METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, Appellant, v. Ramon V. COLINA, As Personal Representative of the Estate of Martha Colina, Deceased, Appellee.
No. 83-406.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
September 18, 1984.
Rehearing Denied October 31, 1984.
456 So. 2d 1233
Before HENDRY, NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
NESBITT, Judge.
Dade County appeals a final judgment rendered on a jury vеrdict in a wrongful death action. The county argues that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in its favor because аny negligence on the county‘s part was not the proximate cause of Martha Colina‘s death. We agree and reverse.
On June 20, 1980 at about 10:00 p.m., Ramon Colina was driving his van southbound on S.W. 16th Avenue in Miami. Ramon‘s wife, Martha, was seated in the right front passenger seat. Stormy weather had caused power outages throughout the county and, as a result, a number of traffic lights were reported out, including the light at S.W. 16th Avenue and S.W. 6th Street.1 Dade County did not, on June 20th, either place traffic control signs at the intersection or send a repair crew out.
When he neared S.W. 6th Street, according to his own testimony, Colina appreciated the hazardous condition and stopped his vehicle.2 He looked to his left and saw two cars traveling westbound on S.W. 6th Street, apрroaching 16th Avenue. He moved the van forward a few feet and stopped again. He testified that he realized the vehicles might not stop, but decided to try to cross the intersection ahead of them. One of the cars traveling on 6th Street, driven by Miguel Masferrer, did not stop. The Masferrer and Colina vehicles collided. Mrs. Colina was thrown from the car sustaining injuries which resulted in her deаth.
The jury found negligence on the part of both co-defendants, apportioning the negligence seventy-five percent to Masferrer and twenty-five per cent to the county. The jury also found no contributory negligence on the part of Ramоn Colina. All of the county‘s directed verdict motions were denied by the trial court.
The issue for decision is whether reasonable people could differ on the question of whether the county‘s omission to act was a proximate cause of Mrs. Colina‘s death. We find that they could not and, as a matter of law, the county‘s failure to act was not a proximate cause of Mrs. Colina‘s death.
An exhaustive review of proximate cause law in Florida is unnecessary since a thorough and insightful analysis has recently been done by Judge Hubbart of this court.
Application of the traditional “but for” test results in a conclusion that the county‘s omission was a cause in fact of Mrs. Colina‘s death. The case, however, turns on whether Masferrer‘s and Colina‘s actions constituted superseding, intervening causes relieving the county of liability. We hold that their actions were such intervening causes.
As previously noted,
Any negligence on Dade County‘s part simрly provided the occasion for the actions of Masferrer and Colina, which together were the proximate cause of Mrs. Colina‘s death. Banat v. Armando, 430 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), review denied, 446 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1984). Both Masferrer and Colina could see that the traffic light was not functioning and, by complying with statutory requiremеnts, could have avoided the collision. To hold the county liable on these facts would make it an insurer of motorists acting in disrеgard of their own safety and that of others. Such a responsibility would be an unwarranted social burden. Finding that reasonable persons could not differ on the proximate cause issue, we reverse the trial court‘s order denying the county‘s motion for directed verdict.
Reversed.