85 Ala. 417 | Ala. | 1888
Lead Opinion
— The general rule of law is, that the offspring, or increase of female animals, when they come into visible existence and are endowed with independent life, rest under the same title or ownership their dam was subject to, at the time they were brought forth. Partus sequitur ventrem. — Gans v. Williams, 62 Ala. 41. Hence it has been often held that, if the dam, at • the time of parturition, be under mortgage incumbrance,, the offspring passes immediately under the same incumbrance. — Hughes v. Graves, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 317; Forman v. Proctor, 9 B. Mon. 124; Fowler v. Merrill, 11 How. U. S. 375; Evans v. Merriken, 8 Gill. & J. 39; Leavitt v. Jones, 54 Vt. 423; Gundy v. Biteler, 6 Bradw. (Ill.) 510; Jones Chat. Mortg. §§ 149, 150.
The attempt has been made to draw a distinction, when, during the time the property remained with the mortgagor, the offspring so increased in strength and maturity as. to cease to follow the dam. In such case, it has been contended that the mortgage ceases to bind the offspring. We are at
The chancellor denied to complainant relief as to the mare Hester, and to the colts she dropped after Meyer Bros, obtained possession under the mortgage. He said: “It is adjudged, ordered and decreed, that the complainant has failed to establish or make out her right to the mare mentioned in said mortgage. As to said mare, defendants are innocent purchasers; and as to any colts foaled since the recovery of possession of the mare by the defendants, complainant has no claim. But, as to any colt foaled between the date of the mortgage and the recovery of the possession of the mare by the defendants, the complainant is entitled to recover in this suit.” Under this ruling, he decreed one colt to the complainant; and from that decree defendants prosecute this appeal.
Under the principle declared above, if the defendants were entitled to the mare under their mortgage, they were equally entitled to the colts, whether foaled prior or subsequent to obtaining possession by them. We have, then, to inquire whether complainant has shown an equitable right to recover the mare; for on that right must depend her claim of property in the colt.
We think the testimony proves that mules were purchased by Mrs. Cook from Robbins, and paid for with effects or moneys which were of her statutory separate estate, and that no _ title papers were taken. The mules, then, were of the corpus of her statutory separate estate. Commencing then with one of these mules, Cook, her husband, made several exchanges, ending with the possession of the mare Hester, dam of the colt in controversy. Mrs. Cook had knowledge
The doctrine declared above being but an equity — a secret equity, as it is phrased in the books — it will not prevail over a bona fide purchase without notice; and it is claimed for Meyer Bros, that they are bona fide purchasers without notice. We think, under the testimony, they have proved that they ar'e purchasers. This shifted the onus on the defendant, to prove notice, or its equivalent. There was an atempt to prove actual notice to Meyer Bros., but the testimony is in such conflict that we prefer to rest our decision on another principle.
It is contended for appellee, that Cook’s debt, secured by the mortgage, is tainted with usury, and therefore Meyer Bros, are not bona fide purchasers, so as to cut off equitable defenses. If the facts be as alleged, the legal result contended for must follow. — Carlisle v. Hill, 16 Ala. 398; Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 13 Ala. 390; Wailes v. Couch, 75 Ala. 134; McCall v. Rogers, 77 Ala. 349.
It is shown in the testimony’, without conflict, that there were dealings between Meyer Bros, on one side, and Albert Cook, husband of complainant, on the other, commencing as early as 1877, and continuing to the close of 1881. The dealings consisted in advances made by Meyer Bros, each year, and payments made by Cook at the close of each season. At no time did Cook make entire payment; and the balances were severally carried forward, and made charges in the account of the next succeeding year. According to the testimony of Meyer Bros., the unpaid balance due to them at the close of 1879 was the sum of $680.55, charged in the account of 1880. The unpaid balance of the account of 1880, thus carried, forward and charged in the account of 1881, was $265.61. A note was given for this, including an additional sum to cover prospective advances, and a mortgage given by Albert Cook on the mare Hester, and other property, to secure its payment. One item in the account of
In recovering the colt, Mrs. Cook got no more than she was entitled to, and the decree of the chancellor must be affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissents from that part of the foregoing opinion, which holds that usury in the debt secured by the mortgage precludes Meyer Bros, from making the defense of bona fide purchase.