297 N.W. 430 | Wis. | 1941
Petition filed in the circuit court by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for the review and vacation, under sec.
The title to ch. 57, Laws of 1939, reads as follows:
"An act to repeal section 20.58 and chapter 111, create a new chapter to be designated chapter 111, create a new section to be designated section 20.58," etc.
And sec.
"Wherever the application of the provisions of other statutes or laws conflict with the application of the provisions of this chapter this chapter shall prevail, provided that in any situation where the provisions of this chapter cannot be validly enforced the provisions of such other statutes or laws shall apply."
There is a material difference between ch. 111, Stats. 1937, and ch. 57, Laws of 1939, in relation to the determination of the proper collective-bargaining unit. Sec.
"The board shall decide in each case whether, in order to effectuate the policies of this chapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit or other unit. . . ."
On the other hand in ch. 57, Laws of 1939, the provision defining the collective-bargaining unit reads, —
"The term `collective-bargaining unit' shall mean all of the employees of one employer (employed within the state), except that where a majority of such employees engaged in a *468
single craft, division, department or plant shall have voted by secret ballot as provided in section
The order made by the board on March 24, 1939, under sec.
Until an order made by the board under sec.
The question in this case, as to whether the board's unconfirmed order, — which was based upon a determination as to the proper bargaining unit that was no longer permissible after the change effected by the enactment of sec.
"Furthermore, the railroad commission is a creature of the legislature. It takes its powers from the legislature and not from the court. Its powers are subject to change or repeal by the legislature. If the legislature had abolished the railroad commission by ch. 444 of the Laws of 1927 it is not *471 likely that any one would contend that the railroad commission continued in existence for the purpose of exercising the power here sought to be enforced. . . . Although the relator was entitled to this certificate at any time prior to the passage of ch. 444 by making payment of the statutory fees required, it could not coerce the issuance of such certificate without the payment of the fees. The right to the certificate had not become vested. It was merely inchoate. When it attempted to perfect its right by the payment of the fees, the law had taken away the authority of the railroad commission to issue the certificate of authority upon the record as it then stood. It would seem that the citation of authority is unnecessary to sustain this conclusion, but the Reports of this court contain ample precedent to that end."
These conclusions are likewise applicable by analogy in the case at bar. The powers of the board under ch. 111, Stats. 1937, were subject to repeal and change by the legislature; and when, prior to the confirmation of the board's order by a court, the legislature not only took away from the board the discretionary power to designate the unit for bargaining purposes, but also entirely abolished the board, and the jurisdiction given by ch. 51, Laws of 1937, to the courts for the enforcement of the board's orders before any right would become vested thereunder, there remained no basis whatever for an adjudication confirming the board's order and ordering the enforcement thereof.
In entering judgment to that effect the court sustained the union's contentions that the requirement that the company bargain collectively constituted a civil liability within the meaning of sec. 370.04, Stats., and that, in view of the saving provision in this statute, the repeal of ch. 111, Stats. 1937, and the abolition of the board created thereby did not defeat the union's right to have the board's order confirmed and enforced. Although sec. 370.04, Stats., was likewise relied upon in the public utility's brief in the Gettle Case, supra, there is no reference to the provisions of the statute in the opinion and it evidently was not considered applicable by the *472
court to such administrative orders. The inchoate right under such an order, which, under the statutory provisions authorizing it, is not final and enforceable until confirmation and enforcement thereof is adjudged by a court, does not result, prior to such adjudication, in "any civil or criminal liability for offenses committed, penalties or forfeitures incurred or rights of action accrued under such statute before the repeal thereof;" and the special proceedings before the board and in a court, which are involved herein and were authorized solely by sec.
It follows that the court should have sustained appellant's contention that by reason of the enactment of ch. 57, Laws of 1939, which became effective May 4, 1939, there could be no further proceedings in court after that date for the confirmation and enforcement of the order made by the former board under ch. 111, Stats. 1937; and as the proceedings should have been dismissed on that ground, there is no occasion to consider the other contentions in relation to the board's order.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the proceedings. *473