MICHIGAN CITIZENS FOR WATER CONSERVATION v NESTLÉ WATERS NORTH AMERICA INC
Docket Nos. 130802, 130803
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided July 25, 2007
479 MICH 280
In an opinion by Justice YOUNG, joined by Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices CORRIGAN and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
The plaintiffs have standing to bring a claim under the Michigan environmental protection act (MEPA),
1. To preserve the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers among the coordinate branches of government to which those respective powers have been committed, the judiciary must confine itself to the exercise of the “judicial power” by vigilantly enforcing principles of standing, which ensure that a genuine case or controversy is before the court. Where a plaintiff claims an environmental injury, this Court lacks the “judicial power” to hear the claim if the plaintiff cannot allege facts to show that he or she has suffered or will imminently suffer a concrete and particularized injury in fact. An injury in fact is established in the environmental context when the defendant‘s activities directly affect the plaintiff‘s recreational, aesthetic, or economic interests in a particular area.
2. The plaintiffs have standing to bring a MEPA claim with respect to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake because the individual plaintiffs enjoy riparian property rights to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake. Therefore, if Nestlé‘s pumping activities have impaired their riparian property rights, they clearly have suffered an injury in fact. Because these individual plaintiffs are members of MCWC, they confer organizational standing on MCWC with respect to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake. This part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
3. The plaintiffs have not shown that they used or had access to the Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301, or that they enjoyed a recreational, aesthetic, or economic interest in them. Therefore, even though these areas may be hydrologically connected to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake, the plaintiffs failed to establish any interest in the Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301 that was detrimentally affected by Nestlé‘s conduct and that was distinct from the interest of the general public. Neither the constitutional provision establishing the public interest in the protection of Michigan‘s natural resources nor the Legislature‘s grant of standing to “any person” to sue under MEPA lightens a plaintiff‘s burden to satisfy traditional standing requirements in environmental cases. Because separation of governmental powers requires the judiciary to exercise only its “judicial power” and decide only actual disputes, plaintiffs in environmental cases, like all other plaintiffs, must demonstrate
4. The environmental “ecosystem nexus” theory of standing—premised on the idea that our environment is interconnected—if accepted would grant plaintiffs standing to assert claims as to particular harms to which they have alleged no direct interest. Such a theory of standing would obliterate traditional standing principles and permit anyone to contest activities occurring literally anywhere in Michigan because all water ecosystems are hydrologically connected. The judiciary lacks power to decide such attenuated claims. The plaintiffs have no greater interest in the Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301 than the general public.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court.
Justice WEAVER, joined by Justice CAVANAGH, dissenting, disagreed with the majority‘s reversal of the Court of Appeals holding that the plaintiffs have standing to bring a MEPA claim with respect to the Osprey Lake impoundment and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301 and would hold instead that the plaintiffs have standing with respect to all the affected properties at issue. The majority‘s test for standing, based on the federal standing doctrine, is not supported by the Michigan Constitution, which does not restrict the Legislature‘s ability to grant standing to the citizens of this state. The Michigan Constitution contains no corollary to
Justice CAVANAGH, dissenting, concurred fully in the dissenting opinion of Justice WEAVER and wrote separately to note that he would hold that the plaintiffs have standing because the evidence they presented soundly demonstrates that Nestlé‘s conduct is perpetrating environmental effects on the ecosystem about which the plaintiffs’ complaint is concerned. It should be recognized that, at the very least, areas that a citizen does not use, but that are perceptibly affected by the same conduct that is affecting the areas
Justice KELLY, dissenting, agreed with the conclusion and analysis in Justice Weaver‘s dissent regarding the test for standing adopted in Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm‘rs, 464 Mich 726 (2001), and Nat‘l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 472 Mich 608 (2004), but also recognized that those cases now constitute binding precedent of the Supreme Court. Because Justice KELLY would hold that the plaintiffs have established standing under Lee and Nat‘l Wildlife, it is unnecessary to consider in this case whether those decisions should be overruled. This case turns on the correct application of the injury-in-fact component of the test for standing. Because, as conceded by the majority, the plaintiffs have standing to challenge Nestlé‘s pumping on the basis of its effects on the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake, they can also raise other inadequacies based on the public interest. Therefore, the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the total effects of the pumping, including its effects on the Osprey Lake impoundment and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301. Separation of powers concerns do not command a different result because a legitimate dispute exists in this case, given the plaintiffs’ injury in fact, and the Supreme Court‘s role is to adjudicate that dispute, not to decide whether the Legislature‘s grant of a broad cause of action under MEPA was wise. By deciding otherwise, the majority oversteps its bounds, telling the Legislature how to function and extinguishing a valid cause of action.
- ENVIRONMENT — STANDING — MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT.
The Michigan Supreme Court lacks the judicial power to hear an environmental claim if the plaintiff cannot aver facts to indicate that he or she has suffered or will imminently suffer a concrete and particularized injury in fact (
MCL 324.1701[1] ). - ENVIRONMENT — STANDING — MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT — INJURY IN FACT.
An environmental plaintiff adequately alleges an injury in fact by averring that he or she has a property interest or uses the affected area or is a person for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the challenged activity (
MCL 324.1701[1] ).
Mika Meyers Beckett & Jones PLC (by John M. DeVries and Fredric N. Goldberg), Warner Norcross & Judd LLP (by Eugene E. Smary and Robert J. Jonker), Kilpatrick Stockton LLP (by David M. Zacks and Adam H. Charnes), and Porteous Law Office, P.C. (by David L. Porteous), for Nestlé Waters North America Inc.
Amici Curiae:
Neil S. Kagan for the National Wildlife Federation, the Michigan United Conservation Clubs, the Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council, the Pickerel-Crooked Lakes Association, and the Burt Lake Preservation Association.
Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP (by John D. Pirich, Timothy Sawyer Knowlton, and Brian T. Quinn) for the Michigan Chamber of Commerce.
Clark Hill PLC (by Fritz R. Damm, David D. Grande-Cassell, and Kristin B. Bellar) for the Michigan Manufacturers Association.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Sara R. Gosman, S. Peter Manning, and Harold J. Martin, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality.
Law, Weathers & Richardson, P.C. (by Clifford H. Bloom), for Michigan Lake & Stream Associations, Inc.
OPINION OF THE COURT
YOUNG, J. The sole question presented in this case is whether plaintiffs have standing to bring a claim under
In Nat‘l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co,2 we noted that “‘environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons “for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened” by the challenged activity.‘”3 Plaintiffs indisputably have standing to bring a MEPA claim against Nestlé to protect their riparian property rights to Thompson Lake and the Dead Stream. However, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they use the Osprey Lake Impoundment (Osprey Lake) and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301, and that, as a result, their recreational, aesthetic, or other interests have been impaired. Accordingly, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we affirm the Court of Appeals in part, but we reverse the Court of Appeals holding that plaintiffs have standing to bring a MEPA claim regarding Osprey Lake and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301, and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This highly publicized case concerns certain interconnected streams, lakes, and wetlands north of the Tri-Lakes region in Mecosta County, Michigan. These bodies of water include Osprey Lake, Thompson Lake,
Defendants Donald and Nancy Bollman own approximately 850 acres of land in an area known as the Sanctuary that surrounds Osprey Lake and several of the enumerated wetlands.5 The Bollmans have operated the Sanctuary as a private hunting preserve since they acquired the property in the 1970s. They granted Nestlé the groundwater rights to a 139-acre area on the northern shore of Osprey Lake within the Sanctuary after preliminary tests indicated that the land contained a suitable and reliable source of spring water.6
In order to begin pumping and bottling the water, Nestlé also obtained permits from the Michigan Department of Environment Quality (MDEQ) that ensured its compliance with the standards of the Safe Drinking Water Act.7 In August 2001, the MDEQ issued Nestlé a permit
Plaintiff Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation (MCWC) is a non-profit corporation of approximately 1,300 members that formed to protect and conserve water resources in Michigan, particularly in Mecosta County. It views Nestlé and its pumping activities as inimical to MCWC‘s mission. Two hundred sixty-five members are riparian owners in the Tri-Lakes area, including plaintiffs R.J. and Barbara Doyle, who own land on the Dead Stream, and plaintiffs Jeffrey and Shelly Sapp, who own land on Thompson Lake.
MCWC filed suit in June 2001, seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief against Nestlé. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ request for temporary injunctive relief to prevent Nestlé‘s construction of the Stanwood bottling facility while the parties litigated Nestlé‘s right to pump spring water from Sanctuary Springs. Later, in November 2001, plaintiffs filed a six-count second amended complaint.8 Following
After a lengthy bench trial, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction of Nestlé‘s pumping activities. In its opinion, the court made elaborate findings of fact identifying what it called the “zone of influence,” the “hydrological effects,” and the “ecological impacts” of Nestlé‘s pumping activities.9 Relying on these factual findings, the court ruled that plaintiffs prevailed on both the common-law groundwater claim and the MEPA claim and that the only appropriate remedy was to grant a permanent injunction.10
plaintiffs have standing because of the complex, reciprocal nature of the ecosystem that encompasses the pertinent natural resources noted above and because of the hydrologic interaction, connection, or interrelationship between these natural resources, the springs, the aquifer, and defendant Nestlé‘s pumping activities, whereby impact on one particular resource caused by Nestlé‘s pumping necessarily affects other resources in the surrounding area. Therefore, although there was no evidence that plaintiffs actually used or physically participated in activities on the Osprey Lake impound-
ment and wetlands 112, 115, and 301, environmental injuries to those natural resources play a role in any harm caused to the Dead Stream, the Dead Stream‘s wetlands, and Thompson Lake, which are used by and adjacent to property owned by plaintiffs and not the subject of a standing challenge.13
Judge SMOLENSKI dissented. He would have found that plaintiffs lacked standing with respect to Osprey Lake and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301 because plaintiffs did not use those areas, so they could not demonstrate that they had suffered or would suffer a concrete or particularized injury distinct from that of the public generally.14 Judge SMOLENSKI also would have declared unconstitutional
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a party has standing is a question of law that we review de novo.20
III. ANALYSIS
A. STANDING
This Court recently explained in Michigan Chiropractic Council v Comm‘r of the Office of Financial & Ins Services,21 that
[o]ur tripartite system of government is constitutionally established in both our state and federal constitutions.
US Const, art III, § 1 confers upon the courts only “judicial power“;US Const, art III, § 2 limits the judicial power to “[c]ases and [c]ontroversies.” Similarly, our state constitution,Const 1963, art 3, § 2 , provides:“The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers
properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” The powers of each branch are outlined in the Michigan Constitution, which assigns to the Legislature the task of exercising the “legislative power,” the Governor the task of exercising the “executive power,” and the judiciary the task of exercising the “judicial power.”22
Standing is an indispensable doctrine rooted in our constitution and the tripartite system of government it prescribes. We vigilantly enforce principles of standing in order to vindicate the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers among the coordinate branches of government to which those respective powers have been committed. Indeed, “neglect of [standing] would imperil the constitutional architecture” carefully constructed by its drafters and ratified by the people.23 To neglect standing would empty the phrases “executive power,” “legislative power,” and “judicial power” of their intended significance and render the separation of powers demanded by
As part of this endeavor to preserve separation of powers, the judiciary must confine itself to the exercise of the “judicial power” and the “judicial power” alone.
[t]he “judicial power” has traditionally been defined by a combination of considerations: the existence of a real dispute, or case or controversy; the avoidance of deciding hypothetical questions; the plaintiff who has suffered real harm; the existence of genuinely adverse parties; the sufficient ripeness or maturity of a case; the eschewing of cases that are moot at any stage of their litigation; the ability to issue proper forms of effective relief to a party; the avoidance of political questions or other non-justiciable controversies; the avoidance of unnecessary constitutional issues; and the emphasis upon proscriptive as opposed to prescriptive decision making. [471 Mich at 614-615.]
We went on in Nat‘l Wildlife to distill this litany of considerations arising from the proper exercise of the “judicial power,” and we determined that “the most critical element” is “its requirement of a genuine case or controversy between the parties, one in which there is a real, not a hypothetical, dispute.”24
Steadfast enforcement of standing principles and separation of powers demands remarkable judicial self-restraint. Before his appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that the doctrine of standing “implement[s] the Framers’ concept of ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society‘” so that “[s]tanding is thus properly regarded as a doctrine of judicial self-restraint.”25 He noted that “[s]eparation of powers is a zero-sum game” and the doctrine of standing
“[i]f the judicial power extended to every question under the constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve almost every subject on which the executive could act. The division of power [among the branches of government] could exist no longer, and the other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary.”
Thus, the court that earnestly adheres to the doctrine of standing must exercise self-discipline to resist the temptation of usurping power from the other branches. The court that is willing to compromise the doctrine of standing and reach beyond the “judicial power” lacks such discipline.
Standing ensures that a genuine case or controversy is before the court. It “‘requires a demonstration that the plaintiff‘s substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large.‘”28 To successfully allege standing, a plaintiff must prove three elements.
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact‘—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.“’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly... traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not... the result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.‘” [Nat‘l Wildlife, 471 Mich at 628-629, quoting Lee, 464 Mich at 739, quoting Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-561; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992).]29
Where the plaintiff claims an injury related to the environment, this Court lacks the “judicial power” to hear the claim if the plaintiff cannot aver facts that he has suffered or will imminently suffer a concrete and particularized injury in fact. In this context, “‘environ-
B. APPLICATION
Plaintiffs MCWC and the Doyles and Sapps must satisfy the three elements of standing to pursue a MEPA claim against Nestlé. In other words, they must have (1) suffered an injury in fact (2) causally connected to Nestlé‘s conduct that (3) can be redressed by a favorable decision. MCWC, as a nonprofit organization, must satisfy our requirement for organizational standing. A nonprofit organization has standing to bring suit in the interest of its members if its members would have standing as individual plaintiffs.32
Defendant concedes, and we agree, that plaintiffs have standing to bring a MEPA claim with respect to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake, because the Doyles and the Sapps enjoy riparian property rights to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake, respectively. Therefore, if Nestlé‘s pumping activities have impaired their riparian property rights, they clearly have suffered an injury in fact. Moreover, because these individual plaintiffs are members of MCWC, they confer organizational standing on MCWC with respect to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake.
To be clear, we are refining, not dismissing, plaintiffs’ MEPA claim. Plaintiffs enjoy the full protection that MEPA affords to vindicate their riparian property interests. Thus, they have standing insofar as Nestlé‘s pumping activities inflicted an injury in fact with respect to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake. However, plaintiffs cannot similarly establish standing with respect to Osprey Lake and Wetlands 112, 115 and 301.33
In reaching this conclusion, we reject the Court of Appeals “interconnectedness” theory of standing as inconsistent with Lee and Nat‘l Wildlife. The trial court found as fact that many of the streams, lakes and wetlands in the Tri-Lakes area are joined by an inextricable, hydrological link. Drawing from these facts, the Court of Appeals held that
plaintiffs have standing because of the complex, reciprocal nature of the ecosystem that encompasses the pertinent natural resources noted above and because of the hydro-
logic interaction, connection, or interrelationship between these natural resources, the springs, the aquifer, and defendant Nestlé‘s pumping activities, whereby impact on one particular resource caused by Nestlé‘s pumping necessarily affects other resources in the surrounding area. Therefore, although there was no evidence that plaintiffs actually used or physically participated in activities on the Osprey Lake impoundment and wetlands 112, 115, and 301, environmental injuries to those natural resources play a role in any harm caused to the Dead Stream, the Dead Stream‘s wetlands, and Thompson Lake, which are used by and adjacent to property owned by plaintiffs and not the subject of a standing challenge. [Michigan Citizens, 269 Mich App at 113 (emphasis added).]
The flaw in this “interconnectedness” theory of standing is that it permits plaintiffs to evade their burden to establish an injury in fact. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Friends of the Earth, Inc v Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc,34 the relevant inquiry in standing analysis is not whether the environment suffered injury, but whether the plaintiff suffered injury. If the hydrological links are as the trial court found, then a reduced flow or water level at one point in the interconnected hydrological system will have a measurable effect elsewhere in that system. But plaintiffs must still establish how they have suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact within this interrelated ecosystem. The environmental peculiarities of the Tri-Lakes area, or any ecosystem for that matter, do not obviate constitutional standing requirements.
Plaintiffs defend the Court of Appeals standing analysis by arguing that all of the harm in this case is singularly traceable to Nestlé‘s pumping activity, and so their single MEPA claim cannot be divided into multiple
Plaintiffs’ argument misses the basic point that plaintiffs are the focus of the standing inquiry, not the Tri-Lakes region. We reject plaintiffs’ bootstrapping approach to standing under which, as long as they have standing to redress their injury in fact, they have standing to redress all injuries conceivably related to their injury in fact. No matter how pervasive the environmental damage in an ecosystem, plaintiffs must still successfully and succinctly establish their injury in fact. Plaintiffs satisfy this requirement for the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake, but not Osprey Lake and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301.
The caselaw that plaintiffs cite to support their position actually confirms our analysis. The Supreme Court cases cited by plaintiffs consistently required that the plaintiff demonstrate an injury in fact in order to bring suit.35 Indeed, in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,36 the Court discredited an “ecosystem nexus” approach to standing that would grant standing to “any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’ adversely affected... even if the activity is located a great distance away.” The Court also held that “a plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage must use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly ‘in
Plaintiffs also rely on Cantrell v City of Long Beach.38 In Cantrell, the plaintiff birdwatchers brought several claims against the defendants arising from the defendants’ plan to demolish a naval station. The gist of the birdwatchers’ complaint was that this demolition would also destroy bird habitats on the site. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court‘s decision that the birdwatchers lacked standing to pursue a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) claim, holding that the birdwatchers sufficiently alleged an injury in fact because the defendants’ actions impaired the birdwatchers’ recreational and aesthetic interest in viewing these bird habitats. The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether the birdwatchers had a legal right to enter the naval station because “their desire to view the birds at the Naval Station from publicly accessible locations outside the station is an interest sufficient to confer standing.”39 Plaintiffs argue that, under Cantrell, they need not own Osprey Lake or Wetlands 112, 115, or 301, or possess a right to access them, to establish an injury in fact if those properties suffer environmental damage.
Plaintiffs and their supporting amici41 claim that two unique and related considerations render traditional standing analysis inappropriate in this case. First, they argue that
We disagree that either of these considerations changes the standing inquiry. Simply put, neither
Similarly, simply by enacting
Notes
It should be clear that by appropriating an insightful proposition from Lujan, I am not endorsing the balance of the Lujan Court‘s standing analysis. See ante at 295 n 29. 471 Mich 608; 684 NW2d 800 (2004).The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
The majority claims that I do not define “the general public interest.” Ante at 304 n 50. As I think is obvious, “the general public interest” here is preventing the destruction of our environment.In House Speaker we stated that “this Court is not bound to follow federal cases regarding standing,” pointing out that “[o]ne notable distinction between federal and state standing analysis is the power of this Court to issue advisory opinions.
Const 1963, art 3, § 8 . Under Article III of the federal constitution, federal courts may issue opinions only where there is an actual case or controversy.” [House Speaker, supra at] 559, including n 20. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in ASARCO Inc v Kadish, 490 US 605, 617; 109 S Ct 2037; 104 L Ed 2d 696 (1989), acknowledged: “We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability....” [Lee, supra at 743 n 2.]
With respect to the MEPA claim, the court found that plaintiffs established an unrebutted prima facie case that Nestlé‘s pumping activities violated environmental standards drawn from the inland lakes and streams act,
It can even be argued that the Legislature did not give any power to the people, because a reading ofThe attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction.
IV. RESPONSE TO JUSTICE KELLY
Justice KELLY quotes the United States Supreme Court‘s statement from Warth that “‘so long as the [standing] requirement is satisfied, persons to whom [the Legislature] has granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear implication, may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest in support of their claim.‘”49 She reasons by analogy from this statement that because plaintiffs have standing with respect to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake, they can assert the interests of the
We conclude that Justice KELLY‘S reliance on that statement from Warth is misplaced. First, the above-quoted statement from Warth is taken out of context by Justice KELLY. Warth simply does not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff may bring a claim asserting the general public interest where the plaintiff lacks constitutional standing to bring that claim himself.50 Warth plainly stated that plaintiffs “may invoke the general public interest in support of their claim,” not that plaintiffs could bring a claim under the banner of the public interest even though they lacked standing to raise that claim.51 Had the Warth Court held to the contrary, it would have created a glaring, untenable exception to Article III‘s case or controversy requirement inconsistent with its own decision. Such a holding also would have flatly conflicted with Sierra Club v Morton,52 where the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the commercial development of a national forest because the plaintiffs failed to allege how the development would injure the Sierra Club or its members. Thus, the plaintiffs could not bring suit as a “representative of the public” where they lacked individual standing.
In this case, plaintiffs cannot allege an injury in fact with respect to Osprey Lake and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301. It follows that they cannot bring a MEPA claim with respect to those particular bodies of water because they cannot satisfy the minimum threshold for standing. Thus, we fail to see how plaintiffs could invoke the general public interest ”in support of” a MEPA claim that they could never bring with respect to Osprey Lake and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301. Some of the confusion in this case might stem from the fact that the alleged widespread environmental damage affecting the several bodies of water was reputedly traceable to Nestlé‘s pumping activities. Thus, if true, as a practical matter, injunctive relief ordering Nestlé to reduce or to stop its pumping activities could benefit Osprey Lake and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301. Nevertheless, we cannot confuse the potential effect of the remedy with plaintiffs’ constitutional burden to prove that they have standing to bring a claim.
We have not, as Justice KELLY insists, selectively adopted favorable portions of federal standing law and
Justice WEAVER‘s dissent merely reiterates objections she lodged in response to our prior standing cases—objections that this Court has considered and rejected. Because there is little to add to our previous colloquies with the dissenter (other than to direct the reader to our analyses in Lee and Nat‘l Wildlife), we will briefly respond.
Justice WEAVER persists in her argument that the textual differences between the federal constitution and our state constitution prove that the exercise of “judicial power” or the doctrine of separation of powers in our constitution means something radically different than it does under the federal constitution.56 This argument that separation of powers should be understood differently in the Michigan Constitution because the words “case” and “controversy” are not in our constitution suggests to us that Justice WEAVER fundamentally misunderstands the doctrine of separation of powers. She refuses to accept that there is a constitutional limit on the Legislature‘s authority to expand “judicial power” in the area of standing. In response, we stated in Nat‘l Wildlife that
[a]s the Michigan Constitution makes clear, the duty of the judiciary is to exercise the “judicial power,” and, in so doing, to respect the separation of powers. While as a
general proposition, the proper exercise of the “judicial power” will obligate the judiciary to give faithful effect to the words of the Legislature—for it is the latter that exercises the “legislative power,” not the judiciary—such effect cannot properly be given when to do so would contravene the constitution itself. Just as the judicial branch owes deference to the legislative branch when the “legislative power” is being exercised, so too does the legislative branch owe deference to the judicial branch when the exercise of the “judicial power” is implicated. Even with the acquiescence of the legislative and executive branches, the judicial branch cannot arrogate to itself governmental authority that is beyond the scope of the “judicial power” under the constitution. The “textual” approach of [Justice Weaver] is a caricatured textualism, in which the Legislature is empowered to act beyond its authority in conferring powers upon other branches that are also beyond their authority. [Nat‘l Wildlife, 471 Mich at 637 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).]
Equally perplexing is Justice WEAVER‘s continued insistence that by refraining from exercising our “judicial power” where plaintiffs fail to allege an injury in fact, we have actually failed to show judicial restraint. Such reasoning turns “reality on its head.”57 In response, we simply reiterate that by acting within the limits of the “judicial power” accorded by our constitution, we have not expanded our power and we have not encroached on the powers granted to the other branches of government.58
Her doctrinal misunderstandings aside, Justice WEAVER‘s core “political point” is that, in insisting on constitutional standing requirements, we have eviscerated environmental laws intended to protect Michigan‘s natural resources, leaving Michigan residents helpless
Environmental laws, such as MEPA (or any statutory law for that matter), may be vindicated by persons who have suffered a real injury in fact and thus have a stake in the controversy. Such is the case here with respect to plaintiffs’ MEPA claim to protect the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake. Moreover, environmental laws are also always enforceable by the executive branch through entities such as the MDEQ. If the people are unhappy with how the executive branch fulfills its enforcement functions, the remedy is not a lawsuit, but a political one at the ballot box.
Finally, just as we stated in Nat‘l Wildlife, we have yet to find any support, textual or otherwise, other than Justice WEAVER‘s assertion, for her contention that
Plaintiffs have standing to bring a MEPA claim against Nestlé to protect their riparian property rights in Thompson Lake and the Dead Stream. However, plaintiffs have not alleged an injury in fact with respect to the Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetlands 112, 115, and 301 because there is no evidence that they use these areas and that their recreational, aesthetic, or economic interests have been impaired by Nestlé‘s pumping activities. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals in part, but we reverse the Court of Appeals holding with regard to this issue and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
TAYLOR, C.J., and CORRIGAN and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with YOUNG, J.
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). I dissent from the majority‘s reversal of the Court of Appeals holding that plaintiffs have standing to bring a claim under the Michigan environmental protection act (MEPA)1 with respect to the Osprey Lake impoundment and wetlands 112, 115, and 301. I would hold that plaintiffs have standing under
The majority‘s holding in this case marks the culmination of a line of cases in which the same majority of four (Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN) has eroded Michigan‘s traditional rules of standing.
Beginning with Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm‘rs,3 the majority overruled Michigan precedent establishing prudential standing as the traditional doctrine of legal standing in Michigan. In place of Michigan‘s doctrine of prudential standing, the majority erroneously adopted a constitutional doctrine of standing based on the federal courts’ doctrine of standing, as stated in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife.4
In Nat‘l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co,5 the majority of four, through lengthy dicta, attacked the statute at issue in this case, MEPA, while stating that the majority was declining to address whether MEPA represented an increase in the power of this Court, because the plaintiffs in that case met the federal constitutional standing doctrine adopted by the majority in Lee.
In my Nat‘l Wildlife concurrence, I wrote: “The majority can wait for a future case that has not drawn public attention to openly and directly declare the MEPA citizen-suit standing provision unconstitutional.”6 Although this case has been highly publicized,
Now, the majority of four has taken this case as the opportunity to finish what it started in Nat‘l Wildlife: to deprive the people of Michigan of the ability to protect the natural resources of this state. I dissent because the Michigan Constitution does not restrict the ability of the Legislature to grant standing to the citizens of this state. Further, the Michigan Constitution places a broad duty on the Legislature to protect the environment, and the Legislature has properly fulfilled its constitutional mandate through its enactment of MEPA.
I. THE MAJORITY OF FOUR‘S ASSAULT ON STANDING IN MICHIGAN
Before Lee, no Michigan case had held that the issue of standing posed a constitutional issue.8 Nor did any case hold that Michigan‘s judicial branch was subject to the same case-or-controversy limitation imposed on the federal judicial branch under article III of the United States Constitution.9 In fact, article III standing derived
In Lee, a case involving
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact‘—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.“’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.‘” [Lee, supra at 739, quoting Lujan, supra at 560-561.]
The majority erroneously adopted the Lujan test as a constitutionally based test for standing, under a theory that
After overruling Michigan‘s traditional prudential doctrine of standing in Lee by adopting the Lujan test, the majority next questioned the Legislature‘s ability to confer standing on citizens through the use of statutes
Further, as the majority mistakenly believed, MEPA does not purport to give the judiciary the power of the executive branch to enforce the laws, because that power is given to the people of Michigan.15 A court‘s role in these cases differs in no way from its role in any other controversy that comes before it: the court hears the case, interprets the applicable law, and renders a decision.
II. ART 4, § 52 OF THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION
Among the reasons why Lee‘s article III-based standing test or any judge-created standing test should not be applied to MEPA plaintiffs, the most important is that to do so defeats the clear, unambiguous, and readily understand-
able purpose of art 4, § 52 of the Michigan Constitution.18 Through art 4, § 52, the people of Michigan directed the Legislature “to provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction.” Art 4, § 52 provides that this mandate serves the people‘s express “paramount concern in the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the people” specifically with respect to the “conservation and development of the natural resources of the state.” Employing the precise words of art 4, § 52, the Legislature enacted MEPA in fulfillment of art 4, § 52‘s mandate. [Nat‘l Wildlife, supra at 665.]
Before Nat‘l Wildlife, this Court had noted that the Legislature conferred standing under MEPA to any person who alleges that a defendant‘s conduct has or is likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water, or other natural resources or the public trust therein.19
Inexplicably, the majority of four has decided that the very specific mandate of
III. APPLICATION
Plaintiff Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation (MCWC) is a nonprofit corporation formed to protect and conserve water resources in Michigan. It consists of approximately 1,300 members; 265 of those members are riparian owners in the Tri-Lakes area of Mecosta County. Among the members are plaintiffs R.J. and Barbara Doyle, who own land on the Dead Stream, and plaintiffs Jeffrey and Shelly Sapp, who own land on Thompson Lake.
In 2002, after receiving the required permits from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), defendant Nestlé Waters North America Inc. began pumping and bottling water on a 139-acre area on the northern shore of the Osprey Lake impoundment.20 The permits allowed defendant to operate the four wells at a combined maximum pumping rate of 400 gallons a minute.
Plaintiffs brought suit under
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court.21 On the issue of standing, a majority consisting of Judges WHITE and MURPHY held that plaintiffs had standing to bring claims with respect to all of the natural resources at issue. The separate opinion written by Judge MURPHY, held that
plaintiffs have standing because of the complex, reciprocal nature of the ecosystem that encompasses the pertinent natural resources noted above and because of the hydrologic interaction, connection, or interrelationship between these natural resources, the springs, the aquifer, and defendant Nestlé‘s pumping activities, whereby impact on one particular resource caused by Nestlé‘s pumping necessarily affects other resources in the surrounding area. Therefore although there was no evidence that plaintiffs actually used or physically participated in activities on the Osprey Lake impoundment and wetlands 112, 115, and 301, environmental injuries to those natural resources play a role in any harm caused to the Dead Stream, the Dead Stream‘s wetlands, and Thompson Lake, which are used by and adjacent to property owned by plaintiffs and not the subject of a standing challenge. [Michigan Citizens, supra at 113.]
The majority now erroneously reverses the Court of Appeals decision on plaintiffs’ standing with respect to the Osprey Lake impoundment, and wetlands 112, 115, and 301, holding that “[p]laintiffs failed to establish that they have a substantial interest in these areas, detrimentally affected by Nestlé‘s conduct, that is distinct from the interest of the general public.” Ante at 297.
For the reasons stated, I believe that plaintiffs satisfied Michigan‘s standing doctrine because they complied with
Furthermore, plaintiffs argue that even if MEPA does not grant standing to any citizen to challenge any environmental harm, plaintiffs have met the majority‘s constitutional standing requirements with regard to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake and that the United States Supreme Court has in the past stated that “[o]nce this standing is established, the party may assert the interests of the general public in support of his claims for equitable relief.”22 While I find that federal standing law is irrelevant to Michigan law and not binding on this Court, I do believe that plaintiffs raise a valid argument. Plaintiffs point to Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490; 95 S Ct 2197; 45 L Ed 2d 343 (1975), in which the United States Supreme Court seemed to contemplate federal standing in a situation similar to that of plaintiffs. The Court noted:
In some circumstances, countervailing considerations may outweigh the concerns underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial power when the plaintiff‘s claim to relief rests on the legal rights of third parties. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. [17, 22-23; 80 S Ct 519; 4 L Ed 2d 524 (1960)]. In such instances, the Court has found, in effect, that the constitutional or statutory provision in question implies a right of action in the plaintiff. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 [45 S Ct 571; 69 L Ed 1070] (1925); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 [90 S Ct 400; 24 L Ed 2d 386] (1969). See generally
Part IV, infra. Moreover, Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. Of course, Art. III‘s requirement remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants. E.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 [93 S Ct 2405; 37 L Ed 2d 254] (1973). But so long as this requirement is satisfied, persons to whom Congress has granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear implication, may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest in support of their claim. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, supra at 737; FCC v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 [60 St Ct 693; 84 L Ed 869 (1940). [Id. at 500-501.]
Whether dealing with federal constitutional standing or standing granted by statute, I find the rationale in Warth to be persuasive when the plaintiffs have established standing for their own claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
By holding that MEPA does not grant standing to plaintiffs to protect all the resources at issue,
[t]he majority disregards the intent of the Legislature, erodes the people‘s constitutional mandate, and overrules 30 years of Michigan case law that held that the Legislature meant what it said when it allowed “any person” to bring an action in circuit court to protect natural resources from actual or likely harm.23
The majority of four has now completed what it started in Lee and Nat‘l Wildlife; it has taken the power to protect the state‘s natural resources away from the
I would affirm the Court of Appeals holding that plaintiffs have standing to bring suit under MEPA, because plaintiffs allege that the defendant‘s water pumping and bottling activities will irreparably harm Michigan‘s natural resources.
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with WEAVER, J.
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). I concur fully with Justice WEAVER‘s dissenting opinion because I, too, believe that the majority‘s systematic dismantling of our standing principles is seriously misguided. Moreover, I would find that plaintiffs properly have standing because the evidence they presented soundly demonstrates that the conduct of Nestlé Waters North America Inc. is perpetrating detrimental environmental effects on the ecosystem about which plaintiffs’ complaint is concerned. I reject the sort of “piecemeal justice” the majority would afford plaintiffs because, in my view, there is no justifiable reason for preventing plaintiffs from holding defendants accountable for actions that affect this intricately connected area. I would recognize that, at the very least, areas a citizen does not use but that are perceptibly affected by the same conduct that is affecting the areas the citizen does use—are encompassed within the citizen‘s right to pursue a claim against the offending actor.1 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 566; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992) (rejecting standing only for “persons who
Only in this way can we attempt to fully ensure the protection of our environment. It is for this reason that I reject the majority‘s statement that “[w]hat we have done is recognized an established constitutional line on our judicial authority to adjudicate what would otherwise be public policy-oriented lawsuits brought by persons who have no immediate stake in the controversy.” Ante at 309. I do not agree that lawsuits brought to vindicate environmentally detrimental conduct are merely “public policy-oriented,” nor do I agree that when an ecosystem of which a person seeking standing is a part is suffering perceptible degradation, the person has no “immediate stake in the controversy.” The divergence between the majority‘s viewpoint and my own stems from what is clearly a fundamentally different assessment of the interconnectedness of people and the environment in which we live.
KELLY, J. (dissenting). The sole issue we decide is whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge the effects of pumping activities by defendant Nestlé Waters North America Inc. on the Osprey Lake Impoundment and wetlands 112, 115, and 301. The majority holds that plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to challenge the pumping in these areas. In dissent, Justice WEAVER reaches the opposite conclusion. In so doing, she rejects the standing test adopted by the majority in Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm‘rs1 and Nat‘l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co.2 While I agree with Justice
FACTS
This case involves a number of interconnected bodies of water in Mecosta County, Michigan. The Osprey Lake impoundment (Osprey Lake) is a man-made body of water created by damming the Dead Stream. South of Osprey Lake is Thompson Lake. Wetlands 112, 115, and 301 are located to the west and north of Osprey Lake. The wetlands, the Dead Stream, and the lakes are directly connected to and part of the same shallow, unconfined spring aquifer.
In December 2000, defendant Nestlé purchased the groundwater rights to the area known as Sanctuary Springs, located to the north of Osprey Lake. Shortly afterwards, it announced plans to build a spring water bottling plant. Plaintiff Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation (MCWC) was formed then to represent the interests of the riparian property owners in the area. MCWC has over 2,000 members, including plaintiffs R.J. and Barbara Doyle, who own land on the Dead Stream, and plaintiffs Jeffrey and Shelly Sapp, who own land on Thompson Lake.
In 2001, Nestlé installed four wells on the Sanctuary Springs property. The combined maximum pumping rate permitted for the wells was 400 gallons a minute. Later that year, plaintiffs filed their complaint. The complaint consisted of (1) a claim for an injunction, (2) a claim that withdrawal of water violated the common law applicable to riparian water rights, (3) a claim that
A trial was held on the groundwater and MEPA claims only. It lasted 19 days, and the transcript contains more than 3,700 pages. Ultimately, the trial court held that plaintiffs had stated a prima facie case under MEPA with respect to Osprey Lake, Thompson Lake, the Dead Stream, the Dead Stream wetlands, and wetlands 115, 112, and 301. The court found the appropriate remedy to be an injunction against all pumping operations at the site.
In reaching its decision, the trial court made a number of findings of fact. It found that, for every gallon of water diverted or removed by the pumping, there is a corresponding loss of water to Osprey Lake, the Dead Stream, Thompson Lake, and the wetlands. It found that the pumping activities would cause Dead Stream‘s surface level to drop two inches and that the Dead Stream wetlands would lose at least 2 inches. It found that wetland 115 would suffer a drop in water level of 1.5 feet, wetland 112 would drop at least 3 inches, and wetland 301 would drop 2 to 4 inches. And it found that Osprey Lake and Thompson Lake would drop by as much as 6 inches. The court found that the result would be that the Dead Stream‘s use as a fishery and recreational area would be reduced; that the bottom of the wetlands would become exposed, which could cause the areas to become choked with vegetation; and that a level-control structure would need to be installed to maintain the lakes’ water levels.
Defendants appealed from the trial court‘s injunctive order, arguing, among other things, that plaintiffs lacked standing with respect to Osprey Lake and wetlands 112, 115, and 301. Writing for a divided court, Judge MURPHY concluded that plaintiffs had standing to assert MEPA claims over all the areas identified by the trial court. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America Inc, 269 Mich App 25, 113; 709 NW2d 174 (2005) (opinion by MURPHY, J.).
Judge SMOLENSKI dissented on the standing issue. He would have found that plaintiffs do not have standing to assert claims over Osprey Lake and wetlands 112, 115, and 301. He believed that, in regard to these areas, plaintiffs had not suffered harm that was different from the citizenry at large. Id. at 83 (opinion by SMOLENSKI, J.).
Both sides applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We scheduled oral argument on the applications, directing the parties to address “only whether the plaintiffs have standing under Nat‘l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608 (2004), to bring claims related to the Osprey Lake impoundment and wetlands 112, 115, and 301.” 477 Mich 892 (2006).
THE STANDING ISSUE
In Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm‘rs, this Court expressly adopted the standing test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992). The test has three elements:
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact‘—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.“’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not... the result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” [Lee, 464 Mich at 739, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 560-561.]
In Nat‘l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, this Court re-affirmed Lee‘s adoption of the Lujan test and applied the three factors to environmental plaintiffs. Nat‘l Wildlife Federation, 471 Mich at 628-629.
The resolution of the case before us turns on the correct application of the injury-in-fact component of the test. In applying that component, the majority overlooks a basic purpose of the standing doctrine. As stated in Nat‘l Wildlife Federation, the purpose of requiring plaintiffs to show injury in fact is to ensure that “a genuine case or controversy [exists] between the parties, one in which there is a real, not a hypothetical, dispute.” Nat‘l Wildlife Federation, 471 Mich at 615. See ante at 293. However, the injury-in-fact requirement is not meant to prevent plaintiffs from protecting the public interest when the concerns underlying the requirement have been satisfied. The United States Supreme Court has instructed:
[S]o long as the [standing] requirement is satisfied, persons to whom [the Legislature] has granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear implication, may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest in support of their claim. [Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 501; 95 S Ct 2197; 45 L Ed 2d 343 (1975).]
The federal courts have consistently applied the principle that, once a plaintiff has established standing to challenge an activity, that plaintiff also has standing to invoke the general public interest. In Citizens Com-mittee Against Interstate Route 675 v Lewis,3 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ plan to build a segment of I-675 violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 542 F Supp at 522. The defendants conceded that plaintiff Mione had standing to challenge the construction of the highway because he used the land that would be taken to build the road. Id. at 523. However, the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the “socio-economic impacts upon the City of Dayton, because [neither Mione nor any of the other plaintiffs had claimed injury] which arises from that act.” Id. The court disagreed, concluding that, since plaintiff “Mione has standing to advance his environmental injury in fact, it is clear, ... that Mione has standing, based upon the public interest, to raise other alleged inadequacies of the [final environmental impact statement], including... the socio-economic impacts of I-675 upon the City of Dayton.” Id. at 524.
Likewise, in Sierra Club v Adams,4 the plaintiffs brought suit seeking an injunction to stop the government from constructing a highway because the government had failed to prepare an environmental impact statement. The defendants conceded that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the failure to adequately consider the potential spread of aftosa.5 But the defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the failure to consider the effect of the construction on the Cuna and Choco Indians. Id. at 149. Considering this argument, the court found that the plaintiffs had not alleged that the government‘s failure to consider the effect of construction on the Indian
In Alaska Ctr for the Environment v Browner,6 the plaintiffs brought suit to compel the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) for Alaskan waters. Id. at 982. The EPA challenged the lower court‘s statewide remedy, claiming that the plaintiffs had demonstrated an injury in fact with respect to only a limited number of waters in the state. Id. at 984. According to the EPA, it was proper to order it to establish TMDLs only for the bodies of water that the plaintiffs actually used. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that the plaintiffs could challenge the failure to establish TMDLs on the basis of how the EPA‘s actions affected them. But the plaintiffs could challenge the failure, also, on the basis of the total effect of the EPA‘s actions. Id. at 985. The court explained that, once standing is established, ” ‘the appropriate scope of the remedy goes to the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and is ultimately limited by the statutory authority,’ ” not by the standing doctrine.7 Id. (citation omitted).
This discussion illustrates that, once a plaintiff has
The majority disagrees and determines that plaintiffs cannot assert the general public interest in support of their claim because they do not have standing to assert a claim. This decision contradicts other findings in the majority opinion. The majority concedes that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the pumping as it relates to the Dead Stream and Thompson Lake. As a result, the majority necessarily decides that plaintiffs have a claim under MEPA. Simultaneously, however, the majority concludes that plaintiffs cannot invoke the general
The majority also finds that the statement from Warth on which I rely is dictum. The statement in Warth echoes similar statements from earlier United States Supreme Court decisions. See Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727, 740 n 15; 92 S Ct 1361; 31 L Ed 2d 636 (1972); Fed Communications Comm v Sanders Bros Radio Station, 309 US 470, 477; 60 S Ct 693; 84 L Ed 869 (1940). It would be odd for the Supreme Court to repeatedly rely on this statement in its decisions if it did not consider the statement to be a binding rule of law. Moreover, numerous federal cases that I have discussed proceed as if the statement from Warth is a holding. E.g., Lewis, 542 F Supp at 523; Adams, 578 F2d at 392. If the federal courts treat the statement as precedent, there is every reason for this Court to do so, as well.12
The majority implies that the federal cases I discuss should be ignored because the statement I rely on from Warth is unique to the area of federal administrative law. There are numerous fallacies in this position. First, a large number of federal standing decisions, notably Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, are from cases in which one party is a governmental entity. Thus, it is not surprising that the decisions I discuss include some of these cases. What the majority fails to demonstrate is that the United States Supreme Court has separated its
Second, there is no principled reason for this Court to make such a distinction. In Warth, the plaintiffs challenged a zoning ordinance of the defendant town, claiming that the ordinance violated their constitutional rights by excluding persons of low income from living in the town. 422 US at 493. In this case, plaintiffs claim that Nestlé‘s pumping has injured them by harming the environment. The majority has not explained the relevance of the fact that, in Warth, the defendant is a governmental entity and here, the defendant is a private corporation. In short, the majority has advanced no principled reason for refusing to apply to this case standing decisions from cases where the defendant is a governmental entity.
By refusing to follow the federal decisions that I discuss, the majority indulges in a serious inconsistency. For example, in this case and in Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Schools,13 which also was decided today, the majority finds that plaintiffs lacked standing, despite the fact that they would have standing under federal law.
But Michigan‘s current standing test is derived exclusively from federal law. Hence, it should follow that plaintiffs in the instant case and the plaintiffs in Rohde have standing. The majority has adopted only a portion of federal standing law. It would seem rational that either Michigan‘s standing law is consistently the same as federal standing law or it is consistently different. If it is the same, the majority should accept and follow the decisions I have relied on here. If it is different, then there is no reason to follow other federal standing
THE MAJORITY‘S SEPARATION OF POWERS ARGUMENT
One final point merits addressing. The majority claims that my interpretation of Warth cannot be correct because it “would violate the separation of powers principles upon which... standing requirements rest.” Ante at 306 n 55. I disagree.
It is uncontested that plaintiffs have standing to assert a MEPA claim challenging defendant Nestlé‘s pumping. Accordingly, the issue is not whether plaintiffs have standing to assert a claim under MEPA. The issue is the proper scope of the claim. And the answer is that, because plaintiffs have standing to challenge the pumping, ” ‘the appropriate scope of the remedy goes to the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and is ultimately limited by the statutory authority,’ ”14 not by the standing doctrine. The majority‘s decision to limit the scope of plaintiffs’ cause of action on the basis of standing actually undermines the separation of powers. By extinguishing a valid cause of action, the majority usurps power rightly belonging to the Legislature.
This Court has recognized that the injury-in-fact component of the standing doctrine is necessary to prevent “the judicial branch [from establishing itself] as first among equals, being permitted to monitor and supervise the other branches, and effectively possessing a generalized commission to evaluate and second-guess the wisdom of their policies.” Cleveland Cliffs, 471 Mich at 616. Injury in fact is the factor that separates hypothetical policy disputes from genuine cases or controversies. Id. at 615. By requiring a plaintiff to
But once a plaintiff has established standing to challenge the activity at issue, the concern that the judiciary is overstepping its bounds disappears. This is because after a plaintiff has shown that the activity caused him or her an injury in fact, any concern that the court is getting dragged into a hypothetical policy dispute evaporates. Rather, a legitimate controversy then exists between the parties, one that the courts can properly resolve. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he test of injury in fact goes only to the question of standing to obtain judicial review. Once this standing is established, the party may assert the interests of the general public in support of his claims....” Sierra Club, 405 US at 740 n 15. Therefore, once a plaintiff has standing to challenge a given activity, it is not the court‘s place to decide whether the Legislature‘s grant of a broad cause of action is wise. The Court‘s role is simply to adjudicate the dispute.
The law of standing is meant to limit courts to deciding actual cases and to keep them out of the business of “prescribing how the other two branches should function....”15 Today, a majority of this Court oversteps its bounds by telling the Legislature how it should function. It fails to exercise appropriate judicial self-restraint. It extinguishes a valid cause of action for no reason other than its belief that the cause of action granted by the Legislature is too broad. Sadly, the majority does not recognize that this decision is not its to make.