MICHIGAN CONGREGATIONAL CONFERENCE v. UNITED CHURCH OF STANTON.
Calendar No. 44,856
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN
June 4, 1951
330 Mich. 561
Docket No. 88. Submitted November 13, 1951.
Members of a church who withdraw therefrom may not, in so doing, take with them, for their own purposes, or transfer to any other religious body, property previously conveyed to, or dedicated to the use of, the religious denomination from which they are withdrawing or one of its member churches, as such property must remain for the use and benefit of adherents to that denomination or those who represent it.
2. SAME—CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH—INJUNCTION.
Members of a Congregational church are entitled to injunctive relief to prevent use of the property of the church for other than Congregational church purposes and interference with plaintiffs’ use thereof for such purposes.
3. SAME—CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH—LACHES.
The defense of laches may not be urged against plaintiffs, consisting of the State Congregational Conference and certain members of a local church desirous of having its property not diverted from use for Congregational church purposes, where plaintiffs were lulled into a false sense of security by the continued payment of annual assessments and by inclusion of provisions in articles of association of transferee church that members should worship and labor, together according to the discipline, rules and usage of the Congregational church for nearly 10 years after execution of deed transferring the property.
4. SAME—DEDICATION—ECCLESIASTICAL CONTROL.
The continued use of church property for the use and benefit of adherents to the denomination for whose use it had been conveyed or dedicated is not affected by the degree of authority possessed or actually exercised in ecclesiastical affairs by the denomination over its member churches.
REFERENCES FOR POINTS IN HEADNOTES
[1-5, 9] 45 Am Jur, Religious Societies, §§ 54, 55, 67.
The theory that the full autonomy in ecclesiastical affairs reposing in the individual congregation in Congregational churches carries with it the right of a majority of its membership to make such disposition of church property as they may desire is untenable in view of applicable statutory provisions relative to the incorporation and regulation of Congregational churches which exclude its use for other than Congregational church purposes (
6. SAME—CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH—NONDENOMINATIONAL CHURCH—AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES—STATUTES.
Decree, in suit to enjoin use of property for other than Congregational church purposes, setting aside amendments to articles of incorporation of transferee church which had not been organized under Congregational church act and enjoining officers and members from amending such articles so as not to violate that act was error, since the provisions of such statute do not apply to a corporation not organized thereunder (
7. SAME—PASTORS—COURTS—PROPERTY.
Provision of decree enjoining officers and members of a defendant church from permitting certain persons, under certain circumstances, from serving it as pastor was error, since courts may concern themselves, in church disputes, with property rights only and not with the ecclesiastical affairs of the church.
8. SAME—INJUNCTION—PARTIES—CONGREGATIONAL CHURCHES.
Addition as parties plaintiff of members of local Congregational church who had signified their desire for continued adherence to the Congregational denomination held, proper in State Congregational Conference‘s suit to enjoin use of church property by a nondenominational church to which had been transferred the property of the local church.
9. SAME—QUIETING TITLE—CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH—NONDENOMINATIONAL CHURCH.
Title to church property which had formerly been used by local Congregational church and which was transferred by it to nondenominational church is quieted in State Congregational Conference and plaintiff members of the local church who evidenced their desire for continued adherence to the Congregational denomination for Congregational church purposes as against claims of transferee church.
REID, C. J., and BOYLES and BUSHNELL, JJ., dissenting.
Bill by Michigan Congregational Conference, a Michigan corporation, against United Church of Stanton, a Michigan corporation, to dissolve defendant, set aside amendments and articles of association and enjoin use of property for other than Congregational church purposes. Decree for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed as modified.
Warner, Norcross & Judd and Leonard D. Verdier, Jr., for plaintiff.
J. A. Weitzel, for defendant.
REID, C. J. (dissenting). Plaintiff Michigan Congregational Conference filed its bill to obtain a decree dissolving defendant corporation. In an amendment to the bill of complaint, plaintiff prayed among other things that certain amendments to defendant‘s articles of incorporation be set aside, and also prayed for an injunction restraining defendant from using its church property for other than Congregational church purposes and for a decree that plaintiff as the representative of certain dissatisfied minority members of defendant church, is entitled to the use and possession of the church property of defendant. From a decree awarding plaintiff part of the relief prayed for, defendant appeals.
This action was begun September 7, 1949. Defendant church was incorporated August 27, 1937. Before that there was a First Congregational church of Stanton and a Methodist Episcopal church of Stanton. In the year 1931, the Methodist Episcopal church building burned and the Methodist Episcopal church received $1,000 as insurance. The members
Defendant‘s articles of incorporation, among other things, provided:
Fourth, The members of said church or society shall worship and labor together according to the discipline, rules and usage of the Congregational church in the United States of America as from time to time authorized and declared by the National Council of the Congregational Churches of the United States of America.
* * *
Fifth, * * * The additional purposes for which said church is to be incorporated are as follows: * * *
f. To succeed to the legal rights and powers of the First Congregational Church of Stanton, and the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Stanton, and
g. To worship and labor together according to the rules and usages of the Congregational Churches in the United States as from time to time declared and adopted. * * *
Seventh: The members of the First Congregational church and the members of the First Methodist Episcopal church, both of Stanton, Michigan, in good standing at the time of the incorporation of the United Church of Stanton, and such other persons as may desire to express their faith and devo-
tion to Jesus Christ and their loyalty to the ideals of said church, may become members of the United Church of Stanton, Michigan. (Italics supplied.)
It can be argued that the original articles of incorporation of the defendant, in article 7, by prescribing that applicants for membership manifest their “loyalty to the ideals of said church,” (i.e., defendant), instead of loyalty to the discipline, et cetera, of the National Council of the Congregational Churches, manifested an intent inconsistent with the intent expressed in articles 4 and 5, as quoted herein, and that by article 7 the incorporators expressed their intent to be an independent church. It can be further argued that the intent expressed in articles 4 and 5 was at best an intent to carry on temporarily an arrangement not intended to be permanent.
Some of the members of the First Congregational Church of Stanton and some of the members of the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Stanton, organized defendant corporation. The articles of incorporation were prepared under the Michigan general corporation act, PA 1931, No 327 (
PA 1901, No 53, as amended by PA 1913, No 298 (
On August 2, 1937, the First Congregational Church of Stanton, which was then in the process of being dissolved, conveyed its church property by warranty deed to the United Church of Stanton, defendant, the said property being described as follows:
Lots 5 and 7, in block No 21, and also lots 5 and 7 in block No 22, all in the village now city of Stanton aforesaid, according to the recorded plat thereof, which said plat is recorded in the office of the register of deeds for the said county of Montcalm, in liber 30 of plats on pages 162, 163.
The deed was recorded in liber 235 of deeds, page 227, on September 17, 1937. This deed designates the United Church of Stanton as an ecclesiastical corporation and contains as a restriction only the following:
Said described premises shall be used for religious purposes only by the said party of the second part hereto and for no other purpose.
The deed also recites that it was made pursuant to a resolution unanimously adopted by the members of the First Congregational Church of Stanton and also by its board of directors.
Upon the organization of defendant, the Methodist church contributed its insurance money which was used in remodeling and reconditioning the church building.
Defendant has been functioning as an ecclesiastical corporation ever since its organization. It paid to the Grand Rapids Association of Congregational Christian Churches per capita tax payments for the years 1937 to 1946, and none since 1946. Defendant
The bill was filed September 7, 1949.
On December 21, 1948, the United Church of Stanton amended its articles of incorporation and filed its certificate of the amendments with the Michigan corporation and securities commission. The principal amendments consisted of amending article 4 by providing that the members of the church shall worship and labor together according to the discipline, rules and usage of the United Church of Stanton as from time to time authorized and declared by the United Church of Stanton, and also of amending subdivision (g) of article 5 by stating that one of the purposes of the church is to worship and labor together according to the rules and usage of the United Church of Stanton, as from time to time declared and adopted.
Upon the introduction in evidence of testimony concerning the amendments to defendant‘s articles of incorporation, plaintiff claimed to be taken by surprise by such testimony and requested leave to amend its bill of complaint to meet the new situation created by the matters recited in the amendments. Defendant announced it had no objection.
Whereupon, plaintiff amended the bill to include among other new matter, a statement of additional relief, including relief as though plaintiff were representing some 22 petitioners who petitioned plaintiff to examine into the charge of such petitioners that defendant was extinct as a Congregational church, and the amended prayer of the bill included a prayer that plaintiff as representative of the 22 petitioners be decreed to be entitled to the possession and use of the church property of defendant and that defendant be enjoined from further use of the same, to which latter amendment to the prayer of the bill defendant did not consent. However, we consider allowance of the amendment was within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the discretion was not abused. The amendment to the prayer properly stands.
The trial court in a lengthy opinion recites the history and achievements of the Congregational church in the United States. The court concluded that the instant case is governed by the case of Hanna v. Malick, 223 Mich 100. Defense counsel has pointed out several matters which differentiate
In the first place, it should be noted that among Congregational churches, in general, the government is vested in the local church organization; that is, the government is in the hands of the members of the local organization, whereas in the Syrian church the government is apparently in the hands of the bishop; the local members seem to have a subordinate position in the Syrian church. However, the exact form of the Syrian church government is not set forth in the opinion in the Hanna Case.
Webster‘s New International Dictionary (2d ed), Unabridged, defines congregationalism as:
1. That system of church organization which vests all ecclesiastical power in the assembled brotherhood of each local church.
2. The faith and polity of the Congregational churches, a system of faith and practice common to a large body of evangelical Trinitarian churches, which recognize the local brotherhood of each church as independent of all dictation in ecclesiastical matters but are united in fellowship and joint action, and to whose membership the designation “Congregationalists” is generally restricted.
The constitution of the general (national) council of Congregationalists contains the following:
We stand for the autonomy of the local church and its independence of ecclesiastic control.
Secondly, defendant claims that it was the intention of those who formed and incorporated the defendant church that defendant should be free from the control of State and national conferences of Congregationalists, and an inference favorable to such claim of defendant is to be drawn from the
Thirdly, without anything corresponding thereto in the defendant church in the instant case, the Syrian Greek Orthodox Church was a banding together of Christians of the same race, in a land foreign to their nativity, of the same language, and inspired by their common reverence for the church of their native land to preserve the continuity of 19 centuries of Christian church history.
Fourthly, the church property in the Hanna Case was purchased in the name of and dedicated to the Syrian Greek Orthodox Church, out of the funds and by the efforts of Syrians for that particular church‘s purposes. In the instant case, the deed was taken in the name of the defendant church, partly representing the interests and activities of Congregationalists, and partly the title so taken represented the contribution of Methodists and persons of Methodist faith who had been habituated to work together under that name and for the Methodist faith.
Fifthly, in the Hanna Case, the priest of the Syrian church had always been of the Syrian Greek Orthodox Church, whereas in the instant case, the
Sixthly, in the Hanna Case, all the members of the church in question had consistently been of that faith, whereas in the instant case some of the members have been Congregationalists and some Methodists. In the Hanna Case, there was always a consistent congregation of 1 faith, but in the instant case there was a merger of 2 churches.
If it had been the intention of those who formed the merger of the 2 churches in the instant case that the resulting united church should be Congregational, there was no necessity whatever for the dissolution of the First Congregational Church of Stanton; that church could have simply received the Methodists into the Congregational church and accepted the Methodists’ contribution to the funds of the continuing Congregational church. The fact of the dissolution of the Congregational church speaks strongly for the contention of defendant, that the new church was simply to be independent of any denomination, with willingness to follow the teachings of the Congregational church, but not to be subject to the authority or control of the plaintiff, or the Congregational national council.
We conclude that the Hanna Case does not govern the instant case to the extent of warranting the relief sought by plaintiff or any part of it. However, in the Hanna Case, the following appears on page 117:
An entirely independent church may be organized and assume to be governed by certain laws, creeds and doctrines of faith as promulgated by some other established church, yet it would not necessarily become a subordinate part of such regularly established church or amenable to its authority.
The record contains no showing whatever that during the years 1937 to 1946 while defendant paid annual per capita tax to the Grand Rapids Association of Congregational Christian Churches, that plaintiff conference ever received defendant church into its conference, accepted any delegate from defendant church as a member of its conference, ever notified defendant of the meetings of the conference, ever admonished or offered to discipline defendant church for having pastors occupy its pulpit who were not Congregationalists, nor that plaintiff by pamphlet, letter or other communication ever exhorted defendant church or any of its members on the subject of the distinctive and characteristic doctrines, ideals or methods of Congregationalism or the government or procedure of Congregational churches. There are thus no equities in favor of plaintiff in its proper capacity in which it filed its original bill.
PA 1901, No 53 (
We are not to be understood as ruling that the State, under our State and Federal Constitutions, has any right to set up plaintiff as a tribunal to
As to those members of defendant church who are represented by plaintiff, it is to be noted that so far as the record discloses, none of such members during the period 1934 to 1946 ever protested against defendant church being served by ministers who were not of Congregational affiliation imbued with the characteristic doctrines of Congregationalism, nor have such dissatisfied members of defendant endeavored in any way to cause Congregationalism to be preached from the pulpit of defendant church or expounded at any meeting of defendant church nor have they sought in any way to cause that Congregationalism be taught, expounded or enforced in defendant church.
We conclude that the 22 members now represented by plaintiff are subject to a charge of laches. If they ever had any rights such as now claimed for them by plaintiff, such rights have been lost through laches. We are not persuaded that such members ever had any such rights as plaintiff seeks to assert for them.
Having in mind the language of the Hanna Case, at page 117, above quoted, we consider that defendant church in the original incorporation assumed to be an entirely independent church, assumed to adopt the general religious teachings of the national body of the Congregational churches, without becoming or intending to become subordinate to such national body or to plaintiff conference, or amenable to the discipline of such national body or conference.
It would be self-contradictory to assert the autonomy of the local church and its independence of ecclesiastic control and still assert that the property of the local church, its meeting house, is subject to the control of plaintiff conference or any other con-
Plaintiff practically concedes it has no right to control over the real estate of defendant, for which reason plaintiff asked leave to amend so as to declare itself the agent of dissident members of the congregation of defendant, and continue the suit on behalf of the dissidents. The deed to defendant was consented to by all of the then members of the First Congregational church of Stanton; their deed so recites. There were left no adherents of Congregationalism as members of the dissolved First Congregational church of Stanton. None of the 22 dissidents that plaintiff now claims to represent, have any right to represent the original First Congregational church of Stanton. If any former members of the First Congregational church of Stanton have now changed their minds, their deed to which they consented bars them from assertion of rights as remaining “faithful” Congregationalists.
The nature of Congregationalism and circumstances of the instant case are such that the several Michigan cases cited by Justice DETHMERS, of which the Hanna Case, supra, is representative, are without applicability. Plaintiff is without color of right in the instant case as an ecclesiastic organization to assert title to the church property of the local church in question. Plaintiff is without right as representative of the 22 dissidents to assert any right to the church property in question of defendant (a) because none of the dissidents can be classified as Congregationalists who remained “faithful” as such at the time the church property was deeded to defendant by unanimous consent of the Congregationalists; and (b) because under Congregational church polity, the majority of any local church represent all there is of Congregationalism in such
The decree appealed from should be reversed. The decree of this Court should be entered dismissing the bill of complaint. Costs to defendant.
BOYLES and BUSHNELL, JJ., concurred with REID, C. J.
DETHMERS, J. I am unable to concur with Mr. Chief Justice REID in reversal, although I am of the opinion that the decree of the trial court ought, in certain particulars, to be modified.
It is the well-established law of this State, declared in Fuchs v. Meisel, 102 Mich 357 (32 LRA 92); Borgman v. Bultema, 213 Mich 684; Hanna v. Malick, 223 Mich 100; and United Armenian Brethren Evangelical Church v. Kazanjian, 322 Mich 651, that while members of a church undoubtedly possess the legal right to withdraw from it, with or without reason, they may not, in so doing, take with them, for their own purposes, or transfer to any other religious body, property previously conveyed to, or dedicated to the use of, the religious denomination from which they are withdrawing or one of its member churches, but such property must remain for the use and benefit of adherents to that denomination or those who represent it. Not inconsistent is the earlier case of Wilson v. Livingstone, 99 Mich 594, when viewed as having been predicated on the theory that the property involved in that case had not been dedicated to the use of any religious denomination.
The property involved in the instant case belonged, originally, to the First Congregational Church of Stanton and was, as such, dedicated to the use of the religious denomination commonly
I am not unmindful of the claimed high degree of autonomy in ecclesiastical affairs enjoyed by the individual congregation in the Congregational denomination as contrasted with some others. It
Provided, however, That all property of said corporation whether real, personal or mixed or whether held in fee or in trust and the income therefrom and the proceeds thereof when sold, shall, subject to the terms of any trust or trusts relating thereto or to
any part thereof, be held and used by said corporation for the benefit of said church as a Congregational religious organization, and for no other purpose whatsoever.
Section 8 provides, concerning the property of any such church, that, when it is no longer used for the benefit of that church as a Congregational religious organization, the Congregational denomination may take certain steps leading to acquisition of title to the property.
The trial court‘s decree provides that the 1948 amendments to defendant‘s articles of association are set aside and held for naught and that defendant, its officers and members are enjoined from amending them so as to make defendant a non-Congregational church. In this the court erred. Whether or not defendant church was organized as a Congregational church in 1937, in any event it was not organized under nor did it ever vote to come under the provisions of PA 1901, No 53, as amended, providing for the organization and incorporation of Congregational churches and, hence, the inhibition of that act against amendment of articles of association in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of that act does not apply to defendant. The court also erred in decreeing that defendant, its officers and members be enjoined from permitting certain persons, under certain circumstances, from serving it as pastor. In church disputes courts may concern themselves with property rights only and not with the ecclesiastical affairs of the church. Berry v. Bruce, 317 Mich 490; White v. Mt. Beulah Baptist Church, 319 Mich 392; United Armenian Brethren Evangelical Church v. Kazanjian, supra.
The trial court properly added as parties plaintiff those members of defendant church who had signified a desire for continued adherence to the Con-
A decree may enter in this Court in accord herewith. Costs to plaintiffs.
NORTH, BUTZEL, CARR, and SHARPE, JJ., concurred with DETHMERS, J.