We must decide whether a state court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing sua sponte when presented with evidence of juror bias is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000). We hold that it is not. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court denying the appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
I
The appellant, Michael Sims, was charged in California Superior Court with, inter alia, one count of first degree robbery and two counts of second degrеe robbery with enhancements for infliction of great bodily injury. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 211, 12022.7. Several hours after his case was submitted to the jury for deliberation, the court received a note from the jury foreman reading as follows:
We the jury in this case request the following: Discussion about the forms we filled out before jury selection. There’s considerable alarm among jurors about Mr. Simms [sic] being allowed to review our forms. We thought we were under the protection of anonymity. The jurors viewed he was talking [sic] notes while reviewing the forms.
With both the prosecutor and defense counsel’s written approval, the trial judge responded with the following note:
In response to your most recent request, please be advised that none of the parties ever had your addresses or telephone numbers or other identifying information .... You will also recall that at the commencement of the jury selection process I informed you that the court reporter’s transcript relating to that portion of the trial is ordered to be sealed and not made available to any party or person, unless good cause is shown.... Likewise, the copies of the *1150 juror’s questionnaire that the district attorney and. the defense attorney had during the jury selection process, was ordered by the court to be returned to the clerk and those copies have been shredded and destroyed. I hope that this is a satisfactory answer to your inquiry. If it is not, please send .me a further communication.
Subsequently, the jury sent a second note, this time requesting “a copy of the questionnaire that the defense attorney/ defendant did get to see — -even a blank form.” The note further inquired as to whethеr the juror’s “names,[and/or] places of employment [were] blocked out,” expressing lingering concern “about whether [their] names and employers were on the form.” Again with the approval of both, parties, the judge responded by providing the jurors a blank questionnaire. The record does not indicate that the judgé held a hearing, formal or informal, prior to either response, or that defense counsel requested such a hearing.
Approximately one hour after the judge’s second response, the jury reached a verdict, finding Sims guilty of two counts of second degree robbery and one count of first degree robbery. Sims was sentenced to an aggregate term of sixty-three years to life.
Shortly thereafter, Sims sought review by the California Court of Appeal, arguing that his conviction violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court rejected this claim, concluding that Sims had not established that his verdict was negatively influenced by the jurors’ fear of recourse. See People v. Sims, No. A079107, at *9 (Cal.Ct.App. Dec. 17, 1999). On the contrary, the court reasoned that a “much stronger hypothesis is that, if fear influenced the jurors аt all, it was in the direction of acquittal.” Id. at ‘•'ll (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the court denied Sims’s due process claim, holding that, “any error in not conducting a formal inquiry into whether jurors were improperly influenced by fear of Sims is not shown to be prejudicial.” Id. The California Supreme Court denied review.
Sims next petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus, reasserting his due process claim. Relying on our decision in
Tracey v. Palmateer,
Sims, timely appealed to this court.
II
This court reviews
de novo
a district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
See Alvarado v. Hill,
Under AEDPA, Sims is entitled to habe-as relief “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
*1151
court proceedings” only if one of two conditions of deferential review are met: “the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly esT tablished Federal law, as determined ,by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
1
See also Lambert v. Blodgett,
The phrase “clearly established Federal law” refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Supreme Court decisions.
See Lockyer v. Andrade,
Although the statutory formulation restricts federal law to Supreme. Court precedent, we have previously observed that “Ninth Circuit precedent may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, and may also help us determine what law is clearly established.”
Robinson v. Ignacio,
AEDPA- also permits relief where the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that ... involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Importantly, “an unreason- ■ able application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”
Williams,
We apply these principles and standards of review to address Sims’s argument that the decision of the California Court of Appeals was both contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
A
- Sims first argues that the decision of the California Court of Appeal is contrary to clearly established federal law because the court’s reason for denying his due process claim — namely, because he failed to demonstrate prejudice — -was erroneous. Specifically, he argues that the state trial court’s failure to investigate potential juror bias presents structural error which requires a new trial even where there is no showing of actual prejudice. 2
*1153
Sims’s assertion is supported to some extent by our decision in
Dyer v. Calderon,
wherein we noted the similarities to a- biased judge and stated that “[t]he presence of a biased juror cannot be harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice.”
More importantly, no Supreme Court precedent holds that a failure to.investigate potential juror bias presents structural error, and even if we were tо read
Dyer
to address potential juror bias, it would be insufficient authority under AEDPA.
See Hernandez,
Accordingly, it remains for us to decide whether the state court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing sua sponte when presented with evidence of juror bias is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Wé hold that it is not. The reason is simple: the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether due process requires a triаl court to hold a hearing sua sponte whenever evidence of juror bids comes to light.
B
The Supreme Court has twice addressed the propriety of holding a hearing to investigate evidence of juror bias.
See Remmer v. United States,
In
Remmer, 347
U.S. at 228,
After the FBI investigated the incident, both the judge and the prosecution reviewed the FBI report, without 'notice to or participation by the defense, and “apparently1 concluded that the statement to the juror was made in jest.”
Id.
at 228,
Remmer
provides little prospective guidance as to when a hearing is required or even appropriate. One might argue that
Remmer
stands for the proposition that when confronted with evidence of jury tampering and an explicit request for a hearing on the issue of juror bias, the trial court must hold the requested hearing.
See Tracey v. Palmateer,
Nearly thirty years later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of juror bias, this time in the habeas context.
See Smith,
The Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial court’s hearing sufficient to comply with due process. The bulk of the Court’s opinion was devoted to justifying the adequacy, as a matter of due process, of the hearing conducted in the state trial court.
See id.
at 215,
Nonetheless, Sims points to Remmer and Smith in support of his argument that the decision of the California Appeals Court is contrary to, or. an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. We find no support for this proposition in either case.
C
We have previously addressed the question of whether a hearing is required whenever evidence of juror bias is brought to light. In
Tracey,
In sum, contrary to Sims’s argument,
Remmer
does not speak to the issue presented here, and
“Smith
leaves open the door as to whether a hearing is always required and what else may be ‘sufficient’ to alleviate any due process concerns.”
Tracey,
Our ruling in
Dyer,
[a] court confronted with a colorable claim of juror bias must undertake an investigation of the- relevant facts and circumstances. An informal in camera hearing may be adequate for this purpose; due process requires only that all parties be represented, and that the investigation be reasonably calculated to *1156 resolve the doubts raised about the juror’s impartiality. So long as the fact-finding process is objective and reasonably explores the issues presented, the state trial judge’s findings based on that investigation are entitled to a presumption of correctness.
Id.
at 974-75 (citations omitted). Rather than establishing a “hard-and-fast rule requiring [an] automatic, full-fledged hearing,”
Tracey,
Furthermore, the state court’s decision cannot be deemed contrary to
Smith
and
Remmer
under the second basis provided for in
Williams,
as neither ease controls the outcome of this appeal.
See Williams,
First, in both Smith and Remmer the defendant explicitly requested that the trial court conduct a hearing on the issue of juror bias. No such request was made in this case. Indeed, in Sims’s case, unlike in Smith and Remmer, defense counsel approved, in writing, the form and content of the trial judge’s response to the evidence of juror bias. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a trial judge’s duty in the face of such approval. Finally, Remmer — the only case in which the Supreme Court actually ordered a hearing — is categorically different from the case at bar, as it concerned allegations of outright jury tampering sufficient to prompt an FBI investigation. Sims has alleged, at most, incidental and unintentional juror influence.
Because the California Court of Appeal did not either apply a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by the Supreme Court or arrive at a different result when confronted by a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court, we hold that the state court’s decision, denying petitioner’s due process claim on the merits, is not contrary to сlearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
*1157 D
For similar reasons, the state court’s decision cannot be'deemed an “unreasonable application” of
Smith
and
Remmer
to the facts of Sims’s case.
See Williams,
We have not been directed to, nor can we identify, any decision of the Supreme Court that can rationally be understood to stand for the proposition that a trial judge has a duty,
sua sponte,
to conduct a hearing when presented with facts such as those alleged by Sims. Instead of referring us to a clear statement by the Suрreme Court establishing a trial judge’s
sua sponte
duty to hold some type of hearing— or, indeed, a hearing at all — Sims relies on two patently equivocal words in
Smith:
due process requires “a trial judge
ever watchful
to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.”
Smith,
It is simply untenable for us to conclude that the state court was “objectively unreasonable” in refusing- to find that the trial judge was required to hold a' hearing in this case when we ourselves have clearly stated that a hearing is “not mandated
every
time there is an allegation of juror bias.”
Tracey,
Accordingly, we hold that it was not an objectively unreasonable application of federal law for the California Court of Appeal to refrain from imposing a sua sponte duty to conduct a hearing as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment due process.
Ill
We hold that the decision of the California Court of Appeal is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We therefore affirm the district court’s decision denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Section 2254(e)(1) is inapplicable to this case because the federal district court did not grant Sims an evidentiary hearing.
See Taylor
v.
Maddox,
. We note some latent confusion in our case law concerning whether, under AEDPA, it is necessary or permissible for us to review the "reasoning” used by the state court, or whether we are simply to review the "decision” of that court adjudicating the merits of the petitioner's claim.
Compare Hernandez v. Small,
. Although we decline to hold that the trial judge had a duty,
sua sponte,
to conduct a hearing as a matter of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, we note that the record is unclear as to whether or not the trial judge actually failed to undertake an "investigation” adequate to comport with our decision in
Dyer,
. Because we find that there is no clearly established duty for a trial judge to sua sponte conduct a hearing on claims of potential juror bias, we need not reach the question of whether or not the violation of such a duty was prejudicial to the appellant in this case.