Micaiah REY, Petitioner-Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 14-1984.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
May 26, 2015.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 7, 2015.*
1089
Submitted: April 13, 2015. * Judge Kelly did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
Timothy S. Ross-Boon, AFPD, argued, Des Moines, IA, (Max Samuel Wolson, AFPD, Cedar Rapids, IA, on the brief), for Petitioner-Appellant.
Richard D. Westphal, AUSA, argued, Davenport, IA, (Mary C. Luxa, AUSA, Des Moines, IA, on the brief), for Respondent-Appellee..
Before WOLLMAN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges, and DOTY,1 District Judge.
DOTY, District Judge.
Micaiah Rey appeals from the district court‘s2 denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under
I.
On May 3, 2007, following a jury trial, Appellant Micaiah Rey was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base in violation of
In August 2009, Rey filed a preprinted form entitled “Motion Under
The district court denied Rey‘s
On March 12, 2014, with the assistance of counsel, Rey filed a motion under
II.
Rey argues that the district court erred in denying his motion as a second or successive petition under
The district court properly construed Rey‘s first motion as one for relief under
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
Rey‘s initial motion fits within that description in both form and substance.5 Rey sought relief on the grounds that the trial was unfair, his counsel was ineffective, and the district court improperly determined the drug amount, all in violation of the Constitution. The fact that Rey did not formally request relief beyond the appointment of counsel does not undermine the district court‘s determination, especially given the form‘s phrase requesting “any other relief to which movant may be entitled.” Liberal construction of Rey‘s pro se filing does not compel a different conclusion because doing so does not alter the substance of his filing. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir.2004) (“When we say that a pro se complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson‘s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.“).
Under the circumstances presented, the district court properly determined that Rey‘s original motion was brought under
Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
