181 Ind. 126 | Ind. | 1914
Appellees, in March, 1912, filed their petition for the improvement of a rural highway, 5,400 feet in length, under the provisions of §7711 et seq. Burns 1908, Acts 1905 p. 521. The board of commissioners referred the matter for report, to J. S. Shannon, engineer, and John F. Passwater and Larkin Stultz, viewers. Subsequently a report was filed, signed by Shannon as engineer, and Passwater as viewer, in which it was recited that the proposed improvement would be of public utility, and that
In July, the board examined the report, and rejected it, and dismissed the petition. From this order ¥m. V. Rooker, one of the petitioners, appealed to the circuit court. His appeal bond was signed by Robert E. Washington, as surety. The regular judge declined to hear the appeal and appointed Hon. Samuel R. Artman, as special judge, to determine the matter. On January 15, 1913, Judge Artman heard the cause and adjudged that the order of the board, in dismissing the petition, be vacated, and remanded it to the board “with directions to take such further proceedings under the statute as is provided by law.” Subsequently, at the same term, appellants, Metsker, Morris, and Wade, appeared in the circuit court, and filed various verified motions, praying to be admitted as parties defendant, and for the vacation of the judgment theretofore entered. These motions were overruled. After-wards, on leave of court, they filed a motion for a modification of the judgment, which motion recited that Metsker, et al., were each resident taxpayers of the township in which the highway is located. Thereupon the judgment was modified to read as follows: “It is therefore con
This modification was certified to the board, and thereupon appellants Metsker, Morris and "Wade appeared before it, and, by verified written motion challenged the competency of commissioner Robert E. Washington to take part in the hearing of the cause, for the reason that he had, before qualifying as county commissioner, executed, as surety, the appeal bond of Wm. V. Rooker. The challenge was overruled, with commissioner Harvey voting to sustain it. Appellants then tendered to the board, and asked leave to file their verified answers, in which it was alleged, among other things, that each was a resident taxpayer of Noblesville Township, Hamilton County where the highway was situate; that the board was without power to order the improvement as "recommended by the report of Passwater, viewer, and the engineer, because the other yiewer did not assent to such report; that the board was hot authorized to' order the proposed improvement of a country highway to be constructed of the materials described in the report of the engineer, and viewer Pass-water. The board, by a vote of two, to one, refused the offer to file the answer, commissioner Harvey dissenting. Appellants thereupon by leave of the board, filed their verified motion to submit the question of the improvement to the legal voters of the township. After consideration, the board (commissioner Harvey dissenting) struck the
On April 25, 1913, the cause was presented for hearing in the circuit court, and appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, for the following reasons: (1) the appellants filed no remonstrance before the board; (2) there was no issue to try in this court; (3) appellants filed no affidavit with the auditor showing interest or grievance, and were not parties to the action. The further hearing of the cause was adjourned to May 29, 1913, when appellees’ motion,was sustained and the appeal dismissed. From that judgment, this appeal is prosecuted, and the aetion of the circuit court, in dismissing the appeal, is here assigned as error. Appellees have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, assigning several grounds therefor, of which the principal one is the alleged fact that the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the matters presented in appellants’ appeal from the final order of the board, and consequently this court has no jurisdiction of this appeal. If it were true that the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the appeal, such fact would require an affirmance of the judgment, rather than a dismissal of this appeal. The other reasons assigned deal wholly with the merits of the ruling of the trial court. The motion is overruled at appellees’ cost. Ryder v. Shea (1913), 180 Ind. 574, 103 N. E. 411.
Appellees claim that as there was no appeal from the judgment rendered by Judge Artman, that appellants are bound thereby and that the only judgment rendered by him was the first one, and that the modification thereof by him was without jurisdiction and void. The modification was made at the same term of court as that of the original order, and it was clearly competent for the presiding judge to make the modification. The judgment, as modified, was a valid one. Bland v. Cassaday (1913), ante 36, 102 N. E. 853. And, as it was limited to the single proposition that the board erred in dismissing the petition, appellants were not thereby precluded, when the cause was remanded, from questioning the jurisdiction of the board because of matters apparent on the face of the record, or from timely challenging a member of the board for disqualification, or raising other questions not waived by delay.
Appellants’ counsel contend that the board erred in refusing to consider the tendered challenge of commissioner Washington. Appellees say the challenge came too late — that all objections of interested parties are waived after the expiration of the time for the filing of a peremptory remonstrance. Acts 1909 p. 353. The challenge here was made at the first opportunity. Before
Appellees concede that Wm. V. Rooker’s appeal was an ex parte one. It is alleged that commissioner Washington executed the appeal bond as surety. A fee bill might have been issued against him. §626 Burns 1908, §599 R. S. 1881. On the other hand, if the proposed work were established, the costs of the appeal were properly taxable as a part of the costs of the proceeding. It was discretionary with the commissioners, if all the proceedings were according to law, either to submit the question of the improvement to the determination of the voters, or order it without such determination. In exercising such discretion, the board acted in a judicial capacity. In Small v. Buchanan (1905), 165 Ind. 549, 553, 76 N. E. 167, it was said: “It is a fundamental principle that all tribunals clothed with judicial or quasi judicial functions shall be disinterested and unbiased in all matters brought before them. Any other rule or doctrine would be abhorrent to a natural sense of justice, and incompatible with judicial action.” A judge’s direct, pecuniary interest in the result of the litigation furnishes sufficient ground for his recusation, regardless of whether such interest is great or small. Moses v. Julian (1863), 45 N. H. 52, 84 Am. Dec. 114, and notes; Tootle. v. Berkley (1899), 60 Kan. 446, 56 Pac. 755; Pearce v. Atwood (1816), 13 Mass. 324. However, where the interest is indirect, such as that of a general taxpayer, it does not ordinarily disqualify. Note to Grafton v. Holt (1905), 6 Ann. Cas. 406. In People v. Suffolk (1836), 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 550, it was said: “Next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment, is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion
A surety on a bond, subsequently called on to' act in a judicial capacity in a proceeding where the bond was given, or, in any matter or proceeding, involving a liability on the bond, is disqualified from acting. 23 Cyc. 581; Wilson v. Wilson (1860), 36 Ala. 655. An exception to the general rule of disqualification is recognized by some courts, including this one, where the disqualification, if permitted to prevail, would destroy the only legal tribunal for the hearing of the matter in issue, and thus bar any hearing; unless the disqualified judge may be compelled to act. Galey v. Board, etc. (1909), 174 Ind. 181, 91 N. E. 593, Ann. Cas. 1912 C 1090; 23 Cyc. 581, and authorities cited. But the exception is not recognized, except in cases of imperative necessity; and, in determining such necessity, the greatest of care must be exercised. 23 Cyc. 582. Where the tribunal, as here, consists of three persons, an interested commissioner should act only where his refusal to do so would effectually bar any remedy. The challenge here was timely, and the board erred in refusing a consideration thereof, even though there might have arisen subsequently an imperative necessity for the recused commissioner to have acted, and it follows that the circuit court erred in dismissing the appeal without a hearing on such matter.
It is urged by counsel for appellees that appellants, by failing to file any motion for a new trial in the court below, have no ground on which to base their application for a review of the judgment. There was no trial in the court below, and consequently such a motion would have been illogical. On appellees’ motion, the court dismissed the appeal without any trial of the issues tendered, and a motion for a new trial would have presented nothing for review. Werley v. Huntington Waterworks Co.
After Judge Artman remanded the cause, appellants tendered to the board an answer in which it was sought to present the question of the power of the board to order the improvement without submitting the question to the voters. It appears, from appellants’ brief, to be their theory that the petitioners were seeking to evade the law requiring a submission of the question of improvement of a highway more than three miles in length, to the township voters, by dividing it into connecting portions less than three miles long, and filing separate improvement petitions for each of such portions. It is sufficient to say that if any such issue was tendered, it came after the time for the appointment of viewers, and, henee, too late. No infirmity of the nature suggested, appears on the face of the petition ; the law gives twenty days after the time set for hearing, in which to file a peremptory remonstrance. When that time expires, if there is no remonstrance, it becomes the duty of the board to appoint viewers. Acts 1909 p. 353. It is then too late to present objections which could have been presented earlier, unless the objection raises a jurisdictional question, apparent on the face of the record.
Appellants contend that under the provisions of §72 of the highway act as amended in 1909, rural highways may not be paved by the use of gravel or stone, with coal tar, or asphalt, as a binder. Acts 1909 p. 353, §2. Counsel for appellees maintain that, even under the act of 1909, such binding material may be used; but if not, that certain acts of the legislature of 1913, warrant such use, and that such acts were retroactive. He calls our attention to the act of March 14, 1913 (Acts 1913 p. 690) and the act of March 11, 1913 (Acts 1913 p. 514). Appellants contend that the above statutes are not retroactive, and that said act of March
In so far as the use of country highway materials is concerned, the act of 1913 (Acts 1913 p. 514) does not differ from the 1909 amendment of §72 of the highway act, and consequently, it is unnecessary to decide whether the act of 1913 is retroactive. "We hold that under either act, a binder may be used, to form a closer union of stone or gravel, and the question of Avhat is the most suitable material is one for the determination of the local authorities.
Judgment reversed with instructions to overrule appel
Nora. — Reported in 103 N. E. 1078. See, also, under (1) 3 Cyc. 189; (2) 3 Cyc. 197; (3) 37 Cyc. 138; (4) 2 Cyc. 678, 680; (5, 17) 37 Cyc. 76; (6) 37 Cyc. 97; (7) 36 Cyc. 1153; (8) 37 Cyc. 100, 101; (9) 37 Cyc. 112, 113; (10) 23 Cyc. 613, 23 Cyc. 859; (11) 37 Cyc. 113; (12) 37 Cyc. 83; (13) 37 Cyc. 85; (14) 23 Cyc. 576, 581; (16) 29 Cyc. 753; (18) 36 Cyc. 1055, 1056, 1193; (19) 36 Cyc. 1055; (20) 36 Cyc. 1130; (21) 36 Cyc. 1193, 1199; (23) 37 Cyc. 222; (24) 16 Cyc. 1076. As to validity of judgment by disqualified judge, see 84 Am. Dec. 126.