227 Mass. 307 | Mass. | 1917
This is an action to recover the value,of certain castings shipped in interstate commerce from Black Rock in the State of New York to Waltham in this Commonwealth, and lost in transportation. It was admitted that a bill of lading “was issued according to law and that a copy of said bill of lading had been duly filed with the tariff schedules of the issuing carrier with the interstate commerce commission and these tariff sched
The jury made an express finding, however, that the condition of the bill of lading requiring written notice of loss within four months had been waived by the defendant. This finding was warranted by the evidence. Therefore, the single question presented is whether such a condition in a bill of lading can be waived under the federal laws relating to interstate commerce. This is a question touching which the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are binding. The interstate commerce act supersedes all State laws as to the subject over which Congress thus has put forth its superior power. Corbett v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 219 Mass. 351, 356.
This question presented in the case at bar seems to us to be set at rest by Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway v. Blish Milling Co. 241 U. S. 190, where, at page 197, it was said: “the parties could not waive the terms of the contract under which the shipment was made pursuant to the federal act; nor could the carrier by its conduct give the shipper the right to ignore these terms which were applicable to that conduct and hold the carrier to a different responsibility from that fixed by the agreement made under the published tariffs and regulations. A different view would, antagonize the plain policy of the act and open the door to the very abuses at which the act was aimed. Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155, 166.” Those words are exactly applicable to the facts here presented. They were used in the course of a decision respecting a clause in a bill of lading in effect the same as that here in-
Waiver by the railroad corporation of an obligation resting on the shipper or consignee would operate to that extent to create a preference in favor of that particular shipper or. consignee and a discrimination against all others to whom a like concession is not made. But it is the plain purpose of the interstate commerce act and its amendments to prevent all favoritism by the carrier toward shippers and to put all. shippers on the same footing. The public policy of the country has been declared to this end in no unmistakable terms in numerous decisions. Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97. Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 477. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657. It was said in Kansas City Southern Railway v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, at page 649, that the Carmack amendment of the interstate commerce act “manifested the purpose of Congress to bring contracts for interstate shipments under one uniform rule or law.”
The doctrine of waiver is not applicable to any subject where the public policy has been authoritatively declared to be contrary to waiver of rights. Laws founded upon considerations of public policy cannot be evaded by the device of waiver. The absolute defence is allowed in such instances, not for the sake of the defend
There are many decisions of other courts which have held that such a clause in an interstate bill of lading may be waived. In these opinions, however, the point that the form of the bill of lading was filed with the interstate commerce commission in compliance with the law and in connection with the rate schedules has not been discussed.
It does not appear on the record in the case at bar that the
The exceptions must be sustained and in accordance with St. 1909, c. 236 judgment is to be entered in the Superior Court for the defendant.
So ordered.
Peninsula Produce Exchange v. New York, Philadelphia & Norfolk Railroad, 122 Md. 231. Howard & Callahan v. Illinois Central Railroad, 161 Ky. 783. Schloss-Bear-Davis Co. Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 171 N. C. 350. Southern Pacific Co. v. Stewart, 233 Fed. Rep. 956. Cockrill v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway, 90 Kans. 650. Pierson v. Northern Pacific Railway, 61 Wash. 450. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. Spears, 31 Okla. 469. Cumbie v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway, 105 Ark. 406. Robinson v. Great Northern Railway, 123 Minn. 495. Sauls-Baker Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 98 S. C. 300. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway v. Rudy, 173 Ind. 181. Wallace v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway, 133 Mich. 633. Eckert v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 211 Penn. St. 267. Lasky v. Southern Express Co. 92 Miss. 268.