Green International, Inc. and Seaboard Surety Company brought this action against Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), seeking damages in the amount of approximately $3.4 million for cost overruns and additional work on the Kensington Transit Station construction project. Green and Seaboard alleged that MARTA’s plans and specifications were inadequate and defective and that MARTA did not correct the errors or *420 administer the contract in a timely fashion, causing a significant increase in the costs of performance.
The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Green and Seaboard for $2.8 million. The trial court denied MARTA’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial, and MARTA appeals, asserting that Green and Seaboard failed to prove damages proximately caused by contract deficiencies, that they failed to comply with contract conditions precedent to recovery, and that the trial court erred in admitting two exhibits and refusing to admit another. Finding no error, we affirm.
1. First, we consider MARTA’s contention that Green and Seaboard .failed to prove damages proximately caused by contract deficiencies. In reviewing a jury verdict after denial of a j.n.o.v. or motion for new trial, we follow well-established principles. “Where a jury returns a verdict and it has the approval of the trial judge, the same must be affirmed on appeal if there is any evidence to support it as the jurors are the sole and exclusive judges of the weight and credit given the evidence. The appellаte court must construe the evidence with every inference and presumption in favor of upholding the verdict, and after judgment, the evidence must be construed to uphold the verdict even where the evidence is in conflict. As long as there is some evidence to support the verdict, the denial of defendant’s motion for directed verdict and new trial will not be disturbed.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
John Crane, Inc. v. Wommack,
Construed in this manner, the evidence shows that MARTA originally engaged Stolte Construction Company to build the project after Stolte submitted a competitive bid based upon plans and specifications provided by MARTA. These plans and specifications were flawed, however, because the firm MARTA hired to coordinate the architectural and structural drawings did not complete its wоrk. The manager of design review for MARTA characterized this firm’s performance as a “total disaster.” The plans and specifications contained major errors, inconsistencies, and design flaws; a Green project manager and an office engineer described the design problems as the worst they had ever seen. Stolte began discovering these problems during construction and repeatedly notified MARTA of a potential claim due to deficient plans and asked for assistance. MARTA did not adopt any of Stolte’s suggestions or respond to requests to address the problem. Green and Seaboard also presented evidence that MARTA did not prepare formal change orders in a timely fashion.
Stolte experienced “financial strain” as a result of the dеsign deficiencies and MARTA’s failure to correct them; eventually Seaboard, the surety on the project, designated Green to complete the work. The problems with design discrepancies and errors did not *421 improve after Green took over management of the project but continued “right through the end of the concrete work.”
The record is replete with evidence from mаny witnesses, who were personally involved in the management and supervision of the project, regarding the design deficiencies, MARTA’s delay in responding, and the resulting effect on the project. According to these witnesses, the state of the plans created a “design-as-you-go situation” requiring over 350 written requests for information and clarification, or “RFIs,” and over 1,000 new or revised drawings while the рroject was already underway. The witnesses testified that this piecemeal design scheme disrupted planning and coordination of the work, impaired efficiency, and caused additional costs, giving numerous specific examples. Green and Seaboard also presented expert witnesses who conducted a detailed evaluation of the claim, including review of all cоnstruction documents, interviews with Stolte and Green personnel, and scheduling and cost analysis. These experts analyzed the claim in terms of the plan deficiencies, the cause of loss of time and efficiency, and the value of that loss, allowing adjustments for more appropriate bid costs and expected or customary delays in similar work constructing other MARTA stations over a period of years.
MARTA contends that some of the corrective work performed by Green was compensated by change orders, that the change orders and RFIs contained waiver language, and that Green and Seaboard did not sufficiently distinguish between the claims remaining at trial and those already paid for and released. But evidence was presented that Green reserved its right tо claim disruption and impact costs caused by the design deficiencies and distinguished between those reserved claims and those already compensated by change order.
Under OCGA § 13-6-2, “[d]amages recoverable for a breach of contract are such as arise naturally and according to the usual course of things from such breach and such as the parties contemplated, when the contract was made, as the probable result of its breach.” The trial court instructed the jury in the language of this Code section, proximate cause, damages as compensation for loss sustained as a result of defendant’s breaches, and proof of the amount of damages. MARTA did not except to these instructions, which are a correct general statemеnt of Georgia law.
Expert testimony will support a finding of the amount of damages caused by a party.
Sanders v. Robertson,
Green and Seaboard presented expert testimony calculating damages caused by the design deficiencies, setting out three different methods of calculation employed in the trade, and explaining which method produced the most accurate results in this case. 1
A very similar problem of damages analysis was presented in
CRS Sirrine v. Dravo Corp.,
On the second appeal, this Court considered and approved a revised judgment specifying the percentage of increased costs caused by the defendant and applying that percentage to various cost categories.
CRS Sirrine,
supra,
2. (a) In its second enumeration of error, MARTA contends that Green’s and Seaboard’s claim is barred because Stolte failed to give timely notiсe of its claim under Article 39 of the general conditions to the project contract “within 15 days after the happening of the event or occurrence giving rise to the potential claim.” MARTA also contends that Stolte failed to submit its claim in a timely fashion as required by Article 40 of the general conditions.
Assuming without deciding that Stolte’s conduct was imputable to Green and Seaboard, this issue wаs for the jury. Some evidence was presented that Stolte notified MARTA approximately four months after the inception of the contract that a number of submittals had not been reviewed in a timely fashion, that this would “begin to affect the field operations and our schedule,” and that Stolte would “have no other choice” but to file delay claims. In April, Stolte again notified MARTA that it would hold MARTA resрonsible “for any delays to the project associated with the untimely answers to RFI’s.” While MARTA routinely responded to Stolte’s RFIs with language indicating that “the clarification given should be performed at no change in contract price or time,” Stolte by letter challenged this statement and noted that it was “not in accordance with the contract.”
In September 1990, Stolte sent MARTA another letter placing it on notice that a claim for damages arising from the contract documents would be forthcoming as soon as Stolte was able to provide “a detailed and accurate statement and calculation of the claim amount.” Stolte followed this letter with claim submittal documents which were updated periodically to reflect revision of the claim.
Article 39 requires only that the contractor set out “insofar as possible” the amount of the claim and its potential effects upon the schedule. MARTA does not identify the particular “event or occurrence giving rise to the potential claim” that it contends should have triggered a notice of potential claim at an earlier date. Nor did MARTA assert at the time that the notice of claim wаs untimely. Moreover, MARTA acknowledged the existence of “a potential claim for inefficiency of design” as early as February 1990.
Ordinarily, the question of reasonable notice is for the jury. See, e.g.,
Brackett v. Cartwright,
(b) MARTA also contends that Special Condition 32 of the contract, “Time of Completion,” bars any claim for compensation for delays to schedule. Green and Seaboard contend that they did not seek delay damages as such. But even assuming without deciding that this special condition applies, it also states: “No claims will be allowed for delays to the reduced time schedule nor will any compensation be paid for delays to schedules until times of completion stipulated below become affected.” (Emphasis supplied.) Green and Seaboard introduced evidence that all but one of the times enumerated in Special Condition 32 (A) through (N) were “affected” by delays. A witness for MARTA acknowledged that ten of the twelve dates were extended by change order. Under the “any evidence” rule, this at a minimum created a question for the jury as to whether the times of completion were “affected” within the meaning of Special Condition 32 and whether it applied.
3. MARTA contends the trial court erred in admitting two exhibits and excluding another.
(a) Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 269 originally consisted of a copy of the project drawings admitted as plaintiffs’ Exhibit 69, with 76 pages of narrative by a witness summarizing the various problems he identified on the job. MARTA objected to the exhibit on the ground that it constituted a continuing witness, and the trial court sustained the objection. Green and Seaboard then removed the narrative pages and tendered only the plans, which had certain parts highlighted in yellow ink; this modified form of the exhibit was admitted by the trial court over MARTA’s objection on the same ground.
“In Georgia the ‘continuing witness’ objection is based on the notion that written testimony is heard by the jury when read from the witness stand just as oral testimony is heard when given from the witness stand. But, it is unfair and places undue emphasis on written testimony for the writing to go out with the jury to be read again during deliberations, while oral testimony is received but once. [Cit.]”
Tibbs v. Tibbs,
(b) MARTA also objects to the admission into evidence of plaintiffs’ Exhibit 309, which was a summary of Green and Seaboard’s claim, prepared by the witness who also prepared the claim submittal documents given to MARTA during the course of the project and discussed in Division 2 (a), above. All the claim submittal documents presented to MARTA at various times were admitted into evidence under specific limiting instructions, and this summary document was admitted in the same manner. 2 In its charge to the jury, the trial court stated: “Some evidence in this case was admitted for what is called a limited purpose. Certain of the plaintiffs’ exhibits, specifically exhibits number 197-1, number 197-2, number 212, number 301, number 302 and 309, all of those plaintiffs’ exhibit numbers, those were admitted by the court for a limited purpose. These exhibits of the plaintiffs were not admitted to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein but solely for the purpose of proving some other element of the case. When an exhibit is admitted for a limited purpose, which these exhibits were, the legal effect is that yоu, the jury, may not use these exhibits as proof of the truth of their contents or substance.”
MARTA contends that it objected to the admission of Exhibit 309 and cites a single transcript reference to that effect in its statement of facts. But the actual history of the introduction and admission of this document, not revealed by MARTA, is far more complex and shows that MARTA first failed to interpose a timely objection to thе trial court’s admission of this exhibit for a limited purpose and then acquiesced in its admission. Failure to make a specific objection at the time the evidence was offered resulted in a waiver of MARTA’s right to object on appeal.
Ryans v. State,
At the time of MARTA’s objection, the trial court observed that the exhibit had already been admitted for a limited purpose. Counsel for MARTA immediately responded, “I stand corrected. That is consistent with my recollection, also,” and concluded his examination of the witness. Another lawyer for MARTA then rose to state that he did not believe he had agreed to the admission of Exhibit 309, but the trial court responded that it had been admitted for the limited purpose “to assist [the jury] in receiving and understanding the testimony of the witness and it is not admitted for the accuracy or the truthfulness of its contents or . . . its calculations.” Later during the trial, this lawyer again raised the issue and stated that he now agreed that the trial court had indeed already admitted the exhibit for a limited purpose; he requested that it be included in the general instruction to the jury regarding such exhibits. Our review of the record indicates that this statement is correct. The trial court did not err in admitting this exhibit under limiting instructions.
(c) Finаlly, MARTA asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to admit a handwritten document discovered in Green’s files on the ground that it was a business record. But the admission of a document as a business record requires that certain procedures be followed and an evidentiary showing made. “OCGA § 24-3-14, the Georgia Business Records Act, governs the admissibility of business records. Subsection (b) requires that a foundation be laid through the testimоny of a witness ‘who is familiar with the method of keeping the records and who can testify thereto and to facts which show that the entry was made in the regular course of. . . business at the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis omitted.)
Nalley Northside Chevrolet v.
Herring,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
MARTA, relying on cases from other jurisdictions, contends that Green and Seaboard proved damages by a means known as the “total cost method” or “modified total cost method.” MARTA contends both that this method is “universally disfavored” and that Green and Seaboard failed to meet the four-part test required by courts that recognize it. Several witnesses, including one of the experts who analyzed the claim, explicitly rejected MARTA’s assertion that the “total cost method” was used. But whether or not this method was used here, which Green and Seaboard deny, its use is irrelevant to the standard for proof of causation or proof of damages under Georgia law.
We recognize, however, the distinction between documents prepared by a witness for demonstrative purposes at trial and those “ ‘documents which are themselves relevant and admissible as original documentary evidence in a case.’ [Cits.]”
Hodson v. Mawson,