This сase is before the court upon the petition of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan) to review and set aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) issued against Metropolitan on March 11, 1963, pursuant to Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1958). In its answer the Board has requested that its order be enforced in full.
Metropolitan is a New York corporation, engaged in the sale and issuance of insurance policies throughout the United States and Canada. Its operations are highly centralized and the practices and procedures established at the New York home office govern the district offices, which are the basic operating units of the company. A superintendent of agencies oversees the district offices in his territory, while each district office is under the supervision of a manager. The district offices themselves are relatively independent of each other, except in so far as they are joined by the cоmpany into a territory. There is virtually no interchange of agents among the various district offices, and there is no business or social contact among agents except on the individual district office level.
Delaware is part of Metropolitan’s Atlantic Coast Territory with three district offices. Two are in the Wilmington area, called Brandywine and Kirkwood, and the third is forty-six miles from Wilmington in Dover. These offices account for fifty-four regular (in the field) agents and four office account agents. Brandywine *822 has eighteen, Kirkwood nineteen, and Dover seventeen.
It was within this organizational structure, the Insurance Workers’ International Union, AFL-CIO (Union) sought to organize Metropolitan’s insurance agents in Delaware. Apparently failing in its attempt to organize the agents of the three district offices, the Union petitioned the Board, pursuant to § 9(e) of the Act, requesting certification as bargaining representative of the agents at the two Wilmington district offices. The Board decided that the grouping of these two offices was an appropriate unit for collective bargaining and directed an election to be held. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
Upon Metropolitan’s refusal to bargain, the Board found that Metropolitan was guilty of an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) and Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 141 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (1963). Metropolitan has admitted that it refused to bargain but has argued consistently below and here, that the grouping of the Brandy-wine and Kirkwood district offices, is not an aрpropriate unit, that the Board’s unit determination is based on the Union’s extent of organization contrary to § 9(e) (5) of the Act.
By virtue of Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), Congress has given the Board the authority to determine units appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1958), as amended. The Taft-Hartley Amendments have not altered this and the determination of an appropriate unit remains one left to the wide and informed discretion of the Board. Its decision, if not final, is rarely tо be disturbed. Packard Motor Car Company v. N. L. R. B.,
Early in its life, the Board had developed the so-called “Extent of organization” theory. This theory, quickly endorsed by the courts,
2
gave expression
*823
to the view that it was desirable in the determination of an appropriate unit to render collective bargaining of employees an immediate or reasonably early possibility. The Board regarded this view as an obedient implementation of the command of the National Labor Relations Act that it seek to “insure to employees the full benеfit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this act.”
3
However, as the theory was brought to bear on Board determinations of appropriate units, it became clear that in certain instances, the extent of employee organization was given controlling weight. See Matter of Chase Brass & Copper Co., Inc.,
These decisions and others 4 attest to the strong, if not overwelming reliance the Board, from time to time, placеd on the factor of the union’s extent of organization. It was this approach Congress sought to block.
Representative Fred A. Hartley, presenting the House Report on its bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act said in regard to what was to become 9(c) (5):
“Section 9(e) (3) strikes at a practice of the Board by which it has set up as units appropriate for bargaining whatever group or groups the petitioning union has organized at the time. Sometimes, but not always, the Board pretends to find reasons other than thе extent to which the employees have organized as ground for holding such units to be appropriate. [Matter of New England Spun Silk Co.,11 N.L.R.B. 852 (1939); Matter of Botany Worsted Mills,27 N.L.R.B. 687 (1940).] While the Board may take into consideration the extent to which employees have organized, this evidence should have little weight, and as section 9(e) (3) provides, is not to be controlling.” 1 Leg.Hist. 328. 5
Senator Robert Taft, after the bill had passed the first time (the Senate and House later had to vote to override President Truman’s veto), submitted a supplementary analysis of the Labor Bill as passed “in order to make clear the legislative intent.” As to § 9(c) (5), Senator Taft said:
“It overrules the ‘extent of organization’ theory sometimes used by the Board in determining appropriate units. Opponents of the bill have stated that it prevents the establishment of small operational units and effectively prevents organization of *824 public utilities, insurance companies and other business whose operations are widespread. It is sufficient answer to say that the Board has evolved numerous tests to determine appropriаte units, such as community of interest of employees involved, extent of common supervision, interchange of employees, geographical considerations, etc., any one of which may justify the finding of a small unit. The extent of organization theory has been used where all valid tests fail to give the union what it desires and represents a surrender by the Board of its duty to determine appropriate units. Its use has been particularly bad where another union comes in and organizes the remainder of the unit which results in the establishment of two inappropriate units.” 2 Leg.Hist. 1625.
Simultaneous with the hearings and debates in Congress regarding the proposed amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, the Board was confronted with a series of representation petitions
6
of which Garden State Hosiery Co.,
In Garden State Hosiery Co.,
“Extent of existing organization can never be the sole criterion, nor is it often the controlling one. The Board has always insisted on the coexistence of certain other facts that establish the feasibility of bargaining on the basis of the smaller unit. Additional objective factors must be present in order to rule out the possibility that the petitioning union might unrestrictedly manipulate the boundaries of the appropriate unit. Thus, not only must bargaining on a more comprehensive basis be improbable in the near future but, as a wholly separate matter, the unit sought must itself be homogeneous,, identifiable and distinct. Indeed the Board has consistently refused to set apart as an appropriate unit any subdivision or group of employees-the nature or situs of whose work is indistinguishable from that of other employees, or whose work is not functionally coherent and differentiated, despite the contention of a petitioning union to the contrary. Petitions which lack objective support are regularly dismissed, despite union’s attempts to invoke the extent of organization theory.”
See also Hudson Hosiery Company,
Applying these factors, the Board could determine any number of •approрriate units, comprising a given set of employees. 13 However, the question before the Board will of necessity be whether the proposed unit is appropriate, and in making that decision, Congress has now said, “the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling.” With all this in mind, we believe the effect of 9(c) (5) is to require the Board to determine whether a unit is in and of itself appropriate, apart from the extent to which *826 the employees ax-e oi’ganized. 14 Whether1 the employees were controlled by the extent of their organization when they petitioned the Board is not the issue. Bather, it is whether the Board in determining a unit’s appropriateness was so controlled. 15
The extent to which the Union failed to organize should not determine the appropriateness of the group it did organize. To hold, that because the Union failed to organize on a broader basis, the smaller unit petitioned for is inappropriate, would be to penalize the Union for failing in an attempt to organize, which right is fundamental to the Act. We are therefore, of the same mind as Membеr Fanning, who in his special concurrence in Life Insurance Company of Virginia,
“Labor organizations are in the business of organizing employees, and it is. not fanciful to assume that they desire to organize all the employees they can, or at least, all employees in certain job classifications.
“That the Board has heretofore given a reasonable interpretation to the extent of organization provision 9(c) (5) is evident in px'ior decisions where, for example, the Boax-d has held that the fact that а labor organization may have unsuccessfully attempted to organize on a broader basis does not render the smaller unit sought inappropriate when the smaller unit is otherwise appropriate. (See Whittaker Controls Division of Telecomputing Corporation (Lynwood Plant),122 N.L.R.B. 624 (1958); Berger Brothers Company,116 N.L.R.B. 439 (1956)).”
Our intei'pretation of 9(c) (5) is not in conflict with our decision in Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
This review is also focused on the insurance industry and the organization of insurance agents regarding which, for many years, a special rule was promulgated by the Board. In 1944, the Board adopted the policy that it would avoid certifying bargaining units of insurance agents less than state or company-wide in scope. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
■“Organization among insurance agents is comparatively recent, but is steadily growing. The tendency of such organization is toward statewide units * * *. Thus, the rapid growth of union organization among insurance agents makes it clearly appear that provisional units less than state-wide in scope are, under ordinary circumstances, unnecessary to make collective bargaining reasonably possible for them, if they desire it. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that, in the absences of unusual circumstances, the practice of setting up units for insurance agents smaller than statewide in scope should be avoided.”
This thinking guided the Board’s determinations for seventeen years until Quaker City Life Insurance Company,
“ * * * adopted solely in anticipation of broader organization on a comрany-wide or state-wide basis, which at that time appeared imminent. As a practical matter, however, such state-wide or company-wide organization has not materialized, and the result of the rule has been to arrest the organizational development of insurance agents to an extent certainly never contemplated by the Act, or for that matter, by the Board, that decided the Metropolitan Life case. There is no longer any rational basis for applying different rules of organization *828 to the insurance industry, than are applied to other industries. The rule was adopted for the purpose of permitting organization on a statewide or employer-wide basis, which did not develop as anticipated. Contrary to our dissenting colleagues, we regard this as a valid reason for changing the rule. Obviously, when the purpose for which a rule has been established fails, the rule should also fail. This is especially so with respect to a rule which unfairly prejudices the collective bargaining rights of employees. Accordingly, in the future, thе Board’s policy will be not to preclude the organization of insurance agents into units of less than employer-wide or state-wide scope, and we shall apply our normal unit principles to the cases as they arise.”
Since Quaker City, pursuant to its new policy, the Board has found as appropriate: a unit composed of district offices in the Cleveland area: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
First of all, there can be no question that it was within the authority of the Board to change its rule, if in so doing, it did not act arbitrarily or unreasonable or in violation of the Act. SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
The Board here decided on the' entire record before it that “ * * * all agents are subject to the same wage-policies, employee benefits and working conditions. * * * There is virtually no interchange or transfer of agents among the various district offices and there is no business or social contact among the agents except on the individual district office level. There is no history of collective bargaining affecting
*829
the employees involved in the instant proceedings. * * * [T]he individual district office is in effect a separate administrative entity through which the Employer conducts its business operation, and therefore, is inherently appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining. * * * [T]his finding does not preclude the grouping оf such offices where such grouping is justified by cogent geographic considerations.” Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
On a petition for enforcement, where there is a claim of gerrymandering or of a violation of 9(c) (5), the court, inter alia, in its study of the record will have that specifically in mind. See dissent in Equitable Life Insurance Company,
The petition for review will be denied. The order of the Board will be enforced. A proposed form of decree may be submitted.
Notes
. Section 9 “(a) * * *
“(b) The Board shall decide in each ease whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exеrcising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: * * *
“(c) (1) * * *
“(2) * * *
“(3) * * *
“(4) * * *
“(5) In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling.”
. N. L. R. B. v. Hearst Publications,
. Under the National Labor Relations Act before the 1947 amendments, 9(b) provided;
“Tbe Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bаrgaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit or subdivision thereof.”
The changed phraseology in Section 9 (b) (see footnote 1) did not change its substance and the pre-1947 considerations are written into the Taft-Hartley version of the section. See 13 N.L.R.B. Ann.Rep. 36 (1948); National Tube Company,
. See footnote 2.
. Leg.Hist. denotes the two volume work Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (G.P.O. 1948).
. Chadbourne Hosiery Mills, Inc.,
. See Garden State Hosiery,
. See International Association of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom,
. Texas Pipe Line Company v. N. L. R. B.,
. Texas Pipe Line Company v. N. L. R. B. ,
. See Pittsburgh Plato Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
. Texas Pipe Line Company v. N. L. R. B.,
. The Board has said “There is nothing in the statute which requires that the unit for bargaining be the
only
appropropriate unit, or
ultimate
unit, or the
most
appropriate unit; the Act requires only that the unit be ‘appropriate’. It
must
be appropriate to ensure to employees,
in each case,
‘the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act.’ ” Morand Brothers Beverage Co.,
. The extent of organization is not excluded as a factor. Section 9(c) (5) permits it to be a contributing, but not a controlling factor. However, while this is what the section says, what it effects is to require the Board to discover a unit’s appropriateness, apart from the extent of employee organization. The Bоard may regard the extent to which the employees are organized as having inherent evidentiary value, in the same way as prior history of bargaining (see footnote 8), but this should not control its determination.
. In this we differ with the interpretation of 9(c) (5) in N. L. R. B. v. Glen Raven Knitting Mills,
. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 143 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (1963); Singer Sewing Machine Co.,
. See inter alia; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company,
. For factors
used to
determine multiplant units, see Continental Baking Company,
