Lead Opinion
OPINION EN BANC
In February 2002, the Rhode Island legislature adopted a redistricting plan in response to the 2000 census and a state constitutional amendment reducing the number of seats in both houses. Based on the allegations in the complaint, it appears that African-Americans are about 4 percent of Rhode Island’s population, but more than half live in Providence. Prior to redistricting, State Senate District 9 in Providence was 25.69 percent African-American and 41.08 percent Hispanic. Until redistricting, an African-American, Charles Walton, had represented District 9 for many years.
Under the 2002 redistricting plan, much of the same African American population now lies within the new District 2, which allegedly is 21.42 percent African-American and 46.74 percent Hispanic. In the 2002 primary after redistricting, a Latino challenger defeated Walton and went on to win the election. Well before the primary, in May 2002, a number of individual African-American voters and related organizations brought the present suit under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000), to challenge the redistricting plan.
In September 2002, the district court granted a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint, Metts v. Almond,
Section 2, adopted as part of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, forbids voting-related measures that deny or abridge the right to vote “on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Under a 1982 amendment, a violation is established “if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that ... members of a class of citizens ... have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” § 1973(b).
The Delphic language of the amendment can be understood only against the background of its legislative history and subsequent Supreme Court interpretation. The former tells us that discriminatory intent is not a necessary element in a violation and that Congress intended a broad range of factors to be taken into account. These points, and the relevant citations, are developed in Gingles, the first post-amendment decision on section 2 by the Court and still the leading authority.
However, Gingles was primarily concerned with the use of multi-member districts, which have an obvious potential to submerge the electoral power of even a substantial and cohesive minority bloc.
In Gingles, the Supreme Court set up a three-part test, ruling that section 2 would ordinarily not be violated by multimember districts unless three conditions were met: that the minority challenging such a district would be “a majority” in a compact single member district; that the minority was politically cohesive (so it would bloc vote in such a district); and that the multi-district majority voted as a bloc (so it would usually defeat the minority’s candidate in a multi-member district). Gingles,
Gingles was directed to a particular practice—multi-member districts—which the Court suggested was particularly problematic,
First, several Supreme Court opinions after Gingles have offered the prospect, or at least clearly reserved the possibility, that Gingles ’ first precondition — that a racial minority must be able to constitute a “majority” in a single-member district— could extend to a group that was a numerical minority but had predictable cross-over support from other groups. DeGrandy,
Second, where single member districts are at issue — as in our case — opinions have increasingly emphasized the open-ended, multi-factor inquiry that Congress intended for section 2 claims. Voinovich,
The present case concerns not multi-member districts but a redrawing of single-member district boundaries. In one key district this has produced a modest readjustment in the proportionate sizes of the two large minority groups — but a readjustment that certainly can affect who wins the election. So far the parties’ argument has been about whether and how to squeeze this case into the Gingles preconditions — raising difficult questions about whether the “majority” requirement in Gingles is a numerical majority or an effective majority that could be constructed out of cross-over votes; how rigidly the Gingles preconditions apply when moving away from multi-member districts; and how to apply Gingles when no racial group makes up more than 50 percent of the district.
It is no accident that most cases under section 2 have been decided on summary judgment or after a verdict, and not on a motion to dismiss. This caution is especially apt where, as here, we are dealing with a major variant not addressed in Gingles itself — the single member district — and one with a relatively unusual history. As courts get more experience dealing with these cases and the rules firm up, it may be more feasible to dismiss weaker cases on the pleadings, but in the case before us we think that the plaintiffs are entitled to an. opportunity to develop evidence before the merits are resolved.
We are thus unwilling at the complaint stage to foreclose the possibility that a section 2 claim can ever be made out where the African-American population of a single member district is reduced in redistricting legislation from 26 to 21 percent. Yes, one would ordinarily expect the consequences to be small, but not always, and arguably not here (based on past his
On the other hand, the plaintiffs cannot prevail merely by showing that an alternative plan gives them a greater opportunity to win the election, DeGrandy,
As the district court correctly pointed out, there is tension in this case for plaintiffs in any effort to satisfy both the first and third prong of Gingles. To the extent that African-American voters have to rely on cross-over voting to prove they have the “ability to elect” a candidate of their choosing, their argument that the majority votes as a bloc against their preferred candidate is undercut. But it is not clear on the pleadings alone how many crossover votes are needed to win an election— unlike in Gingles, Rhode Island law allows a candidate to win with less than an absolute majority, see R.I. Const. art. IV, § 2 (general elections); R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-15-29 (2002) (primary elections) — nor do we have any evidence at this stage about how vigorously the majority votes as a bloc over time, nor the impact of the fact that the “majority” here is made up of both Hispanics and whites. Gingles itself warned that “there is no simple doctrinal test for the existence of legally significant racial bloc voting,”
The burden of inquiry is on the plaintiffs — they are the ones challenging the redistricting plan — but in this case they are entitled (within ordinary limits) to develop the evidence that they think might help them. Whether a full-scale trial is needed is an entirely different matter; perhaps summary judgment will suffice depending on how the evidence develops and the ultimate theory or theories offered by both sides — theories that hopefully will go beyond dueling claims as to what Gingles means. In all events, it is premature to close the door now.
The judgment of the district court is vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each side shall bear its own costs on this appeal.
It is so ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I appreciate the measured tone of the majority opinion, and I agree with much of what the court writes: section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1973, verges on the opaque and the Supreme Court precedent interpreting it
Here, however, the case is not arguable.
I will be brief. The plaintiffs allege that African Americans represented approximately 26% of the relevant population in former Senate District 9 yet represent only 21% of the population in the new district (Senate District 2). They characterize this 5% differential as a political kiss of death and ask that the district lines be redrawn so that, in their ideal district, African Americans again will number 26% of the population.
. Stripped of rhetorical flourishes, the postulate underlying the plaintiffs’ claim proceeds along the following lines. Whenever a candidate preferred by African-Americans runs for the state senate in the new district, he or she will receive all the African-American votes plus no less than 32% but no more than 37% of the combined white and Hispanic votes (these being the percentages of all white and Hispanic voters necessary to form a majority in conjunction with a monolithic African American vote when African-Americans constitute 26% and 21% of the population, respectively). Whether viewed as a matter of logic, political science, or human behavior, this postulate, which assumes that the electorate’s polarization is so deeply entrenched that candidate-specific variations will operate only within a 5% margin, strikes me as fanciful. Moreover, the impetus behind it is the plaintiffs’ conviction that they can forge some sort of functional majority, i.e., that African Americans, though not numerous enough to comprise anything close to a majority in their ideal district, nonetheless will have the ability to elect a particular candidate with the aid of a large and predictable non-African-American crossover vote. Whatever may be said for functional majority claims in general — a matter on which I take no view — the plaintiffs’ functional majority claim lies well beyond the prophylaxis of section 2. The minority group described in the amended complaint comprises too small a fraction of the dis
The plaintiffs seek to blink this reality by treating crossover voters as if they constitute part of a protected minority within the purview of section 2. Fidelity to core democratic values demands that we reject this taxonomy. Although the Gin-gles preconditions contemplate a certain degree of crossover voting, see Thornburg v. Gingles,
The plaintiffs’ claim also trips over the third Gingles precondition. See Gingles,
The plaintiffs showcase Senator Walton’s past electoral successes as proof of the cogency of their ability to elect claim— but that datum is a two-edged sword. Consistent electoral success on the part of a racial or ethnic minority group that comprises considerably less than a numerical majority of the electorate is a telling indi-cium of the absence of majoritarian bloc voting and, thus, is presumptively inconsistent with an actionable vote dilution claim. See Gingles,
In short, I do not believe that section 2 of the VRA authorizes vote dilution claims that are wholly dependent upon massive crossover voting. There is a critical distinction between minority-preferred candidates who lose because redistricting excludes too much of the minority electorate from a particular district (illegal vote dilution) and minority-preferred candidates who lose because they do not attract enough votes from other constituencies
Some vote dilution cases are sufficiently clear that, on any rational view of the facts alleged, further proceedings are inappropriate. This is one of them. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision. Left to my own devices, I would affirm the order of dismissal.
Notes
. There are obvious dangers in applying the principle favoring further factual development too liberally. If one is willing to split an infinite number of hairs, it always will be possible to conjure up remote scenarios that might be disinterred during discovery (and, thus, might prevent the allowance of a motion to dismiss). Rule 12(b)(6) does not invite courts to engage in such endless surmise; rather, "[t]he method of Rule 12(b)(6) requires courts ... to resolve all realistic possibilities in the pleader’s favor.” Garrett v. Tandy Corp.,
