*1 Before WIENER, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: [*]
Michael J. Riley appeals: the district court’s granting Janet Napolitano’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing, with рrejudice, Riley’s claim alleging discriminatory discharge from his employment with the Federal Emergency Management Office (“FEMA”); and the court’s denying Riley’s motion for a new trial. AFFIRMED.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Riley was hired by FEMA as an Equal Rights Officer in January 2006. On July 11, 2007, Riley sent an e-mail to then-Acting Cadre Manager Louis Cleveland, which Riley copied to Director Pauline Campbell, stating various complaints about his status in the department. Although his e-mail contained the statement “I feel as if I am being mistreated”, he did not elaborate further as to what the mistreatmеnt was or how he was being mistreated; nor did the e-mail assert his complaint was based on a protеcted status such as age, gender, or race. Shortly thereafter, James Montgomery, then-immediatе supervisor to Riley, decided, with the consent of Campbell, to terminate Riley’s employment as а result of unauthorized use of his Government-issued travel charge card in an amount exceeding $7,000.00. He was terminated officially on August 1, 2007.
Upon termination, Riley filed a discrimination complaint with the FEMA Office of Equal Rights, alleging unlawful retaliatory discharge. Riley thereafter filed the instant suit against Napolitano, on Jаnuary 27, 2011. Napolitano moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56; the motion wаs granted on November 15, 2012. On November 21, 2012, Riley moved for a new trial; the motion was denied on Decembеr 17, 2012. Riley’s appeal challenges both decisions of the district court.
II. Discussion
The district court’s grant of summary judgmеnt is reviewed
de novo
.
E.g.
,
Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank
, 665 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal
citation omitted). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Whether a
dispute of material fact exists requires our considering the evidence in the
record as a whole, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant;
in so doing, we will neither mаke credibility determinations nor weigh the
evidence.
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
,
To survive summary judgment, Riley must demonstrate that there exists a prima facie claim of retaliation under Title VII: “(1) [he] engaged in protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action”. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr. , 476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2007). Napolitano contends, and the district court held, Riley did not meet thеse requirements because he failed to demonstrate that he engaged in an activity protеcted by Title VII. Specifically, Riley’s July 11, 2007 e-mail did not constitute protected activity within the meaning of Title VII because it did not refer to any practice made an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. Riley maintains his sending the e-mail constituted a protected activity sufficient to satisfy this element of a prima facie claim.
“An employee has engaged in protected activity when [he] has (1) ‘opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice’ by Title VII [opposition
clause] or (2) ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ under Title VII [participation clause].”
Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co.
,
Riley further contends FEMA’s stating his termination was bаsed on his
alleged abuse of a Government-issued credit card was pretext. Had Riley
established a
prima facie
claim, the burden would have shifted to Napolitano to
articulate a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for Riley’s termination; if
Napolitano carried that burden, only then would Riley have the oрportunity to
offer evidence that,
inter alia
, the reason for termination was mere pretext for
discrimination.
Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank
,
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED.
Notes
[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.