Appellant was charged in a one-count indictment with “aggravated assault upon the person of Carolyn Barnett by pointing a pistol, a deadly weapon, at, toward and in the direction of Carolyn Barnett and orally threatening to shoot her.” He was convicted by a jury of terroristic threats and appeals from the judgment entered on that conviction.
Evidence adduced at trial shows that appellant and Barnett lived together in Barnett’s house prior to the incident giving rise to appellant’s indictment. On the night of the incident, appellant went to Barnett’s house and found Barnett with Willie Nutall, another man she had been dating. An altercation between appellant and Barnett ensued, and Nutall stepped in to protect Barnett. Appellant went out of the room and returned with a large handgun. Accounts of what hap *460 pened at that point diverge. Barnett testified that appellant pointed the gun at her head and threatened to shoot her if she did not tell Nutall to leave, and that appellant subsequently threatened to “blow her brains out” if Nutall ever came over again. Barnett’s testimony was corroborated by that of Nutall. Appellant testified that he felt threatened by Nutall and that he simply stood there with the gun at his side and asked Barnett to tell Nutall to leave. Nutall did leave, and appellant left soon afterward.
The State and appellant both asked for jury charges on lesser included offenses. The trial court granted the State’s request to charge on terroristic threats as a lesser included offense but denied appellant’s request to charge on simple assault.
1. Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on terroristic threats as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. A person commits the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon when he uses a deadly weapon to place another person in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury (OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2)), and a person commits the offense of a terroristic threat when he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose of terrorizing another person (OCGA § 16-11-37 (a)). Appellant cites several cases for the proposition that the crime of terroristic threats is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault as a matter of law because the two offenses involve proof of separate and distinct essential elements. See, e.g.,
Echols v. State,
2. Appellant further contends that even if terroristic threats is an included offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court’s instruction to that effect was error because the indictment failed to notify appellant that he could be convicted of terroristic threats. This contention has already been rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court. “A defendant is on notice of the crime charged ... in the indictment or accusation and (1) lesser crimes which are included in the crime charged as a matter of law . . . and (2) other lesser crimes which are shown by the facts alleged to show how the crime charged was committed.”
McCrary v. State,
3. Lastly, appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested instruction on simple assault as a lesser included offense. In essence, appellant suggests the jury could have found that appellant acted in a manner causing a reasonable apprehension on the part of Barnett that she might immediately receive a violent injury, but did so without the use of a gun. A defendant is entitled to have the jury consider every lesser included offense authorized by the evidence. See
Dickson v. State,
Judgment affirmed.