49 Conn. App. 831 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1998
Opinion
The plaintiffs
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. In May and June of 1995, the town conducted an examination for the position of police sergeant. The plaintiff Christopher J. Meyer and the defendants John W. Collins, Paul G. Miffitt and Donald S. Weglarz are police officers employed by the town who sat for the examination along with other police officers. On the basis of the results of the examination, the police department published an eligibility list for the position of sergeant, ranking six individuals in the order of their scores.
The mayor, Edward Slattery, by letter dated July 18, 1995, appointed Collins, who had the highest score, to the position of police sergeant effective July 23, 1995, and Miffitt, who had the second highest score, to the position of sergeant effective July 24, 1995. The succeeding mayor, Tony Muro, by letter dated September 10, 1996, confirmed the appointment of Weglarz, who had the fourth highest score, to the position of sergeant effective September 29,1996. By letter dated September 27, 1996, Muro stated to the chief of police that “[t]his is to confirm that I have authorized a one year extension of the certified list for promotion to Sergeant, pursuant
On October 11, 1996, Christopher J. Meyer filed two complaints, one in the nature of quo warranto and one in the nature of mandamus, against the defendants. On December 18, 1996, the plaintiff filed a motion to add Paul E. Meyer as a party plaintiff, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs sought, in their quo warranto action, to oust the defendants from their positions as sergeants and, in their mandamus action, to compel the town to hold another examination and to compile a new list of candidates. The trial court dismissed the quo warranto complaint as to Christopher J. Meyer for lack of standing, but permitted Paul E. Meyer to proceed with the quo warranto action.
I
The plaintiff first argues that the trial court improperly concluded that the town had not exceeded its authority in creating a list of eligible candidates for the position of sergeant when the stated duration exceeded that authorized by the town rules and regulations. The plaintiff argues that as a result of the durational error, the entire list is void ab initio. We disagree.
“Rules and regulations adopted pursuant to the authority granted by [a town] charter carry a presumption of validity and have the force and effect of law. Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 497, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S. Ct. 781, 93 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1986).” Civil Service Commission v. Pekrul, 41 Conn. Sup. 302, 313, 571 A.2d 715 (1989), aff'd, 221 Conn. 12, 601 A.2d 538 (1992). When construing a town charter, the court must determine the intent of the legislative body that promulgated the rules. McAdams v. Barbieri, 143 Conn. 405, 418, 123 A.2d 182 (1956). “To determine the intent of the charter, ‘ [t]he enactment must be examined in its entirety and its parts reconciled and made operative so far as possible.’ [Id.]” New Haven Police Local 530 v. Logue, 188 Conn. 290, 297, 449 A.2d 990 (1982). “Intent is to be ascertained from the language used, if it is plain and unambiguous; or, if it is not, by considering the legislation in the light of all of its provisions, the object which it seeks to accomplish, the pre-existing legislation upon the same subject matter, and all other relevant circumstances. . . . The words used must be accorded their commonly accepted meaning.” (Citation omitted.) McAdams v. Barbieri, supra, 415-16.
In Resnick, our Supreme Court held an examination illegal and void because, during an interview required as part of an open competition for a municipal position, the interviewer asked the plaintiff improper questions regarding his political and religious affiliations. The
In Walker, our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding illegal and void an eligibility list established as a result of an examination given in violation of the town charter and civil service rules. Walker v. Jankura, supra, 162 Conn. 482. Pursuant to the town charter, the personnel director was required to hold an examination for the position of police inspector within 120 days of the establishment of a vacancy for
Unlike the circumstances present in Resnick and Walker, the mayor, who is charged with making the appointments, appointed Collins and Miffitt to the position of sergeant pursuant to the requirements of the town charter. In fact, the mayor appointed Collins and Miffitt the month following the creation of the eligibility list. Further, the policy considerations in Resnick and Walker do not exist in the present case. Collins and Miffitt were appointed within the period of time contemplated by the rules. See State ex rel. Chernesky v. Civil Service Commission, 141 Conn. 465, 470, 106 A.2d 713
Because we conclude that the list is not void ab initio, we conclude that the appointments of Collins and Miffitt are valid, as they were made within the period of time provided in the town charter. On the other hand, to determine whether the appointment of Weglarz was valid, we must determine whether the mayor properly extended the list for the second year, during which Weglarz was appointed.
II
The plaintiff next argues that the mayor’s allegedly retroactive extension of the list was untimely and unlawful and, as a result, the appointment of Weglarz is illegal and void. In support of this argument, the plaintiff argues that the plain meaning of § 8.2 K is that the list expires one year from the date it becomes effective unless the mayor extends it prior to such expiration. The plaintiff argues that the mayor failed to extend the list prior to its expiration as evidenced by a letter from the mayor to the chief of police dated subsequent to the expiration of the list. We disagree.
Section 8.2 K simply provides that “[t]he certification list shall be effective for one (1) year; it can be extended up to one additional year by the Mayor.” Neither the
Under these circumstances, we turn to the principle of law that “ ‘[p]ublic officers, acting in their official capacity, are presumed, until the contrary appears, to have acted legally and properly.’ Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc., 201 Conn. 1, 6, 513 A.2d 1218 (1986).” Beechwood Garden Tenants’ Assn. v. Dept. of Housing, 214 Conn. 505, 515, 572 A.2d 989 (1990). In the present case, the presumption that the mayor acted legally and properly governs, as the plaintiff has not shown the contrary.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The plaintiffs are Christopher J. Meyer and Paul E. Meyer. Christopher J. Meyer originally brought these actions on his own behalf and subsequently filed a motion to add Paul Meyer as a party plaintiff in the quo warranto action, which was granted by the trial court.
General Statutes § 52-491 provides in relevant part: “When any person . . . usurps the exercise of any office ... the Superior Court may proceed, on a complaint in the nature of a quo warranto, to punish such person . . . for such usurpation, according to the course of the common law and may proceed therein and render judgment according to the course of the common law.”
The trial court’s memorandum of decision did not address the merits of the mandamus action because it denied the relief sought in the quo warranto action. The plaintiff in the mandamus action, Christopher J. Meyer, has appealed from the denial of his request for a writ of mandamus to preserve his right to have the matter retried in the event of a reversal by this court.
The list provided in relevant part as follows:
“1. Collins, John W. 91.456
“2. Miffitt, Paul G. 88.332
“3. Meyer, Christopher J. 84.082
“4. Weglarz, Donald S. 82.926”
Rule 8.2 K provides: “Duration of List: The certification list shall be effective for one (1) year; it can be extended up to one additional year by the Mayor.”
The following parties have standing to proceed in a quo warranto action: the government that created the office in question, one entitled to claim the office and a taxpayer of the town in which the charter authorizes the office. Carleton v. Civil Service Commission, 10 Conn. App. 209, 216, 522 A.2d 825 (1987). The trial court found that Christopher J. Meyer was neither the governmental entity nor a taxpayer of the town of Vernon. Further, the court found that because the list names only those who are eligible, leaving the town with discretion to choose among those with the three highest scores, Christopher J. Meyer was not entitled to claim the office. As a result, the trial court concluded that Christopher J. Meyer lacked standing to proceed. Nevertheless, Paul E. Meyer’s interest and standing in this matter is as a resident and taxpayer of the town of Vernon.
Although Christopher J. Meyer and Paul E. Meyer both appealed from the denial of their application for a writ of quo warranto, neither argued that the trial court improperly dismissed the complaint as to Christopher J. Meyer for lack of standing. As a result, we will address only Paul E. Meyer’s appeal. Hereinafter, we refer to Paul E. Meyer as the plaintiff.
The plaintiff cites several additional cases for the proposition that the list is illegal and void in light of Connecticut decisions that have “uniformly recognized the importance of preserving the integrity of the civil service system.” The plaintiffs reliance on such decisions is misplaced because unlike in the present case, the rules of the municipalities in those cases contained provisions expressly requiring cancellation of the list or appointments made pursuant to it in certain circumstances or the practice of the town flouted the policy behind limitations on eligibility lists. See Cassella v. Civil Service Commission, 202 Conn. 28, 36, 519 A.2d 67 (1987) (examination taken by plaintiff illegally altered in his favor; thus, promotion not according to merit, fitness); State ex rel. Gaski v. Basile, 174 Conn. 36, 41, 381 A.2d 547 (1977) (prohibiting appointment from expired list and refusing to create judicially new list as it would “flout the policy” regarding limitations on eligibility lists); McAdams v. Barbieri, supra, 143 Conn. 409 (charter specifically provided “any appointment made in violation of its provisions was null and void”); State ex rel. Chernesky v. Civil Service Commission, 141 Conn. 465, 470, 106 A.2d 713 (1954) (act specifically provided that “ ‘commission shall cancel such portion of any list as has been in force for more than two years’ ”); New Haven Firebird Society v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 32 Conn. App. 585, 589, 630 A.2d 131, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 902, 634 A.2d 295 (1993) (promotions “subject to assignment” extended two year limitation indefinitely, thereby violating principle that one does not acquire “permanency of eligibility” by passing examination once).
The civil service provisions of the charter provided that “[n]o question in any test shall relate to religious or political opinions or affiliations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Resnick v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 156 Conn. 30.
We note that the parties agreed that the complaint in the present case was filed prior to the date of the mayor’s letter. This fact, however, does not resolve the question of what, if anything, the mayor did, or was required to do, to effectuate the extension properly.