157 F.2d 793 | 5th Cir. | 1946
The United States in the court below instituted condemnation proceedings to acquire in Jefferson County, Alabama, certain land upon which was situated a house and other improvements, for use during a term of years in connection with the Birmingham Municipal Airport. The United States obtained an order of immediate possession of the property and then removed the house and other improvements. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama
By way of objection to questions posed by counsel for the United States and by way of a motion for a new trial, the appellants raise the sole question upon this appeal: Was it correct for the jury to consider, in its determination of just compensation for the house and other improvements, that the owner was under a duty to the owner of the land to remove them within a reasonable time after notice was given ?
Irene Messer was entitled to receive the “market value fairly determined”
The appellants argue: “The right to remove the property was taken, along with the property itself. No right of removal exists in favor of the owner, as it was extinguished upon the taking. Upon the taking, the Government stepped into all of the property rights, both present and prospective, of the licensor and the licensee alike. The Government, however, did not become the licensor as against the licensee. If so, justice would require that the licensee be afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to protect their property rights by removal of the improvements.”
The argument must fail because
time of taking.”
As authority for its argument the counsel for the appellants rely upon three cases, which are controlling neither in principle nor in authority. In the first of the three cases, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
In the second case, the New York Court of Appealsj held,
In the third case cited by appellants, the St. Louis Court of Appeals held,
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Messer v. City of Birmingham, 1942, 243 Ala. 520, 10 So.2d 760.
United States v. Miller, 1942, 317 U. S. 369, 374, 63 S.Ct. 276, 280, 87 L.Ed. 336, 147 A.L.R. 55.
Ibid.
Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 1909, 217 U.S. 189, 30 S.Ct. 459, 460, 54 L.Ed. 725, 727.
The argument of appellant fails to distinguish between the condemnation of all interests in property and the condemnation of some of the interests. Where the case is the former, the Government is interested in the award of a lump sum for all interests taken, and not in the division of the lump sum among the owners of the interests. See United States v. 25,936 Acres of Land in Borough of Edgewater, 1946, 3 Cir., 153 F.2d 277. Where, as here, the Government settles with the- owner of one interest, the question of compensation for all interests is irrelevant; only the question of just compensation for the interest taken concerns the Government. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 1946, 327 U.S. 372, 374, 66 S.Ct. 372.
29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 195 p. 1068.
United States v. Petty Motor Co., supra, 376.
United States v. Seagren, 1931, 60 App.D.C. 183, 50 F.2d 333.
Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914).
City of Ladue v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 1943, Mo.App., 168 S.W.2d 966.
Ibid, 168 S.W.2d 970.