111 P. 505 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1910
Plaintiff in April, 1910, as treasurer of the county of Santa Barbara, offered for sale certain bonds of a reclamation district known as Reclamation District No. 798, which district had theretofore been organized under the provisions of section 3446 et seq., Political Code. In response to the offer defendant submitted a bid to purchase ten of the bonds for the price of $1,021.20. Ten per cent of this amount he deposited with his bid. Upon his offer being accepted demand was made that he pay the remainder of the purchase price, which he refused to do. This action was then brought to compel payment for the bonds.
In the complaint the various steps taken preliminary to the organization of the reclamation district, with the proceedings had subsequent thereto, including those for the issuance and sale of the bonds in question, are set out in detail. It is alleged, referring to the offer of defendant to purchase the ten bonds, that the bid "was made contingent upon said bonds being legal and valid." A general demurrer to plaintiff's complaint was presented and overruled. Defendant failed to answer and judgment was entered against him for the amount prayed for. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted. The defendant by his demurrer sought to call into question the regularity of the organization of the district, directing *246 his attack solely to the original petition filed with the board of supervisors, by which the proceedings for the formation of the district were initiated. He contends that this petition was insufficient to give to that board jurisdiction to act, in that certain facts required to be stated therein were not set forth. Section 3446 of the Political Code provides that the petition shall contain, among other things, "a description of the lands by legal subdivisions, or other boundaries, the county in which they are situated, the number of acres in the proposed district and in each tract." The particular objection made, touching the sufficiency of the petition, is that it did not describe all of the land embraced within the proposed district by legal subdivisions or other boundaries, and that the acreage in certain parcels was not stated.
The board of supervisors approved the petition, and all of the subsequent steps required to be taken by the statute are conceded to have been taken, and to have been in regular form; they so appear to have been, as alleged in the complaint. Trustees were selected to manage the affairs of the district; work of reclamation was undertaken; indebtedness was incurred and money expended. The district became, and continued to be up to and after the time the bonds were issued, and still asserts the right to act as, a duly organized reclamation district. It had an existencede facto if not de jure.
Reclamation districts belong to that class of civil organizations denominated "public corporations." Mr. Dillon, in his work on Municipal Corporations, at paragraph 22, says: "Corporations intended to assist in the conduct of local civil government are sometimes styled political, sometimes public, sometimes civil, sometimes municipal; and certain kinds of them, with very restricted powers, quasi corporations.All of these by way of distinction from private corporations. Thus an incorporated school district or county, as well as city, is a public corporation; but the school district, or county, properly speaking, is not, while a city is, a municipal corporation."
Under this classification a reclamation district is a public, as distinguished from a private, corporation. It acts as a state agency invested with certain limited powers, and restricted to the doing of a particular work, public in its nature. *247
It is not a municipal corporation possessing in any degree general powers of government, but nevertheless, within the limits of the authority granted to it, it exercises public functions. Among other rights conferred is that to make rules for the government of the district which are binding upon the property holders and their successors; indebtedness can be incurred for reclamation work, and the charge may become a lien against the real property of the district. The scheme of organization comprehends a complete system for the doing of reclamation work, with all of the incidental power to compel the payment of assessments levied, and secure the accomplishment of the intended project of reclamation. Such a district, to be sure, possesses autonomy in a very limited sense, but it is in no wise a private corporation. As to public corporations of any variety, the decisions are almost unvarying to the effect that their existence cannot be called into question by any suitor, except the power from which they derive their right to be; and that an attack, collaterally made, with a view to testing the regularity of their existence or organization, will not be permitted. (Quint v. Hoffman,
The defendant in this case is in the same position as was the defendant in the case last noted, and the attack which he makes is collateral and unauthorized, unless there is something in the terms of his bid which permits him to assume a different position. The bid for the ten bonds was, as expressed in the language of the complaint, "contingent upon the bonds being legal and valid." This condition would entitle defendant to question any proceeding which was so defective as to invalidate the bonds. If the bonds are binding obligations against the property of the district, however, that is all that defendant can ask or require. As before suggested, the district had a live de facto existence when it issued *248
the bonds. As a de facto corporation the acts of its trustees and officers were binding. The purchaser of bonds of such a district would acquire a lien against the property thereof, securing the payment of these obligations. Defendant here cannot go further in his inquiry when this fact has been ascertained, and it matters not at all to him then whether the district was duly organized or not. In the case of Hamilton v.County of San Diego,
The appeal of defendant is thus disposed of; and while the court is not called upon to consider the objections urged to the sufficiency of the petition presented to the board of supervisors for the organization of the district, in view of further litigation which may follow upon the same subject, it is appropriate, and perhaps desirable, that something more be said. In our opinion, the petition was sufficient. The description of the land embraced within the Rancho Guadalupe was quite general in character, but it referred to what was apparently a well-known ranch and also referred to a map made by one Stratton. This map is not alleged to have been recorded, but with the reference to it, as made in the petition, under the decision in Vance v. Fore,
The judgment is affirmed.
Allen, P. J., and Shaw, J., concurred.