Case Information
*4 Before MARCUS, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs-Appellants Michael McGee et al., purchasers of investment real estate in a Sarasota, Florida condominium development, appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the amended complaint they filed against their lender, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”). The complaint alleges that after the plaintiffs entered into contracts to purchase condominium units at the Sarasota Cay Club (“SCC”), a Chase loan officer, Ross Pickard, made misrepresentations related to the price of the units, the sale of other units in the project, and appraisals of their units. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim of negligent misrepresentation against Chase. After careful review, we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Randall
v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” The complaint “must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face’” in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,
To state a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation in Florida, a
plaintiff must allege: “(1) the defendant made a misrepresentation of material fact
that he believed to be true but which was in fact false; (2) the defendant was
negligent in making the statement because he should have known the
representation was false; (3) the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to rely . .
. on the misrepresentation; and (4) injury resulted to the plaintiff acting in
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.” Simon v. Celebration Co., 883
So. 2d 826, 832 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
Further, because negligent
misrepresentation sounds in fraud, the facts surrounding the claim must be pled
with particularity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Linville v. Ginn Real Estate Co., 697 F.
Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2010); see Ostreyko v. B.C. Morton Org., Inc.,
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310 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (“In this state, a negligent
misrepresentation is considered tantamount to actionable fraud.”). Plaintiffs must
therefore allege “(1) precisely what statements or omissions were made in which
documents or oral representations; (2) the time and place of each such statement
and the person responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not making)
them; (3) the content of such statements and the manner in which they misled the
plaintiff; and (4) what the defendant obtained as a consequence of the fraud.”
FindWhat Investor Group v. FindWhat.com,
Among other things, the complaint fails to allege facts satisfying the fourth
element of a negligent misrepresentation claim -- reliance. The only allegation
concerning reliance repetitively offered by the plaintiffs is the conclusory claim
that they “relied upon the PICKARD statements to proceed with the purchase and
CHASE loan of the SCC unit.” But this unexplained assertion is merely a
“[t]hreadbare” recitation of negligent misrepresentation’s “reliance” element,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and, moreover, fails to establish that Pickard’s
representations about pricing, sales or appraisals were “a substantial factor in
determining the course of conduct that result[ed] in [their] loss.” See Specialty
*7
Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc. v. Venus,
In addition, the plaintiffs’ claim -- that they relied upon Pickard’s
representations when they entered into the loan agreements and closed the
purchases -- fails to support a viable claim for damages. Presumably the plaintiffs’
theory is that the pricing, sales and appraisal representations by Pickard overstated
the value of the property and, as a result, they paid the developer more than the
units were worth. However, whether the plaintiffs paid with cash or a loan from
Chase, their damages would be the same: the amount by which the purchase price
exceeded the value of the property. Thus, the plaintiffs have not alleged that
anything about the loan or Pickard’s statements caused them to suffer damages.
Simply put, the plaintiffs have not been “economically damaged in [their] loan
transaction[s] with the bank.” Cooper v. Brakora & Assocs., Inc.,
In short, the plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Chase’s pricing, sales and appraisal representations fail state a claim for negligent misrepresentation.
AFFIRMED.