643 S.W.3d 501
Mo.
2022

STEVIE JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. ANNE PRECYTHE, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:21 CV 1276 JMB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

October 5, 2023

JOHN M. BODENHAUSEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Anne Precythe (“Precythe“), Alana Boyles (“Boyles“), and Richard Adams (“Adams“) (collectively, “Defendants“) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 51). Plaintiff Stevie Johnson (“Plaintiff“) filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 57). All matters are pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge with the consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion will be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Eastern Missouri Correctional Center (“EMCC“), filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Plaintiff alleges that he was denied constitutionally adequate medical care for a Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA“) infection. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Precythe and Adams implemented an unconstitutional policy of understaffing medical facilities, resulting in inadequate medical care. He further alleges that Precythe and Adams ignored his grievances regarding medical treatment and that Boyles (an EMCC grievance officer) also ignored his grievances. Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief.

The following facts are taken from Defendants' Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (ECF No. 53), Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (ECF No. 57-1), and the supporting documentation. Where the parties disagree, the Court notes the dispute.

Plaintiff is an inmate within MDOC. Precythe is the Director of MDOC. Adams is the Chief Medical Officer for MDOC. Boyles is the Grievance Officer at EMCC. During the relevant time, medical services at EMCC were provided by Centurion Health (“Centurion“), an independent contractor. Neither Precythe nor Adams is a medical professional, and they do not provide medical care to inmates. Boyles is not a medical professional.

On January 4, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by Nurse Practitioner (“NP“) Janet Sullentrup for complaints of a painful knot on his left hip that had been present for four to five days. NP Sullentrup noted that the area was red, warm to the touch, and had a small amount of purulent drainage. She diagnosed Plaintiff with a possible MRSA infection and prescribed Doxycycline (an antibiotic) for ten days. She also ordered a wound culture and daily dressing changes.

On January 6, 2021, the wound culture results were returned, confirming the presence of MRSA. Plaintiff continued his course of Doxycycline and received daily dressing changes by nursing staff. On January 14, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by NP Sullentrup for a follow-up. She noted that the wound was healing but still had some drainage. She prescribed an additional seven days of Doxycycline.

On January 21, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by NP Sullentrup again. She noted that the wound on his hip was almost completely healed. However, Plaintiff reported a new painful area on his right leg. NP Sullentrup diagnosed another MRSA lesion and prescribed Clindamycin (a different antibiotic) for ten days. She also ordered daily dressing changes for the new lesion.

On January 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Informal Resolution Request (“IRR“), number EMCC-21-44, alleging that he was not receiving proper medical care for his MRSA infection. He stated that he had been trying to get treatment since December 2020 but was ignored by medical staff. He also claimed that the laundry department was not properly cleaning infected linens, which was causing the infection to spread. On February 15, 2021, the IRR was denied, noting that Plaintiff was receiving appropriate medical treatment, including antibiotics and dressing changes, and that his laundry concerns had been addressed with the laundry manager.

Plaintiff was seen for follow-up medical appointments throughout February and March 2021. Medical records indicate that while the original hip wound healed, Plaintiff developed several other lesions on his legs and buttocks. Each time a new lesion appeared, medical staff provided treatment, including different courses of antibiotics (Bactrim and Clindamycin) and wound care. Plaintiff frequently complained that the medical staff was understaffed and that he often had to wait for dressing changes or to see a provider.

On March 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a second IRR, number EMCC-21-178, reiterating his complaints about inadequate medical care and understaffing. He also alleged that Precythe and Adams were responsible for the understaffing policy. This IRR was denied on April 5, 2021. Plaintiff then filed a Formal Grievance, which was denied by the EMCC Warden. Plaintiff appealed the grievance denial to the MDOC Central Office. Defendant Boyles processed the grievances at the institutional level, and Defendant Adams (or his designee) reviewed and denied the grievance appeal at the Central Office level.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank of Mo., 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with adequate medical care. Specifically, he asserts that Precythe and Adams are responsible for a policy of understaffing medical facilities, which led to delays and deficiencies in his treatment. He also claims that Defendants ignored his grievances.

A. Individual Capacity Claims

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate medical care, a prisoner must show that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and (2) defendants knew of the need but deliberately disregarded it. Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000).

1. Defendants Precythe and Adams

Defendants Precythe and Adams argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they were not personally involved in Plaintiff's medical care. They assert that, as high-level administrators, they are not liable for the actions of medical staff under a theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiff counters that these defendants are liable because they implemented a policy of understaffing medical facilities and failed to intervene after learning of his medical issues through the grievance process.

It is well-settled that “respondeat superior is not applicable to § 1983 claims.” Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995). A supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 only “if he directly participates in the constitutional violation, or if his failure to train or supervise the offending actor caused the deprivation.” Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dep't, 28 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 1994). In the context of medical care, a non-medical administrator is generally not liable for failing to second-guess the medical judgment of treatment providers. Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2002).

Here, there is no evidence that Precythe or Adams directly participated in Plaintiff's medical treatment. They are not medical doctors and do not provide care to EMCC inmates. While Plaintiff claims they implemented an unconstitutional understaffing policy, he has failed to provide any evidence of such a policy or how it specifically caused a deprivation of his rights. Mere conclusory allegations of understaffing are insufficient to survive summary judgment. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042.

Furthermore, the fact that Precythe or Adams may have been aware of Plaintiff's complaints through the grievance process does not establish personal involvement in a constitutional violation. The denial of a grievance, by itself, is not a constitutional violation. Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 2002). When a non-medical administrator receives a grievance regarding medical care, their responsibility is generally limited to ensuring that the inmate is being seen by medical professionals. Meloy, 302 F.3d at 849. The record demonstrates that each time Plaintiff filed a grievance, the responding officials checked his medical records and confirmed he was receiving treatment, including various antibiotics and wound care from NP Sullentrup and other Centurion staff. Therefore, Precythe and Adams are entitled to summary judgment on the individual capacity claims.

2. Defendant Boyles

Plaintiff's claim against Boyles is based solely on her role in processing his grievances. He alleges that she ignored his medical complaints. However, as noted above, there is no federal constitutional right to a prison grievance procedure, and a prison official's failure to process a grievance or their unfavorable response to a grievance does not violate the Constitution. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). Boyles is not a medical professional and had no role in Plaintiff's medical treatment. Her only involvement was reviewing his IRRs and grievances. In doing so, she relied on the medical professionals' findings that Plaintiff was receiving appropriate care. Summary judgment will be granted in favor of Boyles.

B. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff also sues Defendants in their official capacities. “A suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent.” Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2006). Thus, Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendants are claims against the State of Missouri. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against a state or its officials in their official capacities. Andrus ex rel. Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 1999). To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, those claims are barred.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against the State, he must show that a municipal or state policy or custom was the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he suffered a constitutional violation. He was consistently seen by medical staff, provided multiple courses of antibiotics, and given wound care. While he disagreed with the effectiveness of the treatment, a mere disagreement with a medical provider's course of treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. Meuir v. Greene Cnty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115, 1118-19 (8th Cir. 2007). Because Plaintiff cannot show an underlying constitutional violation, his official capacity claims for injunctive relief also fail.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Plaintiff's claims.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 51) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

A separate Judgment will be entered on this date.

/s/ John M. Bodenhausen

JOHN M. BODENHAUSEN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated this 5th day of October, 2023.

The Court now considers Defendant‘s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). To grant such relief, the Court must find that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction in sentence.1 As the court held in United States v. Smith, 262 F.3d 305, 320 (4th Cir. 2001), these reasons must be specific to the defendant and substantiated by the record. Additionally, the Court must evaluate the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine if a reduction is appropriate.

Finally, Defendant moves for reconsideration of the Court‘s previous order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Because Defendant fails to demonstrate a manifest error of law or fact, or present newly discovered evidence, the motion is denied.

JOHN A. ROSS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

FISCHER, J.

Kendrick Anderson appeals the circuit court‘s judgment following a jury trial finding him guilty of one count of first-degree murder, one count of second-degree murder, and three counts of armed criminal action.1 Anderson raises six points on appeal. First, he claims there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for first-degree murder and the related count of armed criminal action. Second, he argues the circuit court abused its discretion by overruling his motion for a mistrial. Third, he contends the circuit court erred by overruling his motion for a new trial because the state failed to disclose evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Fourth, Anderson claims the circuit court abused its discretion by overruling his motion for a new trial because the state presented false or misleading evidence. Fifth, he claims the circuit court abused its discretion by overruling his motion for a mistrial when a witness commented on his exercise of his right to remain silent. Finally, he argues the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of a victim‘s alleged violent character. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal because Anderson was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. The circuit court‘s judgment is affirmed.

Background

The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that on the night of November 17, 2016, K.S. and her seven-year-old son, J.S., were in their home in Kansas City, Missouri. J.S. was sleeping on the couch in the living room, and K.S. was in her bedroom. Anderson, who was K.S.‘s boyfriend, entered the home through the front door. He went to K.S.‘s bedroom and began arguing with her. During the argument, Anderson produced a handgun and shot K.S. multiple times. J.S., who had been awakened by the arguing, saw Anderson shoot his mother.

After shooting K.S., Anderson walked into the living room where J.S. was standing. Anderson pointed the gun at J.S. and shot him in the face. Anderson then fled the scene. J.S., despite his injuries, was able to go to a neighbor‘s house for help. K.S. died from her injuries, but J.S. survived. Anderson was later apprehended and charged with first-degree murder for the death of K.S., first-degree murder for the shooting of J.S., and three counts of armed criminal action.

At trial, J.S. testified and identified Anderson as the shooter. The state also presented evidence of DNA and cell phone records linking Anderson to the scene. Anderson‘s defense was that he was not the shooter and was at another location at the time of the crimes. The jury found Anderson guilty of first-degree murder for the death of K.S., the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder for the shooting of J.S., and three counts of armed criminal action. The circuit court sentenced Anderson to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, life imprisonment for second-degree murder, and terms of years for the armed criminal action counts, with all sentences to run consecutively.

Standard of Review

“To determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction and to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court deems it privileged to determine whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Naylor, 510 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Mo. banc 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court “views the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict and disregards all contrary evidence and inferences.” State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 757 (Mo. banc 2002).

“The decision to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the circuit court and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Clark, 490 S.W.3d 704, 707 (Mo. banc 2016). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court‘s ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before it and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.” Id.

“This Court reviews a circuit court‘s ruling on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Stewart, 313 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Mo. banc 2010). “A circuit court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.” Id.

Analysis

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first point, Anderson claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree murder for the death of K.S. and the related count of armed criminal action. Specifically, he argues the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with “deliberation.”

“A person commits the offense of murder in the first degree if he or she knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter.” Section 565.020.1. “Deliberation” is defined as “cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief.” Section 565.002(3). “Deliberation is not often proved by direct evidence, rather it is more commonly inferred from the circumstances surrounding the murder.” Tisius, 92 S.W.3d at 758. “Deliberation may be inferred from the fact that a defendant had the opportunity to terminate the attack.” State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 687 (Mo. banc 2010). Furthermore, “[t]he finding of deliberation is supported by evidence that the defendant killed the victim by shooting her multiple times.” State v. Belton, 153 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005).

Here, the evidence showed that Anderson entered K.S.‘s home and engaged in a prolonged argument with her before shooting her. The evidence further showed that Anderson shot K.S. multiple times, including shots to her head and chest. These facts provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable juror to infer that Anderson acted with deliberation. The fact that he brought a handgun to the home and chose to fire it repeatedly indicates “cool reflection” rather than a spontaneous act. Because there was sufficient evidence of deliberation, Anderson‘s convictions for first-degree murder and the related count of armed criminal action are supported by the evidence. Point I is denied.

II. Motion for Mistrial - Witness Comment

In his second point, Anderson argues the circuit court abused its discretion by overruling his motion for a mistrial. This point relates to testimony from a police officer who mentioned that Anderson refused to provide a DNA sample after his arrest. Anderson contends this was an improper comment on his exercise of his right against self-incrimination.

“A mistrial is a drastic remedy to be exercised only in those extraordinary circumstances in which the prejudice to the defendant cannot otherwise be removed.” Clark, 490 S.W.3d at 707. In this case, when the officer made the comment, the circuit court sustained Anderson‘s objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement. The circuit court determined that the curative instruction was sufficient to alleviate any prejudice and that a mistrial was not warranted. Given the fleeting nature of the comment and the circuit court‘s prompt instruction to the jury, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying the mistrial. Point II is denied.

III. Brady Violation

In his third point, Anderson claims the circuit court erred by overruling his motion for a new trial because the state failed to disclose evidence in violation of Brady. The evidence in question involved a statement made by a witness to investigators that Anderson claims would have impeached the witness‘s trial testimony. To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued. State v. Salter, 637 S.W.3d 79, 92 (Mo. banc 2021).

The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on this issue and found that the evidence was not material because there was no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. We agree. The witness‘s testimony was corroborated by other significant evidence, including the testimony of J.S. and physical evidence linking Anderson to the crime scene. Therefore, Anderson failed to establish the prejudice necessary for a Brady violation. Point III is denied.

IV. False or Misleading Evidence

In his fourth point, Anderson argues the circuit court abused its discretion by overruling his motion for a new trial because the state presented false or misleading evidence. He alleges that a forensic analyst‘s testimony regarding DNA evidence was inaccurate. “To prevail on a claim that the state used perjured testimony, a defendant must establish that: (1) the witness‘s testimony was false; (2) the state knew it was false; and (3) the conviction was obtained as a result of the perjured testimony.” State v. Cummings, 400 S.W.3d 495, 504 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013).

Anderson failed to prove that the analyst‘s testimony was false or that the state knew it to be so. At most, he presented a disagreement between experts regarding the interpretation of complex DNA data. Such a disagreement does not constitute the presentation of false evidence. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial on this ground. Point IV is denied.

V. Right to Remain Silent

In his fifth point, Anderson claims the circuit court abused its discretion by overruling his motion for a mistrial when a witness commented on his exercise of his right to remain silent. This point refers to a separate instance during trial where a detective mentioned that Anderson ended his interview after being read his Miranda rights.

It is well-established that the state may not use a defendant‘s post-arrest silence as affirmative evidence of guilt. State v. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d 332, 337 (Mo. banc 1997). However, a brief, isolated comment on a defendant‘s silence does not always require a mistrial. Here, the detective‘s comment was not solicited by the prosecutor‘s question, and the state did not highlight or emphasize the comment during closing argument. The circuit court offered a curative instruction, which Anderson declined. Under these circumstances, the circuit court‘s refusal to grant a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. Point V is denied.

VI. Victim‘s Violent Character

In his final point, Anderson argues the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of K.S.‘s alleged violent character. He sought to introduce this evidence to support his theory that K.S. might have been the aggressor or that someone else had a motive to kill her. “Evidence of the victim‘s prior specific acts of violence is admissible in a murder case only when the defendant asserts self-defense.” State v. Waller, 816 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Mo. banc 1991).

In this case, Anderson did not assert self-defense; instead, his defense was that he was not the shooter. Therefore, the evidence of K.S.‘s alleged violent character was irrelevant and inadmissible. The circuit court properly excluded the evidence. Point VI is denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the circuit court‘s judgment is affirmed.

Zel M. Fischer, Judge

All concur.

The Missouri Sheriffs’ Retirement System (SRS) and its board of directors (the Board) appeal from the circuit court’s judgment finding section 488.0241 unconstitutional. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.

Background

The SRS was created in 1983 as a retirement system for county sheriffs. Section 57.949. The Board is responsible for the administration and operation of the SRS. Section 57.952.1. The SRS is funded by, among other things, a surcharge in criminal cases. Section 57.955. Section 488.024 provides for a surcharge to be collected by the clerk of the court in all criminal cases, including violations of county and municipal ordinances. The surcharge was $3 until 2013, when it was increased to $5. Section 488.024.

David Fowler and several other individuals (Plaintiffs) were defendants in various criminal cases in which they were assessed and paid the $3 or $5 surcharge. In 2015, Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against the SRS and the Board (collectively, SRS) seeking a declaratory judgment that section 488.024 is unconstitutional and seeking a refund of the surcharges paid. Plaintiffs contended the surcharge violates the “open courts” provision of the Missouri Constitution because it is not reasonably related to the administration of justice.

The circuit court granted class certification. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, finding section 488.024 unconstitutional because the surcharge is not “reasonably related to the administration of justice” and, therefore, violates the right of access to the courts guaranteed by article I, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court ordered the SRS to refund the surcharges paid by the class members since the lawsuit was filed. SRS appeals.

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews the constitutional validity of a statute de novo.” State v. Richey, 639 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Mo. banc 2022). Statutes are “presumed to be constitutional and will not be found unconstitutional unless they clearly violate some constitutional provision.” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Kan. City v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 634 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Mo. banc 1982)). “The person challenging the validity of the statute has the burden of proving the statute’s unconstitutionality.” Id.

Analysis

Plaintiffs argue section 488.024 violates the open courts provision of the Missouri Constitution. Mo. Const. art. I, § 14. Article I, section 14 provides “that the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”

This Court has previously addressed the constitutionality of court surcharges under the open courts provision. In Harrison v. Missouri Sheriffs’ Retirement System, 632 S.W.3d 310 (Mo. banc 2021), this Court considered a similar challenge to a surcharge used to fund the SRS. However, Harrison involved a challenge to the surcharge under a different constitutional theory.2 In the present case, the parties agree the controlling precedent is State ex rel. Wright v. Carter, 319 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. banc 1958).

In Wright, this Court held that court costs and surcharges are constitutional only if they are “reasonably related to the administration of justice.” Id. at 600. The Court explained that “the courts of justice shall be open to every person... and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.” Id. (quoting Mo. Const. art. I, § 14). If a surcharge is not reasonably related to the administration of justice, it constitutes an impermissible “sale of justice.” Id.

SRS argues that section 488.024 is reasonably related to the administration of justice because county sheriffs perform essential functions in the court system, such as serving process, providing courtroom security, and transporting prisoners. SRS contends that providing a retirement system for sheriffs helps recruit and retain qualified individuals to perform these court-related duties.

This Court disagrees. While it is true that sheriffs perform many important duties that assist the courts, they are executive branch officers, not judicial branch employees. Their primary duties involve law enforcement and public safety, which extend far beyond the courtroom. The fact that some of their duties overlap with the court system does not make a retirement fund for all county sheriffs “reasonably related to the administration of justice” in every criminal case. As the circuit court correctly noted, the surcharge is assessed in all criminal cases, even those in which the sheriff played no role whatsoever, such as municipal ordinance violations prosecuted by municipal police or cases investigated by the highway patrol.

Furthermore, the surcharge does not fund the sheriffs’ performance of court-related duties; it funds a retirement system for individuals who happen to be sheriffs. The connection between a criminal defendant’s court case and the long-term retirement benefits of county sheriffs is too remote to satisfy the “reasonably related” test set forth in Wright. Because the $5 surcharge in section 488.024 is not reasonably related to the administration of justice, it violates the open courts provision of article I, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution.

Conclusion

The circuit court did not err in finding section 488.024 unconstitutional. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Zel M. Fischer, Judge

Wilson, C.J., Russell, Powell, Breckenridge, and Draper, JJ., concur. Ransom, J., not participating.

Notes

1
Plaintiff brings his claims against Defendants in their official and individual capacities. In his complaint, Plaintiff also named the Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC“) as a defendant. The Court dismissed MDOC at the initial 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) review. (ECF No. 6) The Court notes that Defendant has previously filed similar motions for relief which were denied for failure to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons. All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, unless otherwise noted. All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as amended.
2
The SRS surcharge was previously challenged on different grounds in Harrison v. Mo. Sheriffs’ Ret. Sys., 632 S.W.3d 310 (Mo. banc 2021), where this Court addressed whether the surcharge was a “tax” or a “fee” for purposes of the Hancock Amendment.