because a “contribution” does not offer or tender of a expressly unconditionally rejected, returned, if contribution part days receipt,” refunded in whole or in within 30 business after 169.204(3)(c), “expenditure” and an “[a]n does not include offer tender *33 Mich Ed Ass’n v Opinion by Dissenting Markman, J. MAJORITY
V RESPONSETO majority I believe that the previously, discussed As a school district’s administration by holding that errs from the defini- is excluded plan deduction payroll 169.206(2) (c) under MCL “expenditure” tion of an district, a is not body,” a such as school “public because fund under separate segregated to create a authorized 6(2) (c) and, therefore, on the may rely MCFA Even “expenditure.” from the definition of an exclusion exclusion, this rely if is entitled to on “public body” that the school district’s majority by holding errs plan falls administration “expendi- statutory exception” “within the because expenditure be characterized as “[a]n ture” cannot administration, establishment, or solicitation of segregated indepen- to a fund or separate contributions discussed, I As also believe that the dent committee.” admin- by holding errs that a school district’s majority returned,” unconditionally rejected expenditure expressly or of an if 169.206(2)(e). However, clearly argument this lacks merit because expenses hardly can be said to the MEA-PAC’s offer to reimburse return, “rejection, an or refund” of a “contribution” or constitute payments “expenditure.” When the school district collects and remits MEA-PAC, MEA it makes an “offer or tender” of from members expenditure.” qualify “offer or tender” “contribution or To for the unconditionally “reject exception, or re- the MEA-PACwould have to district, something which it neither does turn” the services of the school doing. district’s services are nor has intention of Because school unconditionally MEA-PAC, accepted by admin- the school district’s not excluded from the definition istration of the “expenditure” or an under either section of MCFA. of a “contribution” observed, wit, although Legislature Finally, should be the obvious “expenditure” “an excluded from the definitions of “contribution” rejected, expenditure” that has been offer or tender” of a “contribution or returned, refunded, for “reimburse- there is no similar exclusion obvious, ments,” thought if exclusion that should be to have been “reject majority return” nonetheless intuits from the intended. The 169.204(1) “clearly requires exception ... a “contribution” in MCL net transfer of value.” Ante at 37. 488 Mich *34 Dissenting Opinion by J. Markman, istration of the payroll deduction plan does not constitute a “contribution.” This latter aspect of the majority’s opinion warrants brief further discussion.
(a) In fashion, circular the majority holds that definition of “contribution” encompasses the term “ex- penditure” and, thus, because the school district’s ad- ministration of deduction plan does not constitute an “expenditure,” it also cannot be a “con- tribution.” The majority then states that only “[t]he other way that the administration of could be a ‘contribution’ under the MCFA would be if admin- istering the system resulted in a ‘transfer of anything of ascertainable monetary value ....’” Ante at 34. This assertion is erroneous. As earlier, discussed an “in-kind contribution,” which is a “contribution .. . other than money,” also constitutes a “contribution.” MCL 169.209(3). Similarly, MCFA defines as a “contribution” 169.204(1). a “payment.” MCL The school district ar- guably makes a “payment” to the MEA-PAC when it transfers money from participating MEA members to the MEA-PAC. Although these circumstances school district only acts as a conduit, a “contribution” made at the direction of another person “shall be regarded as an expenditure or contribution attributable persons to both . . ..” MCL 169.270.
(b) The majority further errs concluding that its interpretation is necessary to avoid absurd results. In discussing whether the administration of constitutes a “transfer of anything of ascertainable monetary value” and thus a “contribu- tion,” the majority states:
There competing ways are two interpret which to word “transfer” in the way statute. The first to read the require statute would conveyance of value for provided services campaign, regardless to a of whether the Secretary Ed v of State Ass’n Dissenting Opinion Markman, for, paid constitute a contribution. The services are would require convey- net way the statute would second to read anything of of value in order to be a “transfer of ance monetary value.” ascertainable require read to We conclude that the statute must be value, monetary conveyance opposed net as to a mere Any exchange interpretation value. other of “contribu- result, tion” would lead to an absurd and statutes must be example, if prevent construed to absurd results. For interpreted statute were to be in the manner the signage suggests, print shop to a then a that sells campaign in the normal course of business would be making campaign to the because it has a contribution something monetary campaign, transferred value *35 though shop compensated has been for the cost of even signage. interpretation of “contribu- providing the Such an sense, defy common and do not read the tion” would we (citations omitted).] [Ante at 35-36 statute this manner. interpretation necessary that its is to By emphasizing results,” to majority appears “absurd itself avoid interpretation concede that the more natural law Resort to “absurd by is that asserted this dissent. analysis generally necessary only results” is to avoid that otherwise flow from a statute interpretation would interpre- of traditional by application principles tation. essence, majority necessary
In
believes that it is
169.204(1) as if it referred to a “net
to read MCL
monetary value,”
anything
transfer of
of ascertainable
not,
the allegedly
which it does
order to avoid
our
of MCL
interpretation
“absurd result” to which
169.204(1)
this
“absurd
allegedly
would lead. What is
that
“quite impossible
result”? What is this result
is
could have intended”? Pub Citi-
Legislature]
[the
440, 471;
Justice, 491 US
Dep’t
zen v United States
(1989)
J.,
2558;
(Kennedy,
S Ct
(c) The majority also errs when it concludes that
MCL 408.477 of the wages and fringe benefits act
provides authority for the school district to administer
“[Sjchool
the payroll
plan.
districts and
school officers have only such powers as the statutes
expressly or impliedly grant
to them.” Jacox v Van
*36
Buren Consol
Ed,
Sch Dist Bd
293
126, 128;
Mich
291
“
(1940).
NW 247
‘The extent of the authority of the
people’s public agents is
by
measured
the statute from
13Although
by
I continue to abide
an “absurd results” rule —albeit a
vastly
justices
different “absurd
majority
results” rule than the
two
—the
justices
join
who
People McIntire,
147,
this dissent do not. See
v
461 Mich
152-160;
(1999);
599
Ass’n,
NW2d 102
cf. Cameron v Auto Club Ins
476
55, 78-80,
(2006)
84-86;
Mich
J.,
While deductions, not authorize it does payroll act refers to administer deductions payroll school districts to 408.477(1) provides action committees. full: per required expressly
Except for those deductions
bargaining agreement, an
by collective
mitted
law or
a
employee,
wages of an
employer shall not deduct from the
including
employee
directly
indirectly,
amount
separate segregated fund
a
to a
established
contribution
organization
corporation
under section 55
or labor
act,
campaign
Act No. 388 of the Public
Michigan
finance
1976,
Michigan
being section 169.255 of the
Com
Acts of
Laws,
full, free,
piled
and written consent of
without
or fear of
employee,
obtained without
intimidation
deduction.[14]
permit
discharge for refusal to
statute,
concludes
majority summarily
From this
408.477,
that,
of MCL
plain language
“under the
deduc-
authority
have the
to administer
bodies
MEA-PAC if the
money
that contributes
plan
tion
agreement that
bargaining
MEA enters into a collective
n
Ante at 38
29.
permits the deductions.”
expressly
majority
grossly misinterpreted
has
again,
Once
absolutely nothing
has
to do with
statute. MCL 408.477
administer a
“public body” may
whether
Rather,
of the MEA-PAC.
for the benefit
169.255(6).
See also MCL
*37
a payroll did not constitute “contribu- “expenditure,” does, tion” or an which it clearly in my judgment, school district still authority lacks the such a plan administer because no statute accords the school authority, district this and the school district only has the authority Indeed, accorded to it statute. earlier, as explained Legislature affirmatively has and expressly district, forbidden a school other public body, from making or expendi- “contribution ture” to a action committee.
VI. OF TREATMENT THIS CASE Particularly striking in its resolution of this case has been majority’s unprecedentedly dilatory treat- ment, abruptly by unprecedentedly followed its acceler- ated treatment. The of Appeals Court its decision issued 28, 2008; on August this Court entered an order sched- uling argument application oral on the for leave to Ed Ass’n v Dissenting Opinion by Markman, 2009; 8, May months later on eight more than appeal six months later on Novem- were heard arguments oral 5, 2009; granted was seven appeal and leave ber was 4, appeal June 2010. When leave to months later on justified grounds this on majority granted, *38 impact the of to be informed about the Court needed Comm, 558 130 v Fed Election US_; Citizens United (2010), a then-recent United 876; L Ed 2d 753 S Ct 175 Mich Ed Ass’n v Secre- Court decision. Supreme States (2010). State, dissenting The three 952 tary of case, in also dissented from the the instant who justices leave, the lack of grant complete earlier of described Citizens, part: in asserting pertinent relevance of United, Unlike the issues in this case have Citizens nothing nothing corporate speech, free to do to do with nothing speech, union free to do with the with labor Campaign Act, nothing Federal Election to do with Federal regulations, Election and indeed Commission rules nothing campaign speech Amend- to do with or the First short, anything nothing ment. In it has to do with involved Instead, only in Citizens United. it involves whether 57 of Michigan Campaign the Finance Act bars a school district administering from for á action committee.
Indeed, party suggested neither itself has that this case is United, any way by sought any affected Citizens nor opportunity supplemental suddenly to file a brief. Yet it is necessary delay that this Court resolution of this case for months, eight what will be a minimum of seven or additional already top passed on of the six or seven months that have previous argument. I am of no instance in since oral aware arguments application, this has held on an taken which Court response arguments to such for more than six no action months, granted during appeal late that and then leave to term, ensuring such be further considered case will not during forthcoming that term and that a decision will not be earliest, until, beginning at the of the second calendar This, 2011, arguments initially year, were heard. with after 488 Mich Dissenting by Opinion Markman, regard may processes to a case that affect the administrative every of school district this state. across presented Court
This has heen with substantial briefs party. party original supple- from each Each has filed an and brief, filed, four mental amicus briefs have been and oral argument place beyond has taken that lasted well the normal argument. time allotted for such We have from the heard State, Attorney General, Michigan AFL- Commerce, CIO, Michigan Employ- the Chamber of State Association, Center, supplemen- ee’s and the Mackinac with a supplemental tal brief filed and two AFL-CIO briefs filed the Chamber of Commerce. This case involves a statutory interpretation, straightforward matter no justice parties any argument, has identified to at oral juncture, any aspect at later this case that has been thoroughly addressed. grant appeal
To leave to under these circumstances judicial resources, imposes an utter constitutes waste of altogether unnecessary expense upon parties, unconscionably delays dispute important resolution of an importance proper of statewide no reason. What ac- *39 for, justifies, delay? taking place counts this What judicial process, abuse majority here is an of the and the considerably explanation owes more for its actions than it [Id. given. J., dissenting).] has at 953 (MARKMAN, summarily The majority now states in is opinion: presented note that We because the issues in this case law, can Michigan opine be resolved under we do not on the application Supreme of United [Ante States Court caselaw. 8.][15] at 26 n of any absence conceivable relevance Citizens
United underscores our
grant
concern that the
of leave to
appeal
case, following
in this
argument
the appli-
on
15
course,
presented
Of
whether “the
in
issues
this case can be resolved
Michigan
Supreme
under
law” is
to
irrelevant whether United States
interpreting
applies
any-
Court caselaw
States
United
Constitution
in
given case.
y Secretary
Ed Ass’n
67
Mich
Opinion by
Dissenting
Markman, resources that
cation,
judicial
a waste of
represented
while de-
unnecessary expenses
parties,
on the
imposed
of statewide
important dispute
resolution of an
laying
Indeed,
arguments
heard oral
even before we
importance.
United
Court
Supreme
on the
States
application,
on
adminis-
upheld Idaho’s absolute ban
specifically
bodies to
plans by public
tration
action com-
employee
facilitate
contributions to
Ass’n,
353;
mittees. Ysursa v Pocatello Ed
555 US
129 S
(2009).
1093;
an alternative those cases which a injustice of the Court believes that an error or an will result decision, yet in from a lower court which there is not a sufficiently far-reaching legal or difficult issue to warrant using argument. the Court’s limited resources for full oral 7.302, (MARKMAN, J., concurring).] [See MCR cxlvi rule, Since the of this we directed the clerk inception have arguments grant of the Court to schedule on whether cases, 14, applications only for leave 280 cases. Of those case, including grant the instant resulted in a cases, application. delay Of these none involved a on the argument application grant between approaching Arguments leave that involved this case. here, already had been delayed by eight which more than months on the application, were followed additional delay application seven-month before the was even granted. Of the other 13 cases that followed the same double-hearing procedure, single not a one took seven arguments months between time of on the application *40 grant leave; indeed, cases, and the in a majority of those elapsed the time was less than one month. Mich 18 Dissenting J. Opinion Markman, appeal, again granting
After leave to this Court heard in arguments year, period oral November of this for dissenting justices to to the respond majority opinion now, compressed, majority was then has in December, in issued an what if opinion approaches, exceeds, record major opinion time for the issuance of a The majority parties this Court. owes the and the explanation their public an for treatment of a case maintaining whose resolution is so critical to the integ- rity governmental processes of the of our state.
VII. CONCLUSION prohibits “public Section 57 body” using from public resources to or expendi- make “contribution political purposes. ture” for The school district’s admin- of the in case, istration this plan payments MEA-PAC, remitting constitutes both “expenditure” “contribution” an as defined by MCFA. The offer to MEA-PAC’s reimburse school district in expenses incurred its administration of plan does not remedy otherwise clear violation of § 57. The majority’s contrary interpretation under- objectives Legislature, mines the of the which enacted § 57 to mandate the separation government from order politics governmental to maintain neutrality in elections, preserve fair processes, democratic and pre- vent taxpayer being funds from used par- to subsidize tisan activities.
this case is with legislative inconsistent this purpose and inconsistent with language of the law. Accord- I affirm ingly, judgment would of the Court of Appeals.
Corrigan JJ., and Young, Markman, concurred with