MICHAEL LESLIE LAKE v. MICHAEL SKELTON
No. 15-13124
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 3, 2016
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-02018-MHC
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, BLACK, and PARKER,* Circuit Judges.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
Lake, a Christian, alleges that he made a religious vow in 1997 to abstain from eating meat, animal fats, or gelatin. He also refuses to eat any part of a meal that contains those items or to trade those items for acceptable food. Lake took the vow because he thought it would gain him the friendship of a woman named Leslie.
Lake sued Major Skelton in his official and individual capacities. He alleged that Skelton violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Lake sought declaratory relief, damages, fees, and costs.
Major Skelton moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for Skelton in his individual capacity, but it denied summary judgment for him in his official capacity on the ground that the sovereign immunity of Georgia did not extend to him. Skelton filed an interlocutory appeal, and we have jurisdiction limited to the issue of his immunity, see Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1270 (11th Cir. 2016).
We review de novo a summary judgment, including the issue whether the soverеign immunity of a state extends to an official. Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313, 1324 n.26 (11th Cir. 2005). We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Black, 811 F.3d at 1265, and summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,”
III. DISCUSSION
A state is immune from a suit for damages in federal court by one of its own citizens, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1890), and this sovereign immunity extends to an official when he acts as an “arm of the State,” Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)). Before our en banc decision in Manders, we applied different tests to determine whether the sovereign immunity of a state extended to an officer. One test had four factors, see Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Fla. State Athletic Comm‘n, 226 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000), and another had three factors, see Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2000). A third test specifically addressed deputy sheriffs and jailers. See Lancaster v. Monroe County,
Manders applied the four-factor test to decide whether the sheriff of Clinch County, Georgia, was acting as an arm of the state in “establishing force policy at the jail and in training and disciplining his deputies in that regard.” Id. at 1319. The first factor “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of immunity” because “[t]he sheriff‘s authority to use force or the tools of violence . . . and the sheriff‘s obligation to administer the jail are directly derived from the State” and beсause “use of force and creating force policy are quintessential policing functions.” Id. The second factor also “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of immunity,” id. at 1322, because, “[i]n addition to mandating and controlling sheriffs’ specific duties . . . , only the State possesses control over sheriffs’ force policy and that control is direct and
A. Governmental Structure
We must apply the four-part test from Manders to the function performed by Major Skelton as a deputy sheriff. Whether a deputy sheriff in Georgia is an arm of the state is complicated. On the one hand, the offices of sheriff and deputy are created by state law, see
Georgia exerts significant control over the Cobb County Sheriff. The office of the sheriff, although independent, is not a “body corporate” like Georgia counties are. See
Georgia uses county jails to incarcerate its state offenders, and it requires sheriffs to take custody of all inmates in the jail in their counties and to administer the jails. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1315-18. Sheriffs are responsible for transferring detainees to and from state court, id. at 1315-16, and sheriffs have discretion to transfer inmates between counties, id. at 1317. “In contrast, counties have no authority over what corrections duties sheriffs perform, or which state offenders serve time in county jails, or who is in charge of the inmates in the county jails.” Id. at 1318.
The independence of sheriffs from the county is underscored by the treatment of sheriffs’ employees. The office of the sheriff has sole authority to appoint and discharge its employees, including deputies. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1311. Both the sheriff and the state can discipline deputy sheriffs for misconduct, see Pellitteri v. Prine, 776 F.3d 777, 781 (11th Cir. 2015), but the county has no such authority, see Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326, 1347 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Georgia caselaw recognizes that deputies are employees of the sheriff and not the county. See id. at 1336.
The Cobb County Sheriff derives his powers from the State and, with the exception of funding, is largely independent of the county. Although this
B. The Factors from Manders
The factors from Manders weigh in favor of immunity for Major Skelton. The first three factors—definition in state law, control under state law, and the source of funds—favor immunity. And the fourth factor—responsibility for judgments—“does not defeat immunity.” Id. at 1329.
1. How State Law Defines the Function
We explained in Manders that “the essential governmental nature of [a sheriff‘s] office” includes “perform[ing] specific statutory duties, directly assigned by the State, in law enforcement, in state courts, and in corrections.” Id. at 1319. One of those duties is taking custody of inmates in the county jail. See id. at 1315;
Another such responsibility is the function of providing food to inmates, which title 42 of the Georgia Code imposes directly on the sheriff. See
a. Section 42-4-32
Chapter 4 of title 42 governs “municipal [and] county jail[s] used for the detention of persons charged with or convicted of either a felony, a misdemeanor, or a municipal offense.”
Section 42-4-32 imposes duties on the “officer[s] in charge” of municipal and county jails,
b. Section 42-5-2
Chapter 5 of title 42 also supports our conclusion that the provision of food is a state function. Although chapter 5 regulates “correctional institutions of state and counties,”
c. Sections 42-4-32 and 42-5-2 in Context
To the extent that doubt remains about the source of the sheriff‘s responsibility under sections 42-4-32 and 42-5-2, we look to the broader context and structure of Georgia law. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1310-12, 1319. As a general matter, the sheriff holds a constitutional office independent of Cobb County and its governing body, see
Our dissenting colleague argues that the Georgia Court of Appeals has long construed section 42-5-2 to impose a duty on counties, not sheriffs, to provide medical care. Diss. Op. at 22, 24-29. He reads sections 42-5-2 and 42-4-32
The Georgia Court of Appeals has never construed section 42-5-2 to mean that a sheriff acts on behalf of the county when he provides medical care. Instead, the Georgia Court of Appeals, like we do, distinguishes between the duty imposed by section 42-5-2 on a county to fund medical care and the duty of a sheriff to provide medical care. See Tattnall Cty. v. Armstrong, 775 S.E.2d 573, 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (en banc) (explaining that section 42-4-4(a)(2) “places certain duties on a sheriff to provide an inmate with medical care,” whereas section “42-5-2(a) imposes upon the county the duty and cost of medical care for inmates” (quoting Graham, 730 S.E.2d at 443)), overruled on other grounds by Rivera v. Washington, 784 S.E.2d 775 (Ga. 2016). And none of the other decisions cited by our dissenting colleague hold that section 42-5-2 imposes a non-fiscal duty on counties in particular. See Epps v. Gwinnett Cty., 499 S.E.2d 657, 663 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (failing to distinguish between the duty imposed on counties by section 42-5-2 and the duty imposed on sheriffs); Cherokee Cty. v. N. Cobb Surgical Assocs., P.C., 471 S.E.2d 561, 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Macon-Bibb Cty. Hosp. Auth. v. Houston Cty., 428 S.E.2d 374, 376 (Ga. Ct. App.1993)) (explaining that 42-5-2 imposes cost of inmate medicаl care on the county).
d. Deputy Sheriffs
A deputy‘s functions are derived from the sheriff‘s functions, so the deputy‘s perfоrmance of this function is also a state function. Georgia law allows sheriffs “in their discretion to appoint one or more deputies.”
2. Where State Law Vests Control
Georgia law vests control over the denial of Lake‘s dietary request in the state through the law on feeding inmates in county jails and the law on training and disciplining deputies. State law regulates food preparation and food service in the jail. It guarantees inmates “not less thаn two substantial and wholesome meals daily,”
Lake dismisses section 42-4-32 as a law of general application that cannot establish control, but we disagree. Although Lake is correct that Manders
That section 42-4-32 governs both municipal and county jails does not affect this conclusion. As we discussed in connection with the first factor from Manders, Georgia law makes municipalities responsible for complying with section 42-4-32 in municipal jails. See
Lake also argues that the county controls the function of feeding inmates because it pays for the food, but this funding does not establish control. As we have еxplained, “The Georgia Supreme Court has held that counties ‘must provide reasonably sufficient funds to allow the sheriff to discharge his legal duties,’ and that ‘the county commission may not dictate to the sheriff how that budget will be spent in the exercise of his duties.‘” Manders, 338 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Chaffin, 415 S.E.2d at 907-08). The state, not the county, has legal control over the preparation and service of food in county jails.
Lake next argues that the food-service contracts signed by the county, the sheriff, and the food vendors appear to give the county some control, but these contracts do not affect our analysis of where state law vests control. We acknowledge that Manders referred vaguely to the “degree of control the State maintains over the entity,” id. at 1309, and to counties not having control, see id. at 1321, 1322, 1328. But the en banc Court specifically defined the factor as “examin[ing] where Georgia law vests control,” id. at 1320 (emphasis added), and we applied it consistent with that definition, see id. at 1320-22. For the reasons already discussed, Geоrgia law vests control over feeding inmates in the state.
The training and discipline of deputies provides further evidence of control by the state. The Peace Officer Standards and Training Council, a state entity, can discipline deputy sheriffs for misconduct by reprimanding them or by limiting, suspending, or revoking their certification as peace officers. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 781. Moreover, the state trains and disciplines sheriffs, Manders, 338 F.3d at 1320-21, and sheriffs train and discipline deputies, Grech, 335 F.3d at 1336. This disciplinary power includes the obligation to ensure that sheriffs do not “[v]iolat[e] or attempt[] to violate a law . . . of [Georgia] . . . [or] the United States,”
3. Source of Funds
The third factor is the source of funding for the function at issue. We concluded in Manders that when the county is required to pay by state law and the state prоvides some funding, this factor “tilt[s] . . . toward immunity.” Id. at 1324. The application of this factor in this appeal is indistinguishable from the application in Manders, so we are bound to reach the same conclusion. The state pays for some of the operations of the sheriff‘s office, and the county “bears the major burden of funding [the sheriff‘s] office . . . because the State so mandates.” Id. at 1323. Under Manders, this factor slightly favors immunity.
4. Responsibility for Adverse Judgments
The fourth factor looks to “the source of the funds that will pay any adverse judgment.” Id. at 1324. In Georgia, counties are not liable for judgments against the sheriff in his official capacity, id. at 1326, and no law requires the state to pay an adverse judgment against a sheriff in his official capacity, id. at 1327. Instead, the sheriff “apparently would have to pay any adverse federal court judgment against him in his official capacity out of the budget of the sheriff‘s office,” which
As with the third factor, the application of the fourth factor in this appeal is resolved by Manders. The sheriff apparently would pay for an adverse judgment against Major Skelton out of the sheriff‘s budget, but regardless of the effect on state finances, “an actual drain on the state treasury” is not required for immunity to apply under Manders. Id. at 1327. Under Manders, “this final factor does not defeat immunity.” Id. at 1329.
C. Skelton Is Entitled to Sovereign Immunity.
Overall, the factors from Manders favor immunity. The first two factors strongly favor immunity: a deputy sheriff derives his powers and obligations from the sheriff, and “[s]heriffs’ duties and functions are derived directly from the State, performed for the State, and controlled by the State.” Id. at 1328. The third factor slightly favors immunity for the reasons stated in Manders, see id., and the fourth factor “does not dеfeat immunity” for the reasons stated in Manders, id. at 1329.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the denial of summary judgment against Lake‘s claims for damages and REMAND for further proceedings with an instruction to enter judgment in favor of Skelton on the claims for damages.
In Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (6-5 decision), this Court, applying a four part test, held thаt a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the State and is therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when he establishes use-of-force policy at the county jail and trains and disciplines his deputies in that regard. The Court was careful to qualify, however, that it was not resolving whether a sheriff acts on behalf of the State for all purposes vis-à-vis the county jail, and it clearly distinguished the provision of food, clothing, and medical care to inmates on the ground that
Notwithstanding those admonitions, the majority holds that a Georgia deputy sheriff acts on behalf of the State and is thus immune from liability for failing to provide food to inmates in the county jail. The majority reaches that conclusion based largely on its view that
The first factor under Manders asks how state law defines the entity with respect to the particular function. Id. at 1319. In Manders, the Court concluded that Georgia law defines the sheriff as a state actor with respect to force policy in the county jail because his authority to use forcе and his obligation to administer the jail “are directly derived from the state and not delegated through the county entity.” Id. “While we must consider context,” the Court continued, the fact that the actions took place within the county jail did not “automatically transmute” them into county functions because they involved “quintessential policing function[s]” that extended beyond the jail:
[I]n administering the jail, the sheriff does not check his arrest powers or force authority at the door. Instead, he and his deputies bring them into the jail and exercise them in the jail setting. This case is not a case of feeding, clothing, or providing medical care to inmates, which necessarily occur within the jail. Instead, it involves Sheriff Peterson‘s force policy, which happens to be at issue in the jail context in this particular case.
Id. (emphasis added). The first factor thus weighed heavily in favor of immunity. Id.
Although the Manders court had no occasion to resolve whether Georgia law defines the sheriff as a state or county actor with respect to the provision of food to county jail inmates, the answer is apparent from its focus on delegation and context. Unlike the force policy, the responsibility of providing food falls directly on the county as the entity having physical custody over the inmates. While the sheriff is responsible for carrying that function out, he does so on the county‘s behalf as the county jailer, pursuant to a delegation of its responsibilities. See
The majority appears to recognize that
The majority offers two additional grounds for concluding that the first factor favors immunity, neither of which, in my view, is sufficient to overcome the force of the text of
Turning to the second factor - where state law vests control with respect to the particular function - I agree with the majority that the State‘s requirement in
The majority determines that the application of the third factor is “indistinguishable from the application in Manders” because “[t]he state pays for some of the operations of the sheriff‘s office and the county bears the major burden of funding [the sheriff‘s] office . . . because the State so mandates.” Maj. Op. at 19. I disagree. Under the majority‘s formulation, it is hard to imagine when this factor would nоt favor immunity, as the State always pays for some of a sheriff‘s
The fourth factor asks what is the source of the funds that would pay for an adverse judgment. The majority, following Manders, concludes that “[a]t a
Moreover, the Manders court itself ultimately relied not on the indirect-impact theory, but on the fact that lawsuits based on the sheriff‘s force policy would offend the State‘s dignity by interfering with what was, according to the remaining factors, a state function. See 338 F.3d at 1327-28 & n.51 (observing that “the United States Supreme Court has never said that the absence of a treasury factor alone defeats immunity and precludes consideration of other factors, such as how state law defines the entity or what degree of control the State has over the
To recapitulate, the first Manders factor weighs heavily against immunity. The third and possibly fourth point in the same direction. And while the second factor favors immunity, it is of limited relevance where the factors conflict. I would accordingly hold that a Georgia deputy sheriff is not entitled to immunity for failing to provide food to inmates in the county jail. This should come as little surprise, given the Manders court‘s repeated observation that the provision of food, clothing, and medical care are materially different for purposes of immunity from the force policy functions.5
To the extent that the Manders factors are not conclusive, however, “the Eleventh Amendment‘s twin reasons for being remain our prime guide,” Hess, 513 U.S. at 47, and they too weigh against immunity. The first factor is to ensure that we do not offend Georgia‘s dignity as a sovereign by allowing sheriffs to be sued in federal courts. Id. As noted, the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that a county is responsible for the sheriff‘s failure to comply with
The second purpose of immunity, which is the “most important,” is to prevent federal-court judgments that would necessarily be paid out of the State‘s treasury absent consent to suit. Hess, 513 U.S. at 47-48. As Manders recognized, a federal judgment would have no direct impact on Georgia‘s treasury because it would be paid out of the budget of the sheriff‘s office, which as previously noted, comes from the county funds. 338 F.3d at 1327. While this fact does not necessarily defeat immunity, e.g., Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 782 n.2, it certainly weighs against it, see Hess, 513 U.S. at 51 (observing that “the Eleventh Amendment‘s core concern is not implicated” when “both legally and practically” the State is not ”in fact obligated to bear and pay the resulting indebtedness of the enterprise“) (emphasis added). And even if an indirect impact on the State treasury could theoretically support immunity, which is questionable, see Abusaid, 405 F.3d at 1312, that impact is too remote and speculative here because it is the counties who ultimately bear the responsibility for ensuring that the sheriff is adequately
For all of these reasons, I would hold that a Georgia deputy sheriff is not entitled to immunity from liability for failing to provide food to inmates at the county jail, and I would affirm the decision of the district court. I therefore respectfully dissent.