47 Ga. App. 687 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1933
Mrs. Fannie Jones, as administratrix of the estate of William Jones, deceased, brought suit against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company on a policy of insurance dated February 17, 1930. William Jones died November 27, 1930, from cancer of the throat. The insurance policy provided that the liability of the company was limited to the return of the premiums paid if the insured was not in sound health on the date of the issuance of the policy or if the insured “has within two years before the date hereof been attended by a physician for any serious disease or complaint, or, before said date, had any pulmonary disease, chronic bronchitis, or cancer, or disease of the heart, liver, or kidneys.” The evidence of the physicians is uncontradicted as follows: Dr. Rayle: “My first contact with Mr. Willie Jones [deceased] was the 20th day of January, 1930, at which time he was a patient in the Steiner Clinic. . . The other treatment I gave Mr. Jones was a series of x-ray treatments beginning on the 23d day of January, 1930 and contin
1. It is admitted by counsel for the defendant in error in their brief that the testimony quoted above with reference to the deceased being carried to Grady Hospital is insufficient to give notice to the company that the insured had cancer. As a matter of law such notice could hardly be termed constructive notice. The rule laid down in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Dodd, 41 Ga. App. 243 (152 S. E. 850), is as follows: “Such waiver will not result
2. The defendant in error introduced no testimony to contradict the testimony of the doctors as set forth in the statement of facts. It appears from the testimony of Dr. Eayle and Dr. Allen that the deceased was being treated for cancer nearly a month before the policy of insurance was issued. The testimony of other doctors was that from their examination of the deceased in July, he had carcinoma of the pharynx before February 17, 1930. The evidence demands the conclusion that the insured was treated by a physician within two years prior to the issuance of the policy for a serious complaint, namely, cancer. The policy provided that if such condition existed, the liability of the company would be limited to the return of the premiums paid; which was done in this case. There being no sufficient evidence of any notice to the company of this condition and a waiver thereof, we hold that the verdict is without evidence to support it.
Judgment reversed.