13 Ky. 387 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1823
Opiniou op the Court.
THIS was an action for a libel. Three counts are laid -in the declaration. The first charges the defendant, in the usual form, with having “ composed and published, of and concerning the plaintiff, a libel, conlaui-
The jury, by their verdict, found the defendant guilty of publishing the libel, as in the declaration charged, and assessed the plaintiff’s damages by reason there oí', to $1,000; and they found the defendant not guilty of composing and writing the same, as charged in the declaration. The court rendered a judgment for the plai- tiff, for the damages assessed by the jury, and the defendant has appealed to this court.
The errors assigned, question, 1st, the sufficiency of the declaration; 2dly, the propriety of the decision of the court on the motion of the defendant to instruct the jury; and 3dly, the sufficiency of the verdict.
Í* ^ie sufficiency of the declaration does not admit of a reasonable doubt. There being no specific objection pointed out, and perceiving none to which we ap
2. The propriety of the decision of the circuit court, on the motion to instruct the jury, is not so clear; but we are inclined to think the decision was correct. The refusal of the court to give the instruction asked by the defendant,. we have no doubt was justified by the state of the-evidence bpfore the jury. The declaration does not allege that the identical paper produced in evidence was published by the defendant; but that a libel, containing, among other things, the libellous matter set forth, was published by him. To maintain the issue, therefore, on the part of the plaintiff, it was only neces--sary for him to prove that the defendant had published a libel containing the libellous matter s'et forth; and to do this, it was sufficient to prove that any paper containing the libellous matter set forth, had been published by the defendant, without being obliged to shotv ihat he had published the one produced by the plaintiff, or any other definite or specific one. It was undoubtedly incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce some paper published by tbe defendant, containing the libellous matter set forth, or account for its nonproduction; but the proof is stated to be, that one paper containing the libellous matter alleged, was burnt by the witness to whom the defendant had delivered it; and thus the nonproduction of it was sufficiently accounted for, to render evidence of its contents and publication admissible. On this’ state of evidence, therefore, it would have been improper for the court to have instructed thejur) to find for the defendant, because the particular paper produced was not proved to have been published by him, and the court was consequently correct in refusing so to instruct the jury. But of the propriety of the instructions which the court then proceeded to give, there is some room to doubt. These instructions involve the question, whether the publication of a paper containing any part of tbe matter chargf ed to be contained in the libel alleged, which would be actionable, was a sufficient publication, or not. On
3. With respect to the sufficiency of the verdict, there is no doubt. The publication of the libel, as alleged in the declaration, of which the defendant was found guilty, is all that was necessary; and whether he was guilty of writing and composing the libel, or not, is wholly immaterial.
The judgment must be affirmed with damages and costs.