Opinion
Thе defendants, Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (union), and William Rodriguez, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the application of the plaintiff, Metropolitan District Commission, to vacate an arbitration award. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly vacated the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrators’ award violated public policy. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendants’ appeal. Rodriguez was an employee of the plaintiff. The plaintiff operates a facility under a contract with the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (CRRA) to receive solid waste from participating towns. The plaintiff then converts that waste into a fuel product that can be burned to produce steam to drive turbines, which, in turn, generate electricity. In operating the facility, the plaintiff is contractually obligated to follow certain рrocedures that are dictated by the CRRA. Pursuant to those procedures, only trucks with permits are allowed to enter the facility to dump solid waste materials. Furthermore, CRRA prohibits certain wastes from being dumped at the plaintiffs facility and prohibits the plaintiff from accepting waste on Saturday afternoons, Sundays and some legal holidays. Although the plaintiff does not accept waste
In response to a rash of vandalism, the plaintiff installed fifteen security cameras throughout its facility with the knowledge and consent of the union. On Tuesday, October 27,1998, an employee advised the manager of the plaintiffs facility to review the security tаpes from the previous Sunday, October 25, 1998. A review of those tapes revealed that on the previous Sunday, a large truck had entered the facility and dumped a load of unidentified material. After dumping the material, the truck drove around to the rear of the facility, an area that is off limits to nonemployees. The truck approached one of the plaintiffs employees. It later was determined that that employee was Sebastian Stevens. After conversing for a short time with the ocсupants of the truck, Stevens went to the dumping floor and moved the materials that the truck had just dumped to an existing waste pile.
The plaintiff conducted an investigation into the events of October 25, 1998. As part of its investigation, the plaintiffs manager interviewed Stevens because Stevens was one of the two employees on duty at the facility on the date of the incident. After the interview, the manager decided that he would discipline Stevens because Stevens had failed to report that an unauthorized truсk had entered the facility and dumped materials, and because he was evasive when questioned by the manager. The plaintiff scheduled Stevens’ disciplinary hearing for November 20,1998. On November 19,1998, Rodriguez, accompanied by two union stewards, approached the manager and handed him a written
Subsequently, the plaintiff scheduled a disciplinary hearing for Rodriguez. At Rodriguez’ disciplinary hearing, he admitted that he had escorted an unauthorized truck onto the property, dumped unidentified materials, and breached rules and procedures that were designed to safeguard the public and the facility of the plaintiff. On the basis of those facts, the plaintiff terminated Rodriguez’ employment.
Thereafter, the union filed a grievance on Rodriguez’ behalf challenging his termination. In accordance with the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the plaintiff, the parties submitted the grievance to arbitration. The issues before the three member arbitration panel were as follows: (1) “Was the termination of the employment relationship of Mr. William Rodriguez on November 20, 1998 for just cause?” and (2) “If not, what shall the remedy be?”
The arbitration panel conducted a hearing and, on March 14, 2000, issued its award in which it concluded that the plaintiff had terminated Rodriguez’ employment without just cause.
The panel concluded that because Rodriguez chose to dump materials during the weekend, a time period when the facility was closed for dumping and when there was no supervisor present, Rodriguez probably knew that the practice of dumping without a permit was not allowed. The panel concluded, however, that there was no evidеnce that Rodriquez knew that his misconduct was of the sort that could subject him to the termination of his employment. Finally, the panel concluded that the plaintiffs claim that it did not know what materials were dumped by Rodriguez was less than accurate because during its investigation, the plaintiff discovered what type of materials Rodriguez had dumped, and the plaintiff failed to show how the material that was dumped would potentially cause it to lose its contract with CRRA. Although the panel was unanimous in its decision that Rodriguez’ misconduct warranted some form of discipline because his actions had led to other employees being disciplined, the panel also unanimously agreed that Rodriguez’ misconduct was not so egregious that it warranted the termination of his employment. Consequently, in its award, the panel reduced the termination to a two week suspension without pay.
The plaintiff applied to the trial court to vacate the arbitration award, claiming that given the undisputed facts and evidence, an award that ordered anything less than full termination of employment violated public policy. It argued that Rodriguez knew the rules regard
The court granted the plaintiffs application to vacate the arbitration award. It concluded that Connecticut has a comprehensive scheme for solid waste management, as found in General Statutes § 22a-207 et seq., the Solid Waste Management Act, and that Rodriguez’ actions violated that policy. The court also concluded that Rodriguez’ actions deprived the plaintiff of revenue and, therefore, his conduct was analogous to the conduct of the employee in Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, supra,
I
The defendants claim that the court improperly vacated the arbitration award as violative of public policy because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of any explicit, well defined and dominant public policy that would be violated by an award reinstating Rodriguez. We agree.
We begin our analysis of the defendants’ claim by setting forth the general rule regarding arbitration awards. “The standard of review relative to arbitration awards depends on the nature of the challenge. With a voluntary, unrestricted submission to an arbitrator, as is the case before us,
“Certain conditions do exist, however, under which we conduct a more searching review of arbitral awards. In Garrity v. McCaskey,
In Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C.,
“Recently, this court had the opportunity to clarify the standard annunciated in Schoonmaker. In State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663, AFL-CIO, supra,
A
First, the court concluded that Connecticut has a public policy regarding solid waste management, as found in § 22a-207 et seq., and that Rodriguez had violated that public policy.
We agree that § 22a-207 et seq. sets forth an explicit and well defined public policy regarding thе disposal and reduction of solid waste. See, e.g., City Recycling, Inc. v. State,
Because the plaintiff has identified a clear public policy, we must, thereforе, address the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff demonstrated that the arbitration award of reinstatement clearly violated that public policy because “[t]he public policy exception applies only when the award is clearly illegal or clearly violative of a strong public policy.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, supra,
Additionally, as the court noted, Rodriguez also admitted at thе disciplinary hearing that he had violated rules and procedures designed to safeguard the public and the facility. The panel found that the rules that were posted at the facility by the plaintiff applied to how vehicles should be processed through the weigh stations and how the appropriate fees were to be collected. The plaintiff, however, failed to demonstrate that the rules and procedures that Rodriguez bl eached were anything other than the internal rules and procedures of the plaintiff. Internal “directives are not in and of themselves determinative of public policy. Internal practices and procedures may reflect public policy but those practices and procedures do not determine that policy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, AFL-CIO, 252 Conn. 467, 476 n.10,
This court’s role “in addressing a public policy challenge has been confined largely to determining whether, as gleaned from a statute, administrative decision or case law, there exists a public policy mandate with which an arbitral award must conform.” Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., supra,
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that
B
Second, the court concluded, in reliance on Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, supra,
We conclude that the plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of identifying a clear public policy because it has failed to demonstrate how the policy set forth in Groton was implicated in this case. The narrow issue in Groton v. United, Steelworkers of America, supra,
Thereafter, the defendant union filed a grievance on the employee’s behalf, challenging the termination of his employment. Id., 39. The grievance was ultimately submitted to arbitration. Id. The arbitrator determined that the conviction did not establish just cause for termination. Id., 41. The town applied to the trial court to vacate the award. Id., 43. The court rendered judgment vacating the award. Id. The defendants appealed, arguing that the court impropеrly applied the public policy exception to the general rule of deference regarding arbitrator’s awards because the employee’s conviction was based on a plea of nolo contendere and therefore that the conviction could not be used to establish that he had, in fact, embezzled from his employer or be given any other effect. Id. Our Supreme Court disagreed. It concluded that the award reinstating the employee “violated the clear publiс policy against embezzlement, and that this policy encompasses the policy that an employer may not be required to reinstate the employment of one who has been convicted of embezzlement of his employer’s funds, whether that conviction follows a trial, a guilty plea, or a plea of nolo contendere.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 46-47.
In the present case, Rodriguez was neither charged with nor convicted of embezzlement or any other crime. Furthermore, there was no finding by the arbitration panel that Rodriguez admitted that he committed theft.
Even if we assume arguendo that the plaintiff has successfully demonstrated that the public policy set forth in Groton was implicated, we would conclude that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how the arbitration award reinstating Rodriguez clearly violates that public policy. We conclude that Groton is distinguishable from the present case. In Groton, the employee was charged and convicted of a crime. Here, Rodriguez was neither charged with nor convicted of embezzlement or any other crime.
Furthermore, a factor that figured prominently in our Supreme Court’s determination that reinstatement of the employee in Groton was repugnant to public policy was the fact that the employee in the Groton case held a position of financial trust. Id., 48. The court concluded that requiring the employer to reinstate that employee to such a position undermined the legitimate expectations of the employer, namely, that an employer is entitled to expect that it should be able to trust an employee in a position of financial responsibility аnd that an employer also is entitled to expect that other employees and members of the public will feel that they can trust that employee. Id., 48-49. In the present case, there is no indication as to the nature of the position held by Rodriguez. Moreover, the cases that have held that a court properly vacated an arbitration award that compelled reinstatement of an employee usually involved some apparent and egregious misconduct on the part of the employee. See id., 35 (employee arrested and
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to deny the plaintiffs application to vacate the arbitration award.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
In the record, Rodriguez is, at times, referred to as the operator of the vehicle and, at other times, an occupant of the vehicle.
The award stated as follows: “Grievance is sustained in part. The termination of the employment relationship of Mr. William Rodriguez on November 20, 1998 was not for just cause. [Rodriguez] shall be suspended for two weeks without pay. He shall be paid all lost wages for the period of his suspension, less any wages earned during the period in question.”
In the present case, the parties did not dispute that thе submission was unrestricted.
The record reveals that Rodriguez dumped cut brush, a material that the plaintiff was not prohibited from accepting at its facility.
General Statutes § 22a-l provides in relevant part that “the policy of the state of Connecticut is to conserve, improve and protect its natural resources and environment and to control air, land and water pollution in order to enhance the health, safety and welfare of the people of the state. . . .”
General Statutes § 22a-15 provides in relevant part that “there is a public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state of Connecticut and that each person is entitled to the protection, preservation and enhancement of the same. . . .”
By means of our analysis, we do not imply that Rodriguez’ conduct constituted embezzlement. See General Statutes § 53a-119; see also State v. Lizzi,