79 Md. 375 | Md. | 1894
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The last two policies were payable to the appellee, and were issued after the death of the father.
The judgment was for the plaintiff, and the defendant has appealed.
The record contains five bills of exception, and we will pass upon them in their regular order.
The first exception was to the refusal of the Court to allow the following question to be asked Dr. Norris, the medical examiner, who had recommended the applicant as a good risk: “If you had known that the mother, sister, and two brothers of the insured had died of consumption, would you have made the reports you did to the company upon this application?”
This question was clearly inadmissible. Whether the answers to the questions asked in the examination of the applicant for insurance were true or not was a fact for the jury, and could in no wise be affected by the opinion of the witness. The jury were specially instructed by the prayers that, if the answers were untrue, they should find for the defendant.
The second exception was based upon the refusal of the Court to allow transcripts from the record of deaths in the city of Baltimore from the office of Registrar of Vital Statistics, to be offered in evidence for the purpose of showing the nature of the disease from which the relations of the insured died. There was no error in this ruling. The transcripts were but copies of the original records in the office of the Health Department of Baltimore, and in the
The third exception arises1 upon a motion to exclude from the consideration of the jury the three policies of insurance, because they were specialties, and were inadmissible under the counts of the declaration. The policies were not declared on as sealed instruments, and we think that neither the proof, nor the instruments themselves show that they were specialties. As was said in the case of Jackson & Wife vs. Myers Brothers, 43 Md., 463 : “What is alleged to be the seal consists simply of an emblem or symbol printed by the printer at the time when the printed blanks were struck.” There is no statement or declaration in any part of the policies that they were or were designed to be executed under the corporate seal of the company.
The policies read: “In witness whereof, the said Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, by its President and Secretary, signed and delivered this policy,” &c. Nor does the proof show that the company ever adopted the printed device or emblem for the seal of the company.
The fourth exception is based upon the overruling by the Court of a motion to exclude from the jury the first policy of insurance, which had been admitted by the Court subject to exception.
This policy, as we have heretofore stated, was by the terms of the application, which was a part of the contract of insurance, payable to John Anderson, the father of the appellee.
Obviously, if the appellee was not the owner of the policy, she could not maintain this action, because the variance between the policy and the fourth count of the declaration, which sets out a contract to pay to the plaintiff, would be a fatal variance.
But we think the proof clearly establishes the appellee’s right to recover in this action, and that the company is es-
This prayer was entirely correct, and contained the law of the casé.
There was no error in rejecting the appellant’s fifth, sixth and seventh prayers, for the reasons we have given. They were also fully covered by the Court’s instruction to the jury.
As the defendant had the benefit of every instruction it was entitled to, and the evidence justified the jury in the verdict they found, we shall affirm the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.