Meyer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

repeat I here hearing go forward. Martinez, P.2d People I said what “By opinion bar the bench and

at 264: attack on the on notice

will be warrant can supporting search

affidavit conjecture.” by surmise and

be commenced

Sophie MEYER and Kenneth H. Petitioners,

Meyer, FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE

STATE COMPANY, Respondent.

INSURANCE EXCHANGE, INSURANCE

FARMERS reciprocal or inter-insurance Plaintiff-Appellee,

exchange, Aguirre, and Porfirio

Clara AGUIRRE

Defendants-Appellants. R.

Marianne I. John ADCOCK

DeCrescentis, Plaintiffs-Appellants, FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE

STATE COMPANY, foreign

INSURANCE

corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 82SC155,

Nos. 82SA474 82SA298. Colorado,

Supreme Court of

En Banc.

Sept. 1984.

Rehearing Denied Oct. Matas, Denver,

Bruce A. petitioners for in No. 82SC155.

Renner, Burke, Rodman & John R. Rod- man, Denver, for respondent in No. 82SC155.

Rector, Retherford, Johnson, Mullen & Bruce, Springs, plain- C. Neil Colorado for tiff-appellee in No. 82SA474. Sternal, Pueblo, P.C., Lee N. for defend- ants-appellants in No. 82SA474. Wagner Waller, Waller, Jr., & William C. Mark, Walkwitz, Engle- Denis H. Jon J. wood, for plaintiffs-appellants in No. 82SA298.

DeMoulin, Anderson, Campbell Lau- P.C., Denver, gesen, Campbell, Laird defendant-appellee in No. 82SA298. Chalat, Denver, Kritzer, Kritzer & Stuart curiae, Lawyers for amicus Trial Colorado Ass’n.

NEIGHBORS, Justice. appeals present

These consolidated of whether a “household exclusion issue However, policy. sions of the State Farm in an automobile clause”1 declaratory seeking judgment the Colo filed suit policy is invalid because violates Act,2 Reparations com Sophie Automobile entitled rado is not to recover addi- (Act), monly known as the No-Fault Act damages bodily injuries tional under therefore Kenneth’s granted reflected in the Act. We certiorari policy provides Kenneth’s insurance in Farm Mutual Automobile Insur State behalf, pay, on Kenneth’s State Farm will (Colo.App. Meyer, 647 P.2d 683 ance Co. v. injury bodily all claims for which he be 1982), appeals’ the court of deci to review obligated pay. legally comes to is and enforce sion that such a clause valid bodily injury coverage that the also states able. “any any apply does not to insured or 82SA474, No. and Adcock v. Aguirre, family member of the of an insured resid Insur Farm Mutual Automobile ing the same household as in 82SA298, respective trial No. (Emphasis original.) The trial sured.” validity upheld the courts also exclusionary provision court held that this cases transferred to clause. Both were Sophie not applied to and did violate the appeals for this court from the court of Thus, requirements of the Act. the trial that Meyer. with We hold consolidation summary judgment court entered a exclusion clause is invalid the household bodily injury Kenneth was not entitled to judgments in all three and reverse the coverage Sophie’s claim. The court of cases. affirmed, holding appeals that when the of the insured and claimant is a relative I. household, in the insured’s the mini resides though principal issue in these Even required mum is that for no-fault identical, litigation in each appeals is 10-4-706(l)(b) specified in section different context. There- case arose a (e), (1973 Supp.), to & 1983 fore, pertinent will discuss the facts we require Act in such circumstances separately.3 each case described 10-4-706(1)(a), 4 C.R.S. Meyer A. Supp.). Mutual Automobile State Farm 26,1978, August Meyer Kenneth was On Meyer, Insurance Co. Mey- Sophie driving an automobile which (Colo.App.1982). mother, er, passenger. Sophie a his was Kenneth; however, they lived resided Aguirre B. together primarily for financial reasons 15, 1976, Aguirre September Clara kept separate. matters On their financial passenger in a car owned and driven in a was a was involved one-car The automobile husband, They Aguirre. Porfirio by her Sophie injured. She sued accident and was collision in which per- a one-car damages for her were involved Kenneth to recover injuries. sued bodily She carri- Clara suffered injuries. Kenneth’s insurance sonal damages alleged on his paid Porfirio for based er, Mutual Insurance was insured negligence. The automobile expenses required as Sophie’s medical by Farmers Insurance (PIP) provi- by a issued Injury Protection Personal -723, operates to 1.Generally, §§ 10-4-701 the household exclusion making pay- carrier from relieve an insurance bodily injury or death under ment for loss from purposes presume the opinion of this 3. For liability policy the named terms of a where proceed- case to be true since each facts in each any family member is or or household insured injured summary judgment ing and the was resolved motor vehicle accident caused in a parties appeal directed our atten- have not negligent operation of the vehicle any disputed material fact. tion to issue of family or a insured or member of his/her Hughes Farm Mutual Auto- household. v. State (N.D.1976). mobile Ins. 236 N.W.2d Exchange to Clara and Porfirio. Farmers II. complaint seeking filed a declaratory Although declaratory sought relief was judgment legally obligated that it by a party case, different in each pivot- any or pay judgment defend Porfirio al issue is the same: Whether the insured against him. poli- rendered The insurance or a member of the insured’s household cy “liability excludes of any may recover under the insured’s injury (a) bodily insured for member coverage, notwithstanding the existence of same household such insured ex- which purports to servant, (b) cept a the named insured.” exclude such We hold that the held

The trial court the exclusion household exclusion is invalid because it is contrary public clause is not Act or provisions of the Act and policy, citing Meyer, 647 P.2d at 683. thereby expressed violates Therefore, the trial court ruled that Farm- in the Act. legally obligated ers any or pay judgment defense to Porfirio to starting point The analysis for our may against which be rendered him. begins with the Act. In order to determine whether household exclusion is incon G. Adcock Act, sistent first to look 12,1978, July On Adcock Marianne was a underlying public policy expressed by the passenger by in an automobile owned her Assembly. 10-4-702, General Section by and driven John R. DeCrescentis with (1973), C.R.S. states: permission. Adcock’s The car was involved Legislative general declaration. The against in an accident suit and Adcock filed assembly purpose declares that its in en- injuries DeCrescentis for she sustained as acting part this to inadequate 7 is avoid alleged negligence. a result his DeCres- compensation to victims of automobile by Employ- centis was insured Government accidents; require registrants to of mo- (GEICO). Company ees Insurance GEICO tor in procure vehicles this state to insur- paid $15,000, policy Adcock its limits of covering legal liability arising out of coverage required by minimum in ownership or use of such agreement return covenant vehicles and judgment. providing persons to enforce also benefits occu- pying persons such and to in- vehicles At the time accident Adcock was jured involving in accidents such vehi- insured Mutual Automobile cles. provid- Her Insurance Co. liability coverage ed that the not apply does We, therefore, legislative conclude that the “any any insured or member of the purpose adopting in the Act was twofold: family of an in residing insured the same inadequate compensation To avoid to vic- poli- household as the insured.” Under accidents, tims of automobile and to re- cy provisions, term “insured” includes quire purchase that motor vehicle owners any person using the with the automobile policies provide coverage which permission of the named Adcock insured. for both and no-fault benefits. sought declaratory and DeCrescentis 10-4-706(l)(a), Section judgment legally that State Farm is obli- (1973),4 compulsory mandates cov gated to a defense for DeCrescen- erage. This states: him, against pay tis Adcock’s suit and to (1) Required coverages. Subject to the any judgment might awarded be The court limitations and Adcock. trial dismissed the com- exclusions authorized plaint filed Adcock and part coverages DeCrescentis. re- $15,000 4. minimum The limits of re- renewal which or takes effect on after $25,000 10-4-706, quired by July this section were raised to Ch. sec. 1983. applies every 1983. The amendment new or Colo. Sess. Laws 456. compliance part with this 7 are clause.6 Section C.R.S. quired for as follows: states: (a) Legal liability coverage bodily (1) Conditions and exclusions. The arising out of the use of injury or death coverages in section described 10-4-706 limit, to a exclusive of the motor vehicle may subject to conditions be and exclu- (cid:127) costs, of fifteen thousand interest and approved by sions the commissioner person any one any dollars to one which are not inconsistent with the re- thirty thousand dollars to accident and part quirements of this accident, persons any one and for all coverages described damage arising out of the use property subject also to exclu- 10-4-706 be limit, to a exclusive of the motor vehicle injured person: sions where costs, thousand of interest five (a) injury caused his Sustains own one accident.... dollars act; intentional added.) 10-4-706(l)(b) (Emphasis Sections (b) operating Is motor vehicle as a (l)(e), Supp.), & 1983 good faith converter without belief generally require referred to- what legally operate he is entitled to or use (PIP) or no-fault personal injury such vehicle. compensation regard without benefits— permit This an insurance car- section would expenses, rehabilitation fault for medical rier to include the household exclusion Li- expenses, pay, and death benefits.5 lost policies long so as the exclu- its coverages provide ability and PIP commissioner, (1) approved by sion is fundamentally distinct for claims that are not inconsistent with the Act. On Paul Cingoranelli in character. v. St. 1,1974, adopted July the commissioner Col- Insurance, P.2d 863 Marine 658 Fire & Regulation No. 74-20 orado Insurance that (Colo.1983). PIP liability Both cover- exclusion in auto- approves the household ages “play a role in effectuation of the liability policies. insurance How- mobile legislative purpose.” Marquez v. Pruden- ever, exclusion hold that the household we Co., Property Casualty tial Insurance Act. it conflicts with the invalid because 29, (Colo.1980). 620 P.2d 33 statutes Barnes, Indemnity Co. v. See Travelers provide time these cases arose effect at the (1976). 278, 552 P.2d 300 Clauses that an owner who fails to have effect attempt which a contract of insurance containing required coverages condition, dilute, statutorily man- or limit subject liability and no-fault “shall be or void. dated are invalid DeWitt 42- provided under section sanctions 474, 625 P.2d 478 Young, v. 7-301, 1973, of the ‘Motor Vehicle C.R.S. (1981). § 10-4- Responsibility Financial Act’.” addition,

705(1),4 an own- effectively The household exclusion no-fault er who fails to have a Meyer and Porfirio renders Kenneth for the personally liable effect becomes operators Aguirre, motor vehicle and other § 10-4- payment of no-fault benefits. circumstances, and there in like uninsured 705(2), 4 C.R.S. them to be violation of by causes public policy of com legislatively mandated liability in Having determined required by the pulsory liability insurance mandatory under the surance is Co., Bishop Act. v. Allstate Insurance statutory scheme to must now examine in the (Ky.1981). 865 Nowhere 623 S.W.2d provisions pertain if determine fami permitted to exclude permit the Act is insurer ing exclusions from the Act members from ly exclusion and household to enforce the household carriers (1973), governs self- provisions not material 6. Section Amendments to these presented applicable these cases. will take effect to the issues January here insurers and is 5, 1, 303, sec. 10-4- 1985. Ch. (l)(d)(I), 706(l)(b), (l)(c)(I)(B), (l)(c)(II), 1984 1067, Colo. Sess. Laws 1071-72. 590 policies

under its in the outings. circum- Consequently, there is prac- no stances of cases. these tical method per- which the class of sons excluded from by this appellate Although courts in other provision may conform their activities so issue, great states are divided on this exposure as to avoid risk riding majority holding are consistent with our who, them, with someone as to invalid. is unin- Stevens such exclusions are v. State Mutual sured. Farm Automobile Insur Co., Ariz.App. 892, 21 519 P.2d 1157 Mutual Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. (1974); (see v. also Arceneaux State Farm Wiscomb, 203, 441, 97 Wash.2d 643 P.2d Co., Mutual Automobile Insurance 113 444 Where happens a claimant 216, (1976)); Ariz. DeWitt v. 550 be the insured under the Young, 474, (1981); Kan. 229 625 P.2d 478 policy or a member of the family, insured’s Co., Bishop v. Allstate Insurance 623 he/she is nonetheless entitled to seek ade- State Farm Mutual (Ky.1981); S.W.2d 865 quate compensation injuries for the sus- Sivey,

Automobile Insurance v.Co. 404 tained. though Even these classes of acci- 51, (1978); Mich. 272 N.W.2d 555 dent victims entitled receive PIP Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. benefits, such benefits Traycik, Mich.App. v. 272 86 N.W.2d adequate compensation contemplated by (1979); Transamerica Insurance Co. the Act. v. Royle, (Mont.1983); Estate recognize We Neal v. Farmers Exchange, Insurance existence cases (1977); Kish which support 93 Nev. position taken by the v. Motor Club America Insurance appeals. carriers these 108 N.J.Super. (1970); 261 A.2d 662 e.g., Farmers Anzalone, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Cocking, Cal.Rptr. 846, 29 Cal.3d (1983); Misc.2d 462 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1981); Allstate Insurance Co. Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automo Skinner, Ga.App. 257 S.E.2d 4 bile Insurance (N.D. N.W.2d Shaw State Auto 1975); Casualty Jordan Aetna & Sure mobile Insurance Ga.App. ty 294, (1975); 264 214 S.C. S.E.2d 818 Looney v. Farmers In S.E.2d 85 Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. of Group, surance (Okla.1980); 616 P.2d 1138 Wiscomb, 203, 97 Wash.2d 643 P.2d 441 Lee v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 1, 265 Or. P.2d 6 507 However, we find these to be cases distin Supreme Washington The Court guishable unpersuasive. or For example, succinctly stated: Farmers Insurance in v. Cock prevents This specific clause class of ing, 383, Cal.Rptr. 846, 29 Cal.3d 173 628 victims, persons innocent those related to (1981), Supreme P.2d 1 the California Court driver, living and negligent with the from held statute permits that a which an auto receiving protection financial under an mobile insurer to exclude policy containing such a bodily injuries to an insured is neither essence, clause. In this clause excludes deny does it from an nor entire class of inno- Looney equal protection. v. cent In good for no victims reason. Group, (Okla. This exclusion particularly becomes 1980), the household exclusion was con disturbing light when viewed in of the sidered in the context of that state’s Finan fact that this class of victims is the one Responsibility cial reviewing Act. After frequently exposed most potential negligence statutory history, court concluded Typi- named insured. family legislature cal that the require family relations did not intend to allow mem- together work, wife-claimant, bers to ride way who was insured un church, school, functions, family social der policy, or

591 Sorenson, 350, Mass. passenger in the car of Sorenson 369 she was where 907, made 339 N.E.2d 915 the court her husband-defendant. following observations about collusion usually sup offered to The rationale accident cases: automobile port validity of the household exclusion lack existence collusion and protects the insurer is that the exclusion cooperation is not difficult to establish lawsuits from fraudulent collusive be ordinary motor case. vehicle accident family. See, members the same tween Prompt, company in- effective Farm Mutual Automobile In e.g., State vestigation requirement and the Mich.App. 86 Traycik, surance Co. regis- prompt reports of accidents to the (1979); Lee v. 272 N.W.2d try of motor vehicles to the insurer Mutual Automobile Insurance quickly facts. establish essential However, 265 Or. The insurance carriers claim that eliminating intra-family immunity tort 10-4-707, (1973 & 1983 Colorado, impliedly we have discounted the Supp.), sanctions the household exclusion argument. validity of this See Trevarton specifically states that because Trevarton, 151 Colo. P.2d the in apply PIP benefits to relatives of (1963) (a may per child his father sue sured; whereas, a simi it does contain parent’s negli injuries by the sonal caused concerning lar injuries inflicted gence in the where argue liability coverage They that because relating to performance of duties business section, legisla in this included duties); parental distinguished from approved impliedly ture has the exclusion Rains, Rains v. family from lia of household and members (a her husband for wife sue bility reject argument. coverage. We this negligence). personal injuries caused his 10-4-707(1) Section states that “[t]he accept possi that there exists While we coverages described section 10-4- context, bility of fraud or collusion 706(l)(b) (l)(e) to: applicable shall be agree with those courts that have noted added). (emphasis Accordingly, sec- ...” possibility justify such a terms, 10-4-707, applies by its own tion barring e.g., claims. non-collusive stated, As only to PIP benefits. we have Royle, Transamerica Insurance Co. sep- liability coverage and PIP benefits are (Mont.1983). The Kansas Su coverages. 10- arate and distinct Sections Nocktonick, preme Court Nocktonick v. 4-713 (Kan.1980), P.2d right of a to sue Supp.), limit the claimant immunity, involving parental stated: a case met. certain conditions are tort unless recognize problem is practical We prohibitions on tort In return for these parent possible that of collusion between recovery, es- section 10-4-707 actions and securing unjusti- aimed an and child at and to whom the no-fault tablishes when recovery compa- an insurance fied from by 10-4- prescribed possibility But the of collusion ex- ny. Moreover, 706(l)(b) (l)(e) payable. are to case. Ev- to a certain extent ists companies’ analysis leads to the insurance depend juries ery day we and trial that all patently the erroneous conclusion to to sift in order deter- judges pedestri- evidence passengers and vehicle drivers proper facts at liability mine the and arrive ver- could excluded from cover- ans be Experience has shown that the they dicts. since also in section age are named this quite adequate for task. is contrary courts 10-4-707. a result Such child, litigation parent and is inade- In between Act which to avoid juries naturally quate and be to victims of automo- judges compensation would relationship and view section 10-4-707 mindful of the would be bile collisions. We being improper irrelevant concerning more on con- PIP benefits even the alert coverage issue raised liability duct. 592 Young, v. DeWitt appeals. liability 229 coverage provided

these Kan. by policy. 474, (1981); Bishop v. issue, All In order to resolve this we must state Insurance (Ky. S.W.2d 865 equally compelling choose between two ar- DeFrain, Allstate Co. 1981); Insurance guments. 503, (1978). Mich.App. N.W.2d supports position The view which ad vanced Farm can be summarized Finally, argue the carriers that our as follows: Where an automobile insurance Newark Insurance Co. v. decisions policy contains an exclusion which is de State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur clared invalid it because conflicts with a 498, 164 Colo. 436 P.2d 353 mandating liability coverage statute and (1968), and Western Insurance Co. v. limits exceed the minimum statu Wann, 457, 363 P.2d 1054 requirements, tory liability carrier’s is Newark, require a different result. In coverage limited to the required minimum an held that insurer free was from Young, DeWitt statute. to the named as a insured result 474, (1981); 625 P.2d 478 State Farm Mu analyzed household exclusion clause. We tual Shelly, Automobile Insurance Co. v. solely that case in the context of constru (1975). 394 Mich. 231 N.W.2d 641 The ing an insurance and concluded that rationale for rule is that the exclusion ambiguous. the clause was not im More only is invalid extent it violates the portantly, Newark is controlling here statutory requirements. But for the statu because was decided before passage tory prohibition, the- household exclusion Wann, the Act. The same is true of preclude would be valid and where we held that clause in employ Arcen liability. carrier’s increased See er’s policy excluding employees eaux Automobile from coverage is Insurance 113 Ariz. Responsibility (FRA) the Financial Act be (1976); State Farm Mutual Automobile procurement cause the of insurance was Shelly, Insurance Co. 394 Mich. voluntary mandatory provisions Estate Neal v. N.W.2d 641 triggered FRA were not until after the Exchange, 93 Nev. first accident operator which the is §§ found to be at fault. 42-7-301 & 42-7- & 1983 Supp.). See However, per we are more Insurance Co. America v. Gona Safeco argument. suaded the insured’s cha, Colo. specifically provides pol Act that insurance greater may provide icies than summary, we hold that the household specified the Act. 10-4- exclusion invalid. The exclusion nei- C.R.S. This is con ther authorized harmony statute nor in legislative sistent with the intent avoid legislative purpose mandating with the lia- inadequate compensation to victims of bility § 10-4-702, 4 automobile accidents. bodily injury property damages (1973). Here, purchased insured more inadequate compensation avoid to victims required by than the Act. We of automobile accidents. hold where the household exclusion clause has held invalid been because it vio III. lates the limits of the carrier’s liability provided An additional is raised in Adcock’s by policy issue those the argues claim. State if required by Farm the and the lesser limits the invalid, standard. Kish v. Motor Club of statutory household exclusion clause is the should be restricted to America Insurance liability NJ.Super. limits of $15,000, liability amount of A.2d To hold other required by the Act at time of wise our would be inconsistent with earlier accident, rather than full amount of determination as re- appeals with di- manded to the court permit Act does fleeted in the to reverse the trial court’s summa- in rections class of beneficiaries to limit the carriers and ry judgment favor State Farm insurance in viola of automobile proceedings consistent remand for further Farm Hughes Act. State tion of the opinion. 236 with this Automobile Insurance Mutual view, (N.D.1975). In our N.W.2d 870 of the trial courts in judgments is more consistent approach second Exchange Aguirre, Farmers Insurance policy which is to intent and legislative 82SA474, and Adcock v. Farm No. minimize insurance rather than maximize Co., No. Automobile Insurance Moreover, rules is our choice of 82SA298, those cases are are reversed and principle supported by the well-established respective trial courts for remanded to the provision in & that where a law of contract proceedings consistent with this further it is is void because contract opinion. remaining portions of policy, the public the extent enforceable to agreement are ROYIRA, J., part and dissents concurs from separated illegal provision can be part. v. Ko e.g., Reilly promises. the valid Justice, ROVIRA, concurring part (1958) rholz, 320 P.2d 137 Colo. dissenting part: agree (even if in stock transfer to vote his required transferor majority opin- ment which II I concur in Part board remaining shares for transferee opinion analysis a fair my ion. In contrary to election void Act Reparations directors Colorado Automobile are enforce policy, portions -723, valid public (Act), 10-4-701 to sections able); Maryland Cas Co. v. Otis Elevator reached supports the conclusion (1934) ualty legislature If the majority. exonerating in (terms Act, elevator of contract a statu- reading of the agree with our against public liability right. void as from the matter tory change staller would set (Second) Con policy); Restatement See §§ generally J. Cal.Rptr. See tracts Cocking, 29 Cal.3d Perillo, The Law Con & J. decision to (legislature’s Calamari 628 P.2d 1977).7 22-4(d) (2d ed. bodily injury tracts insurers to exclude authorize supported by a insured is

liability to an reasons). rational, legitimate variety of IY. III of the However, I from Part dissent that the house- have determined Since we limits of liabili- holds that the opinion which it violates hold exclusion is invalid because minimum to the legisla- ty should not be restricted by the promulgated public coverage required Act, amount of need not address ture in the Act. parties.8 arguments raised other three judgments all

Accordingly, the equal- choice from “two support of its cases are reversed. majority con- compelling arguments” the ly purchased insured that since the cludes Mutual Automo- Meyer v. Act, he 82SC155, required by the more than is re- No. bile Insurance Co. They exclusion denies also claim the to courts. express the issue of whether no view on 7. We may, guaranteed equal con- of the law insurance carrier them automobile of insurance United States issue sistent with the fourteenth amendment II, which ex- a household exclusion that contains 25 of the article Constitution and of the mini- claims in excess suggest cludes that if Others Constitution. Colorado prescribed by statute. valid, mum amount the claim- then household exclusion compensation the unin- under is entitled to ant con- and the insureds 8. Some of the claimants poli- respective provision of the sured motorist vio- exclusion clause tend that the household cies. II, Consti- section 6 of the Colorado article lates tution which justice guarantees equal access ute); is limits of Farm policy entitled and not Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. required by the statute. This Shelly, Mich. 231 N.W.2d 641 First, pre- result overlooks two facts. (1975) (where exclusionary void, re- paid mium for the was based on the instated is limited to amount re- provi- inclusion household exclusion quired by statute); Estate Neal v. of policy; second, sion in the if even Exchange, 93 Nev. public household exclusion (1977), (even though policy, the carrier would still have op- household exclusion clause was void inso- portunity to limit its to the minimum far attempted as it to eliminate the mini- statute, required by amount and limit security mum liability required by tort coverage by excess a household exclu- statute, it was otherwise viable in that lia- e.g., v. Young, DeWitt provision. sion bility statutory was limited to the mini- (1981). 229 Kan. mum). effect, majority’s substance and supported only by choice its conclusion coverage greater

that since the Act allows minimum, legisla-

than it reflects inadequate compensa-

tive intent to avoid

tion, i.e., maximize rather than minimize

insurance coverage required by The minimum PUEBLO WEST METROPOLITAN DIS 10-4-706, set out in Act is section TRICT, City Florence, and St. Insurance carriers also offer Association, Ap Charles Mesa Water coverage in See required. excess of that pellants, general although rule is that an in- SOUTHEASTERN comply statutory surance must COLORADO WATER DISTRICT, Appellee. requirements, CONSERVANCY such as those in the has upon statute no effect insurance which No. 82SA225. Also, require. exclusions in Supreme Colorado, Court policies are valid and en- En Banc. exceeding as to forceable amounts the cov- erage required by statute. See DeWitt v. Oct. Young, 229 Kan. Am.Jur.2d, Automobile Insurance preclude applica-

Since Act does

tion of the to liability household exclusion excess that re-

quired by statute, preferable I believe it general

follow rule and hold the exclu- only

sion void as to the minimum

required by majority appel- statute. The support

late courts this view. Arceneaux Insur- Automobile (1976) 113 Ariz.

(coverage in excess that mandated

law, subject provisions statute); v. Young,

DeWitt 625 P.2d (exclusions only are void as to

the minimum coverage required by stat-

Case Details

Case Name: Meyer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Sep 24, 1984

Citation: 689 P.2d 585

Docket Number: 82SC155, 82SA474 and 82SA298

Court Abbreviation: Colo.