63 Md. 6 | Md. | 1885
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cross-appeals are a continuation of Mayor and City Council of Baltimore vs. Frederick M. Ketchum, Jr., by his guardian, Wm. Hollingsworth Whyte, 57 Md., 23, wherein the city was required to issue a new certificate of stock to Frederick M. Ketchum, a minor, whose stock had been cancelled upon a forged assignment thereof. The question now involved is, shall the loss resulting from the forgery be borne by the city, or by the Metropolitan Savings Bank; or shall the same be shared by the city and the bank as has been decreed by the Circuit Court?
There can be no doubt, that a corporation, by issuing stock, declares by its certificate to the world, that the person
The object of this rule of law, is to prevent loss to a party who shall be deceived by tbe certificate, and it is only to the extent that loss has actually been incurred through misrepresentation, made by the certificate, that it will be made good. The inquiry here is, to what extent was the bank actually induced to lend its money upon the statements of the certificate alone? The essential and undisputed facts are as follows: On the 27th day of May, 1876, Isaac W. M. Helm, (together with George W. Bishop,, who had lately been one of the Judges of the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City,) came to the bank and requested a loan of §3500, and offered as collatual secm-ity a certificate of stock of the city for §18,400. The stock stood in the name of Frederick M. Ketchum, Jr., and purported to bear his endorsement for transfer. The holder was a minor, and the endorsement was forged; though the bank was ignorant of both these facts. The loan was made, and Helm gave his note to the bank, payable one year after date, which was duly discounted, and the bank accepted the certificate with the endorsement as security for the money lent.
Upon the 18th of July following, Helm accompanied by Bishop, again called at the bank and requested a. further loan of six thousand dollars upon the certificate of stock already held by the bank, as collateral for the first loan. It was agreed on the part of the bank to make this additional loan, provided Helm would have a new certificate made out in the name of the bank, to cover both
On the part of the city, it is contended, that the bank, upon this state of facts, made Helm their agent to have the certificate changed which they held as collateral on a
On the part of the hank it is contended that in no sense oan the hank he regarded as having made Helm its agent for any purpose, and that the city was hound at its peril, to know that the transfer was properly authorized; and inasmuch as the city upon a forged endorsement issued to the hank a ten thousand dollar certificate, hy that act it had deceived the hank, and induced it to lend its money and make a transaction it would not have entered into without such certificate ; and thereby it had been lulled into security and failed to make from Helm the money first loaned on the original certificate.
To neither of these contentions did the learned Judge who decided this case below give unqualified assent. He thought the hank should bear the loss resulting from its unwarranted confidence to the extent of the loans made ■on the faith of the old certificate and the representations of Helm before the new certificate was issued; ■and that the city should hear the loss resulting from further advances made by the hank on the faith of the new certificate, and its purchase, after the certificate was made out in the name of the bank. This decision was based upon the principles decided in Brown, Lancaster & Co. vs. Howard Fire Insurance Co., et al., 42 Md., 384, and John A. Hamilton & Co. vs. The Central Ohio R. R. Co., 44 Md., 551. We think these cases entirely justified the Court in the conclusion reached, and that there is no proof in this case to take it out of the operation of the principles there enunciated, or to distinguish it from them. 'To the extent of the advances actually made before the
Whilst we agree with the Circuit Court in the construction of the authorities applicable to this case, and as to the principles which were intended to be applied, we find that the Court has inadvertently fallen into some ■errors in the amounts decreed to be paid by the city which must be corrected.
The hank must he reimbursed for thfe actual amounts-paid out hy it after the issue of the new certificate to it, with interest thereon from the date such sums were paid out respectively. The sums for which the hank is entitled to be reimbursed are as follows: $3592.67 with interestfr'om the 20th of July, 1876;'$494.75 with interest from the 13th of November, 1876; $1200 with interest from the 29th day of November, 1876; and the further sum of $178.50, amount of interest rehated on the 20th of July, 1876, (when the loans were consolidated) with interest from that date. The aggregate of these several amounts with interest must he credited with such amount of interest as has been actually paid hy the city to the hank upon the certificate issued to it. There being errors to he corrected on each side the decree will he reversed on each appeal, and the cause will he remanded, that a decree may he passed in conformity with this opinion. The costs of these appeals will be equally divided between the parties.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded.