66 Iowa 179 | Iowa | 1885
Two of the notes which are secured by the chattel mortgage bear dates within a few days of the time when the store was opened. The aggregate- amount of these notes is $3,210.25, and defendant’s claim is that they were given for money loaned by him to Jones. The third note bears date on the day before the mortgage was given. It is for $275, and was given, as defendant claims, for money due him from Jones for his services in the business. Defendant’s salary was $75 per month, and plaintiff contends that the claim that he loaned to his employer the amount,-evidenced by the first two notes is incredible, and that it is not reasonable to suppose that a mere clerk, working on a salary which was barely sufficient to afford him a support, should have that amount of money to loan. Both Jones and defendant swear, however, that defendant had the amount, and that he loaned it to Jones at the dates when the notes were given, and they are not contradicted by any direct testimony. "Witnesses who were acquainted with defendant while he lived in Kansas swear, it is true, that he was not understood to be a man of means, and that he did not, to their knowledge, have any such amount of money. But defendant swears that he drew more than $2,100 from two banks in Kansas a short time before he went to Marshalltown. Also that he received $2,000 from a party at St. Paul, Minnesota, within less than two months before the loans to Jones are alleged to have been
But, conceding that the rule is as held by these authorities, that the mortgagee in such case does not acquire an equity in the property which he can assert as against one who had an equitable interest or right thei’eiu when the mortgage was given, or as against a subsequent purchaser for value without notice, it does not follow, that the mortgage is invalid as between the parties to it, or as between the mortgagee and one who after its execution acquired from the mortgagor the interest in the property which then remained in him. As between the parties to the mortgage, the existence of the debt is sufficient consideration for the contract. If defendant and Jones had agreed upon a sale of the goods by the latter to the former in payment of the debt, it would hardly be contended that such agreement was not valid as between the parties. It would be supported, however, by no, other consideration than that upon which the mortgage rests. It would be an agreement for the appropriation of the goods to the payment of an antecedent debt, while the mortgage is an agreement for their appropriation as security for the same debt. We think, therefore, that the mortgage is not invalid on this ground, and our conclusion is supported by the following cases, heretofore decided by this court: Cooley v. Hobart, 8 Iowa, 358; Duncan v. Miller, 64 Id., 223. See, also, Babcock v. Jordan, 24 Ind., 14; Doolittle v. Cook, 75 Ill., 354; Jones, Chat. Mortg., § 81.
Plaintiff contends, however, that the mortgage in question was given with intent to hinder and delay the other creditors of Jones, and that it is fraudulent in fact. We deem it unnecessary to set out the evidence relied on to establish this allegation. We think it sufficient to say that we have examined it with care, and that it does not satisfy us that defendant was influenced, in accepting the mortgage, by any other motive or purpose than a desire to secure the debt due him.
We reach'the conclusion that the judgment of the district court is not sustained by the evidence in the case.
Reversed.