Michael HUGHES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James DIMAS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-1818
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
September 19, 2016
841 F.3d 430
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
Submitted June 24, 2016
OPINION
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
An Illinois state court ruled that Michael Hughes was a sexually violent person who suffers from a mental disorder that creates a substantial risk that unless confined he is apt to commit further sexual violence. And so the court ordered him to be civilly
The Supreme Court has suggested that a civilly committed sex offender is constitutionally entitled to “immediate release upon a showing that [he] is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired.” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-69, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997); see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-74, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986). But who is to make that showing? Illinois allows only persons licensed under the Sex Offender Evaluation and Treatment Provider Act to treat Rushville’s civil detainees and determine whether and when they’ve improved to the point where they can be released without danger to the public.
The district judge dismissed Hughes’ complaint primarily on the grounds that the Constitution doesn’t require Rushville to comply with state statutes and that anyway a state statute is not enforceable in federal court. But this reasoning misconceives the basis of the suit. As indicated in the cases cited earlier, the Supreme Court understands the Fourteenth Amendment to require that civil detainees receive treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement and be released when they’ve improved enough no longer to be dangerous. Illinois has decided to permit only persons licensed under the state’s Sex Offender Evaluation and Treatment Provider Act to make that evaluation.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.