Michaella M. M. v. Abdel Monem El G.Michaella M. M. v. Abdel Monem El G.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Thе issue on this appeal is whether Special Term properly granted the defendant’s cross motion to vacate the plaintiff’s notice to submit to a blood-grouping test pursuant to CPLR 3121. The notice to submit to the test was served in the context of the parties’ divorce action. In the action, the plaintiff wife seeks, inter alia, (1) a judgment declaring that the plaintiff’s son, now two years of age, bе deemed for all purposes the child only of the plaintiff and not the defendant; (2) custody of thе child; (3) to change the surname of the child and (4) a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant frоm visiting or attempting to con
Inasmuch as any ruling оn this matter will necessarily affect the interests of the child whose paternity is in issue, the matter should be remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a hearing as hereinafter indicated after thе appointment of a special guardian to represent and safeguard those interеsts.
This case presents the interesting question of whether a wife may compel a husband to submit himself to a blood-grouping test on the issue of paternity under circumstances where the wife is seeking to disprove, rather than prove, his paternity, i.e., an attempt to illegitimize her son.
It hardly need be said that any determination on the issue of paternity will have a profound effect on the child. As we see it, meritorious reasons exist for either ordering the blood test or disallowing it. On the one hand, if plaintiff is successful in her quest the child will be labeled illegitimate. Such a finding will result in considerable harm tо the child including the loss of the right to be supported by, or to inherit from, the defendant. Moreover, in the context of this proceeding, that harm will be compounded by the additional fact that the issue of paternity will not be settled, i.e., it will only be known that the defendant is not the child’s father and no decision will be made as to who is the boy’s natural father. On the other hand, it may be argued that the stigma attаched to illegitimacy has eased in our society in recent years, that courts are concerned with ascertaining truth, and that “the truth should out” regardless of the effect on the child.
If the instant case goes to trial without the blood test there is the possibility (1) that custody and/or visitation rights with the child will bе awarded to a person who is a complete biological stranger; and (2) the child may nеver learn who his real father is even though a “highly accurate” tool such as the blood-grouрing test is available to assist the courts in the search for the truth upon the trial of this matter. (See Matter of Joanne O. v Andrew H. W.,
It is beyond dispute that our courts have the power to direct a blood-grouping test in an action where the legitimacy of a child is in issue (Kwartler v Kwartler,
Although public policy authorizes the use of such tests, sеveral cases have applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel as а bar to ordering the alleged father to submit to a blood test (see Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH.,
Accordingly, the matter is remitted to Special Term for (1) the appointment of a special guardian to represent and safeguard the child’s interests and (2) a hearing and determination of whether, under the circumstances of this case, the defendаnt husband should be compelled to undergo a blood-grouping test.
Order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered February 3,1983, reversed insofar as аppealed from, without costs or disbursements, and matter remitted to Special Term for the appointment of a special guardian and for a hearing in accordance with the opinion herewith.