Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
We are asked to interpret provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requiring federal prisons to withdraw certain amounts from prisoner trust accounts to pay court filing fees.
Under the PLRA,
Michael Siluk is an indigent state prisoner who was allowed to file IFP in the district court and this Court. He currently owes a filing fee to both courts ($850 to the Clerk of the District Court and $455 to the Clerk of this Court which was the applicable appeal fee at the time the notice of appeal was filed). Siluk argues that § 1915(b)(2) only requires a 20-percent deduction from his prison account each month until both fees are paid, and that the deductions should be made in the order in which they were incurred (referred to as “sequential collection,” “sequential recoupment,” or “per inmate approach”). The government argues that § 1915(b) requires that a monthly 20-percent deduction must be made concurrently for fees owed in both courts until the fees are paid (referred to as “concurrent recoupment,” “simultaneous recoupment,” or “per case approach”).- The latter' interpretation would result in a 40-percent deduction from Siluk’s account each month that would continue until both fees are completely paid.
On January 11, 2013 this Court entered an order which among other things granted Siluk’s motion to proceed IFP; referred the petition to combine payments to a merits panel; and directed the Clerk of the Court to appoint pro bono counsel on behalf of Siluk to “address whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires recoupment of multiple encumbrances sequentially or simultaneously.” For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Congress intended to cap the monthly debit for filing fees at 20 percent of a prisoner’s monthly income, even where, as here, an inmate owes more than one filing fee.
When this suit was filed, Siluk was an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Rockview (“SCI Rockview”). He had filed various actions in state court claiming that state authorities had wrongfully intercepted his federal income tax refund and applied it to a child-support arrearage he allegedly owed. After Siluk’s state court litigation proved unsuccessful, he filed this pro se complaint in federal district court, alleging that Catherine Merwin' — -the Director of Perry County Domestic Relations Section — had deprived him of his federal tax refund, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted Siluk’s motion to proceed IFP and ordered the collection of an initial partial filing fee, followed by monthly installments as required by § 1915(b).
Siluk appealed and applied to proceed IFP before us.' He also filed a motion to combine payment of his filing fees which was referred to the merits panel. Siluk seeks to make one combined payment of 20 percent of his prison account deposits, rather than a 40-percent deduction (20 percent for each fee owed), as urged by the government. The sequential collection he requests would postpone collection of the filing fee for this appeal until after his filing fee has been completely paid to the district court.
Siluk maintains that sequentially debiting his inmate account will leave him with sufficient funds to maintain a minimum quality of life that would otherwise be jeopardized. He purportedly lives on prison wages of around $40.00 a month after the 20-percent deduction of the District Court filing fee. According to Siluk, he is required to pay for such items as: “soap, shampoo, razors, [and] deodorant” to maintain basic hygiene.
II. Statutory Background
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, federal courts are authorized to allow indigent persons, including prisoners, to pursue litigation without pre-paying fees and costs.
Section 1915(b) allows prisoners who qualify for IFP status to make an initial partial payment, followed by monthly payments against the remaining balance.
This scheme is relatively clear when an inmate only owes one filing fee. However, it is not clear how the deductions should be made when a prisoner owes more than one filing fee arising from multiple lawsuits or
In this case, Siluk faces the prospect of paying two fees: (1) the $350 district court filing fee that he incurred by filing his pro se complaint; and (2) the $455 fee he incurred in this court for pursuing an appeal of the district court judgment. All parties agree that Siluk must pay both fees eventually and that these fees should be deducted from his inmate account; however, there is a highly contested legal question as to the rate at which these fees should be paid.
In his petition, Siluk requests that this Court order that 20 percent of his account balance, rather than 40 percent of his account balance, should be deducted each month, toward the payment of these fees. That is, Siluk requests that a single 20-percent payment be deducted, rather than two 20-percent payments (one toward his district court fee and one toward his appellate fee).
The question presented by Siluk’s request for consolidation of fees, as interpreted by the motions panel and as briefed by counsel is whether § 1915(b)(2) allows only a maximum of 20 percent to be taken from his monthly income regardless of the number of cases or appeals filed, or whether the PLRA requires 20 percent taken each month for each case or appeal that he undertakes.
These two conflicting interpretations of § 1915(b)(2) are referred to in the briefs and in the cases as “sequential” and “simultaneous” recoupment.
Sequential recoupment refers to the method of payment whereby a single 20-percent payment is withdrawn on a monthly basis. For example, if an inmate had $10 in his or her account on the first of the month, the most that he or she could be required- to pay toward his or her- filings fees would be $2 (20 percent of the $10). That one payment is withdrawn monthly, and the cases and/or appeals that an inmate has filed will be paid off sequentially. Under such a rule, an inmate’s account could not be emptied in a single month based solely on the clerk’s withdrawal of a filing fee.
As applied to this case, sequential recoupment dictates that Siluk’s account would be subject to a single 20-percent charge each month, and these charges would be used to pay off: (1) first his district court fee; and (2) then, only after his first fee was paid, his fee to this court for his appeal.
Simultaneous recoupment on the other hand, refers to a protocol whereby 20 percent of the inmate’s account is withdrawn for each case or appeal. Under such a rule, fees are paid off simultaneously, and an inmate’s account could be emptied in a single month by the clerk of the court. For example, unlike for the sequential rule, under this reading of the statute if an inmate had $10 and owed money in five cases the clerk would deduct $2 for each case thus emptying the inmate’s account.
As applied to this case, simultaneous recoupment dictates that the clerk of this
Given the PLRA’s text, structure, and purpose, we conclude that Congress intended the monthly payments mandated under the PLRA to be debited from an inmate’s account sequentially. Sequential recoupment provides prisoners with a reasonable economic disincentive to file frivolous claims, without being punitive or imposing such significant burdens that a prisoner might forgo asserting legitimate claims.
A. Text and Structure of § 1915
As noted earlier, § 1915(b) establishes a gradual two-step garnishment procedure to ensure payment of filing fees. Subsection (b)(1) lays out the procedure for calculating and remitting the initial partial payment. It provides:
if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal [IFP], the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee[.]”21
This subsection unambiguously applies to each action or appeal that a prisoner files, whether or not the prisoner has filed other suits that are pending. The controversy here stems from the ambiguity that arises when subsection (b)(1) is read in conjunction with the explanation of how the remainder of the filing fee must be paid, which is set forth in subsection (b)(2). Subsection (b)(2) states: “[a]fter payment of the initial partial filing fee,” prisoners must “make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income ,.. until the filing fees are paid.”
The Supreme Court has explained that-the words of a statute “must be read in their context with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”
Here, the government argues that construing the text and structure of § 1915 as
However, the two subsections address different situations and neither the statutory text nor the relationship between the two subsections suggests that we read the statute with such rigidity. Subsection (b)(1) deals with a one-time initial partial filing fee withdrawn “when [and only when] funds exist.”
Nothing in subsection (b)(2)’s language, requiring monthly payments to “the clerk of the court, ... until the filing fees ... are paid[,]”
Nevertheless, the government argues that, because “[t]he rest of Section 1915 addresses each case individually,” subsection (b)(2) should also be construed to require a monthly payment for each case a prisoner has filed.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explained that the various subsections of § 1915 reflect the PLRA’s multi-pronged approach to reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal courts.
We therefore agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that the reference to an initial partial payment of “any court fees ... implies] that multiple fees and costs should each be subject to a uniform ceiling [of 20 percent].”
B. Purpose of the PLRA
When congressional intent is clear from the text of a statute, we do not delve into legislative history or focus on the statutory scheme.
The Supreme Court has noted that the overarching purpose of the PLRA is to implement “a series of controls” designed to prevent meritless filings in federal court.
Congress did not enact the PLRA to punish inmates for filing suits, nor did it intend to deter prisoners from filing valid claims.
In order to balance the competing objectives of preserving a prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts while deterring frivolous litigation, § 1915(b) requires that an IFP prisoner make an initial payment towards the filing fee, but permits the prisoner to pay the balance of his or her fees over an extended period of time. Pursuant to this scheme, the initial partial filing fee can be withdrawn only “when funds exist” in the prisoner’s account.
Concurrent recoupment is inconsistent with the purpose of the PLRA because, although Congress intended to deter frivolous litigation by requiring IFP prisoners to bear some marginal cost, Congress did not intend to create a payment scheme that would ensure fees be paid as expeditiously as possible or that would create tension with an inmate’s constitutional right of access to the courts.
Citing Newlin v. Helman, the government argues that sequential recoupment would undermine Congress’s intent to deter frivolous prisoner litigation by allowing a prisoner to “postpone” indefinitely his or her monthly payments for any additional lawsuit until after all previous filing fees had been paid.
Moreover, concerns that sequential repayment will not sufficiently deter merit-less claims are alleviated by subsection (g)’s “three strikes” rule.
Accordingly, there is a clear difference between the purpose of § 1915(g) and the rest of the PLRA. As the government agrees, § 1915(g) is structured to deter frivolous suits while protecting a prisoners’ right of access to the courts.
The Newlin Court’s concern that, under a sequential collection scheme, a prisoner filing multiple suits could “postpon[e] payment of the fees for later-filed suits until after the end of imprisonment (and likely 'avoid them altogether)[ ]”
We therefore conclude that sequential recoupment harmonizes subsection (b)(2) with the purpose of the statute, while avoiding the constitutionally suspect result of erecting barriers to courts that would make some inmates choose between attempting to seek redress for legitimate claims and having enough money in one’s prison account to purchase items required for basic hygiene.
C. Constitutional Concerns
Our conclusion is consistent with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. If a statute can be construed two ways, “by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided,” our duty is to “adopt the latter.”
Siluk argues that simultaneous recoupment, by permitting the garnishment of anywhere from 40 to 100 percent of a prisoner’s income, risks violating prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights by rendering a prisoner unable to buy necessary hygiene supplies.
However, the government’s argument is undermined by the allegations here.
In Abdulr-Akbar, we upheld the PLRA’s “three strikes” provision, which requires some prisoners to pay their entire filing fees before their complaints are adjudicated.
We realize, of course, that several of our sister circuit courts have rejected the contention that simultaneous recoupment is unconstitutional because there is no constitutional right to proceed IFP.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that we have a duty to “avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.”
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that § 1915 permits the recoupment of only 20 percent of a prisoner’s monthly income for filing fees, regardless of how many civil actions or appeals the prisoner elects to pursue, thereby adopting the sequential recoupment rule advocated by the petitioner.
Notes
. See infra notes 18 and 26.
. Title VIII of Pub.L. No. 104-134, 100 Stat. 1321 (1996), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1915 et seq.
. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The IFP statute "is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams,
. We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although Siluk is appealing the order dismissing his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), he has filed a motion to consolidate court fees which is currently pending before the Court, we only need to discuss the latter issue. The District Court thoroughly and carefully explained that Siluk’s claim against an officer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Eleventh Amendment "bar[s] suits for monetary damages by private parties in federal court against a state or against state agencies. It also bars a suit against state officials in their official capacity, because the state is the real party in interest inasmuch as the plaintiff seeks recovery from the state trea
“All courts and agencies of the [Pennsylvania unified judicial system] are part of the Commonwealth government ... [and]' entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole,
.As of the filing of his appellate brief, SCI Rockview has remitted eleven partial payments, totaling $119.98, toward Siluk’s $350.00 District Court filing fee. Appx. 68-88.
. See Siluk v. Merwin, No. 11-1654,
. Appx. at 47 (Pet. To Combine Filing Fees at ¶ 4); see also id. at 52-53 (Prison Account Statement, reflecting commissary charges).
. Id.; see also id. (Prison Account Statement, reflecting postage charges).
. The relevant text of § 1915 is as follows:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess .and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent....
(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make*425 monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner’s account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
28 U.S.C. § 1915.
. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie,
. Abdul-Akbar,
. Id. at 311-12 ("[PJrisoners easily obtained I.F.P. status and hence were not subject to the same economic disincentives to filing merit-less cases that face other civil litigants.”).
. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
. See Santana v. United States,
. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Prisoners need not make this initial partial payment if they do not have the available funds. See id. § 1915(b)(4) (requiring collection of the initial partial filing fee only when sufficient funds exist).
. Id. § 1915(b)(2).
. Id.
. Id.
. This issue is a matter of first impression for this Court, and there is a split of authority among our sister courts of appeals. The government argues that we have tacitly accepted the majority view of our sister courts of appeals, which is that the PLRA requires simultaneous recoupment. See Ray v. Reed,
. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
. Id. § 1915(b)(2).
. Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury,
. AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, - U.S. -,
. See, e.g., Hagan v. Rogers,
. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
. Id.
.The government asks us to adopt the view of the majority of our sister circuits, including the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, which have interpreted § 1915(b)(2) to require prisoners pay 20 percent of their funds towards filing fees concurrently, per case and per appeal. See Pinson v. Samuels,
District courts in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have also followed the "per case,” or "simultaneous recoupment” interpretation of § 1915. See Hendon v. Ramsey,
. See, e.g., Atchison,
. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
. Id.
. Id. § 1915(b)(2).
. Id.
. Torres v. O’Quinn,
. Id. (emphasis in original).
. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
. Id. § 1915(a)(2) (emphasis added).
. Gov. Br. at 13 n.6.
. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
. Other portions of § 1915 that do not apply on a per-case basis include subsection (d), which is a blanket rule that pertains to all cases brought under § 1915, and subsection (e)(1), which provides that "[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” Id. §§ 1915(d), (e)(1).
. Skinner v. Switzer,
. 28 U.S.C. §. 1915(b)(1).
. Id. § 1915(b)(2).
. Id. § 1915(b)(1).
. Whitfield v. Scully,
. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC,
. See Dolan v. United States Postal Serv.,
. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
. Skinner v. Switzer,
. Id. (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S7,498-01, S7,526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (Sen. Kyl)).
. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7,526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (Sen. Kyi) (“The filing fee is small enough not to deter a prisoner with a meritorious claim----”); 141 Cong. Rec. S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (Sen. Hatch) (“I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims.”); see also Bounds v. Smith,
. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).
. The Supreme Court has held that prisoners have a constitutional right to bring court challenges to vindicate " ‘basic constitutional rights.'" Allah v. Seiverling,
. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
. Id. § 1915(b)(2).
. As we noted at the outset, and as Siluk’s allegations suggest, although the amounts appear “marginal,” they can be quite substantial to an inmate subsisting on nominal prison wages.
. See Newlin v. Helman,
. See 141 Cong. Rec. S14,413-14 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
. See also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
. As discussed above, § 1915(g) states "if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions,” brought an action or appeal in federal court "that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[,]” then "[i]n no event shall [the] prisoner” bring an action or appeal IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Subsection (g) contains an exception permitting a prisoner with three strikes to file an IFP action if s/he is "under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id.
. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie,
. Id.
. Although, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Torres, the statutory requirement, that all filing fees be paid, deters frivolous litigation on its own, without further requiring simultaneous recoupment. Torres v. O’Quinn,
. See Gov. Br. at 22.
. In addition to the "three strikes” rule of , subsection (g), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) permits IFP privileges to be automatically revoked on appeal if the trial court certifies that the appeal is meritless. Additionally, in cases brought by a plaintiff proceeding IFP, the court is directed to “dismiss the case at any time if [it] determines that ... the action or appeal ... (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(a)-(b) (containing a similar requirement for all prisoner cases which "seek[] redress from a governmental entity”). If the court dismisses an action or appeal on one of these grounds, the prisoner nonetheless re
. See Newlin v. Helman,
. Id. at 436-37.
. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
. Under either a simultaneous or sequential recoupment approach, § 1915 requires the prisoner to repay the .entire filing fee, eventually. See id. §§ 1915(b)(2), (3) (filing fee payments continue "until the filing fees are paid”); see also Torres v. O’Quinn,
. Newlin,
. All appellate courts to have reached this issue have held that the obligation is not coterminous. See Robbins v. Switzer,
. Pinson v. Samuels,
. See also Torres v. O’Quinn,
.Id.
. See also id. at 246-47 (explaining that the sequential interpretation of § 1915(b) "both satisfies Congress's .intent when passing the PLRA and protects the constitutional rights of inmates.”); Whitfield v. Scully,
. United States v. Edmonds,
. See Rhodes v. Chapman,
. Gov. Br. at 23-24 (quoting Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr.,
. Id. at 24 (quoting Bounds v. Smith,
. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
. This case is before us following Siluk’s appeal of the District Court’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal, Siluk’s application to proceed IFP before us, and Siluk’s motion to combine payment of his filing fees. In reviewing a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "we accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’’ Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd.,
. Appx. at 47 (Pet. to Combine Filing Fees at ¶ 4).
. See, e.g., Young v. Quinlan,
. Appx. at 52-53 (Prison Account Statement, reflecting postage charges).
. As noted above, the Second and Fourth Circuits have declined to require prisoners who file multiple lawsuits to pay more than 20 percent of their monthly income toward filing fees because of this exact concern. Torres v. O’Quinn,
. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie,
. Id. at 317.
. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (establishing an exception to the "three strikes” rule for a prisoner who "is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); see also Torres,
. Mayer v. Chicago,
. Atchison v. Collins,
. Gomez,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The majority holds that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), a prisoner who owes multiple filing fees is required to pay them sequentially, not simultaneously, such that a prisoner pays no more than 20% of the preceding month’s income each month, no matter how many separate filing fees he owes. . I respectfully disagree, and would join the majority of our sister Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue in holding that § 1915(b) requires a prisoner who has incurred multiple filing fees to pay them simultaneously. An interpretation requiring that fees be paid simultaneously is the most natural reading of the statute and is more consistent with the purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) than is a sequential approach. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I.
A.
In Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, we discussed the history and development of the PLRA. See
Among other reforms, the PLRA amended the IFP statute as it applies to prisoners. Under the PLRA, prisoners who qualify for IFP status are no longer excused from paying filing fees altogether, but rather are required to pay them in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), which provides:
(1) [I]f a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of—
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account; or
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal.
(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
This provision, while clearly (1) requiring prisoners to pay filing fees in full, and (2) permitting prisoners who qualify for IFP status to pay filing fees over time rather than up front, does not explicitly address what happens when a prisoner owes more than one filing fee at once. The majority interprets the statute as requiring sequential payment of multiple filing fees, with a hard payment cap of 20% of a prisoner’s monthly income no matter how many filing fees he owes. I disagree, and believe that the statute requires simultaneous payment of multiple filing fees. A majority of Courts of Appeals having considered this issue support this view. See Pinson v. Samuels,
B.
The Supreme Court has recently instructed that “reasonable statutory interpretation must account for both ‘the specific context in which ... language is used’
The text of § 1915(b)(2), which requires that “[ajfter payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account,” does not explicitly answer the question of how multiple filing fees should be paid. However, reading § 1915(b)(2) in the context of § 1915(b) as a whole shows that the statute requires simultaneous recoupment of multiple filing fees. It is clear from the text of § 1915(b)(1) and undisputed by the parties that a prisoner is required to pay an initial filing fee for each case or appeal he files— a “per-case” approach — no matter how many other fees he has paid or is paying. See § 1915(b)(1) (requiring that “if a prisoner brings' a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis ... [t]he court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect ... an initial partial filing fee.... ”). Accordingly, “[t]he plain text of [§ 1915(b)(1) ] calls for assessment of the initial partial filing fee each time a prisoner ‘brings a civil action or files an appeal.’ ” Pinson,
The text of § 1915(b)(2) itself provides further support for a simultaneous recoupment approach, as the provision specifies that the prisoner must make monthly payments of 20 percent “[ajfter payment of the initial partial filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). If, as is undisputed, a prisoner must pay the initial filing fee for each
Other provisions of § 1915 similarly reflect a per-case approach. For example, § 1915(a)(2) provides that a “prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding without prepayment of fees or security therefore ... shall submit ... a trust fund account statement ... for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (emphasis added). In addition, § 1915(e)(2) provided that “[njotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time” if the court determines that the case is defective. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (emphasis added). Finally, § 1915(f)(1) provides that a court may issue a judgment for costs “at the conclusion of the suit or action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(1) (emphasis added). Again, these subsections exemplify the “per-case” approach common to all of § 1915.
For these reasons, I part ways with the majority, and would interpret § 1915(b)(2) to require that prisoners who owe multiple filing fees pay them simultaneously rather than sequentially.
C.
A rule requiring simultaneous recoupment is consistent with the PLRA’s effort to require prisoners to incur a marginal cost for each additional lawsuit they file. By requiring prisoners to bear additional costs for each suit, the PLRA encourages prisoners to absorb a portion of the economic impact of their lawsuit and aggregate their claims in a single suit. It also discourages frivolous lawsuits.
Some of our sister Courts of Appeals have recognized as much in interpreting § 1915(b) to require simultaneous recoupment. See, e.g., Pinson,
The marginal cost to prisoners of filing additional lawsuits or appeals might not only be delayed, but also might be eliminated entirely, as some of our sister Courts of Appeals have held that “the PLRA fee requirements are not applicable to a released prisoner.” DeBlasio v. Gilmore,
Allowing prisoners to postpone or even escape their payment obligations is clearly contrary to the PLRA’s purpose, as it provides virtually no deterrent to filing an infinite number of lawsuits. An interpretation requiring that fees be paid simultaneously is, therefore, more consistent with the purpose of the PLRA.
D.
Finally, I respectfully disagree with the majority that such a reading gives rise to constitutional concerns, either by treading on inmates’ rights under the Eighth Amendment or by barring inmates’ access to the courts.
We have 'observed that the Eighth Amendment requires prisons to provide “humane conditions of confinement” and “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr.,
Nor would simultaneous recoupment bar inmates’ access to the courts. With regard to the concern the majority raises, that inmates require tools such as pens and paper to file suit, the Supreme Court has made clear that “[i]t is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.” Bounds v. Smith,
The Court of Appeals in Torres raised a different ground for fearing that simultaneous recoupment would bar access to the courts, expressing concern that a prisoner who was required to pay 100% of his inmate account funds to service his filing fee obligations would not be able to engage in further legal action. But the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit effectively addressed this concern in Pinson, explaining that “the PLRA’s safety-valve provision, § 1915(b)(4), separately” ensures that insufficient funds will not' bar inmates from bringing suit. Pinson,
In light of prisons’ obligations to provide inmates with supplies necessary for humane confinement and meaningful access to the courts, and considering the statutory safeguards the PLRA provides for destitute inmates, I conclude that the canon of constitutional avoidance does not compel sequential recoupment.
II.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. I do join my learned colleagues, however, in thanking the attorneys who handled this matter pro bono and in commending them for their excellent representation.
. The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections memorialized this requirement in Policy Statement DC-ADM 815 (effective May 29, 2009).