68 N.J. Eq. 431 | New York Court of Chancery | 1904
The object of the bill of complaint in this cause is a decree requiring the defendant to specifically perform a written contract, by the terms of which the complainant agreed to sell, and the defendant to purchase, two parcels of land located at Bound Brook, in this state. By the terms of this contract the complainant agreed to well and sufficiently convey the lands to the defendant, b3r deed of warrant3r, free from all encumbrances. It is admitted that the complainant tendered the deed required by the contract on the day named therein for that purpose, and that the defendant refused to comply, alleging as an excuse therefor the inability of the complainant to convey the 'title as it had contracted to do. The cause was argued upon bill, answer and a stipulation as to the facts counsel deemed necessary. This stipulation, after consenting that the deed upon which the complainant’s title depends, and the contract for sale, be considered
“the said trustees and their successors in office forever, in trust that they shall erect and build or cause to be erected and built thereon a house or place of worship for the use of the members of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States of America, according to the rules and discipline which from time to time may be agreed upon and adopted by the said church at their general conferences in the United States of America,”
and upon the further trust to permit ministers belonging to that church to preach and expound God’s holy word therein. Following this was a covenant of warranty to the trustees and their • successors. Succeeding this covenant the deed recites “that the parties of the first part did grant, bargain, sell and convey to the said trustees and their successors in office forever” the second tract of land, describing the same, but without declaring the trusts, if any, subject to which the second tract was conveyed. The defendant insists that as to both tracts the trustees, named in the deed as “the parties of the second part,” took only a life estate, and that it nowhere appears that the complainant has any title to the land.
It is well settled in this state that a court of equity will never compel a purchaser to take a title unless it be one which
My conclusion is that the complainant has not presented a case which justifies the court in exercising its discretion in its behalf, and that the defendant ought not, under all the circumstances, to be required to comply with the contract, and I will so advise.