Michael Malik Allah, Minister Khalil Wali Muhammad Michael Malik Allah v. Humza Al-Hafeez William W. Ennis, Rev. United States of America, IntervenorMichael Malik Allah, Minister Khalil Wali Muhammad Michael Malik Allah v. Humza Al-Hafeez William W. Ennis, Rev. United States of America, Intervenor
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Sloviter
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Michael Malik Allah appeals the District Court’s order granting the motion of defendants Humza Al-Hafeez and William W. Ennis for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing Allah’s claims alleging infringement of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion in violation of
I.
Allah, who was granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis,
filed his pro se complaint on October 15, 1996, naming as defendants Ennis, the chaplain for S.C.I. Frackville, and Al-Hafeez, the appointed outside minister for the Nation of Islam within S.C.I. Frackville. Allah, a follower of the Nation of Islam, alleges that his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion
1
and that of other followers of the Nation of Islam in S.C.I. Frackville is being violated because Al-Hafeez is not a member of the Nation of Islam and engages in teachings that contradict the teachings of Elijah Muhammad, the leader of the Nation of Islam.
2
His complaint
On April 30, 1997, Allah filed an amended complaint adding 26 defendants (mostly prison officials and guards) and alleging that they harassed him in retaliation for filing this lawsuit and trying to practice his religion. The District Court treated Allah’s filing as a motion to amend his complaint and, over objection by Ennis and Al-Hafeez, granted the motion, stating that “Defendants’ contentions may be raised by a Motion for Summary Judgment following completion of discovery.” Allah v. Al-Hafeez, No. 96-6587 (E.D.Pa. May 30, 1997). However, apparently those 26 additional defenclants were never served with the amended complaint, and they were not added to the docket.
In July 1997, Allah was transferred from S.C.I. Frackville to S.C.I. Greene. On April 3, 1998, Ennis and Al-Hafeez filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. They argued that Allah’s complaint against them should be dismissed because his claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot by his transfer and because his claims for damages were barred under the PLRA,
This court appointed counsel to represent Allah on appeal.
4
We also granted the United States Department of Justice leave to intervene to defend the constitutionality of
We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the final order of the District Court under
II.
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
Allah concedes that his claims for injunc-tive relief were mooted by his transfer from S.C.I. Frackville to S.C.I. Greene and that only his claims for damages remain. Therefore, our examination of
Allah emphasizes that he is seeking damages for harm allegedly suffered as a result of the defendants’ violation of his First Amendment rights. The plain language of
It is well settled that compensatory damages under
In elaborating on this principle, the Supreme Court has explained that compensatory damages for claims brought under
We see no construction of Allah’s complaint that would save his claims for compensatory damages from the bar imposed by
Allah relies on footnote 14 in the
Stadium
opinion as support for the proposition that a jury could measure the value of the infringement on his constitutional rights without basing it on any mental or emotional injury. That footnote is not helpful here because it refers to a narrow category of cases in which compensatory damages may be presumed, i.e., voting rights eases.
See
477 U.S. at 311 n. 14, 106 S.Ct. 2537 (citing
Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759 (1927)). As the Court explained in the text of
Stachura,
presumed damages are designed to “roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate for harms that may be impossible to measure.”
Id.
at 316, 106 S.Ct. 2537. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that presumed damages are available for a First Amendment free exercise claim,
but see Spence v. Board of Educ.,
806 F.2d 1198, 1200 (3d Cir.1986) (no presumed damages for violations of First Amendment free speech and free association rights), that claim would still be “for mental or emotional injury suffered” under the facts as alleged in this case and would be barred by
But our determination that
Although Allah does not expressly seek nominal damages in his complaint, this court has held that “it is not necessary to allege nominal damages.” Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir.1965). Moreover, the allegations in Allah’s complaint are consistent with a claim for nominal damages, and he has asserted that he seeks nominal damages in his brief on appeal. Cf. Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C.Cir.1998) (declining to construe complaint to seek nominal damages where complaint sought only damages for mental or emotional injury and neither plaintiff nor amicus mentioned a claim for nominal damages in briefs on appeal). Construing his pro se complaint liberally, we interpret Allah’s complaint to request nominal damages. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam) (holding pro se complaint to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers); Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 808 (10th Cir.1999) (construing pro se complaint as seeking injunctive relief despite plaintiffs failure to expressly request such relief).
Punitive damages may also be awarded based solely on a constitutional violation, provided the proper showing is made.
See Alexander v. Riga,
208 F.3d 419, 430 (3d Cir.2000);
Basista v. Weir,
340 F.2d at 87;
see also Coleman v. Kaye,
87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir.1996) (“[Punitive damages may be awarded under
Given the Supreme Court’s clear directive that nominal damages are available for the vindication of a constitutional right absent any proof of actual injury, we cannot agree with the position taken by Al-Hafeez and Ennis that Congress intended
The defendants’ position would put us in conflict with the other courts of appeals who have faced similar issues. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Canell v. Lightner,
143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir.1998), the first court of appeals to face the issue, held that la prisoner plaintiff was not barred under
The holding in
Davis v. District of Columbia,
158 F.3d 1342 (D.C.Cir.1998), is not to the contrary. In
Davis,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
III.
In sum, we hold that Allah’s claims for compensatory damages are barred by
Notes
. He also alleged violation of his substantive due process rights and violation of federal and state law. Those claims are not at issue in this appeal.
. The complaint is signed by 21 members of the Nation of Islam at S.C.I. Frackville and is accompanied by affidavits of members of the Nation of Islam at S.C.I. Frackville concerning the teachings of Al-Hafeez. Included in the affidavits were affidavits of Rabiq V. Muhammad and Khalil Wali Muhammad, who were also named as plaintiffs in the action. Rabiq V. Muhammad was dismissed by order entered July 29, 1997. Khalil Wali Muham mad does not appeal the grant of judgment on the pleadings.
. The District Court also stated in its order that Allah‘s claims against defendants Al-Haf-eez and Ennis were dismissed “because the ‘Religious Practices Claims’ represent a doctrinal dispute within the Muslim religion.” Allah v. Al-Hafeez, No. 96-6587 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 22, 1998). This was not an argument presented by defendants in their motion for judgment on the pleadings, and they concede on appeal that “Allah’s complaint against them does implicate First Amendment concerns.” Appellees’ Br. at 11 n. 3. Given the facts alleged in the complaint and our duty to construe those facts liberally, we agree with the parties,that, to the extent the statement was intended to serve as an alternate basis for the court’s ruling, the District Court erred in dismissing the claims on that ground at this juncture. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 764 & n. 3, 767-68 (3d Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997); SapaNajin v. Gunter, 857 F.2d 463, 464 (8th Cir.1988); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) (courts should accept assertions of intrafaith differences unless claim is so bizarre or clearly nonreligious in motivation as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause).
. We express our appreciation to appellant’s counsel for volunteering their services in this and numerous other civil rights cases. Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, the firm representing Allah in this appeal, and an increasing number of other lawyers in the Third Circuit who agree to act as counsel at the request of the courts act in the highest tradition of service of the legal profession.
. Because we conclude that
. Of course, we express no view on the merits of Allah’s claims, as they are not before us.