Lead Opinion
This interlocutory appeal requires us to decide whether sovereign' immunity bars a complaint for damages against a deputy sheriff who failed to accommodate a dietary request from an inmate in a county jail in Georgia. Michael Leslie Lake requested a vegetarian diet for religious reasons during his pretrial detention. After his jailers denied the request, Lake sued Major Michael Skelton in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff of Cobb County. Lake sought declaratory relief, damages, fees, and costs for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 2000cc et seq. The district court denied Major Skelton’s motion for summary judgment against Lake’s claims for damages, and Skelton filed an interlocutory appeal. We conclude that the sovereign immunity of Georgia extends to a deputy sheriff who denies a dietary request of an inmate in a county jail. We reverse the denial of summary judgment against Lake’s claims for damages and remand with an instruction to enter judgment for Skelton on those claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Lake, a Christian, alleges that he made a religious vow in 1997 to abstain from eating meat, animal fats, or gelatin. He also refuses to eat any part of a meal that contains those items or to trade those items for acceptable food. Lake took the vow because he thought it would gain him the friendship of a woman named Leslie.
On November 28,2011, Lake was arrested for contacting Leslie, allegedly in violation of a stalking protective order. He was held without bond at the Cobb County
Lake requested a special diet to accommodate his religious vow, but the jailers denied that request, In May 2012, Lake sued Major Skelton. The jailers accommodated Lake’s request on November 29, 2012. Lake was released on July 15, 2013, after the Cobb County Superior Court dismissed all charges against him.
Lake sued Major Skelton in his official and individual capacities. He alleged that Skelton violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Lake sought declaratory relief, damages, fees, and costs.
Major Skelton moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for Skelton, in his individual capacity, but it denied summary judgment for him in his official capacity on the ground that the sovereign immunity of Georgia did not extend to him. Skelton filed an interlocutory appeal, and we have jurisdiction limited to the issue of his immunity, see Black v. Wigington,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a summary judgment, including the issue whether the sovereign immunity of a state extends to an official. Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County,
III. DISCUSSION
A state is immune from a suit for damages in federal court by one of its own citizens, Hans v. Louisiana,
Manders applied the four-factor test to decide whether the sheriff of Clinch County, Georgia, was acting as an arm of the state in “establishing force policy at the jail and in training and disciplining his deputies in that regard.” Id. at 1319. The first factor “weighted] heavily in favor of immunity” because “[t]he sheriffs authority to use force or the tools of violence ... and the sheriffs obligation to administer the jail are directly derived from the State” and because “use of force and creating force policy are quintessential poliсing functions.” Id. The second factor also “weighted] heavily in favor of immunity,” id. at 1322, because, “[i]n addition to mandating and controlling sheriffs’ specific duties ..., only the State possesses control over sheriffs’ force policy and that control is direct and significant in many areas, including training and discipline,” id. at 1320. The third factor “tilt[ed] ... toward immunity,” id. at 1324, because the state partially funded the sheriffs office and the financial contributions of the county were required by state law, id. at 1323-24. The fourth factor “d[id] not defeat immunity,” id. at 1329, because although neither the state nor the county was required to pay an adverse judgment, the sheriff apparently would have to pay out of his budget and “both county and state funds are implicated,” id. at 1327. The Court also stated that “the State’s sovereignty and thus its integrity remain directly affected when federal court lawsuits interfere with a state program or function.” Id. at 1329. We concluded that the sheriff of Clinch County, Georgia, was immune from a suit for damages that challenged his policy on the use of force. Id. at 1328.
A. Governmental Structure
We must apply the four-part test from Manders to the function performed by Major Skelton as a deputy sheriff. Whether a deputy sheriff in Georgia is an arm of the state is complicated. On the one hand, the offices of sheriff and deputy are created by state law, see Ga. Const. Art. IX, § I, ¶ III (sheriff); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-16-23 (deputy), sheriffs sometimes function as an arm of the state, see, e.g., Manders,
Georgia exerts significant control over the Cobb County Sheriff. The office of the sheriff, although independent, is not a “body corporate” like Georgia counties are. See Ga. Const. Art. IX, § I, ¶ I; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-3 and 1—3—3(7). Instead, the State legislature establishes the powers and duties of sheriffs. See Ga. Const. Art. IX, § I, ¶ III. These duties fall intо two broad categories: (1) the common-law duty of “enforc[ing] the law and preserving] the peace on behalf of the sovereign State”; and (2) “specific statutory duties, directly assigned by the State, in law enforcement, in state courts, and in corrections.” Manders,
Georgia uses county jails to incarcerate its state offenders, and it requires sheriffs to take custody of all inmates in the jail in their counties and to administer the jails. Manders,
The Georgia Constitution prohibits counties from taking actions “affecting” the office of the sheriff, including “the salaries ... [and] the personnel thereof.” Ga. Const. Art. IX, § II, -¶ 1(c)(1). Counties do not delegate their governmental or police powers to their sheriffs. See Manders,
The independence of sheriffs from the county is underscored by the treatment of sheriffs’ employees. The office of the sheriff has sole authority to appoint and discharge its employees, including deputies. Manders,
The Cobb County Sheriff derives his powers from the State and, with the exception of funding, is largely independent of the county. Although this framework informs our analysis by providing evidence of “the governmental structure of [the sheriffs] office vis-a-vis the State,” id. at 1309, all we need to decide today is whether Major Skelton acted as an arm of the State in the function of providing food to inmates.
B. The Factors from Manders
The factors from Manders weigh in favor of immunity for Major Skelton. The first three factors—definition in state law, control under state law, and the source of funds—favor immunity. And the fourth factor—responsibility for judgments— “does not defeat immunity.” Id. at 1329.
1. How State Law Defines the Function
We explained in Manders that “the essential governmental 'nature of [a sheriffs] office” includes “performfing] specific statutory duties, directly assigned by the State, in law enforcement, in state courts, and in corrections.” Id. at 1319. One of those duties is taking custody of inmates in the county jail. See id. at 1315; Ga. Code Ann. § 42-4-4(a)(1) (“It shall be the duty of the sheriff ... [t]o take from the outgoing sheriff custody of the jail and the bodies of such persons as are confined therein.... ”). The duty to take custody of inmates entails certain custodial responsibilities over the bodies of inmates. For instance, it is “the duty of the sheriff’ to furnish “medical aid, heat, and blankets, to be reimbursed if necessary from the county treasury.” Id. § 42-4-4(a)(2). Georgia courts have interpreted this provision as giving sheriffs exclusive control vis-a-vis the county over choosing vendors for medical care. See Bd. of Comm’rs of Spalding Cty. v. Stewart,
Another such responsibility is the function of providing food to inmates, which title 42 of the Georgia Code imposes directly on the sheriff. See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 42-4-32, 42-5-2. We first discuss sections 42-4-32 and 42-5-2 individually. We then consider sections 42-4-32 and 42-5-2 in the broader context of Georgia law. Finally, we address, the office of deputy sheriff, concluding that a deputy sheriff wears a “state hat,” Manders,
a.Section 42-4-32
Chapter 4 of title 42 governs “municipal [and] county jail[s] used for the detention of persons, charged with or convicted of either a felony, a misdemeanor, or a municipal offense.” Ga. Code Ann. § 42-4-30(1). Section 32 of that chapter governs the provision of food. It provides that all inmates in the county jail shall receive “not less than two substantial and wholesome meals daily.” Id. § 42-4-32(b). It also requires that “[a]ll aspects of food preparation and food service shall conform to the applicable standards of the Department of Public Health.” Id. § 42-4-32(a).
Section 42-4-32 imposes duties on the “officer[s] in charge” of municipal and county jails, id. -§ 42-4-32(d), which the statute dеfines primarily as “the sheriff’ of a county jail, id. § 42-4-30(3). That section 42-4-32 imposes duties directly on the sheriff, a constitutional officer of the state of Georgia, see Ga. Const. Art. IX, § I, ¶ I, and not on the county in which the jail is located, is evidence- that the provision of food is a state function under Georgia law.
b.Section 42-5-2
Chapter 5 of title 42 also supports our conclusion that the provision of food is a state function. Although chapter 5 regulates “correctional institutions of state and counties,” Ga. Code Ann. tit. 42, ch. 5, its provisions are devoted in part to allocating responsibilities between correctional institutions and jails, see, e.g., id. §§ 42-5-51; 42-5-2; see also City of Atlanta v. Mitcham,
c.Sections 42-4-32 and 42-5-2 in Context
To the extent that doubt remains about the source of the sheriffs responsibility
Caselaw interpreting section 42-5-2 in the context of medical care suggests that the statute operates differently depending on whether the jail in question was a municipal or, county jail. Section 42-5-2 imposes a unified duty on municipalities to pay for and ensure that inmates are provided with medical care. See Mitcham,
Our dissenting colleague argues that the Georgia Court of Appeals has long construed section 42-5-2 to impose a duty on counties, not sheriffs, to provide medical care. Diss. Op. at 1345, 1345-48. He reads sections 42-5-2 and 42-4-32 “harmoniously” to mean that- “the sheriff acts on behalf of the county” when providing food to inmates. Id. at 1347. We respectfully disagree.
The Georgia Court of Appeals has never construed section 42-5-2 to mean that a sheriff acts on behalf of the county when he provides medical care. Instead, the Georgia Court of Appeals, like we do, distinguishes between the duty imposed by section 42-5-2 on a county to fund medical care and the duty of a sheriff to provide medical care. See Tattnall Cty. v. Armstrong,
Section 42-5-2 regulates both the furnishing of “food” and the furnishing of “needed- medical and hospital attention,” Ga. Code Ann. § 42-5-2, and we draw the same distinction regarding food that the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court, of Appeals have drawn regarding medical care. Although the Georgia Code may not- be a model of clarity when it comes to allocating responsibility in the context of corrections, we conclude that the duty to feed inmates—including the denial of an inmate’s dietary request—is not delegated by the county but instead is “directly assigned by the state.” Manders,
d. Deputy Sheriffs
A deputy’s functions are derived from the sheriffs functions, so the deputy’s performance of this function is also a state function. Georgia law allows sheriffs “in their discretion to appoint one or more deputies.” Ga. Code Ann. § 15-16-23. Deputies are employees of the sheriff, and only the sheriff can hire deputies. Pellitteri,
2. Where State Law Vests Control
Georgia law vests control over the denial of Lake’s dietary request in the state through the law on feeding inmates in county jails- and the law on training and disciplining deputies. Statе law regulates food preparation and food service in the jail. It guarantees inmates “not less than two substantial and wholesome meals daily,” Ga. Code Ann. § 42-4-32(b), and provides that “[a]ll aspects of food preparation and food service shall conform to the applicable standards of the Department of Public Health,” id. § 42-4-32(a). As we explained in Manders, this regulation of “the preparation, service, and number of meals” is “evidence of how the duties of sheriffs in Georgia are governed by the State and not by county governing bodies.”
Lake dismisses section 42-4-32 as a law of general application that cannot establish control, but we disagree. Although Lake is correct that Manders- distinguished “laws of general application” that do not establish control from “specific statutes” that do, id. at 1321, Lake is wrong that section 42-4-32 is a law of general application. Section 42-4-32 applies only to jails. The section uses the term “officer in charge,” Ga. Code Ann. §42-4-32(d), which the
That section 42-4-32 governs both municipal and county jails does not affect this conclusion. As we discussed in connection with the first factor from Manders, Georgia law makes municipalities responsible for complying with' section 42-4-32 in municipal jails. See Ga. Code Ann. 42-4-30 (referring to municipal jails). But the responsibility of sheriffs to comply with section 42-4-32 is.direct and subject only to state control. Cf. Manders,
Lake also argues that thе county controls the function of feeding inmates because it pays for the food, but this funding does not establish control. As we have explained, “The Georgia Supreme Court has held that counties ‘must provide reasonably sufficient funds to allow the sheriff to discharge his legal duties,’ and that ‘the county commission may not dictate to the sheriff how that budget will be spent in the exercise of his duties.’ ” Manders,
Lake next argues that the food-service contracts signed by the county, the sheriff, and the food vendors appear to give the county some control, but these contracts do not affect our analysis of where state law vests control. We acknowledge that Manders referred vaguely to the “degree of control the State ’maintains over the entity,” id. at 1309, and to counties not having control, see id. at 1321, 1322, 1328. But the en banc Court specifically defined the factor as “examining] whеre Georgia law vests control,” id. at 1320 (emphasis added), and we applied it consistent with that definition, see id. at 1320-22. For the reasons already discussed, Georgia law vests control over feeding inmates in the state.
The training and discipline of deputies provides further evidence of control by the state. The Peace Officer Standards and Training Council,’ a state entity, can discipline deputy sheriffs for misconduct by reprimanding them or by limiting, suspending, or revoking their certification as peace officers. Pellitteri,
3. Source of Funds
The third factor is the source of funding for the function at issue. We concluded in Manders that when the county is required to pay by state law and the state provides some funding, this factor “tilt[s] ... toward immunity.” Id. at 1324. The application of this factor in this appeal is indistinguishable
4, Responsibility for Adverse Judgments
The fourth factor looks to “the source of the funds that will pay any adverse judgment.” Id. at 1324. In Georgia, counties are not liable for judgments against the sheriff in his official capacity, id. at 1326, and no law requires the state to pay an adverse judgment against a sheriff in his official capacity, id. at 1327. Instead, the sheriff “apparently would have to pay any adverse federal court judgmеnt against him in his official capacity out of the budget of the sheriffs office,” which “implicate[s]” “both county and state funds.” Id. But as we explained in Manders, the Supreme Court has “[njever ... required an actual drain on the state treasury as a per se condition” of sovereign immunity. Id. And “the State’s sovereignty and thus its integrity remain directly affected when federal court lawsuits interfere with a state program or function.” Id. at 1329. For these reasons, we concluded that, “[a]t a minimum; this final factor does not defeat immunity.” Id.
As with the third factor, the application of the fourth factor in this appeal is resolved by Manders. The sheriff apparently would pay for an adverse judgment against Major Skelton out of the sheriffs budget, but regardless of the effect on state finances, “an actual drain on the state treasury” is not required for immunity to apply under Manders. Id. at 1327. Under Manders, “this final factor does not defeat immunity.” Id. at 1329.
C. Skelton Is Entitled to Sovereign Immunity.
Overall, the factors from Manders favor immunity. The first two factors strongly favor immunity: a deputy sheriff derives his powers and obligations from the sheriff, and “[s]heriffs’ duties аnd functions are derived directly from the State, performed for- the State, and controlled by the State.” Id. at 1328. The third factor slightly favors immunity for the reasons stated in Man-ders, see id. and the fourth factor- “does not defeat immunity” for the reasons stated in Manders, id. at 1329.
We acknowledge that we reserved judgment in Manders about a “case of feeding ... inmates, which necessarily occur[s] within the jail,” Id. at 1319. But we also observed that Georgia law “regulates the preparation, service, and number of meals,” which we called “evidence of how the duties of sheriffs in Georgia are governed by the State and not by county governing bodies.” Id. at 1317 n.30. To the extent that our dissenting colleague suggests that this appeal should be decided based on “the Eleventh Amendment’s twin reasons for being,” Diss. Op. at 1350 (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the denial of summary judgment аgainst Lake’s claims for dam
Notes
. In each of the cases cited to show that § 42-5-2 imposes a duty on the counties to furnish medical care to inmates in their physical custody, the allegations involved wrongdoing by the sheriff, his deputies, or both. Those decisions rest on the premise that inmates in county jails, while in one sense in the physical custody of the sheriff as the county jailer, see Maj. Op. at 1340, are also in the physical custody of the county such that the county can be held responsible for the actions of the sheriff as its agent, see Macon-Bibb Cty. Hosp. Auth. v. Reece,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
In Manders v. Lee, this Court, applying a four part test, held that a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the State and is therefore entitled to Eleventh-Amendment immunity when he establishes use-of-force policy at the county jail and trains and disciplines his deputies in that regard.
Notwithstanding those admonitions, the majority holds that a Georgia deputy sheriff acts on behalf of the State and is thus immune from liability for failing to provide food to inmates in the county jail. The majority reaches that conclusion based largely on its viеw that § 42-5-2- does not impose a duty on the counties, even though, as Manders recognized, the Georgia Court of Appeals has construed the statute to do just that. The majority then proceeds to an inappropriate application of the Manders factors while losing sight of the principal purpose behind the Eleventh Amendment—not implicated here—of protecting the State’s purse from federal-court judgments absent consent to suit. The result is a decision that significantly expands the reach of sovereign immunity and will leave Georgia counties unanswerable for constitutional violations predicated on their failure to provide food or any of the other necessities required by § 42-5-2. Because I believe that such an outcome is neither correct as a matter of law nor wise, I respectfully dissent.
The first factor under Manders asks how state law defines the entity with respect to the particular funсtion. Id. at 1319. In Manders, the Court concluded that Georgia law defines the sheriff as a state actor with respect to force policy in the county jail because his authority to use force and his obligation to administer the jail “are directly derived from the state and not delegated through the county entity.” Id. “While we must consider context,” the Court continued, the fact that the actions took place within the county jail did not “automatically transmute” them into county functions because they involved “quintessential policing function[s]” that extended beyond the jail:
[I]n administering the jail, the sheriff does not check his arrest powers or force authority at the door. Instead, he and his deputies bring them into the jail and exercise them in the jail setting. This case is not a case of feeding, clothing, or providing medical care to inmates, which necessarily occur within the jail. Instead, it involves Sheriff Peterson’s force policy, which happens to be at issue in the jail context in. this particular case.
Id. (emphasis added). The first factor thus weighed heavily in favor of immunity. Id.
Here, the particular function is the 'provision of food to inmates in the county jail. As noted, that function is addressed in § 42-5-2, which provides that “it shall be the responsibility of the governmental unit, subdivision, or agency having the physical
Although the Manders court had no occasion to resolve whether Georgia law defines the sheriff as a state or county actor with respect to the provision of food to county jail inmates, the answer is apparent from its focus on delegation and context. Unlike the force policy, the responsibility of providing food falls directly on the county as the entity having physical custody over the inmates. While the sheriff is responsible for carrying that function out, he does so on the county’s behalf as the county jailer, pursuant to a delegation of its responsibilities. See O.C.G.A. § 42-4-4 (“By virtue of their offices, sheriffs are jailers of the counties.... ”). That is, after all, why the Georgia courts have held counties responsible under § 42-5-2 for the actions of the sheriff and his deputies in the county jail.
The majority appears to recognize that § 42-5-2, so read, presents a substantial obstacle to immunity. But it concludes that because § 42—4—4(a)(1) “requires the sheriff to ‘take ... physical custody of the jail and the bodies of such persons as are confined therein,’ ” the sheriff is the “governmental unit” having physical custody of the inmates under § 42-5-2. Maj. Op. at 1340. But this conclusion is foreclosed by Georgia law: The Georgia Court of Appeals has construed § 42-5-2 to impose a responsibility on counties to provide food, clothing, and medical care to inmates in the county jail, which makes sense only if the counties are the “governmental units” upon whom that responsibility falls. Because I see no basis to conclude that the Georgia Supreme Court would interpret the statute differently, we are bound by the Court of Appeals’s construction. See Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama,
The majority offers two additional grounds for сoncluding that the first factor favors immunity, neither of which, in my view, is sufficient to overcome the force of the text of § 42-5-2. First, the majority cites § 42-4-32, which requires the sheriff to feed inmates and ensure that food preparation and service conform to state standards, and reasons that the imposition of such duties “directly on the sheriff ... and not on the county in which ■ the jail is located” is- “evidence that the provision of food is a state function.” Maj. Op. at 1340. While I agree that § 42-4-32 places a duty on the sheriff to furnish food to inmates in his care, that does not tell us whether the sheriff acts on behalf of the State or the county when doing so. Section 42-5-2 does. Instead of construing § 42-4-32’s silence to mean that the sheriff acts on behalf of the State, I would read the sections harmoniously to provide that the sheriff acts on behalf of the county. To the extent that doubt remains, context is again instructive: Because the function, with limited exceptions, occurs within the jail, the sheriff is best understood as acting on behalf of the county.
The majority also observes that “counties lack supervisory authority and ‘delegate no powers or duties to sheriffs,’ ” and that'Georgia courts have interpreted § 42-5-2 to require counties to fund the provision of medical care but give the sheriff exclusive control over selecting a provider. Maj. Op. at 1341 (quoting Manders,
In sum, because the task of providing food to inmates in the county’s physical custody is assigned by statute to the county and is generally limited to the county jail, and because the alternative sources of state law do not clearly indicate that the sheriff acts for the State, I would hold that state law defines the function of providing food to inmates in the county’s custody as a county function. Accordingly, I would find that the first factor weighs heavily against immunity.
Turning to the second factor—where state law vests control with respect to the particular function—I agree with the majority that the State’s requirement in § 42-4-32(a) that food preparation and service conform to the Department of Public Health’s standards, coupled with the counties’ apparent lack of control, weighs in favor оf immunity. Maj. Op. at 1342. But control is of limited relevance to the Eleventh Amendment analysis where, as here, “[[Indicators of immunity or the absence thereof do not ... all point the same way,” since “ultimate control of every state-created entity resides with the State” and “rendering control dispositive does not home in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of the State’s treasury.” Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
The third factor is the source of funding for the particular function at issue. In Manders, the Court observed that “[t]he State funds the annual training of sheriffs” and it was “reasonable to assume that such training includes instruction on force policy and hiring and training deputies.”
The majority determines that the application of the third factor is “indistinguish
The fourth factor asks what is the source of the funds that would pay for an adverse judgment. The majority, following Manders, concludes that “[a]t a minimum, this final factor does not defeat immunity,” because although the State is not directly responsible for a judgment against the sheriff, any decrease in the sheriffs budget would indirectly impact both state and county funds, and “the State’s sovereignty and thus its integrity remain directly affected when federal court lawsuits interfere with a state program or function.” Maj. Op. at 1344 (quoting Manders,
Moreover, the Manders court itself ultimately relied not on the indirect-impact theory, but on the fact that lawsuits based on the sheriffs force policy would offend the State’s dignity by interfering with what was, according to the remaining factors, a state function. See
To recapitulate, the first Manders factor weighs heavily against immunity. The third and possibly fourth point in the same direction. And while, the second factor favors immunity, it is of limited relevance where the factors conflict. I would accordingly hold that a Georgia deputy sheriff is not entitled to immunity for failing to provide food to inmates in the county jail. This should come as little surprise, given the Manders court’s repeated observation that the provision of food, clothing, and medical care are materially different for purposes of immunity from the force policy functions.
To the extent that the Manders factors are not conclusive, however, “the Eleventh Amendment’s twin reasons fоr being remain our prime guide,” Hess,
The second purpose of immunity, which is the “most important,” is to prevent federal-court judgments that would necessarily be paid out of the State’s treasury absent consent to suit. Hess,
For all of these reasons, I would hold that a Georgia deputy sheriff is not entitled to immunity from liability for failing to provide food to inmates at the county jail, and I would affirm the decision of the district court. I therefore respectfully dissent.
. I say almost exclusively because the Georgia courts have held that a person may be an “inmate” in the physical custody of the county even though he was not physically in the
. For the same reason, I fail to see the relevance of the principle of Gеorgia law that the . powers of county commissioners are .to be strictly limited and construed. See Maj. Op. at 1342. The question for purposes of the first factor is not whether the county has authority or control over the sheriff’s actions, but whether it bears responsibility for them.
. I acknowledge that here, as in Manders, the State pays "for certain state offenders as- ' signed to county jails under the sheriff’s supervision.”
. The extent of the majority's discussion on thеse statements is to "acknowledge that we reserved judgment in Manders about 'a 'case of feeding inmates, which necessarily occurs within the jail,’ ” but note that "we also observed that Georgia law ‘regulates the preparation, service, and number of meals,’ which we called 'evidence of how the duties of sheriffs in Georgia are governed by the State and not by county governing bodies.’ ’’ Maj. Op. at 1344 (quoting Manders,