METROPOLITAN PITTSBURGH NONPROFIT HOUSING CORPORATION, Appellant, v. BOARD OF PROPERTY ASSESSMENT, APPEALS AND REVIEW.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Sept. 29, 1977. Decided Oct. 5, 1978.
391 A.2d 1059
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
(1) The lay testimony as to appellant‘s sanity was insufficient to support the verdict;
(2) The prosecutor‘s closing argument to the jury contained reversible error;
(3) The court erroneously refused to accept appellant‘s proposed addition to a supplemental charge requested by the jury;
(4) The court erred in permitting the prosecution to examine a psychiatric report and in allowing portions of that report to be read to the jury.
William J. Fahey, D. R. Pellegrini, Asst. City Sol., Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O‘BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and PACKEL, JJ.
OPINION
NIX, Justice.
The appellant, Metropolitan Pittsburgh Nonprofit Housing Corporation (Metropolitan), was denied a local real estate tax exemption by appellee Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review. A de novo appeal was taken to the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County, which determined that the exemption had properly been denied. On appeal from that determination, the Commonwealth Court
Metropolitan is a nonprofit corporation which has built the Lemington Heights Housing Project in Pittsburgh in conformity with the provisions of section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act,
Of the 87 rental units in Lemington Heights, 32 are rented by families whose annual incomes average $5,000, and who also receive rent supplement payments from HUD. The other 55 units are occupied by families with average annual incomes of $7,500. The rents paid by all tenants range from $130 per month for a one-bedroom apartment to $200 per month for a four-bedroom apartment. These rents are below the market rate for comparable apartments commercially available in the area. The lower rates are possible because the federal government subsidizes the mortgage payments and because Metropolitan is a nonprofit corporation. Tenants who fail to pay their rent are evicted. In the Rental Housing Project Income Analysis and Appraisal form3 which it used in establishing a rental schedule to
Metropolitan‘s claim to exemption from local real estate taxes is based on article VIII, section 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides:
“(a) The General Assembly may by law exempt from taxation:
. . . .
(v) Institutions of purely public charity, but in the case of any real property tax exemptions only that portion of real property of such institution which is actually and regularly used for the purposes of the institution.”
“All hospitals, universities, colleges, seminaries, academies, associations and institutions of learning, benevolence, or charity, including fire and rescue stations, with the grounds thereto annexed and necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the same, founded, endowed, and maintained by public or private charity: Provided, That the entire revenue derived from the same be applied to the support and to increase the efficiency and facilities thereof, the repair and the necessary increase of grounds and buildings thereof, and for no other purpose; . . . .” (emphasis added).
Metropolitan contends that, while no case has specifically held that a housing project built in accordance with section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act is tax exempt, some of the reasoning in our developing case law justifies an exemption for Lemington Heights as a “purely public charity.” We view this claim in the light of the well-established rules stated by this Court in Four Freedoms House of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 443 Pa. 215, 279 A.2d 155 (1971):
“Since liability of all real estate is the rule with exemption the exception, e. g., Dougherty v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa.Super. 570, 172 A. 177 (1934), the burden is placed on the claimant to bring itself within the exemption. E. g., Pittsburgh Institute of Aeronautics Tax Exemption Case, 435 Pa. 618, 258 A.2d 850 (1969); University of Pittsburgh Tax Exemption Case, 407 Pa. 416, 180 A.2d 760 (1962); Wynnefield United Presbyterian Church v. City of Philadelphia, 348 Pa. 252, 35 A.2d 276 (1944); Albright College Tax Assessment Case, 213 Pa.Super. 478, 249 A.2d 833 (1968). Moreover, statutory provisions exempting property from taxation are subject to a strict construction. E. g., Y.M.C.A. v. Reading, 402 Pa. 592, 167 A.2d 469 (1961); McGuire v. Pittsburgh School District, 359 Pa. 602, 60 A.2d 44 (1948).”
Id. 443 Pa. at 218-19, 279 A.2d at 157. With these considerations in mind, we agree with the Board of Assessment and both lower courts that the cases on which Metropolitan relies are distinguishable in significant respects, and that the grant of an exemption for the Lemington Heights project would be an unjustified extension of the constitutional concept of a “purely public charity” as developed by our case law.
Metropolitan‘s principal reliance is on two cases, Four Freedoms House of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Philadelphia, supra, and Presbyterian Homes Tax Exemption Case, 428 Pa. 145, 236 A.2d 776 (1968), which involved housing for the elderly. Metropolitan contends that the important factor leading to the conclusion that the nonprofit housing corporations in those cases were institutions of purely public charity was not that their tenants were elderly but that they had limited incomes. We disagree. Four Freedoms House of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Philadelphia, supra, stated the following three-step test for determining entitlement to a tax exemption:
“For the appellant to obtain the claimed exemption from taxation, it must affirmatively show that the entire institution, (1) is one of ‘purely public charity‘; (2) was founded by public or private charity; (3) is maintained by public or private charity.”
“Turning to the facts of the case at bar and guided by our decision in the Presbyterian Homes Tax Exemption Case, 428 Pa. 145, 236 A.2d 776 (1968), there can be no doubt that providing low-cost housing for elderly persons with limited incomes constitutes a public charity.”
Id. 443 Pa. at 219, 279 A.2d at 157. Obviously, on the issue of whether the institution in question was one of purely public charity, Four Freedoms House was simply following the Presbyterian Homes Tax Exemption Case, supra. The most cursory reading of Presbyterian Homes reveals an overwhelming emphasis on the age of the tenants in determining that the use of the homes was a charity in the sense that term is used in the Pennsylvania constitutional and statutory tax exemption provisions.4
Metropolitan relies on Vanguard School Tax Exemption Case, 430 Pa. 378, 243 A.2d 323 (1968), for the proposition that entitlement to charitable tax exemption does not depend solely on the age of the beneficiaries. In that case, the students at the school suffered from physical and emotional infirmities which necessitated special educational attention. The school supplied a necessity to the students which they would not otherwise be able to obtain. Thus the underlying reason for finding the Vanguard School to be a purely public charity was the same as for Four Freedoms House and Presbyterian Homes—that in each case the institution supplied essential care which its beneficiaries could not provide for themselves. This is clear from Mr. Justice MUSMANNO‘s opinion in Vanguard School, which after quoting at length from Mr. Chief Justice BELL‘s discussion of the needs of the elderly, see Note 4, supra, states:
“The beneficiaries in this case are at the opposite end of the chronological scale but they need care in the same manner that the disabled superannuated require attention.”
Vanguard School Tax Exemption Case, supra at 383, 243 A.2d at 324 (1968). In contrast, while Lemington Heights probably makes it possible for its tenants to have somewhat better housing than they might otherwise be able to afford it is not providing them with any physical, emotional or moral services which they would be without were it not for Metropolitan‘s building of the Lemington Heights project.
Salvation Army v. Allegheny County, 367 Pa. 373, 80 A.2d 758 (1951), on which Metropolitan also relies, is similarly distinguishable. In that case, the Salvation Army operated a residence for young women under thirty-five years of age
Metropolitan also urges us to look at cases from other jurisdictions in our consideration of whether Lemington Heights should be entitled to a charitable tax exemption. We can locate only one such case with a factual situation similar enough to provide an adequate basis for comparison. In Mountain View Homes, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 77 N.M. 649, 427 P.2d 13 (1967), the Supreme Court of New
Our analysis of the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, as well as the cases thereunder, convinces us that Metropolitan is not a “purely public charity” entitled to a local tax exemption. Accordingly, the order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.
MANDERINO, J., concurred in the result.
ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
PACKEL, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting.
Metropolitan Pittsburgh Nonprofit Housing Corporation provides housing for low and moderate income families at less than market rents. Metropolitan is eligible for federal support under Section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act.
Other institutions, such as schools and hospitals, which are exempt from the tax in question, and which are in large part subsidized by government funds, do not make available their services to those who cannot pay a fee. Thus, I do not find the eviction of tenants controlling on the question of whether Metropolitan is eligible for tax relief.
The majority also asserts that since Congress has provided some measure of reimbursement for Metropolitan‘s tax liability, Metropolitan should not be granted status as a tax exempt charity under Pennsylvania statutes. I cannot support the view that we should determine whether Metropolitan is a charity under the laws of Pennsylvania by looking to specific provisions of federal legislation.
In Presbyterian Homes Tax Exemption Case, 428 Pa. 145, 150, 236 A.2d 776, 778-79 (1968) we held:
“The word ‘charitable‘, in a legal sense, includes every gift for a general public use, to be applied, consistent with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, and designed to benefit them from an educational, religious, moral, physical or social standpoint. In its broadest meaning it is understood ‘to refer to something done or given for the benefit of our fellows or the public‘: Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa. 194, 196, 116 A. 826. ‘Charitable uses may be unlimited in number and are not to be determined by the application of any narrow criterion. Whether a purpose is charitable must be ascertained from a consideration of all surrounding circumstances. A design to achieve objects beneficial to the community is common to all charitable purposes.‘”
Metropolitan‘s purposes and structure fall squarely within this characterization of a charity and therefore I would reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court.
