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Micha v. Sun Life Assurance of Canada, Inc.
874 F.3d 1052
9th Cir.
2017
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 M.D., MICHA, John Paul Plaintiff,

individual CANADA, LIFE OF ASSURANCE

SUN

INC., corporation, Defen a Delaware

dant/Cross-Defendant/Appellee, Gy For Benefits Plan Partners, Oncology

necologic Associates liability c, limited a California

Ll

company, Defendant/Cross-Claim

ant/Appellant.

No. 16-55053 Appeals, Court

United States

Ninth Circuit. * August

Submitted

Filed October 12-55816, previous panel from of this *The No. risdtótion ju- retained Benefits

Marc Corey S. Schechter F. Schechter, LLP, Butterfield San Schechter California, Diego, for Defendant/Cross- ClaimantyAppellant.

Michael B. Bemacchi and Keiko J. Koji- ma, LLP, Burke Williams & Sorensen Los California, Angeles, for Defendant/Cross- Defendant/Appellee. MURPHY,**

Before: R. MICHAEL WARDLAW, KIM M. and MARSHA S. BERZON, Judges. Circuit by Judge Concurrence Berzon OPINION MURPHY, Judge: Circuit

I. INTRODUCTION generally This employs the five- out ‍​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‍in Ry test set Hummell v. S.E. (9th Co., 1980), & 634 F.2d 446 koff determine the appropriateness awarding denying a 29 U.S.C. request for appellate ERISA-based attor ney’s Managers fees.1 See Credit Ass’n оf S. Cal. Kennesaw & Ins. Accident 1994); Oper ating Eng’rs B E Pension Trusts v. & Backhoe, Inc., 1356-57 question presented The here is analyzing party’s whether in request for appellate attorney’s fees within the Hum- rubric, mell a court must consider litigation. entire course of the The decision ** Murphy, rigid Honorable Michael R. Senior exceptions applicability exist Judge Appeals, Circuit the U.S. Court of test. For reasons that will soon Circuit, sitting by designation. Tenth however, apparent, become this is not the specifically emphasize qualifier appropriate explore 1. We case to the existence of "generally.” infra, may exceptions. set out there well such (quo- Bernstein, fаvor. Disability’s at 907 Sokol omitted). recog- specifically 1987), an compels affirmative tations n Accordingly, exer question. to that nized

swer XJ.S.P; to 28 jurisdiction pursuant cising [w]hen, underlying course of the *3 § the district this court REVERSES litigation, court district informed attorney’s denial court’s (“Sun Company Life Assurance- [Sun matter to the district and REMANDS Life”) regard- concerns it serious ] had of a for calculation reasonable award handling ing [Dr. John] Sun Life’s costs. fees and benefits, disability claim Sun Micha’s so, Sun Life the suit. When did settled II. BACKGROUND Disability’s Group Life fully vindicated Disability Group Micha In Benefits interests lawsuit. § a affirmed we Id.3 of Group in litigation attorney’s fees in Micha emphasized that the fee award (“Group Disability Benefits Plan Disabili- Disability’s favor a “remnant of Group was Oncology Associates ty”) Gynecologic (“GOA"). noted that Partners, Fed.Appx. precedent” and be- LLC discarded change significant, intervening cause a Micha conclud- 906-08 law, (1) unpublished our “some achieved ed in.this (2) practical no sig- disposition “likely was on the merits”2 success anyone to in con- nificance other than not abuse its discretion court did n.l,4 Id. at 906 Sun Life filed the five Hummell factors weighed cluding appeal.” Co., disability denying at 331 Micha benefits. fiOR 2. See Standard Ins. Hardt v. Reliance Life 242, 244-45, (“While trial, 130 S.Ct did not reach the court 560 U.S. this case (2010) (holding party findings Regarding need not in Order made L.Ed.2d its several ”prevail[]” a fee award under Scope to obtain of Review to Determine Motions instead, 1132(g)(1); court has discretion indicating assessing in Sun Life’s bad faith long grant claims,”).’ such award as finding to Based on its Sun Micha's degree of success on faith, some achieved “has .the Life acted in bad the district court con- omitted)). (quotations merits” eluded “the first and fifth factors awarding [litigation weigh in favor of attor- underlying court in the benefits district ney’s] Disability. Group to” Group Disability, dispute Micha and between Life, side, side, on one Sun on the other Micha, explained 4.As "ample was evidence” Sun concluded there' Disability employee Group is an welfare denying engaged Mi- Life in misconduct ,.. provide disability plan maintained to disability cha’s сlaim: employees Group .... to benefits [GOA] complaint appears central to be Plaintiff's disability from Disability purchased policy engaged pattern Life of con- Sun covering employees, Sun Life GOA’s includ- designed permit company to duct Dr, Micha, sought disability ing Micha John learning certain details about Plain- avoid Sun Life. When Sun Life de- require benefits would find tiff’s it to condition claim, Indeed, brought Micha suit policy. nied the him disabled under the- Disability. See ample Life review of the record finds evidenc'e Sun 132(a)(1)(B), § T support this contention. U.S.C. omitted) (em- (footnote Fed.Appx. response EOR 254. In to the district court’s phasis original). requiring The rule Micha as to misconduct conclusion Life, Disability sue to obtain benefits with Micha and Sun Life settled Thereafter, eventually by disability granted from Sun abandoned benefits. Life him banc; litiga- sitting Disability’s request granting Group this court en fees, specifi- Financial In In Everhart Allmerica tion district court cally Life acted in bad faith surance found Certiorari, asserting for a Petition Writ asked that for appellate attor- ney’s unpublished fees be disposition Micha resolved with the five-factor test set out wide-ranging repercussions.5 have Hummell.6 The would despite But concluded that petition having see id. Sun Life’s certiora- achieved some success (1) by ri litiga claimed increase prevailing on appeal, Group Disability was (2) expand tion over fee awards and not, to appellate attorney’s entitled class of entitled an award of individuals under the Hummell'factors. The district regard not only with (1) court reasoned as follows: Sun Life did through also attor ERISA but "similar act in with culpability as bad.faith ney’s being fees claims filed in federal n the prior appeal because pre- context.” courts outside (i.e., sented a novel issue whether a nomi- filed an *4 opposition the nal defendant could recover from a co- Supreme the Court petition and denied defendant based on the success of the — Sun Life’s for certiorari. U.S. (2) plaintiffs case); ability Life’s Sun to —, 2894, 192 926 135 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d uncontested, pay was awаrd but not (2015). determinative; (3) an award fees would § Seeking appel- award of (a) future misconduct deter because prevailing late for attorney’s fees' Mi- prior appeal the taken bad faith cha, Disability Group to filed Motion (b) clear Micha made the “facts of this Attorney Transfer Consideration Fees (4) unlikely to repeated”; case are be the on Appeal to the District Court Deter- factor, litigation provided fourth whether (“Any mination. See Ninth R. 39-1.8 plan to all or participants benefit resolved eligible party may who is attor- issue, legal implicated by a novel was not may to neys appeal this Court ... (5) Group Disability’s request; file to motion trаnsfer consideration parties’ positions merits of the relative attorneys fees on to appeal Disability, Group but favored .,. was tak- court slightly prior appeal because Sun Life’s en.”). panel granted the motion predicated upon fairly legal and “was debatable Disability before the district arguments involving a novel is- ERISA 2001), unnecessary disposition this court held U.S.C. ments are 1132(a)(1)(B) permit "does not suits -Request this Life’s for Judicial third-party against, a ben insurer recover unnecessary DENIED it is Notice is because when is not as functioning efits the insurer to take notice of documents in this contained Instead, plan under Ev- the erhart, administrator.” court’s docket. plan proper de ERISA was the fendant a suit for benefits. After the 6. The five are: Hummell factors filing complaint giving of the rise this (1) Cyr degree parties’ opposing this overruled Everhart. of the cul- faith; (2) Ins. Reliance Standard pability ability or bad 2011) (enbanc). fees; opposing parties satisfy award of original). (emphasis Id. at n. (3) whether an of fees opposing would deter others from 5. We GRANT Disability’s Motion circumstances; (4) acting under similar Take Judicial Notice to Exhibits 1 and 2. parties requesting sought whether Cty. Orange, Harris 682 F.3d participants to benefit all and beneficiaries 2012) ("We may judicial take plan significant of an ERISA or to resolve a record, undisputed public notice of matters ERISA; (5) legal quеstion regarding including or state documents on file federal (citation omitted)). partids’ positions. relative courts.” We DENY as to Exhibit motion because those docu Heineman, Hillis v. be clear from recita- sue.” should 2010).7 (9th Cir. reasoning, tion of the district court’s factors, analyzing the dis- the Hummell Prevailing-Party Presumption exclusively on trict court focused Group Disability claims the district arguments actions and Life’s pre apply court erred when failed Life’s and refused to consider Sun vailing-party presumption resolving underlying suit Micha conduct appellate attorney’s entitlement disability benefits. brought Steelworkers Am. v. Ret. See United Hourly-Rated Emps. Plan Income III. ANALYSIS ARCO, Inc., AS 2008) (“[A]s rule, general prevailing to Reverse the A. Forfeited Bases on an claim is entitled District Court special unless circum Rule 1. Automatic-Entitlement such an stances render award un omitted)). (quotation This issue was just.” asserts we should in Group for the first time Disabili raised automatic-enti- adopt the Circuit’s Seventh ty’s Citing motion for reconsideration. and, basis, reverse the tlement rule precedents, the district court re *5 appellate of attor- court’s denial district Kona ‍​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‍fused consider the issue. See En Lilly v. Eli & ney’s Bandak Co. fees. See ters., 229 Bishop, Inc. v. Estate F.3d of (7th 2009) 798, Cir. 803 Ret. 587 F.3d (9th 2000) 877, (holding Cir. that a 890 (“[A]ffirmance appellee an entitles who has for “may motion reconsideration not be attorney’s an properly beеn awarded arguments present used raise evi attorney’s to an fee for they for time could rea dence first when successfully defending the district court’s sonably have been raised earlier appeals. of judgment in the court Other- for of litigation”). review abuse discre We of the initial award—to purpose wise for tion the denial of a motion reconsidera losing the cost of shift Props. Corp., Dev. tion. Smith v. Pac. & imperfectly party—would 2004). achieved.” (9th Cir. 358 F.3d We A. (quoting Randolph, Sullivan William no of in the dis perceive abuse discretion (7th 2007))). Inc., Cir. F.3d trict refusal to consider an issue court’s reasonably to consider this issue because been decline that could have raised We Group Disability’s original ap motion for raised in the district court. See was never hand, therefore, is, type gave unnecessary is the of fees-on-fees case that to decide It precedent rise to the automatic-entitlement rule. The whether extant Ninth Circuit would question adoption before court here prevent of an automatic-entitle- sole Group Disability was entitled to Managers was whether ment .rule. In Association Credit achieving California, appellate attorney’s some court held "[i]n Southern degree an considering appellate fees of success on the whether to award appropriateness 1132(g), must wherе the issue was the under 29 U.S.C. we consider 25 F.3d of a district court’s award of attor- the five Hummell factors.” 1994); Operating Eng’rs, ney’s that distinction is mean- fees. Whether see also (same). ingful enough panel key to allow a of this court to 1356-57 There is a dis- F.2d at adopt rule without and this the automatic-entitlement between those cases tinction Operating Engi- superseding involvement of the en banc court Managers In and both Credit grant deciding is a we leave for where this court was whether to matter neers litigated properly appellate appeals presented issue is raised and fees in case, district court. ERISA merits issues. This other pellate attorney’s fees.8 if reversе the district court used incorrect

legal findings. standards reach its Hope B. HummeWs Multi-Factor Test Workers, v. Int’l Bhd. Elec. 1986). Furthermore, Group Disability asserts the dis will reverse if denial “it has trict analysis of the Hummell fac a definite firm conviction that the dis legal tors is infected with error and its trict court judg committed clear error of appellate attorney’s denial of fees is mani Int’l, ment.” Inc., United States v. Tucor festly In particular, unreasonable. 1171, 1175(9th Disability asserts the district court’s refus al to pre-appeal consider Life’s con The district court erred when it improperly analysis duct skewed its refused consider the full course of the Hummell factors in Sun Life. An litigation, specifically including Life’s fees is reviewed conduct, pre-appeal in applying the Hum- discretion, though “any abuse elements mell factors to Group Disability’s request legal analysis statutory interpreta Sokol, attorney’s fees.9 See tion figure which in the district court’s (“First, the district court decision are de novo.” reviewable Fabbrini found that arbitrarily Bernstein had acted City Dunsmuir, and, thus, capriciously this appeal 2011) omitted). Thus, (quotation have arisen had it not been reviewing a district court’s denial his initial bad faith in handling pens ion.”).10 this court Weighing must the five fac- is, therefore, unnecessary It to address defending connection with courts prevailing-party presumption whether the set the Ninth appel- Circuit whether the review pursued out in United Steelworkers survived Su- lant bad faith and not Hardt, preme conduct, Court’s appellant’s decision 560 U.S. at whether the re- *6 244-45, 130 S.Ct. 2149. original litigation, sulted in a warrants finding of culpability.” bad faith or None of cited, the three The cases the district court howev- 9. district court refused to consider Sun er, cases, support proposition. pre-appeal weighing Life’s Two of conduct Inc., Group Disability Painting, DeVoll v. Burdick Hummell factors because 35 F.3d 1994) purportedly origi- Operating Engineers, did not raise the in its issue request proce- nal for fees. district court’s F.2d at involved ERISA beneficia- ries, who, ruling here, plans dural as to waiver of the issue is erro- unlike the at issue аre asserting rarely neous. In appellate charged attorney’s an Operating entitlement to fees. See fees, attorney's Group Disability specifically Eng'rs, (noting 911 F.2d at 1357 that "the it achieved some noted success on the merits very frequently sug- Hummell considerations participated it supported when in and Micha’s gest attorney’s charged fees not be should attempt disability to obtain from benefits Sun plaintiffs”); Flanagan ERISA v. In- Group Disability Tr., Life. claimed Empire that but land & Elec. WorkersPension Plan denying 1993) Sun Life's faith in ("[Ojur bad Micha’s bene- claim, fits it never would have “became a perception common fees [is] only reading victim to the lawsuit.” The fair charged against plain- should nоt be ERISA Group Disability's request of appellate tiffs.”). fees Operating And in both En- DeVoll and Group Disability asking is that was here, that the gineers, no unlike there is indication the keep Group district court the basis for Dis- beneficiaries acted bad faith or ability’s firmly success in mind as it moved culpable point litigation, were any at though analysis. the Humme:il undermining any opinions' inference that the pre-appeal silence about conduct indicated denying 10. In its order the district court such was In the third consideration barred. case, appellee Building Employees "[w]here stated that seeks attor- Misic v. Service Trust, ney’s fees performed and costs for services & Health Welfаre conduct, solely basis of its judged on the light of of Life’s will all Sun tors arguments on the fee appellate of claim issue. wrongful denial Micha’s its from of for a writ filing petition of a to its Furthermore, as this court’s memoran- certiorari, Disability is it is clear clear, disposition in Micha made dum attorney’s fees. appellate to entitled- dead-ender, a underlying' fee was anybody to but legal significance with no Degree Culpability of Bad Faith 1. 906 n.l. Fed.Appx. Nev- parties. strongly favors award This factor ertheless, litigated the vigorously Sun Life Disabili- costs appellate going so far as to dubi- matter into this forced ty. certiorari that petition a ously assert in wrongfully Life Sun after Micha disрosition' the memorandum to Micha. disability benefits denied far-reaching impli- exceedingly have sivpra Although note 3. as denominated types cations for various awards under then-pre- this court’s “defendant” under The first Hmnmell fee-shifting statutes. decision, vailing Everhart concluded weighs of an heavily factor in favor award ‍​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‍was, Group.Disability reahty, co-plain- Dis- appellate fully supportive tiff Micha’s ability. Fed.Appx. at ERISA benefits. 597 907. weighing Sokol requires courts Pay Ability to Hmnmell factor pre- first consider court, by noted culpability bad faith or satisfy fee dispute ability does non-claiming party. at 561. F.2d however, analysis, point At no in its prevents party insulating award. This rule what-weight, indicate by from an did the district court appellate itself assigned -factor. This if identifying any, merely an issue whose resolu- that, precedents indicate at least'as “sufficiently justi- tion is uncertain have beneficiary party against involving to a suit an ERISA fied which an award [the seeking plaintiff, defendant-appellant’s abili litigation fees has entered] been Sullivan, weigh strongly in ty pay appellate should review.” See Smith CMTA- A like Life should not be an award Trust, Pension award, from a IAM able Disability is Although Group justifying even on an re- issue beneficiary, this view, thereby significant technically an ERISA impose costs *7 and award, in an Hmnmell factor still weighs favor of appellee defending in the fee on the affirming In the district taking knowledge in that of fees. comfort the award while in of against it fees any potential original fee award court’s award appellate 1986), appellate may properly of conduct under the discussion consider factors,” limited, .attorney’s simply preclude fees is so cannot but did not it. the Hummell conduct, meaningfully the bears on the it pre-appeal said case of which consideration clear, however, be,- be, hand. issue at It is that have to consid- both said but did not could prevailed significant part, in depiction in Misic court's Even were the ered. district casting party’s accurate, doubt on the notion either that is Circuit law its of Ninth order litigation position in the court district distinguish- why on it relied on three silent behavior, Id. culpable amounted to ignore cases faith rath- able Sun Life’sbad Sokol, directly analogous court, is er than which denying The district in reconsidera- and, today, mandates this case we hold of of contorted its reliance denial tion its cases,, con- stating any pre-appeal of bad faith they on those consideration demonstrat- three ,, merely in duct. courts the Ninth Circuit ed "that claims; (2) of Group Disability, denying legitimate held as from Sun follows: Life not did act bad in bringing faith

Having novel; Micha’s suit because the issue concluded raised was (3) Life nominal- defendant Sun fact the the under arose , defendаnt/plaintiff-in-interest decision, Everhart now-rejected the a situ- the proper vantage is likely ation that would not repeat, meant validity to review the of the dis- of. an award have no deterrent fee award,, easily trict court’s The district value. conclusion court’s rejects arguments Sun Life’s toas suc- regard -manifestly is unreasonable. cess on the merits. Sun Life contends First, an of award fees and costs deciding that whether an particularly not meaningful is when a de- appropriate, fee the award district can force the expenditure signif- fendant required court was focus the relief icant fees defend award. on its obtained own Thus, proper of litigation award every point behalf. At each and neces- up by appellate is backed award sary, Group Disability supported Mi- is generally sufficient deterrent disability cha’s benefits as wrongful conduct the consistent with the contract insurance it Second, ERISA defendant. When, purchased from Sun Life. the is legally consideration of faith bad underlying litigation, the course suspect because district refused it district court Life informed Sun had to consider pre-appeal Sun Life’s conduct regarding serious concerns Sun Life’s which, above, as discussed bad involved handling, of Micha’s for disability claim supra Finally, note 3. faith. benefits, settled suit. When (i.e., court’s third consideration so, fully Sun Life vindicated did relative unimportance of decision lawsuit, Disability’s interests Micha limits the deterrent effect According Micha, FedAppx. at 907. award) appellate is arguably inconsis- Group Disability’s interests were identical tent with the district court’s determination to, with, fully aligned Micha’s interests appellate that Sun Life’s was tak- conduct obtaining disability award of proper good ap- en in because faith the issue identity-of-interest benefits. That did not is, peal was novel. That fact undeniable disappear Life appealed when Sun the fee original district court’s award in favor Group Disability. award entirely fees was a product Life has no reason to offered conclude that Everhart decision now-discarded identity-of-interest disappeared when ana- vigorous makes Sun Life’s advo- appellate whether the Hummell factors lyzing weigh cacy, exemplified petition for by its certio- in favor of an of appellate award fees to rari, all the harder all understand and Disability. case, being That susceptible the more ef- deterrent rule of law Smith weighs set out of an fect *8 of an of particular favor fees in this award in district abused its con- discretion case. cluding this an weighed factor 3. Deterrence Instead, of appel- award of an award fees present late in in The district court the the circumstances concluded de appeal significant would have a weighed against terrence factor an award deter- (1) marginal of fees original bringing the fee rent effect of because: award the sufficiently companies of appeals deterred insurance a misconduct-based denial after see benefits, appellate of fees swpra note led an award to an of discretion. amounts abuse of fees and costs.

an award Legal Significance IV. CONCLUSION of Issue/Benefit Participants All Plan above, those set out the For reasons Group Disability’s of Micha held that resolution of Sun district court’s denial fees significance appellate motion practical had no appeal Life’s matter is is and the appeal. on 597 costs REVERSED anybody but for the REMANDED to the district court at 906 n.l. Because Fed.Appx. of of award appeal with limited calculation a reasonable vigorously pursued way through all and costs. practical significance certiorari, a writ of this factor petition for BERZON, Judge, concurring: Circuit

weighs in of an award of fees favor Disability.11 Group opinion in follow- I concur with the ing observations: Relative Merits issue,1 reaching I Were we Positions Parties’ Supreme precedent that Court hold both Disability prevailed on Group that Given compel the and our own case law conclu- Micha, every matter at issue district that ERISA fees should sion correctly concluded this factor fa- on to a appeal be awarded Group because an award vored successfully the fees it was award- defends prevailed Disability way, at the district court. Put another ed viewed, the Hummell nigh should be unto auto- Properly each “fees-on-fees” matic, appellate of an in ERISA cases as others. We weighs factors favor fee the Hummell troop through not The district should Disability. award factors, Rykoff see Hummell v. S. E. & contrary conclusion and denial of Disability weigh concluding Group con- concluding did not erred in 11. In this factor factоr, fees, inapplicability of this entire ceded the of an award district court conceding inapplicability "Group Disability instead of as follows: admits stated portion benefit-to-other-participants weigh not in favor of an that this factor does Instead, factor. Group Disability fourth Hummell ar- award of fees. largely gues inapplicable is this factor dispute notes, should therefore be opinion an individual 1. As the main inapplicable here.” The affirmatively deemed use of the fac- invited misreading upon analyzing is based court’s decision for the fees tors fees, Group arguing exclusively In its the record. to the dis- that basis argued Only Disability specifically Op. ap- that because the trict at 1055-56. court. grounded Disability peal fee well in law assert that award was did nearly always equity, Life's award for the suc- fees are available significant legal present It is We issue. cessful defense of a award. have dis- did certainly reply support raised for true in its cretion to “consider an issue presented conceded that if the issue is first time factor, portion purely opposing party will the other benefit one of law and the however, others, Notably, prejudice United States irrelevant. suffer no as a result.” Valdez-Novoa, nothing Group Disability’s reply there is omitted). 2015) (internal withdrawing previous argument quotation that be- marks majority оpted present not to exercise that discre- cause Sun Life’s did has issue, Op. I legal 1055-56. accede to that significant this factor still favored tion here. See Thus, district court *9 an award of fees. decision.

1061 446, (9th 1980), impose 634 F.2d 453 Cir. with ment could cost ..., regard appeal—even though, prevailing parties to the fees as the financial de illustrates, terrent that the EAJA aims to opinion in this eliminate resurrected.”); would be Ne. Ohio doing properly likely result of so is anoth Coal. Husted, the Homeless ‍​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‍v. 831 F.3d er fee award. (6th 2016) 724-25 Cir. (“[Diluting the fee-shifting The case law statutes is by failing provide overall fee award fully See, Comm’r, e.g., well-settled. I.N.S. v. compensatory fees fees undermines the Jean, 154, 161-63, 496 110 U.S. S.Ct. congressional 1988], intent [§ behind (1990); 134 Cootеr & Gell L.Ed.2d encourage private which is to prosecu 384, 408-09, 110 Corp., Hartmarx 496 U.S. tion of rights through civil suits the trans (1990). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d fer costs to those who uniformly held that have time “[C]ourts (internal infringe upon rights.” basic civil spent establishing the entitlement omitted)). cases, quotation marks In such compensable amount the fee is under if fee-shifting is to mean anything, it must ” fee-shifting provisions .... Blix federal prevailing party actually mean that Club, LLC, seth Yellowstone Mountain award, obtains the of its fee benefit rather (9th 626, 629 854 F.3d Cir. We have depleting than or it in exhausting the inev applied con principle numerous litigation. Moreover, itable follow-on if the See, (fees e.g., texts. id. under 28 U.S.C. party prevailing get as to fees will not its 1927); Developers, In re S. Cal. Sunbelt award, defending full fees for op (9th 2010) (fees Inc., 456, 462 608 F.3d posing leverage party has to force a dis involuntary following dismissal of an bank settlement, count to the fee award with ruptcy petition); Bridgeport Camacho v. pursuing expending out Fin., 973, 978, Inc., 523 F.3d Husted, attorneys’ own do so. 2008) (fees under the Fair Debt Collection at 724. Act); Kinney see also v. Int’l Practices There is no that the doubt ERISA fees Workers, Bhd. Elec. here, provision issue U.S.C. 1991) (common-law fee-shifting). § 1132(g)(1), fee-shifting provision is a underlying logic The is that unless se by precedents. the sort covered these curing a fee entitlement is cost- contemplates provision that a party on the free awarded fees mаy award reasonable fees costs merits, the initial fee will be effec by participant, ... action bene- “[i]n eliminated, tively or reduced fundamental added). ficiary, fiduciary.” (emphasis or ly undermining purposes the fee- A plain reading language makes shifting provision. Lilly See Bandak v. Eli Congress clear that intended the fee-shift- & Co. Ret. ing provision apply the “action” as a 2009); Camacho, 523 F.3d at 981. whole, aspects rather than to of it. discrete purposes creating These include an incen anything Nor suggest does the statute attorneys provide representa tive for damages qualifies the fee award as might tion in counsel other sanction; cases where operates as a where the fees are obtain, wise be difficult to or where it is award, damages of a or sanction particularly important represent that the party who wins the fee award is not enti- monetary ed obtain the full amount defending tled to fees incurred due, (“The Sunbelt, having expend without at 464 addition See, Jean, e.g., al sum to secure it. ... distinction is between those statutes (“If 164, 110 permit recovery U.S. S.Ct. Govern *10 without con on the merits are therefore consis- some success damages, and which Rule, question lengthy inquiry those into the ducting the American a tent with and recovery of. permit party’s success particular the a was whether cre- qua attоrney’s fees therefore fees and issue.” or on central occurred substantial the Rule.’? exception added) to American 255, 130 (emphasis ate Id. at S.Ct. (citations marks quotation internal and (alterations quotation marks internal Blixseth, omitted)); at- 629 omitted).2 (“[T]he distinguished Supreme [has] Court gets halfway opinion The to eligibility fee-shifting where provisions, by rule” con- “automatic entitlement ah of the outcome turns on the required cluding that the was liti- are for the litigation costs shifted litigation to'consider the entire under - whole, from gation sanctions statutes as a long analysis. Hwmmell As the second as 11, of Rule like the former version where analysis3 for second Hwmmell accounts spеcific eligibility turned whether it, party’s everything preceded that fee costs are pleading was well-founded likely change to from isn’t one entitlement portion only for a discrete shifted litigation next. The reasons stage litigation.”). from the district court upholding fees Moreover, re Supreme Court has the equally granting them the will apply “fee-shifting” § ferred is, effect, something appeal. The result “statutory deviation[] provision and as a to the ordinary approach close fees-on-fees Reli from the American Rule.” Hardt fee-shifting in other applied this-court has Ins. 560 U.S. ance Standard Life contexts. 253-54, L.Ed.2d S.Ct. same, the if the effect is largely But (2010). And the ERISA standard ordinary is adоpt approach refusing on the as a under Hardt focuses action noted, justify. more difficult all whole, any not on individual success U.S.C, provision, “A of the action. claimant does component § 1132(g)(1), meaningfully is not different achieving satisfy requirement not th[e] [of fee-shifting provision other con- achieving from by on the merits] some success Bandak, by Jean. at purely procedural trolled' ... or a trivial success course, require Of we do a Hwm- it if the 802-03. victory, satisfy court can but does analysis mell before ERISA will fairly call the outcome of — ASARCO,LLC, Here, contrast, question by is no there U.S. Baker Botts L.L.P. 2164-66, —, fee-shifting provi provision 135 S.Ct. 192 L.Ed.2d at issue is a (2015), support sion, does con contrary appeal are for which fees incurred on held the statute clusion. Baker Botts’ allowed. 330(a)(1) case—§ issue in that the Bank fee-shifting ruptcy statute Code—was analysis. Or Or the third Hummell ordinary displaced the American Rule. Among problems repeating fourth. with to award 330 authorizes a Id. Section analysis every with actual, compensation for neces "reasonable adju- is back court to it forces rendered,” sary services 11 U.S.C. litigation adjudicating prior from dicate fees ,a 330(a)(1)(A), phrase Supreme § Court disapproved Supreme Court has specifically explicitly au held nor "neither judicial “Kafkaesque nightmare this sort courts costs adversarial thorizes shift - litigation, to recover fees the last infinite one side the other.”' Baker Jean, litigation over 496 U.S. round fees..” Botts, Consequently, 135 S.Ct. at 2165. S.Ct, (internal quotation held, no basis to there conclude Court omitted), marks under were allowed that fees-on-fees *11 could, however, Simonia v. Glendale 1056 n.7.4We awarded. Operat Nissan/In limit 1118, ing Engineers to procedural 608 1119 posture, F.3d finiti 2010). distinguish (9th it from nothing Cir. But fees-on-fees dis Simonía putes Micha’s, such as where logic requires analysis that the Hummell be underpinning automatic entitlement once, performed or separately more than rule is particularly compelling.5 See Voice at stage. the fees-on-fees Inc., 1015, (9th v. Stormans 1016 may amount of a fee аward 2014). Cir. separately determined at the fees-on-fees sum, In had automatic entitlement stage, filing applica with the of a new fee court, been raised issue at the I Jean, 163, See 496 at 110 tion. U.S. S.Ct. would have taken this make opportunity (“[N]o fees is ‘automatic.’ 2316 that parties clear on who seek fees a suc- Exorbitant, unfounded, procedural ... cessful ERISA are not re- ly applications—like defective fee oth quired to prove their entitlement to fees a improper position may unreason er time. As second the issue was not raised in ably protract proceedings—are matters court, majority and as the has recognize that the distriсt court can and opted not to discretion to exercise its de- discount.”). stresses, But as also Jean a cide new issue raised for the first time entitlement to fees-on-fees and the opinion. I concur in the questions. amount of such fees are distinct 161-63, 2316; 110 Id. at S.Ct. see also (9th Apfel,

Atkins v. F.3d Cir.

1998). statute, a fee-shifting Under question is

threshold entitlement answered

only once. notes, opinion pre- has

viously separate conducted Hummell

analysis for fees on an ERISA awarded Operating

merits appeal. Eng’rs Pension Backhoe, Inc., B

Trusts v. & E F.2d (9th 1990); Op. see also discussion, majority point I am confident less than assumes a without panels.”). Managers case ‍​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‍does bind future Credit can be as merits described Managers Ass'n Credit S. Cal v. requires single fee 5. Because Jean entitle & Acc. Ins. Kennesaw F.3d fee-shifting ment decision statutes under such even But as a fees-on-fees this, approach Operating Engi taken in case, Managers preclude does not Credit separate analysis for entitlement neers—a de Managers automatic entitlement here. Credit fending victory appeal—is almost governed, assumed Hummell without consid wrong. certainly present But as the case con ering any possible fees-on-fees distinction. Id. appeal, Operating cerns nonprecedential 752. It is therefore Engineers application. has no direct More Mink, point. See Sorenson v. F.3d over, Operating Managers, Engi like Credit 2001) ("[U]nstated assumptions assumes, explanation, neers without non-litigated precedential issues are not applies a second time to (citation holdings binding future decisions.” likely panels. and so does not bind future omitted)); C.I.R., Magnin 1356-57; Estate Operating Engineers, 911 F.2d at 1999) ("When Magnin, at 1077. Estate

Case Details

Case Name: Micha v. Sun Life Assurance of Canada, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Oct 31, 2017
Citation: 874 F.3d 1052
Docket Number: 16-55053
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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