MICHELSEN et al. v. PENNEY et al.
No. 124.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
March 19, 1943.
Ct. 285, 62 L.Ed. 591; Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 31 S.Ct. 578, 55 L.Ed. 738; Whitchurch v. Crawford, 10 Cir., 92 F.2d 249, 253; Hickey v. United States, 10 Cir., 64 F.2d 628, 629, 631,
Before AUGUSTUS N. HAND, CLARK, and FRANK, Circuit Judges.
I. Gainsburg, of New York City, and Kendall A. Sanderson, of Boston, Mass. (Joseph P. Segal, of New York City, on the brief), for plaintiffs.
Peyton Randolph Harris, of New York City (Gibboney & Harris and Stuart G. Gibboney, all of New York City, on the brief), for R. C. Parsons, receiver.
Nathan L. Miller, of New York City (Gwinn & Pell, Harold H. Corbin, and Caleb C. Curtis, all of New York City, on the brief), for defendant.
CLARK, Circuit Judge.
This is an action by the members of a depositors’ committee, for themselves and other depositors, of City National Bank in Miami, Miami, Florida, against James C. Penney, the chairman of the board of directors of the bank, to recover for losses claimed to have been caused it by his violation of duty as a director. A successor receiver to the original receiver who had been appointed on the bank‘s failure in December, 1930, was allowed to intervene; and he and, upon his death, his successor, the present receiver of the bank, have joined forces with plaintiff to urge recovery. A special master, appointed by the district court, held extensive hearings and then submitted his report, with detailed findings and the recommendation that the complaint be dismissed. The district court, however, sustained exceptions to the master‘s report, made its own extensive findings, supported by a careful opinion, 41 F.Supp. 603, and gave judgment in favor of the receiver for a substantial recovery. All parties have appealed, the plaintiffs and the receiver because they believe the recovery allowed was too small, the defendant because he thinks no recovery, or at the least a lesser one, should have been granted. In our view of the case, which is that a lesser recovery should be granted, a rather detailed review of the history of this failed national bank becomes necessary.
Penney arranged a syndicate loan of $1,000,000, which came to the City National Bank and Trust Company through its merger with the newly organized City National Bank in Miami, to whose capitalization the loan was applied. As one feature of the merger, doubtful assets of the City National Bank and Trust Company in the amount of $1,500,000 were charged off against its surplus of $500,000, and against its stated capital of $2,000,000. The $1,000,000 balance in the capital account was transferred to the new bank. Thus, the latter began operations with a stated capital of $1,000,000, represented by 10,000 shares of $100 par value each, and a surplus of like amount. The syndicate members had complete stock control of the bank, however, for, in addition to 5,000 shares received by them in return for their loan, the stockholders of the old bank gave them a bonus of 298 shares of the new organization and Penney-Gwinn Corporation purchased the equivalent of 405 shares from the stockholders of the old bank. In the syndicate, Penney-Gwinn became and was recognized as the dominant factor.
After the organization of the bank, defendant was elected a director and chairman of the Board; Saunders, agent and resident manager of Penney-Gwinn in Florida, became a director and vice-chairman of the Board; and Lewis, a vice-president and a director of Penney-Gwinn, became a director. In order that Saunders and Lewis might appear to comply with the National Bank Act,
Immediately after the bank began business, its entire capital and surplus were applied to reduce the old “pool loan” contracted by the former City National Bank and Trust Company. These and other payments on the “pool loan,” until it was wiped out in July 26, 1929, plus recurring losses on investments, so reduced the bank‘s capital that it was forced from the outset to resort to borrowings, principally from its largest stockholders. In fact throughout its life its borrowings generally exceeded the limit permitted by the National Bank Act,
In addition, the bank underwent two recapitalizations. By the first, occurring February 20, 1929, doubtful assets in the amount of $1,000,000 were charged off against capital and surplus, each being reduced by one-half, and authorized capital stock was increased to 40,000 shares at $25 par value. The existing stockholders received two shares for every one of the old stock, and the balance of 20,000 shares was sold at $50 per share. Penney-Gwinn made purchases to the extent of $492,662.50. Capital and surplus thus were restored to $1,000,000 each.
By the second recapitalization, occurring April 4, 1930, and involving the controverted Tarrier transaction, the bank erased doubtful assets of $2,000,000 from its balance sheet. First, each stockholder contributed one-half of his holdings, permitting a reduction of capital and surplus to $500,000 each and producing a $1,000,000 offset. Next, the Tarrier Company of Delaware, a corporation organized for the purpose, contributed a second $1,000,000 offset, together with all its common stock, in return for such bank assets as had theretofore been charged off or which were regarded as doubtful. The Tarrier Com
But matters went from bad to worse. On June 11, 1930, the failure of the Bank of Bay Biscayne precipitated a run on the City National Bank. Defendant and Penney-Gwinn lent the bank $880,000 by way of deposit, to tide it over the crisis, with the understanding that the money was to be repaid with interest as soon as the emergency was over. This expedient was successful, the bank survived the run, and by July 7, 1930, the loan had been repaid with interest, apparently in the real belief that the crisis had passed. At least the Penney-Gwinn deposits in the bank were increased from $171,602.13 on July 7, 1930, to $485,500.87 on December 20, 1930. On December 20, however, another run began and the bank was compelled to close. The Comptroller of the Currency, on December 23, 1930, announced its insolvency and appointed H. J. Spurway as receiver. The depositors at the time of closing numbered some 5,700, and were owed $5,996,970.02. They have since received liquidating dividends totalling 40 per cent.
The parties have been at variance as to the respective weight to be accorded to the two lengthy findings of fact now before us, the master‘s and the district court‘s respectively. While it is the master‘s findings of fact which are to be accepted “unless clearly erroneous,”
Defendant points out that he and his corporation, Penney-Gwinn, by this bank‘s failure, have lost very large sums of money which from his point of view and in substantial effect were donations made to the bank to keep it running, in the interest of the depositors, without personal gain of any kind, whether by way of dividends or otherwise. Moreover, it is a fact that the claims against him are not based upon intentional or wilful wrongdoing, but rest in final analysis on his inattention to duty. The picture of the bank disclosed by the record is that of a comparatively small institution, which during its brief existence engaged in a continuing struggle against the deepening gloom of the Florida real estate depression. Hindsight suggests that it was doomed from the beginning. Nevertheless, certain of the losses should never have been incurred. One cannot be a national bank director in absentia, and we cannot condone defendant‘s failure to attend to the duties of an office voluntarily accepted or relieve him of responsibility for losses to the avoidance of which he should have devoted his best thought and endeavor.
1. Statute of Limitations.
The appropriate statute of limitations is the
An original bill of complaint alleging both fraud and deceit and misfeasance and nonfeasance in office was filed by plaintiffs on December 13, 1933. It was dismissed for misjoinder of legal and equitable causes of action, with leave to serve an amended bill of complaint. Michelsen v. Penney, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 10 F.Supp. 537. On August 31, 1934, an amended bill for this action was served. Shortly thereafter Bancroft, who had succeeded Spurway as receiver in April, was allowed to intervene. Still later, in May, 1935, the court permitted plaintiffs to file a supplementary and amended complaint which prayed for judgment to the receiver, Bancroft; and this he completely and promptly accepted as the basis of his own prayer to the same effect.
The original bill first alleged without particulars that a total loss of $3,000,000 suffered by the bank and otherwise unaccounted for had been occasioned by defendant‘s negligence and violation of the National Bank Acts, “as hereinafter more particularly set forth and otherwise,” and then specifically complained of certain transactions involving City National Building, Inc., Coral Gables, Inc., and preferential payments to defendant. The amended bill elaborated “otherwise” to “in other manners and by other means peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, James C. Penney, and wholly unknown to the plaintiffs.” The supplemental and amended complaint, filed after motions made by defendant and covering forty-five printed pages, set forth with more detail than the present federal rules contemplate not only the transactions particularly described before, but also others allegedly contributing to the $3,000,000 bank deficit and occasioned by defendant‘s negligence and violation of statutory obligations.
Defendant contends that the statutory period should be reckoned from the date the alleged wrongs were committed against the bank—in every instance prior to December 13, 1930—and that, therefore, even the original complaint is barred. He contends, further, that even if the prescriptive period is reckoned from the date of the appointment of a receiver, at least the supplementary and amended complaint is barred.
Under the general rule, to which New York has apparently adhered, notwithstanding the provision that the cause accrues only upon discovery of the facts, the prescriptive period ordinarily runs from the time alleged wrongs are committed. Chance v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, supra; see The Statute of Limitations in Stockholders’ Derivative Suits Against Directors, 39 Col.L.Rev. 842, 852. But the statute is tolled while a corporate plaintiff continues under the domination of the wrongdoers. See The Statute of Limitations in Stockholders’ Derivative Suits Against Directors, 39 Col.L.Rev. 842, 854. Here there is no dispute of the district court‘s finding that “at all times during the existence of City National Bank in Miami the defendant Penney through his agents
Discovery of the facts, must, however, be attributed to plaintiffs as of that time. That the receiver may have kept his mind closed to any actual knowledge of the wrongs and refused to institute suit upon plaintiffs’ request was immaterial. Since in fact he was given sufficient notice to put him on inquiry of the wrongs to the bank and he failed to inquire, he was charged with discovery, Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 25 L.Ed. 807; Higgins v. Crouse, 147 N.Y. 411, 42 N.E. 6, 70 N.Y. St.Rep. 50, and through him the bank, the “plaintiff,” was charged. And further it would avail the depositors nothing on this score to consider them the plaintiffs within
The amended and supplementary complaint is saved, however, by the doctrine of relation back. As a matter of pleading, the original complaint clearly gave defendant notice that he would be held for all acts of negligence. It charged him with negligence generally and with a resultant three-million-dollar loss “as hereinafter more particularly set forth and
2. Basis of Defendant‘s Liability.
This case has developed the most divergent views as to the standard of liability by which defendant‘s conduct as a bank director must be judged. They range from plaintiffs’ contention, which was adopted by the district court as its first ground of decision, that defendant was liable as an insurer for bank losses because of his acts in enabling certain directors to qualify without bona fide ownership of stock, to defendant‘s claim, substantially adopted by the master, that though he might be held for common-law negligence, yet he was not liable for any losses resulting from statutory violations, since he did not “knowingly” participate in or permit them. Since defendant was unwilling to concede proof of negligence, except as to a single claim (which he contended to be barred by the statute of limitations), his view of the law would pretty much protect him from responsibility for the losses.
All concede that under the authorities there are two bases of liability—one at common law for failure to exercise that degree of care which ordinarily diligent and prudent men would exercise under the circumstances, Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 513, 39 S.Ct. 549, 63 L.Ed. 1113, and one under the National Bank Act. By
In the Bowerman case the Court had occasion to define the common-law duty of a bank director. In that case Bowerman, who lived 200 miles away from the bank, had never attended a directors’ meeting or examined any of the books or papers of the bank. The Court said it was “beyond discussion” that he “did not exercise the diligence which prudent men would usually exercise in ascertaining the condition of the business of the bank, or a reasonable control and supervision over its affairs and officers. * * * He cannot be shielded from liability because of want of knowledge of wrongdoing on his part, since that ignorance was the result of gross inattention in the discharge of his voluntarily assumed and sworn duty.” 250 U.S. at page 513, 39 S.Ct. at page 552, 63 L.Ed. at page 1119.
The similarity of that case to the case at bar is striking. Here the master and the court were in agreement as to not merely defendant‘s utter incompetence, but also his complete neglect of duty, as a bank director. He had no special knowledge or experience for the position, and not only did nothing to fit himself for it, but failed in the obvious duties of attendance at meetings of the Board of which he was chairman. Of thirty-one regular and special meetings of the Board during his directorship, he attended only three—two in 1928 and one in 1930. He also attended a meeting of the Loan and Discount Committee in 1930. His excuses of ill health on the part of himself and his wife were properly discounted—especially in the light of his other manifold activities. And at most they should have led him to resign, not to continue in a relation which would mislead the public. See Rankin v. Cooper, C.C.W.D.Ark., 149 F. 1010, 1016. As the master said, with the court‘s concurrence, “The conclusion is inescapable that defendant Penney treated the bank‘s business as of secondary consequence.” 41 F.Supp. at page 616. But “his oath forbade his abandoning the conduct of the business to” the other bank officers. See L. Hand, J., in Goess v. Ehret, 2 Cir., 85 F.2d 109, 110. Indeed, defendant concedes his liability for the Board‘s negligence, for he says in his brief that “save as the Statute of Limitations affords a defense, appellant Penney does not dispute his liability if negligent acts of the Board are shown to have caused damage to the bank.”
This concession of defendant loses substantially the greater part of its effect when it is coupled with the contention that any act of the Board which violates the National Bank Act is subject to the exclusive remedy contained in the statute, which in turn shields him from liability because of his lack of knowledge. As pointed out below, even on so strict a view, he must be charged with a greater knowledge of the bank‘s affairs than this contention admits; but we do not believe it is a correct, or at least a complete, statement of the appropriate standard. Its logical conclusion would be that as proper banking practices come more and more in accordance with present trends to be the subject of statutory enactment, a director inattentive to duty will secure greater and greater exemption from liability. Thus, the scope of the Bowerman rule would be small and would be constantly decreasing. Actually, as the decision below makes additionally clear, McCormick v. King, 9 Cir., 241 F. 737, losses for which Bowerman and other bank officers were held were in violation of the Act (now
In the light of this trend towards increasing responsibility of bank fiduciaries, we do not think we are justified in holding that the statutes extend the area of protection accorded a director. It is true, as it is appropriate, that a director conscientiously carrying out the duties of his office cannot be held for statutory violations of which he neither has nor should have knowledge. There the statute is the only measure of responsibility. But where he has substantially abdicated the responsibilities of his office, then the common-law principle—which is in addition to the statutory rules—operates to make him liable for losses improperly incurred by his co-officers to whom he has abandoned the operation of the bank. In fixing those losses, there seems no reason why the statutory standards should not have their ordinary function in determining what are allowable and what are prohibited bank practices. We may say, in accordance with the usual rule,
Each standard of liability still requires, however, a causal connection between the act interdicted and the loss. It is because of that requirement that we do not agree with the district court in holding defendant as an insurer by reason of the qualification of dummy directors. That there was a violation of statute seems clear.
Stress is placed upon the word “thereby” in the statutory command that an unqualified director shall vacate his office. But the statute does not show a clear intent to declare the office vacant on the mere happening of the disqualifying condition; and the case of Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152, 11 S.Ct. 924, 35 L.Ed. 662, 670, suggests the contrary in its careful examination of the effect of an oral resignation of a director who had surrendered his stock. See the same case below, Movius v. Lee, C.C.N.D.N.Y., 30 F. 298, 301. And even if automatic vacation of office should have resulted, or even if the number of directors fell below the statutory requirement of five,
It may be added that if general liability were to be assessed because of this situation, it would be difficult to know where to begin and even more where to leave off in computing damage. If liability exists beyond that for the specific acts which we are about to examine, there would seem no stopping point short of complete responsibility for all disappointed expectations in the bank, even those of stockholders for at least principal, if not for profits. In this, regard plaintiffs’ actual contention is not overclear. Their most explicit statements are be found in their respective notices of appeal, where they claim for violation of
We therefore reject any claim for damage beyond that sustained in the specific matters we now discuss.
3. The City National Building Transactions.
Liability is asserted against defendant on two counts in connection with City National Building, Inc.—one for alleged negligence in improvidently investing the bank‘s money in preferred stock of City National Building, Inc., the other for alleged negligence in unnecessarily paying City National Building, Inc., an excessive rent for the bank‘s premises. The two acts arise from the same set of transactions, as follows:
In 1925, Miami Bank and Trust Company, wishing to obtain its own banking premises, organized Miami Stockholders Company. It distributed the capital stock of the latter to its own stockholders and then proceeded to lend the company $450,000 to acquire the desired property, taking back a note of an equivalent amount, secured by a purchase-money mortgage on the property. The funds for a new building to be erected on the property were supplied by a bond issue of $650,000, secured by a first mortgage upon the entire property superior to the bank‘s purchase-money mortgage. The bank took a ten-year lease covering the ground floors in the new building at a rental of $36,000 per year. Pursuant to a provision in the lease that the lessor would rent to the bank additional space in the ten-story building, the bank also took possession of the second floor without, however, executing any new lease, agreement, or instrument in writing. It paid an annual rental of $17,000 for the space.
In June, 1926, City National Bank and Trust Company of Miami acquired the assets of the Miami Bank, succeeding both
When City National Bank and Trust Company of Miami merged with the City National Bank in Miami in February, 1928, the notes, the mortgages, and the lease again changed hands. At this time the first mortgage on the Prince Edward Apartments had been foreclosed, and the interest of the second mortgagee wiped out. The second mortgage on the bank premises was also in default; and in March, 1928, City National Bank began a foreclosure proceeding. This was not pressed, however, but by agreement which became effective by May 8, 1928, City National Building, Inc., was organized with 13,000 shares of $100 par value preferred stock and with 100 shares of common stock, 51 per cent of which was distributed to City National Bank, and 49 per cent to Miami Stockholders. Miami Stockholders transferred its equity in the bank premises to City National Building, Inc., and City National Bank exchanged the notes and mortgages which it held against Miami Stockholders for an equivalent par value of preferred stock. Thus far City National Bank had lost nothing. Stock of doubtful or no value had been merely substituted for notes of like value.
But underlying these financial manipulations was the assumption that City National Bank should itself pay off the first mortgage on the bank premises, taking in satisfaction additional preferred stock of City National Building, Inc. At this time, $647,000 was still owed on the mortgage, $77,000 being due immediately. Accordingly, at the outset, the bank paid $77,000 to the trustee of the mortgage and subsequently, until it failed, paid $108,000 more on the mortgage and $58,000 for another new building—a grand total of $243,000—in satisfaction of which preferred stock at par was received. There has been a recoupment upon this stock of only $17,320.30. A loss of $225,679.70 was thus incurred.
In addition, City National Bank, after taking over the banking headquarters of City National Bank and Trust Company, continued to pay the annual rental of $53,000 which the Miami Bank first undertook to pay, and which City National Bank and Trust Company had assumed to pay under its assignment of the lease. This occurred notwithstanding the fact that both Miami Stockholders and the directors of City National Bank had contemplated, and urged upon the Comptroller of the Currency as a basis for his approval of this project, that the bank through its stock control of City National Building, Inc., would cancel the old lease and execute another at a fair annual rental of $20,000. Thus, the bank paid an excessive rent of $33,000 per year throughout its life, sustaining a loss of $88,000.04.
The master and the district court agreed that the directors, including defendant, were negligent in that they acquired title to the bank premises through City National Building, Inc., without obtaining an appraisal of the property and upon the assumption that its value was still the equivalent of its cost at the height of the Florida real estate boom. The district court found that “an honest appraisal obtained at the time would have shown the building worth much less than the principal amount of the first mortgage,” also that “had a competent examining committee appointed as provided by the by-laws and as directed by the National Bank Examiner properly functioned, such a committee, in evaluating the assets of the bank, would have found that the property, free and clear of all encumbrances, was not worth more than $400,000.” And the master agreed that $400,000 was the fair market value of the land and bank building in May, 1928.
Some of the directors holding office at the time testified that they judged the property was worth upward of a million dollars; but it appeared that in many cases these estimates were based not on what the directors thought the building would be worth on the market, but on what they felt it was worth to the bank. But a finding of the master, in which the district court concurred, rejected any good-will value: “The bank had occupied its then quarters less than two years. The Flagler Street end of the building was by all accounts ramshackle and a wooden fire-trap. The failure of banks in the neighboring business section made other sites available. It is impossible to believe that the bank would have sustained any loss of goodwill in moving to one of them.” Furthermore, it appeared that, while some of the directors questioned the acquisition of the property on the ground that “it would not pay,” no disinterested appraisal was ever sought.
The master nevertheless held that the directors incurred no liability for this action because, while their failure to investigate was undoubtedly negligent, even had they investigated they might reasonably have foreseen no harm to the bank from the acquisition. He reasoned that the bank was liable on the original lease to pay an annual rental of $53,000 for the balance of its term—some seven and one-half years—and that this was $33,000 more than a fair annual rental for the property. By adding the total excessive rent of $247,000, which would have to be paid over the balance of the lease term, to the fair market value of the building, based on a fair economic rent, the property could be accorded a value of $647,000.
This rationale can only be made applicable, however, by a process of oversimplification whereby the intervening landlord-mortgagor drops out, and the bank in effect buys for $647,000 the building and the burdensome lease against it, which it is further assumed the first mortgagee can enforce. Clearly as to the financially irresponsible Miami Stockholders the rationale will not suffice. It owed the bank a total of overdue indebtedness of $555,250—$435,000 secured by the second mortgage on the bank building, and $120,250 secured by the second mortgage already determined to be worthless on the Prince Edward Apartments. Faced with this overwhelming claim, it was practically in no position to oppose the bank‘s demand for a new lease at a reasonable rental which would eliminate the abnormal increment of value attributed to the property. The bank could have foreclosed this interest, as it had already started to do, or use it otherwise to secure appropriate adjustments. True, Miami Stockholders made some attack on the bank‘s title to those mortgages; but this obviously could have been at most a bargaining point, for the debts were certainly validly owed at least to the old Miami Bank and Trust Company, which City National Bank then represented.
As to the first mortgagee (the trustee for the bondholders), even accepting the master‘s premise that he could enforce the lease throughout its terms, it is doubtful whether the transaction should be considered a reasonable purchase in view of its obvious purpose and the various complications which it involved. The rather clear-cut proposition of the master was never visualized or considered by the directors. In fact, it only came into the case when it was propounded by the master in his draft opinion in 1939 after the hearings were closed and arguments had. It seems clear that the real purpose behind the complicated setup of the newly organized City National Building, Inc., was to avoid the immediate crisis by another palliative which would (a) substitute new securities (preferred stock) for the overdue indebtedness criticized by the bank examiner and (b) preserve the speculative position of all concerned in the bank office building, even though the offices were only half rented and despite the fact that the Miami real estate boom had burst and the bank was already gorged with real estate. The evidence in fact gives rise to an implication that the bank was influenced to favor Miami Stockholders by an active interlocking directorate. The master found, and the court agreed, as to Miami Stockholders that, while they had contributed nothing to the enterprise, “their vociferousness, all out of proportion to their interest in the property, to retain a speculative interest in the building, should not have been treated by the directors as an important circumstance. Particularly is this so when the most outspoken were officers and directors of the bank, whose actions were, therefore, subject to the more careful scrutiny.” And he found it impossible that the directors could have believed the building then worth its cost. It is to be further noted that Saunders, officer and director of the bank and resident manager of Penney-Gwinn, who actively promoted this plan before the board, became president of the Building Company.
Furthermore, the transaction left Miami Stockholders still in the picture, together with the new corporation, City National Building, both of which would require moneysops, even if the venture ultimately proved speculatively successful. As it actually turned out, the bank continued to pay a rental of $53,000 a year, although apparently all the negotiators had contemplated its reduction to $20,000. This otherwise inexplicable result was presumably due to the uncalculated needs of City National Building arising from the bank premises. In other words, this was an indirect and a potentially expensive way to accomplish
But the premise that the first mortgagee could enforce the lease for its full term against the bank is, we think, not sound. There are initial problems, not made clear on this record or in the briefs, as to whether City National Bank can be held originally to have assumed the lease (which at the time of its organization was actually held by the trustee of the “pool loan” as security for that loan), and whether that part of the rent based on the oral agreement for the occupancy of extra rooms—$17,000 per year—can be included in any event. Passing these questions, the master relied on the pledge of the rents. The first mortgage contained a provision conveying not merely the land and fixtures, but “also all the hereditaments, rents, issues and profits now or hereafter belonging to, and all the right, title and interest of said parties of the First Part in and to all leaseholds, leases and subleases now or hereafter on or to said real estate.” Other provisions gave the mortgagor possession and use of the property “and the income, rents, issues and profits thereof” until default. Upon default, the trustee (mortgagee) could take possession directly or through a receiver, and the mortgagor agreed upon demand to furnish proper assignments of all leases or subleases.
It may well be argued, however, that with or without these provisions, the mortgagor, until the mortgagee takes possession, is entitled to the rents and is in charge of the premises to make proper contracts as to their use. Smith v. D. A. Schulte, Inc., 2 Cir., 91 F.2d 732, certiorari denied 302 U.S. 744, 58 S.Ct. 145, 82 L.Ed. 575; In re Humeston, 2 Cir., 83 F.2d 187, 189; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Liberdar Holding Corp., 2 Cir., 74 F.2d 50; Freedman‘s Savings & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494, 8 S.Ct. 1250, 32 L.Ed. 163. See, also, White v. Anthony Investment Co., 119 Fla. 108, 160 So. 881; Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baumgartner, 99 Fla. 987, 128 So. 241; Pasco v. Gamble, 15 Fla. 562. Accordingly the mortgagor and the lessee might be at liberty to draw up a new lease, so long as no fraud is contemplated. Haussmann v. Colonial Trust Co., 254 App.Div. 480, 5 N.Y.S.2d 344, affirmed 280 N.Y. 577, 20 N.E.2d 24; Id., D.C.S.D. N.Y., 23 F.Supp. 213; Prudence Co. v. 160 West Seventy-Third St. Corp., 260 N.Y. 205, 183 N.E. 365, 86 A.L.R. 361; Bank for Sav. v. Shenk Realty & Constr. Co., 265 App.Div. 72, 37 N.Y.S.2d 597; Fahnestock v. Clark Henry Corp., 151 Misc. 593, 272 N.Y.S. 49; cf. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. 571 Park Ave. Corp., 263 N.Y. 57, 188 N.E. 156. And where the new lease is for the reasonable value of the premises and the mortgagee has not started proceedings, it has been suggested unlikely that any fraud exists or can be discovered. See 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 504. Furthermore, it seems clear that here the bank as second mortgagee could have foreclosed and thus gotten rid of all but an obligation to pay for reasonable occupancy. Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 9 Ave.-31 St. Corp., 274 N.Y. 388, 9 N.E.2d 20. The failure to consult the first mortgagee in any way and the absence of any suggestion that his permission was needed for the important matter of adjusting the rent show how far this was from the contemplation of the bank officers at the time. We think this whole transaction must be considered an unwarranted real estate venture, rather than a proper purchase of the bank premises.
Damages proximately caused by the directors’ negligence certainly extend to all payments on or incidental to the first mortgage indebtedness. From what we have just said, it is also amply clear that they should include the unnecessary payment of the excessive rent. We think further that they should include the sum of $58,000 contributed to the erection of the new building in 1929 to replace the old wooden and ramshackle firetrap previously used by the bank. Had the directors originally considered all aspects of the situation, they must reasonably have contemplated that a new building would be required within a few years, and they must have realized that there was no one other than the bank to do the financing. True, they may have contemplated that some space in the building could be leased out, but they must also have realized that income from this source was very uncertain, since there was an oversupply of office buildings in the neighborhood at the time.6 Defendant is accord-
Liability cannot, however, be predicated upon a violation of
Prior to 1933, and
4. The Coral Gables Transaction.
Coral Gables Corporation was a land development company which purchased various exclusively residential tracts just outside Miami, financing each purchase by the issuance of a series of bonds. These bonds were secured by a trust mortgage constituting a first lien, subject to taxes, upon the tract acquired. The corporation sold lots on the installment plan, and in fact pledged many of the purchase-money contracts to secure additional needed funds. When a purchaser paid the last installment upon a lot, he became entitled to a deed conveying it free of the mortgage. But because the corporation failed to account strictly for the proceeds from the pledges, it was forced to give purchasers of some 3,000 lots deeds without release of the mortgage. In 1928, the corporation owed City National Bank $347,929, secured in large part by series bonds, while Merrick, the corporation‘s president, owed the bank $56,667.78 upon his note for $51,000, secured by worthless collateral. Both Merrick and the corporation had defaulted upon the direct and the collateral obligations; they were financially irresponsible, and an involuntary petition in bankruptcy had been filed against the corporation. Real estate values had declined, and the corporation owed taxes on its property of $3,540,000 as of 1929.
Efforts to reorganize Coral Gables Corporation began as early as February 3, 1928. At a meeting of the bank directors on March 22, 1928, defendant counselled against any action designed to thwart the efforts of the corporation‘s officials to keep it from receivership and hoped “this bank would lend a helping hand, if only in its attitude.” He also told the Board that these officials wished the bank to participate in a contemplated new bond issue of $1,000,000. The directors were at this time inclined to foreclose on the bonds held by the bank; but whether because of defendant‘s advice or because the estimated costs of foreclosure appeared disproportionately large in comparison with the bank‘s bond interests, they delayed action.
In the fall of 1928, a plan for the reorganization of the corporation was worked out. Pursuant to it, two new corporations, Coral Gables, Inc., and Coral Gables Properties, Inc., were organized. Coral Gables, Inc., issued debenture stock dollar for dollar in exchange for pledged purchase-money contracts, judgments, and bonds outstanding against the old corporation, and these bonds were transferred to Coral Gables Properties to prevent a merger. Then the old corporation‘s equity in 8,300 lots was transferred to Coral Gables, Inc., and upon these lots and the purchase-money contracts, the transferee placed a deed of trust to secure $2,000,000 of Class A bonds—to be issued for new money—and $15,000,000 of the debenture stock. The three classes of outstanding securities ranked in order of precedence as follows: Class A bonds,
Denham, trustee under the old “pool loan,” and Saunders, vice-chairman of the bank‘s board of directors, at first opposed this plan. One reason, it appears, was their lack of confidence in the proposed management of the new corporations by the officials of Coral Gables Corporation. But after Denham was elected treasurer and chief executive officer of Coral Gables, Inc., at an annual salary of $25,000, and Saunders chairman of its board of directors at an annual salary of $7,500, both withdrew their objections.
Under this plan neither the bank nor any other secured creditor of the old corporation was required to invest in the Class A bonds. An attempted public distribution of the bonds failed, however; and the bank, by action of its Loan and Discount Committee, approved by the directors on April 23, 1929, subscribed to $200,000 of the issue. Coral Gables, Inc., accepted $150,000 cash and the Merrick note for $51,000 in payment of the bank‘s subscription. Coral Gables, Inc., never redeemed any of the Class A bonds, and the receiver of the bank finally sold its block at a net loss of $139,092.62.
Until the bank purchased Class A bonds, it stood to lose nothing by the plan; and no liability has been asserted against its directors for any acts done prior to that time. Issue has been raised only as to defendant‘s claim that the purchase of the Class A bonds was also a part of the salvaging operation. If it was not, it violated
Upon the whole evidence we are of the view that defendant‘s claim cannot be sustained. Before attempting a salvage, bank directors should have a well-founded expectation of a substantially greater recovery than would otherwise be possible, based upon some plan for a quick and expedient disposal of the property salvaged. Compare the Atherton cases, supra, 86 F.2d at page 525, and 99 F.2d at page 887; McBoyle v. Union Nat. Bank, 162 Cal. 277, 122 P. 458. The operation should be devoid of speculation. First Nat. Bank of Ottawa v. Converse, supra. Here the plan of reorganization contemplated a protracted liquidation, which, indeed, was hardly to be differentiated from a permanent continuation of the business under the control of the bank and other creditors. Thus, Class A bonds were to be redeemed from the receipts of land sales over a four-year period, while Class B bonds, issued in place of the debenture stock, were to be redeemed after 1939. Once the debenture stock had all been redeemed and the bonds paid off, the remaining assets of the corporation would belong to Coral Gables Corporation, to which all the common stock of Coral Gables, Inc., had been issued. The directors of the bank at no time contemplated the sale of its holding of bonds and stock. Indeed, public distribution of the bonds had been proved impossible. Under these circumstances at least, the acquisition of bonds and stocks of a substandard quality to be held for a period of five to ten years cannot be considered a reasonable salvage operation. Significant on this point is
That Coral Gables, Inc., was a speculative enterprise becomes evident from a review of its financial outlook at the very outset. Pledged to secure Class A bonds, as well as $15,000,000 of debenture stock, were $17,000,000 of accounts receivable, based on purchase-money contracts, and 8,300 unimproved lots. The estimated recovery on the accounts receivable as of the date of the reorganization was $10,000,000. In the past, collection of these accounts had been very slow, a fact of which the directors of the bank had ample notice because of the bank‘s own meager recovery on purchase-money contracts pledged with it. The 8,300 lots were appraised at $3,005,500, but there was an offsetting tax liability of $3,540,000. Some of these lots were also covered by purchase-money contracts and included in the $17,000,000 of accounts receivable. On the whole, the directors might reasonably have supposed that the security of the trust deed was ample to cover the Class A bonds. But to justify the claim of a salvage operation, there should also have been some reasonable expectation of a substantial recovery
The new corporation furthermore was never adequately financed to enable it to carry out a salvage operation. Only $799,468.15 in cash was realized from the sale of the Class A bonds and from other credits. Tax claims were compromised in part at $623,694.24 cash. There remained, however, an unsettled tax claim of $1,445,097.24. It is apparent that from the start the new corporation was left without working capital, and the evidence justifies the conclusion of the district court that “there was no reasonable expectation that * * * the new company would be able to operate with new money of but $799,468.15.”
Defendant emphasizes the fact that the bank was the last creditor to subscribe for Class A bonds, being preceded by a number of banks and trust companies. But by then it should have been more evident than ever to the directors that the scheme was doomed. The fact that other banks invested is some evidence of the reasonableness of the operation, but we do not think it can outweigh the public interest against the bank‘s holding inferior securities in its portfolio for long periods of time.
The directors’ purchase of the Class A bonds was, therefore, unjustified. For this, defendant must be held liable for his abdication of his duties as director on the principles stated earlier herein. It is to be noted, further, that even though he was absent from the directors’ meeting at which the purchase was authorized, he was in fact a large factor in the bank‘s involvement in this affair. His advice to the Board in the spring of 1928 to do all in its power to lend Coral Gables Corporation a helping hand, coupled with the fact that he also told the Board then that Mr. Merrick wanted the bank to take a block of a new bond issue contemplated by Coral Gables Corporation, made his assent to the subsequent purchase a foregone conclusion, at least so far as the other directors were concerned. In view of his dominant position in the bank, his attitude was naturally influential with the directors. Cf. Dodd v. Wilkinson, 42 N.J.Eq. 647, 9 A. 685. In fact at this same meeting he promised the Board that he would investigate the Coral Gables situation and report back to it. This he failed to do. By this failure to keep informed, particularly as to a matter upon which he had taken such a definite position, he “in effect” knowingly and intentionally violated
5. Loss to Fred H. Rand, Jr.
Claim for this loss, due to negligent loans, in the sum of $89,300.39 was disallowed by the master solely on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Since we have rejected that defense, we agree with the district court in allowing the claim.
6. Excess Borrowings by the Bank.
From its inception in 1928, City National Bank engaged continuously in borrowings in excess of its capital stock, actually paid in and remaining undiminished by losses, and thus constantly violated
The district court allowed the interest, but agreed with the master that the bank was not damaged by the excessive loans. When the bank opened for business in 1928, it owed $3,550,000 upon the inherited “pool loan.” Its new capital of $1,000,000 and all other cash which came into its hands were used to reduce this indebtedness. It was accordingly left without working capital and was forced to resort to excessive borrowings, generally from its stockholders. These loans, as both the district court and the master found, were obviously mere substitutes for the old “pool loan“; and, of course, the loans renewing and replacing them also dated back to the “pool loan.” The substitutionary character of the borrowings was not altered by the fact that they may not have been used to pay off the “pool loan” directly, but were reloaned to the public. The lending of funds by a bank is one of its essential functions. Whether old debts are paid from working capital, which is then repaired by new borrowings, or whether old debts are paid directly from new borrowings without touching working capital, the result is the same. The total indebtedness of the bank was meanwhile
One finding of the district court, however, has cast some doubt upon the otherwise clear conclusion that the excessive borrowings were all substitutionary. It appears that the excessive borrowings reached an all time low of $726,407.27 on July 24, 1930. The evidence does not show, however, that the increase in excessive borrowings from that time until the bank failed was not in fact of a substitutionary nature, and that the particularly low level of the borrowings on July 24 did not really represent a temporary and abnormal down-sweep in an otherwise general decline. The findings of fact, on the contrary, seem to demonstrate that the bank never even partially freed itself of the heavy load imposed upon it by the “pool loan.”
Even had this later borrowing been completely unrelated to past transactions, the question would still arise whether liability should follow from a mere showing that the borrowing was used for investments which resulted in losses or whether such investments must themselves have been improper. As we have seen, under either the common law or the statute,
Absent proof of specific losses, we must assume that the excessive borrowings augmented the bank‘s total assets by the exact amount of the increase in its liabilities, without prejudice to the depositors. The burden of proof was upon plaintiffs to show the damages sustained by the statutory violation. Cf. Curtis v. Metcalf, D.C.R.I., 259 F. 961, affirmed Curtis v. Connly, 1 Cir., 264 F. 650, affirmed 257 U.S. 260, 42 S.Ct. 100, 66 L.Ed. 222; Warner v. Penoyer, 2 Cir., 91 F. 587, 44 L.R.A. 761. They have failed to sustain that burden. Indeed, they have not even shown that the excessive borrowings were not substitutionary.
In the light of these conclusions we cannot agree further with the district court that there should be recovery for interest. Considering the borrowings as generally substitutionary, recovery in any event should have been limited to the difference between the amount which was actually paid in interest and the amount which would have been paid had there not been substituted for the “pool loan” new borrowings at higher rates of interest. But in addition, the master found, without contradiction from the district court, that “the desirability of paying off the pool loan, if the bank was to continue as a going concern, is not open to question. All of the bank‘s assets were pledged for its payment, and the trustee had an uncontrolled discretion with respect to any collection whether to apply all or any part of it to the pool loan. The expense of the trusteeship was substantial. The bank was at a disadvantage with unfettered banks in competing for new business. It could not obtain a surety bond, and was obliged to purchase and deposit Liberty Bonds as security for public deposits.” It is clear that in getting out from under the burden of the “pool loan,” the bank was released from onerous obligations, and that this release was good consideration for the increase in the interest rate on the bank‘s borrowings. So again proof fails that the bank suffered damages, and defendant accordingly may not be held for the claimed loss.
7. Loans Made While Reserves Were Deficient.
City National Bank was deficient in its reserve balances at the Federal Reserve Bank almost continuously throughout its life. Under
The bank made a number of loans while its reserve balance was deficient. Upon these, a total sum of $28,545.65 proved uncollectible. The bank also paid penalties in the amount of $5,178.21 during the nearly three years of its existence. Whether defendant is liable for these sums depends again upon whether the losses can be considered as caused by the statutory violation. Section 464 is a provision of the Federal Reserve Act; and by
Considering the unpaid loans, the important part of
Further, the companion prohibition of
