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Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals v. Gunn
477 N.E.2d 289
Ind. Ct. App.
1985
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*1 defendant acknowledgment that the court's At on counts. sentenced both not be

could hearing, it stated: guilty plea understanding, "It is the Court's of Indiana with both State consulted possi- is no that there and the Defendant sentencing in this bility of consecutive matter, that therefore ... and power pursuant to ... only has Court to sentence of Indiana

Supreme Court these regard to one of with you ... there one murder was counts of of the crime." victim proper. imposed was The sentence with instructions The cause is remanded guilty plea court to vacate to the trial on one judgment of conviction and the of murder. the two counts things, the trial court In all other affirmed. DeBRULER,

GIVAN, C.J., PREN- PIVARNIK, JJ., concur. TICE ZON The METROPOLITAN BOARD OF II, APPEALS, MARI DIVISION ING COUNTY, Indiana, Consisting of: ON Chairman, Hayes, Imhau Fred Robert Chafee, sen, Member, Mem Mrs. Hank ber, Fuller, Member, D. Michael John Member,

McGinley, Richard Loren Hudson, Hudson, Mary Ann and Noble Centers, Operated Marion Citizens, Ap for Retarded Association Below), pellants (Respondents GUNN, Appellee Barbara Below). (Petitioner No. 2-583A157. Indiana, Appeals of Court Fourth District.

April23,1985. *2 Rees,

David F. City-County Legal Div., Weaver, Ben J. Olvey, Thomas N. Johnson Weaver, & Indianapolis, appellants. for Lewis, Ted B. Donn Wray, H. Christine Royce, F. Stewart Irwin Gilliom Fuller & Meyer, Indianapolis, appellee. for MILLER, Presiding Judge. petitioned Barbara Gunn for writ of cer- tiorari from an order issued the Metro- politan Zoning Appeals (Board), granting special exception for the estab- lishment of a developmen- home for tally disabled adults next-door to Gunn's home. The trial court reversed the Board's order after concluded the Board had improperly requirement cireumventеd the prior approval by for the Meridian Street Commission, findings Preservation its were insufficient, and its order was contrary to After considering argu- law. the Board's opposition ments in judgment to the court's counter-arguments Gunn's in support thereof, we must find the trial court erred and do reinstate the Board's order. Re- versed.

ISSUES

The issues we purposes address here for reversal,1 parties' as distilled from the briefs, are: 1) Whether grant- the Board's action in ing special exception home developmentally for disabled adults 1. The constitutionality Board also ultimately attacks the cause we determine this act does not preservation herein, the act for the prohibit of historic street we obvi- (IND.CODE (1976)). areas seq. ously 18-4-24-1 et Be- need not address the constitutional issue. preservation the Meridian Street area consistent with the residential charac- legislation neighborhood. was in contravention of ter of the historic street areas 2. THE GRANT OF THE SPECIAL (IND.CODE seq. 18-4-24-1 et EXCEPTION WILL NOT INJURE OR (now seq.)); at IND.CODE 14-8-8.2-1 et ADVERSELY AFFECT ADJA- 2) findings the Board's basic CENT AREA OR PROPERTY VAL- Whether *3 support special exception in said fact THEREIN UES because: are insufficient to sustain its ultimate There externally will be no discernible findings.2 change present from the appearance or subject estate,

use of the real and it FACTS essentially will remain a residential use. 11, 1982, January Mary Loren On 3, petition Ann filed a Hudson before THE GROUP BE HOME WILL IN special exception for a Board HARMONY WITH THE CHARAC- Street, THE (located TER OF DISTRICT AND LAND Indianapolis, North ‍​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‍Illinois area) preservation in the Meridian Street USE AUTHORIZED THEREIN be- property group order to use the home cause: eight developmentally of no more than dis- subject The use оf the real estate will thereafter, Shortly pe- abled adults. a like residential, remain and there will be no filing

tition with its fee was returned to the from the deviation residential charac- by the Meridian Hudsons' counsel Street neighborhood ter of the which would (Commission) Preservation Commission be- incompatible or inconsistent with opinion cause it was the Commission's surrounding land use. prohibited by the was historic THE 4. SUBJECT REAL ESTATE IS act, specifically I.C. 18-4-24- NOT LOCATED WITHIN THREE 19, regarding single-fami- habitation (8,000) FEET, "THOUSAND FROM ly dwellings preser- in Meridian BUILDING LOT LINE TO BUILD- However, hearing vation area. after evi- LINE, ING LOT OF ANOTHER dence, Board, April granted on GROUP HOME FOR DEVELOPMEN- group special exception Hudsons a home TALLY DISABLED PERSONS be- following findings with and conclu- cause: sions: developmen- No other home for tally persons exists in this disabled "FINDINGS OF FACT area, and the nearest home to beyond subject real estate is well 1. THE THE GRANT OF SPECIAL BE (8,000) EXCEPTION WILL NOT INJURI- threе thousand feet from the HEALTH, THE PUBLIC building subject OUS TO line of real lot MORALS, SAFETY, CONVENIENCE estate.

OR GENERAL WELFARE because: THE HOME WILL BE LI- GROUP proposed BY THE DEVELOPMEN- The intended residents of CENSED way injurious in no TAL RESIDENTIAL group home are DISABILITIES aforesaid, subject COUNCIL AND WILL and the use of the FACILITIES AP- WITH ANY AND ALL real estate said residents will be COMPLY However, appellate extensively argued App., does brief 421 N.E.2d 1119. Gunn 2. The Board's that, argue sup findings buttressing the evidence is not sufficient in addition to its basic fact, and, findings findings, presented port evidence suf- the Board's basic its ultimate Thus, ficiently supported findings. argues address this basic the trial court did not even its will, gamut proper aspect review. We runs the administrative of its administrative Board therefore, See, eg, undisputed appeal. the issue to be review here on Carlton v. consider ourselves with whether Board and concern 337; findings support basic its ultimate find 252 Ind. v. Boone Boаrd's Boffo ings. Ind. REQUIREMENTS PLICABLE OF 82 SE2-4 before the Board wherein said MARSHAL, THE STATE FIRE Respondents IN requested approval under ACCORDANCE WITH City-County INDIANA 41,- General Ordinance No. LAW, PRIOR TO OCCUPANCY Docket No. 81-AO-2 to use the AND OPERATION OF THE GROUP real commonly estate known as 4579 HOME. Street, North Indianapolis, Illinois Indi- ana, Group as a developmental- 6. THE Home for GROUP HOME CONTAINS ly persons. disabled AT LEAST TWO HUNDRED SQUARE FEET OF HABITABLE 3. The real commonly estate known FLOOR AREA FOR EACH RESI- Street, as 4579 North Indianapo- Illinois DENT because: lis, Indiana, subject which is the matter SE2-4, of Case Number 82 square par- There is a total of 8746 feet of more area, ticularly habitable floor and the described as follows: maximum *4 number of full-time residents is nine (9). [LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS]

7. THE PLAN OF OPERATION OF Petitioner, 4. The adjoining THE GROUP HOME IS RESI- landowner of commonly real estate DENTIAL IN NATURE because: Street, known as 4577 North Illinois Indi- herein, Operation, The Plan of filed anapolis, Indiana, aggrieved per- in a demonstrates that the activities and sonal and pecuniary way by a performed by functions the intended Board's decision in Case Number residents are compatible consistent and granted SE2-4 Respondents' peti- which with residential use and the residential entered, tion and pur- which decision was surrounding character of the area. suant adopted findings to the Board's of certiorari to review the Board's decision. sions: following pertinent court reversed the Board's action on the tioned the Marion After resident Record, pp. 114-15. One month later on sion)." reference and made a conditions are EXCEPTION 82 granted, subject Board that GROUP HOME SPECIAL ined IT IS THEREFORE the decision of the hearing arguments at 4577 North Illinois the minutes of this Board DECISION Superior incorporated to findings and conclu- any SEZ2-4 is May part Court for a writ conditions stat- 19, counsel, Street, of this deci- hеrein Gunn, hereby (which peti- by a Ann was codified as Sections 18-4-24-1 et Meridian Street Preservation Commis- seq. tan At areas and Exception was ture, torically and architecturally significant ed in the Meridian Street Preservation District, ana Code of chapter concerning preservation of his- Public Law 260 of the Indiana fact, 7. Loren Richard 6. The real the time the [*] Board of of the Indiana on Hudson filed a entitled April # streets 1971, 18-4, 'An 20, Zoning Appeals, estate was created Acts filed with the [*] Act to Amend the Indi- Request 1982. Code, in question Hudson and cities and towns. petition L by adding a new 1971. by L Metropoli- with the said Act Legisla- is locat- Special Mary 1979, [*] "FINDINGS OF OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ENTRY # [*] FACT, L [*] CONCLUSIONS [*] denied of the Indiana sion for cial exception, pursuant by approval the Commission on January Code, 1971, to request § 18-4-24-13 which was spe- 1982. 2. Respondents, The Loren Richаrd

Hudson, Mary Ann Hudson and Noble 8. Loren Richard Mary Hudson and Centers, petitioners were the in Case No. Ann Hudson did not seek review of the by Although certio- 6. jurisdic- decision writ of the Board has Commission's § the In- pursuant requests rari 18-4-24-21 of tion to hear for variances and special exceptions, requirement Code, im- diana 1971. § posed 18-4-24-18(a) The Meridian Street Preservation pri- 9. makes approval or entirely of of the Meridian Street Pres- District consists residential districts, Commission, dwelling including schools and ervation aor favorable de- § designated land not as dif- pursuant churches on termination on review 18- classifications, spe- 4-24-21, but as jurisdictional ferent prece- condition dent to the exercise of juris- the Board's cial uses. granting diction and to the dwellings 10. All of the the Meridi- an Street Preservation District are sin- request. gle-family dwellings. 7. Section 18-24-19 of the Indiana creating In the act when Code, 1971, requires single-family Preservation District Meridian Street dwellings within the Meridian Street enacted, special excep- there were no

was occupied Preservation District are to be tions in existence in the Marion family, no more than one and defines Dwelling District Ordinance. family individuals, mean one or more Special Exeep- 12. The Petition for all marriage, related to one another proposed Group tion stated that consanguinity legal adoption. occupied by eight Home would be §§ provisions 18-4-24-1 et. individuals, developmentally disabled Code, 1971, seq. of the Indiana demon- *5 plus person. a non-resident staff part legisla- strate an intent on the of the ture to control ‍​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‍the use of land within the CONCLUSIONS OF LAW District, Meridian Strеet Preservation L [*] # [*] [*] [*] and that any proposed changes in or de- tition for 41,1981, Docket Number which must be satisfied variances taining without the granting sets ana shall be an Street Preservation Commission. or every final determination of the Meridian Street Preservation Commission City-County General Ordinance Number Code, 1971, provides 4. Section 5. Section 18-4-24-21 of the Indiana 3. The ordinance under which the adoption [*] Code, 1971, forth seven property or of a granted, adopted or amended or # special of prior approval applying petition special exception.... 18-4-24-18(a) any zoning # provides or exception (7) standards, bordering property for the amendment for the review of u 81-A0-2, that no ordinance of the Meridi- prior was filed is of the Indi- [*] Meridian by filing to the all of # per- pe- tions are included within the property to be reviewed and pursuant to vation Commission. and a stantive difference between approved by Meridian change special exception, ana that: ridian Street Preservation Commission viations 9. SAFETY, RIOUS TO OR GENERAL 'THE word Code, 1971, Although special exception, Street in the use of Meridian GRANT from that use which the 'variance' in said statute. Board's MORALS, § 18-4-24-13(a) there is and that WILL NOT constituted a WELFARE because: approved by legislature PUBLIC finding CONVENIENCE be reviewed and normally this Street Preser- special excep- of the Indi- number request meaning BE HEALTH, proposed intended variance the Me- a sub- INJU- (1) proposed residents of the The intended petition for writ of certiorari verified way injurious in no group home are Superior with the Court of Cireuit aforesaid, (60) subject of the days and the use County sixty Marion within af- real estate said residents will be ter the date of final determination. with the residential charac- IS, THEREFORE, IT ORDERED, AD- consistent neighborhood.' ter of the JUDGED, AND DECREED tht [sic] says only that the individuals to reside in Metropolitan decision of the Board of County, of Marion Indi- injuri- the Home themselves will not be ana, II, ous, granting Division says nothing respondents' as to whether grant request special be, exception, of the would be health, injurious is, public safety, hereby to the the same reversed." morals, general convenience or welfare. Record, pp. disputes 266-74. The Board such, finding As no bears relation- conclusions; agree these they we are incor- ship subject require- matter of the rect. Ordinance, support ments of the does not requirements Ordinance, DECISION legally is insufficient. When a trial court asked to finding 11. The Board's numbеr review a decision a board of that: appeals, it following is constrained 'THE GRANT WILL NOT INJURE principles. fundamental A writ certiora- OR ADVERSELY AFFECT THE AD- alleging ri illegality of a board's deci AREA JACENT OR PROPERTY sion is the seeking device for trial VALUES THEREIN because: 86-7-4-1008, court review. IND.CODE externally There will no discernible words, 36-7-4-1009. In other the court change present appearance from the or may examine the board's decision to deter estate, subject 'use of the real and it mine if it was incorrect as a matter of law. essentially will remain a residential See Miller v. Board of use," Ind.App., Rochester 397 N.E.2d Group is silent about the effect of the 1091; Metropolitan Zoning Ap Board of values, adjacent property Home on Ind.App. does peals Marion support requirements of the Ordi- 36; Zoning 40 nance, legally and is insufficient. Appеals v. American finding 12. The Board's number Fletcher National Bank & Trust Co. *6 (1965), Ind.App. 139 205 N.E.2d322. that: may The trial court not 'THE GROUP conduct a trial de HOME WILL BE IN may HARMONY movo not substitute its decision WITH DISTRICT AND for that of the illegality. LAND USE AUTHORIZED board absent such THEREIN because: v. Boone Zoning Board Boffo (1981), Appeals Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 1119. subject The use of the real estate will Thus, generally, if there is sufficient evi residential, remain and there will be no support dence to the board's decision which deviation from the residential charac- legal, upheld. is otherwise it must E.g., be neighborhood ter of the which would Miller v. Board incompatible or inconsistent with Rochester, supra, 397 N.E.2d 1091. On surrounding land use.' appeal, by this court is restricted the same § contrary is to law in that 18-4-24-19 considerations. Nelson v. See Code, 1971, requires of the Indiana that single-family dwellings within the Meridi- 240 Ind. 162 N.E.2d 449. With these an Street Preservation District are to be mind, restraints we examine Gunn's at cecupied family, no more than one as allowing tack on the Board's order the defined the pro- same statute. The group home and the trial court's conclu Home, posed Group housing nine un- sions thereon. individuals, related would violate the re- quirements of said statute. alleged specific Gunn's three writ fail- ings

13. The decision of the grant Board was in the Board's of the special 1) exception: jurisdiction the Board lacked contrary to law. group prohibition of home clear matter, "proce- tion act's subject matter and the over side, allega the the other On dural"; 2) to make find- in the locale. the Board failed the stems from claim irregularity tion of alternative, fact, 8) the ings of in the findings fail to supported by specific substantial еvi- order was not that the Board's Record, pp. findings. 2-6. probative support dence of value. its ultimate adequately court's The actual rationale for the trial point that she has (We at this Gunn remind clear, argument no there is Board's order is not conceded reversal of the therefor, grounds it recited various regard but with sufficiency of the evidence generalized from its decision which can be 1, supra, fn. thus reduc findings, see above) The Board (reproduced as follows: "illegality" argument for ing potential the Hud- jurisdiction to entertain lacked only.) We find no "irregularity" one of exception petition special because sons' illegality but do claims of merit to Gunn's Board, Commission, had been that, irregularity, one respect to find with statutory authority granted the exelusive finding supported by an inсom ultimate con- initial determination. The court of an specific facts. plete statement of prop- had thus failed to cluded the Hudsons remedies erly exhaust its administrative Special Exception Legality of certiorari requesting their own writ of Reiterating briefly portion peti- returned their when the Commission immediately preceding, we believe that addition, In the trial court tion and fees. Gunn and the trial contending court are regardless that of Hudsons' determined illegally Board acted granted when it Meridian problems, the jurisdictional special exception for the home in two prohibited spe- preservation act itself respects: Hudsons' route of ad Lastly, exception being granted. cial from ministrative through recourse was findings of found fault with the the court Commission as exclusive arbiter of the Me findings fact, specific declaring the Board's ridian Street act rather than findings. support its ultimate insufficient to through Board, regardless of ad these Extracting the kernel of law from review, exception ministrative itself is conclusions, challenges to perceive we two impliedly prohibited by the act. Instead of decision and one legality of the Board's answering directly these sepa attacks regularity. Zoning to its See Board of rately, we have determined it would be Moyer Appeals Indianapolis v. comprehensible more to combine these ar (distin Ind.App. 27 N.E.2d 905 guments into one broad discussion address "irregularity").3 guishes "illegality" from ing legal whether there was sufficient au illegality attacks on the order's The two thority for the grant Board to essentially not substan are there was hоme the Meridian 1) probative value to sus tial evidence of *7 preservation Street area. We conclude jurisdiction because tain Board's that there is. proper their ad failed to exhaust Hudsons (the Meridian Street ministrative remedies In City-County Council act endowed the Com Preservation Indianapolis of County and Marion adopted spe over jurisdiction with exclusive mission an amendment to dwelling its 2) district zon locale) in and to con exceptions cial ing (the ordinance such that D-2 districts preserva the Meridian Street traindicate meaning ing prescribed. illegality general stat- to the forms within the of the It is the 3. "An (1933), now IND.CODE § ute 48-2305 rule that courts are [Burns' inclined to treat defects goes under consideration to plainly jurisdictional irregular- 36-7-4-1003] that are as and discloses that the foundation of thе action illegalities." ities rather than as nothing upon proceedings to stand while have Indianapolis Moy- Board of 198,210, Ind.App. er 108 27N.E.2d frregularity the board had an denotes proceedings jurisdiction but failed to added). (emphasis respects all accord- its work in consummate area, ex the fact the Meridian preservation Street preservation Meridian D-2, ample) permit area is following because the City-County Coun- would uses:4 following "The permitted uses shall be in eil's superseded by ordinance is statutes the D-2 All DISTRICT. uses in the D-2 giving only the Commission power DISTRICT shall conform to the D-2 De- grant exceptions. velopment (section B) Standards 2.03 and The corrider of land known as the Meridi- Dwelling Regulations District of see- tion 2.00. an Street currently area is protected by legislative governing 1. ONE-FAMILY act DWELLING (per- prеservation of historic street DWELLING, 2. areas. I.C. TWO-FAMILY only) mitted on corner lots seq. purpose 18-4-24-1 et The of such act was to HOMES, 83. regulated GROUP as in see- tion 2.18. "preserve deterioration, from and from USES, 4. regulated TEMPORARY as in improperly implemented conceived or section 2.14. change, preserve and to for the contin- USES, 5. regulated ACCESSORY as in health, ued safety, enjoyment gener- section 2.15. Indiana, al welfare of the citizens of an OCCUPATIONS, 6. HOME regulat- historic, scenic, aesthetically pleading, ined section 2.16." unique portion lying of a street [sic] Record, p. goes 12. The ordinance on to City within the constitut- clarify, 2.18, in its section get per- how to ing the unique backbone of a residential put

mission to home in D-2 area and other such streets and areas in District: Legislature intends, Indiana. The "Group homes for developmentally dis- passage of Chapter, this encourage persons abled permitted ... shall be in private efforts preserve to maintain and Dwelling all Districts the D-11 (except portion such of such street and other District) any and in other district Indiana, such streets and areas County permitting Marion dwelling promote orderly proper usage land uses, subject grant of a SPECIAL preserve and to significant tourist attrac- The Metropolitan EXCEPTION. tions of historical and economic of Marion value in County, In- Indiana, ‍​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‍the State of by limiting diana, hereby and re- grant authorized to such ungesthet- SPECIAL permit unhealthful, EXCEPTIONS and stricting unsafe, Group Homes in Dwelling ic, Dis- or other unique use of areas which j incongistent tricts." would be with their charac- Record, p. argues 16. ter Gunn in- as tourist that the attractions and with the stant error, despite general was public." welfare of the brief, appellate 1037; In additionally her Gunn at- N.E.2d see also Board Commissioners itself, validity tacks the of the ordinance claim- City Howard v. Kokomo Plan Commis- ing improperly passed it prior was without (stat- sion 263 Ind. 330 N.E.2d 92 approval argument of the Commission. Gunn's ute). presented absolutely She no evidence of is ill-advised for four reasons: The Commis- impropriety beyond presentation of conclu- approval adoption sion's of an amendment to or sory allegations thereby and has failed to make required; ordinances is not case, prima much less a facie one. "recommendation" is. See IND.CODE 18-4-24- proper body Board is not the before whom the 13(b)(2) (1976) now IND.CODE 14-3-3.2- *8 validity may of the challenged. ordinance 13(b)(2). (2) did not include this issue in Gunn question Council, Such is City-County for the certiorari, thereby waiving her writ of any later promulgated ordinance, who by the ap- direct argument thereon. See Kessler-Allisonville Civic peal. Bryant See v. County Lake Trust Co. League, Zoning Inc. v. Marion Board of (1972), 628, Ind.App. 537; 152 (1965), 610, 284 N.E.2d Appeals Ind.App. Board 137 209N.E.2d43. Indianapolis Waintrup v. of of (3) proof Gunn had the burden of that the (1935), 576, 701; Ind.App. 99 193 N.E. see also improper- ordinance was invalid as been (writ IND.CODE 36-7-4-1009 of certiorari from ly promulgated. City Taylorville See Nolan v. of "decision of zoning the board appeals.") (1981), 1099, 479, IIl.App.3d 95 of 51 Ill.Dec. 420

297 neighborhood is in direct con nent to the end, this the act formu- 18-4-24-1. To I.C. Commission, grant estab- its to the Board to deal with entity of the trast to lated the special exceptions. variances and it, both restric- procedures for established lished legislature's particularizing action in construction, The ete. The Com- on new tions zoning empowered to veto was also mission variances, authority over the Commission's . in variances the area: any authority by implication excludes over "(a) after the effective date Upon and exceptions: expressio special unius est ex- relat- zoning no variance v. Chapter generally of this clusio alterius. See Maroon any Meridian Street ing to the use of State, Department Mental Health of Bordering Property shall be Property or Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 404. And we administrative, Legisla- granted by any authority this in the face of cannot add governmental body without other tive or purposeful generally omission. See the prior approval of Commission the (1965) Schwartzkopf Fettig v. ex rel. State (6) of six or 201, 342; upon affirmative vote the 246 Ind. 204 N.E.2d Town оf of its members. Commission more Ind.App. 180 v. Vavrus Schererville if the approve such variance shall 346. We therefore con 389 N.E.2d by establish sub- petition therefor shall comparison clude of the statutes describ probative value stantial evidence of the Board and the ing powers of both in conclusions set out correctness of the had no the Commission Commission reveals (4) (1) through para- subparagraphs exception power to deal with section, (c) notices of this and that graph group home. hearing given to all have been of such legis- possibility no that the There is also re- in the manner Interested Parties im- by "variance" use of the word lature's Chapter." this quired exceptions." "special plication included added.) (Emphasis How- 18-4-24-18 1.C. has recently explained court what Vеry this ever, any power over there is no mention of recognized as the distinctions long been special exceptions, grant or denial exception: special and a a variance between of zon- specifically vouchsafed to boards is or a deviation "A variance involves generally: ing appeals zoning classi- change legislated from "(b) provided this Except as otherwise piece of to a certain applicable fication section, zoning appeals shall: a board of granting of a variance property. The excep- special all hear and determine though discretionary is even the Board of the ordi- to the terms tions may have satisfied petitioner nance...." special exception A statutory criteria. 86-7-4-918(b) (1981). (Empha- IND.CODE permitted is a use which involves within added.) is accorded to the sis This cer- once given classification ability to determine here in addition satis- statutory criteria have been tain petitions for variances: granting of fied. The legislature's IND.CODE added.) Commission metropolitan board of each for an the terms (2) grant "(e) cordance subsection [*] METRO. municipal excluded It with subsection 36-7-4-918(e) is self-evident # must specific deny (b), In addition to board city # rule zoning ordinance variances each expression shall: on variances zoning appeals and [*] (1981) (Emphasis division of to us zoning appeals (f)...." of use [*] the duties that in ac- perti- from [*] Ash v. Rush Appeals Zoning see 350; there distinct cluding the other is statutory criteria nance." also N.E.2d 790. mandatory Boffo Appeals, Long v. Board absolutely (1984), Ind.App., 464 separate County Board Boonе upon compliance with It is clear supra, nothing in the Meridian set forth concepts, neither in implication. County Board that the two are Ind.App. N.E.2d in the ordi- Zoning Thus, 1119; *9 may reside. argues pres- She thus that the preservation any way Street act which in conveyed jur- to the Commission exclusive preempts authority ervation statute local special exception isdiction over this which enacting conflicting from ordinances. We in fact was the Board's exclusive bailiwick. stops observing believe Gunn short of any The trial court erred in and all conclu- picture entire and find no conflict. holding. sions so just We reiterate the we enunci- principle conceding Even the Board's sole authori- virtually only ated that given control ty grant deny exceptions, or legislature the Commission was over preempted Gunn contends the Board was variances in the Meridian granting particular exception from this be- preservation given Street area. It was al- prohibitions preservation cause of power themselves, most no over ordinances following statutory act. She relies on the authority that ultimate been be- language: stowed here on City-County Council. "Every Occupant Owner and of Meridian out, As pointed Gunn has City-County Bordering Property Street or shall: authority Council's in zoning to accommo- (1) (1) family Permit no more than one group regulated date for homes is IND. single-family dwelling. to inhabit a (1982) (now CODE 16-10-2.1-6.5 IND. (2) (2) Permit no more than two fam- 16-18-21-12): CODE family ilies to inhabit a double dwell "Zoning

ing.... adopted ordinances under IC living together mily' shall mean one riage, als, For the [*] all related to one another consanguinity purposes [*] [*] as a of this (1) or [*] single or more individu- Chapter: legal *% household adoрtion, a 'Fa- [*] mar- solely in the residential facility are not relat- ed, unless business or 18-7 dential [36-7] because the residential facility the residential because the may not exclude from a residential area persons residing facility facility a resi- will be is a thereof, single together with a head (8,000) with located within three thousand feet any paid employees live-in domestic facility, of another residential as meas- up (2) guests two nontransient of such ured between lot lines. The residential household; facility may required to meet all other and 'bedroom' shall mean a room, consisting of a not less than zoning requirements, ordinances, [sic] eighty square usable feet and one laws." closet, builtin which is located or on added.) (Emphasis comparison A of this above the first floor of such structure." authority аppears to inbe conflict with the (1976)(now IND.CODE 18-4-24-19 at IND. preservation act inasmuch as that act 14-8-3.2-18, 14-3-8.2-19). CODE meaning "family" seems to restrict the " 'Single Family Family or Double ‍​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‍Res- in the Meridian Street area whereas I.C. Dwellings' idential means residential 16-10-2.1-6.5 forbids restriction in structures which share no common wall general. formulation of ordinances in structures, with other residential However, investigation further reveals designed which were and built for occu- provision there is an pres- additional in the pancy by (2) separate no more than two act ervation which reconciles that act with families and which contain no more than 1.C. 16-10-2.1-6.5. (2) separate living quarters." two quoted provisions We two of I.C. 18-4- 18-4-24-2(13) (1976)(now IND.CODE IND. 24-19, which invests area 14-3-8.2-8). CODE pro- Gunn reads these property duty owners with the to control creating visions as upon a restriction singlе- the habitation of and double-family operation preserva- of a home in the dwellings. A present: third clause is also neighborhood tion argues proposed "Every Occupant Ownerand of Meridian single-family dwelling home is a above, "family," as defined Bordering Property shall:

299 purpose regula ultimate of (1) family "[The (1) one to no more than Permit dwelling. single-family a is to confine certain inhabit tions classes of uses and structures to certain areas." Misner (2) (2) families no more than two Permit family dwelling; a double (1981), to inhabit Ind.App., Presdorf 684, Thus, proper municipal it is (8) any dwelling to inhabit unit Permit persons authority designate to certain as that number of areas no more than by multiplying the total number derived "residential" and "to restrict those uses by in such unit the number stable, of bedrooms incong- a which would conflict with (8). single-family ested environment." of three ..." Incor added). porated Village Freeport v. Association {emphasis 1.C. 18-4-24-19 It is of dwelling "any that unit" important to note Help Retarded Children for of here, opposed language used as to is the 94 Misc.2d 406 N.Y.S.2d 222. In "either," instance, which would better obverse, then, municipal authority a (as dwellings types of refer to two may those uses maintain authorize which units") list "dwelling previously opposed to group such a residential environment. A apparent us quite It is to ed the statute. "generic" quality home has such a of resi contentions, that, contrary to Gunn's purpose dential ambience because its is to preservation area is not Meridian Street provide qualities so of a and stable single- double-family and dwell limited to permanent developmental household to the agаinst ings. prohibition there a Nor is ly disabled. Id. What Gunn asks we "any dwelling non-family habitation among make do is a distinction households 5 Rather, contemplated the statute unit." upon genetic intimate or relations based dwellings City-County all for which This, rather than land control. we use D-2, zone, in this case so Council would believe, See, inappropriate. eg., is Hess long the area maintained its residential as City 193 Colo. ling v. of Broomfield keeping purpose of character in with the P.2d 12. scenic, historic, act, "an preserve to legislature spoken clearly The has on the unique portion aesthetically pleasing, and "main-streaming" developmen- subject of such a street." I.C. 18-4-24-1. One tally family adults into normal en- disabled dwelling a home which unit could be than them insti- vironments rather facility," as defined is a "residential tutionalizеd. IND.CODE 16-10-2.1-1 See statute. IND.CODE 16-10-2.1-1 (now seq. resi IND.CODE 16-18-21-1 now IND.CODE 16-18-21-1. Such et Meridian families, seq.) policy The is clear. The et facility is not limited to dential act, hand, other single- preservation and on the they purposes are defined for dwellings policy specific as related individu in a double-family controls the land use 16-10-2.1-6.5, als, specifi supra, 1.0. Indianapolis neighborhood by giving the in- cally prohibits zoning restrictions thereof a modicum of self-deter- founded habitants Thus, are anyway. on definition we regarding the manner which such minism to find conflict between unable may may complexion of their locale act, impliedly allows which from its essential- changed variances non-family exceptions, and residential policy therein ly residential character. here, is on statutes ordinance based controlling the character of is not one developmentally governing homes for the except in denominated sin- the households disabled. double-family dwellings. If gle- one dwelling granted recognized ex- also deem our conclusion We home, ception neigh- public policy. to be labelled general be consonant with non-family preserva- any express prohibition will include uses which on 5. The absence of residents, only by tion act can limit number of non- not, however, non-families does authorize double-family family single- maintaining "family"-like thereby habitation residential dwellings. statute to allow that We read the quality. here, ordinances, special exceptions such as empowered are not boring inhabitants real estate said residents will be of the lack prevent it on the basis consistent with residential charac- *11 erred relationship. familial The trial court ter neighborhood." of the finding in as a matter of law otherwise. findings The trial court criticized the here Findings 'Irregularity ordinance, bearing relationship as no to the of of Fact ordinance, supporting being the The trial court declared three legally insufficient. We believe the find conclusions of law were not of the Board's ings significant of fact do bear a relation by findings of facts. In supported so do ship matter, subject finding to the the first following ing, he the dictates of well- was being merely paraphrase of the ordi regarding precedent judicial established requirement nance's first as it is set forth of a decision a board of review caps. in enough. But this is not See Carl appeals: Zoning Appeals ton v. Board Indi of of must in all cases set out "[Thе anapolis, supra. findings Both are state findings support of fact in written of general policy up ments of which would their, may decision so that this Court finding exception hold the ultimate that the intelligently specific review that decision injurious health, would not public be speculating as to the Board's without etc., agree findings but we are incor reasoning. findings help Written of fact being sufficiently specific. rect as not In integrity to maintain the of the Board's asmuch quarrel as Gunn has no with the by insuring decision that our review is sufficiency support of the evidence to these strictly findings." limited to those general findings, support two which do (1972), 573, v. 258 Ind. Kunz Waterman finding, only ultimate we need remand for 371, 373; 283 N.E.2d Corlton irregularity by breaking of correction Board of of generalities specific down into more (1969), 337; Ind. 252 IND. findings. Habig See v. Harker Ind. ("The in CODE 36-7-4-915 board shall all ("'Where App., 447 N.E.2d 1114 a board of findings it make cases heard written of zoning appeals findings, has failed to make fact.") findings These basic of fact are not proper action of the trial court is to support sufficient to the Board's ultimate entry findings." remand for the of Id. at general if findings they merely repli are 1117); Metropolitan Zoning Ap Board of requirements cation of the of the ordinance peals Marion v. Graves at issue. generally See Carlton v. Board Ind.App. 360 N.E.2d 848. Indianapolis, supra finding The second attacked is: (statutes). generality finding Such THE "2. GRANT OF THE SPECIAL chiefly at the heart of the trial court's NOT EXCEPTION WILL INJURE OR conclusions here. We believe in one in ADVERSELY AFFECT ADJA- stance he was correct. CENT AREA OR PROPERTY VAL The ordinance at issue here has seven THEREIN UES because: requirements must met before which externally There will be no discernible may grant the Board an change present appearance from Order, group supra. home. See Board's estate, subject use of the real and it findings support Gunn attacks the of facts ing three. The first one is: essentially will remain residential use." "1. THE GEANT OF THE SPECIAL

EXCEPTION WILL NOT BE INJURI- again The trial court stated the basic find- HEALTH, TO THE OUS PUBLIC ings support capitalized requirement SAFETY, MORALS, CONVENIENCE of the ordinance were insufficient and not OR GENERAL because: addition, WELFARE supportive. In it declares the ba- findings sic are proposed The intended residents of the silent on effect of the way injurious adjacent property home are in no home on values. aforesaid, subject contrary, and the use of the directly On Board has property values limiting single addressed the issue ~CODE 14-3-3.2-2 as family dwellings within the historic very specific stating terms there appearance no аlteration of or use occupancy by will be district to family. one subject real estate. We see fail to majority states language appears this how the Board could have rendered find- to be conflict with IC 16-10-2.1-6.5 ings as the court would demand without prohibits exclusion of residential fa- being general as a cilities on lack family based of a too restatement relation- already ordinance itself. We have estab- ship between the residents. I see no con- improper. lished this The Board would be flict, however. (the properly stated the effect ordinance IC 16-10-2.1-6.5 refers ordi- *12 requirement) specific supporting with its adopted 18-7(86-7). nances under IC This causes. statute, however, govern- deals with local findings The last of the three at- under zoning mental ordinances. The statute in tack is: question here is a zoning local ordi- "3. THE GROUP HOME WILL BE IN nance. It a passed by is statute our state WITH THE HARMONY CHARAC- legislature. It establishes as state law TER OF DISTRICT AND LAND historic district and sets forth USE AUTHORIZED THEREIN be- specific guidelines protect that district. cause: scope Since the of IC 18-7 is limited to subject The use of the real estate will level, ordinances on the local I be- residential, remain and there no will be inappropriate attempt lieve it is to use deviation from the residential charac- language separate its to control a section neighborhood ter of the which would of the Indiana Code. incompatible be or inconsistent with Furthermore, even if the two sections surrounding land use." conflict, 18-7, by were in IC relied on The trial improper court found this as a majority, general in is nature. It refers to by finding exception matter of law 14-3, all local ordinances. IC how in single-family conflict with the dwell- ever, specific particular as to in is area ing provision preser- of the Meridian Street guidelines question and the to be followed already dispensed vation act. We have protecting in that area. It is well settled argument contrary with this to the court's specific statutes are in conflict the where conclusion. There is no need for further prevail general statute will over the more point. discussion on this subject matter it one as covers. properly granted We conclude the Board Hale, (1985), Ind., et v. Higgins, al. et al. law, here on the and Gunn 95, 100; High 476 N.E.2d Indiana State appeal concedes she has no further with way Rogers Commission Bates & Con Therefore, regards to its merits. all that (1983), Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d struction Co. left to us is to remand tо the trial court for 321, 324; (1983),Ind.App., State v. Souder formality remand to the Board for the making findings of ultimate find- basic majority The further tries to show the ing specific. Number One more housing in intent of IC 14-8 is not to limit Reversed and remanded. Preservation District the Meridian Street interpreting portion of that section J., YOUNG, concurs. reads: CONOVER, J., separate dissents with "Every Occupant of Meridian Owner opinion. Bordering Property Street or shall: CONOVER, Judge, dissenting. (1) (1) family no more than one Permit dwelling. single-family to inhabit respectfully majority I dissent. The has at (2) misconstrued the statute issue herein. fam- Permit no more than two family dwelling; correctly interpreted The trial court IND. flies to inhabit double any dwelling Permit to inhabit unit persons than that number of no more multiplying the

derived total number in such unit of bedrooms number (8). of three ..." legislature if majority The states in- only single for there to be tended and dou- family dwelling ble units in this district it phrase "any would not then have used the dwelling paragraph unit" but rather dwelling would used "either have unit". majority's interpretation signifi- "any" cance of the use of the word paragraph para- if 3 would be correct

graph any dwelling referred to unit classi- it not. It but does refers to fication unit, dwelling probably of which there are hundreds in the Meridian Street Preserva- *13 tion District. agree I majority

While with the the Me- ridian Street Preservation Commission has approval rights only zoning

absolute over variances in the district not special exceptions over ordi- nance, I agree appellee with ‍​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‍the and the trial court ordinances passed by governmental the local unit must comply statute,

first with the State portions thereof which are in conflict are would, therefore,

void. I affirm. WRESTLING, INC., CHAMPIONSHIP (Plaintiff), Appellant STATE BOXING COMMISSION State of Indiana and Treasurer (Defendants).

Indiana, Appellees No. 2-184A3. Indiana, Appeals Court of District. Second April 1985. Rehearing Denied June

Case Details

Case Name: Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals v. Gunn
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Apr 23, 1985
Citation: 477 N.E.2d 289
Docket Number: 2-583A157
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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