Messenger v. Messenger

MESSENGER, James D.

Plaintiff-Appellee, MESSENGER, Kay

Earla

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 71388.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma. 18, 1992.

Feb. rights protected violating

law Constitution. the Oklahoma Hert, Kistler, Kist- Baker & Stephen R. I Stillwater, defendant-appellant. ler, THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION Szlichta, Szlichta, Ramsey Christopher D. Stillwater, plaintiff-appellee. for Meyers, & Messenger appellee, James D. [hus- Kay Messenger band], appellant, and Earla ALA, Justice. OP Chief [wife], July on married were by an Oklahoma decree They that were divorced v. Clifton1 the court held Clifton 16, 1981, provides for 1289(F)2 which be con- of December should O.S.Supp.1987 § spousal assets.3 the division of all their post-decree property strued as bar (a) pay ordered to child rested The husband was sought to be readjustment division parties’ two minor children spousal right to reach for on (b) support alimony the amount income. pension military retirement Clif- years, or a total of a month for ten provision in subsection ton teaches $300.00 that the $36,000.00. divorce was of di- When the (F), reopening which authorizes years in solely to the husband spent had active decrees, addresses itself vorce military retirement military service. His support alimony modification. The nar- unsettled, mentioned in. the decree’s were not which row issue left Clifton property award. division today, decision is whether presented for 1987 amend- decrees rendered before divorce, the husband retired After O.S.Supp.1987 ment enacted drawing his began from the service 1289(F) reopened adjudication for may be 17, 1988 the military pension. On March non-military spouse’s previously un- of the reopen divorce decree sought to wife support alimo- tendered and unresolved support ali additional an effort to secure sought founded on the ny claims to be the hus mony distributive share of and a military retirement income spouse’s other She military retirement benefits. band’s time legally reachable at the that was not post-decree decisional contended below that marriage dissolution. of mili authorize the inclusion law came to spousal ass among legisla- tary pensions divisible today hold that after-enacted We Congress argued that when claims for ets.4 She post-decree tion cannot create Former passed Uniformed Services alimony support spousal without additional or Spouses’ Protection Act long-settled running Act]5 of our decisional [USFSPA afoul Stokes, Okl., 4. The wife cited Stokes 801 P.2d 693 (1987), held that a in which the court 1289(F), O.S.Supp.1987 re- 2. The terms of 12 plan, military private pension, like a retirement 134(F), provide: O.S.Supp.1989 § as codified property. jointly acquired may be divisible as Uniformed Services "Pursuant to the Federal (PL-252), Spouse’s Protection Act Former provisions 1408(c)(1) (1983). Section 5. 10 U.S.C.A. E 14] of subsection [infra February 1983: provides effective pro- retrospective and shall have this section disposable, re- retired or “A court treat regards spective application to modifica- with peri- pay pay payable for obtaining support to a member purpose or tainer tions for the payments pertaining property either as beginning after June to a division ods solely final after divorce decrees which become member or as on added.) (Emphasis spouse June 1981." accordance his of the member and jurisdiction such court." with the law scanty cannot record before us we 3. From the parties’ dispute over whether resolve the response to Congress enacted USFSPA (a) agreed on an settlement decree was based approved S.Ct. McCarty McCarty, U.S. (b) on the wife’s waiv- the court (1981). McCarty held that 69 L.Ed.2d 589 right plead, appearance as well er of and of was to be income services’ retirement armed reaching merits of the her consent to on proceedings as the mili- treated in dissolution to her. We hence case without further notice McCarty, separate tary spouse’s asset. Prior opinion express on this issue. See in this no govern applied its own law to Dickason, had each state connection Dickason v. military interspousal division of divorce-related pen- court that since the modifica the trial reasoned retroactive in 1983 it sanctioned part of the marital estate eq sion was permit an divorce decree to tion of a granted, divorce it could not when the was military retirement uitable distribution spousal equitable as a asset for be included urged Finally, the wife pension rights. post-decree proceeding. in a distribution provisions of retro 1289(F)6 expressly accorded were Appeals, which The Court reversed legislative to follow in a effort active effect military ruling, pen- held this the husband’s done, This was of USFSPA. the dictates sion, though not at the time of di- on, it was Con argument went because her vorce, spousal a divisible was nonetheless to facilitate state-court gress’ intention opinion Its crafts a new rule that asset.8 reopening post-decree proceedings reopening pre-amend- allow the of would denied pre-USFSPA decrees which those military for ment decrees distribution spouse share non-military a distributive the rights9 remands the retirement and cause under military pension retirement proceedings further consistent with its for jurispru McCarty then extant federal the pronouncement. own bar.7 dential opinion Appeals’ If the Court this agreed O.S.Supp. that 12 The trial court final and were indeed to become the case 1289(F) retro- was intended to have 1987 § post- the prius, to return to nisi cause effect, quest but denied the wife’s spective property decree redistribution sanctioned property the division modify to decree’s appellate clearly would by the court offend provisions. This rul- and bar. Because the wife also our Clifton on the ing prius the court bottomed nisi might support alimony on assert remand military pen- principle that the husband’s grounded claim on the husband’s income the not vested the date of sion had military pension, his she could from avoid and hence the bond’s dissolution offending teachings marital the of Clifton qualify acquired jointly amending opt did not as her claim to asset below instead short, relinquishing subject support alimony to In and the property distribution. reinstate the USFSPA effect amendment Congress retirement spouse ordered, ratified, TIVE COURT ORDERS.—Subsection ment incident ber as member and a ment, ing retired of a member amended divide or treat) any section 1408 of FORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES’ PROTECTION (A) "Sec. 555. AMENDMENTS TO final PROHIBITION (B) before the member’s being reopened. new sentence: or to (A) made pay decree did not treat and the benefits. USFSPA's intention partition protect pre-McCarty by adding legal separation amount provides authority McCarty. was as its as the property ACT title intentions clear issued or member’s divorce, such spouse any OF CERTAIN RETROAC- marriage at the end of the approved 'A court to property (or retired On November member pertinent part: amount of before (P.L. 101-510). apply the state law in United States decree) affecting reserve or former dissolution, (including any proceeding spouse pay divorce property June and the mem- jurisdiction the member THE UNI- retired amending the mem- not spouse (c)(1) of 5, 1990, Code, decrees follow- former was to annul- settle- court treat pay to if 9. 6. For the text of jointly acquired property subject to division or under 10 U.S.C. 1408 is the divorce ment asset was enhanced ing of the upon crees to distribute is authorized ny; supra note 2. uted; (b) the extent the the tions, Carpenter, 10 U.S.C. The Court of McCarty McCarty, supra ber’s as income for the conditions: requisite ^[3] court held that absent Court of retirement benefits military pension only "disposable spouse constitute marital retiree’s death. during ^[4] was 1408(d)(2); period to Appeals Appeals or spouse’s ^[1] modify post-June payments military retirement income to former previously of ten marriage purpose parties relied held that the retired either benefits asset was ^[2] spouse.'" allowed to be distrib- years to the earned property. special note 5. upon Carpenter were married for under considered (a) or retainer military will terminate former (1983), as an item of acquired required by 1289(F), during trial considera- 1981 de- follow- spouse alimo- where retire- when court pay" see or (A).12 granted cer- section and subsection of relief.10 We latter other avenue if petition proscribes to decide modification of on the husband’s division tiorari ground her arrangements. could on remand wife support ali- claim to an additional amended short, 1289(F)’s holds that § Clifton previously mony on the husband’s award retroactivity provisions apply only sup- pension unreachable benefits. port alimony awards.13 Its rationale is (F)14 language on

bottomed subsection (E).15 II which refers the reader to subsection (E) Subsection authorizes modi- retroactive QUEST THE support obligations upon proof THE TO REOPEN fication of WIFE’S FOR REDIS- changed DIVORCE DECREE circumstances that affect either TRIBUTION OF SPOUSAL ASSETS ability provide sup- the need for or the AND SUPPORT FOR ADDITIONAL awards, port.16 Property division the court ALIMONY concluded, except must stand inviolate subject when the decree is to vacation in a Property A. The Division Claim— manner authorized statute.17 Bar The Clifton that 12 the court held Clifton Support Alimony B. The Claim 1289(F) O.S.Supp.1987 could not serve as § predicates support The wife now her ali- reopening a for a divorce decree to vehicle mony claim on our construction in military retirement as divide benefits Clifton. previous seeks her enlarge She to award spousal property, by where law those bene by tendering for consideration the hus- at the time of dissol fits were divisible military pension rights, band’s retirement The court that if it ution.11 observed were previ- which had not and could not 1289(F) been be to conclude controlled modifica § awards, ously sup- property irrec included for evaluation of her tion of division an port alimony oncilable conflict would arise between that claim. Swart, Seymour Supra 10. In 512- note 2. when, (1985), judgment’s we noted that on a trial, 1289(E), reversal a cause is remanded for a new it O.S.Supp.1987 The terms of 12 § 134(E), if it been returns to the trial court as decided, had never O.S.Supp.1989 § recodified as 43 are: only applica- save for the "settled law” "Except provided D as otherwise in subsection ble to the case. section, any provisions of this the of divorce alimony pertaining payment decree to the of Clifton, supra note 1 at 697. Clifton may upon proof support as modified changed relating to the need circumstances for 1289(A), O.S.Supp.1987 12. The of 12 § terms ability support are to which sub- 134(A), O.S.Supp.1989 provide: recodified as 43 continuing make the stantial and so as to the decree unreasonable to either terms of provides any "In divorce decree which for accruing party. Only those installments sub- periodic alimony payments, the court shall sequent to the for modification motion state, origi- plainly entering at the time of the added.) (Emphasis be modified.” decree, nal the dollar amount of all or a payment designated portion is of each which 1289(E), supra note 15. 16. 12 and the dollar amount of all or a portion payment which is a of the of 12 O.S.1981 recodified 17. The terms pertaining property. a to division 122, provide: O.S.Supp.1989 § as 43 specify pay- in the decree the court shall of one "A divorce at the instance property pertaining ments to a division of party operate the shall as a dissolution of completed. Payments shall continue until both, marriage as to and shall be a contract pertaining to a division are irrev- any party or to the bar to claim either subject subsequent ocable and not to modifica- other, except in cases where the (Em- making by the tion the court award.” by or shall have been committed actual phasis fraud party.” the successful on behalf of added.) Clifton, supra note 1 at 696. Clifton being capable certain a sum made

III terms of the decree.22 reference the IS SUB- ALIMONY AWARD A SUPPORT an award would be When found TO READJUDICATION ONLY JECT obli- the decreed void for indefiniteness THE IF THE AWARD IS ON VOID subject obligor’s liability the was gation, ROLL FACE OF THE JUDGMENT readjudication,23 the divorce decree At time Messenger specif a decree sets the terms of rendered in was wife, support alimony amount of O.S.1981 ic statute—12 governing month, due each 1289(B)18—mandated provides amount required time length for the to the total amount declares be certain as judgment appeal brought was post-decree payments. A No imposed obligation. following bond’s dis the award marital monetary on a award19 attack ascertain, appeal So far as we can bring a solution. party who failed to direct utterly judgment of the roll fails to succeed face of that award could review any jurisdictional fatally in the ali only on reveal defect the award flawed was if monetary adjudication sought re mony now to be judgment roll.20 A face was ren facially opened. judgment if the valid when void21 allowance deemed efficacy impaired adjudged obligation is dered and its cannot be total amount of the legislation.24 not in sum or is not established in a certain 1289(B) cognizance, power pertinent personam or the of 12 matter or 18. The terms O.S.1981 particular decision—appears provided: to render have Co., been absent. Heiman Atlantic any provides for “In divorce decree which Richfield 11; Capitol 260 n. note 20 at Federal periodic alimony payments, shall the court Savings Bewley, state, entering origi- Bank v. plainly time of Okl., decree, (1990); Hough, Hough v. 772 P.2d 1054 dollar amount all or nal what 920, (1989); designated Mayhue Mayhue, supra v. note portion 921 each such 8; Fuller, support_” supra at n. v. note 20 20 893 Scoufos 1985, 1983, 723; 1987 Section 1289 was amended rel Commissioners Land at State ex Okl., 742, Keller, § and recodified as 43 v. 264 P.2d 747-748 Office (1953). recognizes two distinct 19. Oklahoma’s law (1) alimony in-kind award forms award: an 19, Frensley Frensley, supra P.2d v. note 58 at prop- by praesenti obligor’s transfer of the an 312, Oder, therein. v. 149 and cases cited Oder (2) erty monetary allowance. a decreed 63, 202, (1931), considered Okl. 299 P. 203 an 209, 472, Bishop Bishop, v. P.2d 475 194 Okl. 148 monetary alimony. open-ended award of The 221, (1944); Frensley, Frensley 58 v. 177 Okl. provided case month- divorce decree in that 307, (1936). P.2d 312 ly payments in a certain to be sum Okl., 890, Mayhue Mayhue, during period v. 706 P.2d 893 in the future. made an indefinite Okl., 720, Fuller, (1985); 723 open- P.2d v. 280 court the award void because its The held Scoufos 269, Roberts, (1955); Petty P.2d 186 98 statutory v. Okl. the command ended terms violated 602, (1939). 603 obligation imposed be in that the total judgment petition, roll consists “... the is certain. an amount that return, process, pleadings subse- verdicts, orders, thereto, judg- quent reports, 22, Oder, 203- v. P. at 23. Oder 299 ments, proceedings of acts and all material 457, 204; Finley Finley, v. 174 Okl. 50 see also 32.1; court; § O.S.1981 Mid-Conti ...” 12 643, Vanderslice, (1935); v. P.2d 645 Vanderslice Bd., Pipe County Excise nent Line Co.v. Seminole 496, (1945); Munsey Okl. P.2d 560 v. 195 159 40, 996, (1944); 1000 Veiser v. 194 Okl. 146 P.2d 902, Okl., (1963); Munsey, P.2d Clark v. 385 905 796, Okl., (1984). Armstrong, P.2d See 688 800 936, Okl., Clark, (1969); May v. 460 P.2d 939 Okl., N.L., (1988); 754 also Matter P.2d 863 Okl., 536, (1979). May, P.2d 540 596 Okl.Cr., (1988); State, v. 765 Minter P.2d 803 Okl., 745, Agee, n. 16 Reeves v. 769 P.2d 752 validity judgment of a must be measured Okl., 915, Braswell, (1989); 917 Carr 772 P.2d v. judgment by when was ren- the law in force 1124, Okl., (1989); Kelley, P.2d Willard v. 803 legislation impair cannot dered. After-enacted Co., (1990); 1134 Heiman Atlantic Richfield efficacy validly judgment. of a rendered Okl., 257, (1991). 260 807 P.2d Okl., Co., Royal 713 P.2d Globe Ins. Timmons 589, (1986); Bonynge, n. Lake v. 161 Cal. facially inspection of 594 18 void 21. A decision is if 120, 535, (1911); Power Co. v. 118 P. 540 proper or more of the its record shows one Pacific 175, 643, State, (1917); subject jurisdictional Cal.App. 162 P. requisite elements—the mony judicial decision constitutes a final IV assessment of all those assets that are then ALIMONY THE DECREED SUPPORT available, legally properly and hence includ- EMBODIES VESTED OBLIGATION able, making spous- for consideration in THAT ARE CONSTITU- RIGHTS judicial al award. The decree that PROTECTED BY ART. 5 TIONALLY monetary obligation creates a in an inter- OKL.CONST.,25 54, EF- FROM THE judgment which, spousal suit is a when AFTER-ENACTED LEGIS- FECT OF final, footing stands on a constitutional ab- LATION solutely equal any money judgment law.30 It is a final determination of all rights by States establish vested rights necessarily accrue and absolute- constitution, or the common their statutes ly parties.31 marriage’s vest After a Rights law.26 so created become absolute all dissolution, interspousal rights gov- are and, 54, Const.,27 by are Art. 5 Okl. con solely by erned divorce decree unless stitutionally legislative invas shielded post-divorce agreement.32 there is a valid ion.28 Judgments comprise obligations of Property represented interests highest A nature known to law.33 by a divorce decree’s judgment’s validity gov effect and must in a award are vested embodied the law in at the time its They constitutionally erned judgment. are insu force rendition. legislative legislature is constitution lated 54 from interference ally powerless judgment statutes.29 A decree’s ali- with burden 173, 734, Dewey, (1898). Anderson v. Idaho 43 L.Ed. 382 vested cause "[A] (1960); action, Regency, John Westervelt’sSons v. emanating S. whether from contract or 472, 767, (1950); also see proper- 70 A.2d principles, 3 N.J. common-law constitute Co., Washabaugh v. Bartlett Collins Glass ty beyond power legislature to take 159, 1162, (1936); Apple States, Okl. 57 P.2d de v. United away...." Rodulfa Fund, State Insurance (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. de F.2d 1257 n. 96 Armco, Inc., (1975); Weber nied, 409 U.S. 93 S.Ct. 34 L.Ed.2d 220 54, Okl.Const., 25. The terms of Art. 5 are: Okl.Const., supra quoted Art. note § 29. 5 repeal "The a statute shall not revive a of America, Inc., Volkswagen Lee v. 25. See also of statute, by previously repealed statute such Okl., 1067, (1987); v. Timmons 743 P.2d 1069 any right, repeal accrued nor shall such affect Co., Royal supra note 24 at 594. Globe Insurance incurred, by begun penalty proceedings or or repealed virtue such statute.” of 56, 912, Stanfield, v. 67 Okl. 168 P. 30. Stanfield (1917). 914 Loudermill, In Cleveland Bd. Educ. v. 26. 470 of 532, 538, 1487, 1491, U.S. 105 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 84 Inc., America, Volkswagen supra Lee v. 31. of (1985), 494 the Court observes that 1069; Royal Timmons v. Globe Ins. at note 29 protected by process due interests are not cre- Co., supra 594; Mayhue Mayhue, v. note 24 at constitution; by they ated the federal stem from 894; supra Bd. Oklahoma Water Res. note 20 at See Board independent as an state law source. Dist., 755; supra v. Central Okl. M.C. at note 28 Roth, Regents Colleges v. State U.S. 408 of of Casualty Property Com- see abo Prudential 2701, 2709, L.Ed.2d 92 S.Ct. 33 548 Grimes, Okl., 1246, (1986); pany v. 725 P.2d 1250 (1972). Finnell, 269, 912, Finnell v. Okl. 230 P. 913 113 54, supra 27. See § note 25 for the text of Art. 5 Arkansas, 253, (1924); Henderson v. 71 Okl. 176 Okl.Const. 751, (1918). P. 753 Water Res. Bd. v. Central Okl. M.C. Oklahoma 28. 1369, Okl., Chapman Chapman, v. P.2d 692 Dist., Okl., 748, (1969); Smith v. 464 P.2d 755 Fisher, Okl., (1984); DeWeese v. P.2d 658 1374 Smith, Okl., 297, (1982) (Opa- P.2d n. 1 652 299 Johnson, Okl., 1153, (1983); Johnson v. 674 1154 la, J., concurring). “Rights that have become Okl., Shipp, 539, (1983); Shipp v. n. 9 P.2d 543 by judgment property protect constitute 30, (1963). 33 interference.” United States legislative ed from Educ., City Chicago, v. Board of of of Osborne, 59, 467, 132, Vaughn (N.D.Ill.1984), v. Okl. 229 P. McCul F.Supp. citing 102, 123-124, lough Virginia, 172 U.S. 19 S.Ct. CONST.37 FROM AFTER-ENACT- in the law at present conditions ED LEGISLATION time of its rendition.34 rights that come to be vest place when the statutory regime in every judgment pri constitute ed in final was rendered autho- parties’ 1981 divorce meaning of Art. 2 property within vate of alimo- neither modification rized 7, Section 7 bars Okl.Const.38 § reopen- nor ny upon changed conditions35 deprivation with government’s readjudication ing of settled decrees highest law. One of the process out due upon rested an after- spousal support to be process performs pro is its functions due military spouse’s retire- created claim to from sub rights fundamental tection of (F) If were to subsection ment benefits.36 depriva stantially or mistaken unfair effect, given retrospective the husband be tions by government, particularly so stripped of a fundamental law’s would be power exercised for the benefit when the is him Art. 5 protection afforded § private parties.39 Although the state Okl.Const. process clauses40 are sim and federal due identically, ilarly, or worded and have a range,41 we are coextensive definitional V free, law, afford as a matter of state protection to state-created THE ADJUDICATION OF DECREE’S than that which flows from more extensive ALSO SPOUSAL SUPPORT IS the federal constitution.42 BY ART. OKL. PROTECTED § 54, Okl.Const., any deprive any person quoted supra State note "... shall [N]or 34. Art. 5 20; life, 25; property, Mayhue Mayhue, supra liberty, due note Lee v. or without America, Inc., 29; supra Volkswagen process note of law....” Company, Royal Timmons v. Globe Insurance Dickason, State, 24; supra supra Okla. v. Dickason v. note 41. See Fair Sch. Finance Coun. of 677; Casualty (1987); Property Com- Prudential McKeev- 746 P.2d 1148 n. 48 Grimes, supra pany note 31. Drilling Egbert, Co. v. 170 Okl. er 1289(E), supra O.S.Supp.1987 quoted Subsection E was added in 1983. note 15. jurisprudence Supreme need not 42. U.S. Court involving rights guar- dispositive questions 1289(F), quoted 36. 12 provisions. States anteed state constitutional F was enacted in 1987. note 2. Subsection interpret process their due are free to own beyond protection clauses to afford 7, Okl.Const., provides: Art. 2 constitution, the state the federal even when life, liberty, person deprived shall be “No similarly are or identi- and federal constitutions process property, due of law.” without Michigan Long, cally phrased. 463 U.S. See Regents Oklahoma See Swatek v. Board of 3469, 3474-3477, 1032, 1037-1042, 103 S.Ct. (1975), citing Colleges, 1201, (1983) Cooper v. State L.Ed.2d 1212-1215 Okl., 458, Duncan, City v. 354 P.2d Graham of 791, 58, 62, 788, California, S.Ct. 386 U.S. 87 of (1960). right’ power is the to do 461 "A 'vested Hass, (1967); Oregon 420 U.S. v. 17 L.Ed.2d 730 things possess lawful- actions or certain certain 1215, 1219, 714, 719, L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 43 570 95 substantially right." ly, and is a Okla- (1975); Coun. Okla. see abo Fair Sch. Finance of Dist., homa Water Res. Bd. v. Central Okl. M.C. 46; State, supra at 1147 n. Jackson v. v. note 41 added). (emphasis supra note 28 at 755 1017, Williams, Okl., (1985); 24 714 P.2d 1024 n. 375, Okl., Lawton, City 733 P.2d 380 Turner v. 7, supra Art. 2 § See note 37 for the text of 38. 336, (1987); Deukmejian, 276 v. 52 Cal.3d Raven Okl.Const. 337, 1077, (1990); 326, Cal.Rptr. 1088 113, 114-115, 101, Disbrow, People v. 16 Cal.3d Bd., v. Oklahoma Water Resources 39. Reherman 272, 360, 368, (1976); Cal.Rptr. P.2d 280 127 545 1296, Okl., (1984); Draper v. P.2d 1302 679 657, 254, Santiago, Haw. 492 State v. 53 1142, State, (1980); see also 1146 (1971); Montroy, Holy Hospital 153 1983, Name v. 67, 81, 664 Shevin, S.Ct. Fuentes v. 407 U.S. 92 299, 181, (1977); N.J.Super. State A.2d 301 1994, 379 32 L.Ed.2d 556 66, 349, (1975); Johnson, N.J. 346 A.2d v. 68 67 511, Isaacson, 406 N.Y.S.2d People 44 N.Y.2d v. Due Process Clause 40. The 14th Amendment's 78, 714, 718, (1978); Common- N.E.2d 82 provides part: to O.S.Supp.1987 eroded nor intended be abolished in The terms of There, legisla- the court held the 1289(F), to modifi Nantz. appear which sanction alimony ture can establish a condition for terminat- award a decree-conferred cation of ing support alimony payments and make subsections’s effec rendered before that apply condition to date, extinguish vest after-enacted unac- operate tive would portions of awards that mature af- rights protected by our funda crued ed ter the new has become effective.49 legislature no law mental law.43 While its past a court anchored conclusion adjust perceived doubt intended to sup- non-military spouses, modifiable terminable nature inequity inflicted on Nantz, operate port alimony. which carved statutes—especially those that out but all exception general a narrow to the rule that retroactively upon rights—must vested do after-enacted statutes not affect to the minimum standards conform prot validity judgment, it terms or rests on and to the values state constitution support the rationale that a decreed obli- ects.44 Our fundamental law’s due gation payable represents designed installments process explicitly clause was judgments, each of well- series of one which shield citizens from the efforts governed by the force at the time no than from law intentioned lawmakers less the installment falls due.50 suspected supportable those of less mot legislature powerless ives.45 The stands sum, In protects the “accrued Nantz cannot abrogate whose existence right” alimony a support installment questioned.46 be teaching only it falls due.51 Its does after apply here.

VI SUMMARY THE NARROW CARVED EXCEPTION IS OUT IN NANTZ v. NANTZ47 Okl.Const., 54, makes Art. 5 § HERE INAPPLICABLE impervious and invulnera- awards legisla- constitutionally tinkering shielded con ble to cept right” Finality spousal support in tion. of decreed an “accrued” or “vested protected by process guar- adjudicated obligation48 was neither stands due 244, 594; 62, Co., supra at see Triplett, A.2d Globe Insurance note 24 wealth v. 462 Pa. Brennan, supra generally view, because, my 1208, (1972). 1215, join in I in did 92 S.Ct. 31 L.Ed.2d 551 Nantz alimony monetary support awards—both as accrued and unaccrued installments—constitute Ass’n, Building & 179 Baker v. Tulsa Loan constitutionally shielded that are vested 432, 45, (1937). Okl. 66 P.2d 49 legislation. by after-enacted diminution from Nantz J., Nantz, (Opala, supra note 47 1141 v. at (1988). Nantz, 1137 v. 749 P.2d Nantz J., joined, dissenting). Kauger, with whom Okl.Const., 54, quoted supra Okl. 51. Art. 5 § 48. Oklahoma v. M.C. Water Res.Bd. Central Dist., 755; Royal v. note 28 at Timmons 874 (Okla.1988), opinion an earlier cited 7, The 1140 Okl.Const. of Art.

antees right a is vested when this Court that held modification, enacted 1289(F) ground for prospec- present or right enjoyment, in here of the decree rendition after the par- some tive, has become to increase contest, legally available is not present inter- person persons as a ticular previ- military husband’s the amount Building & Loan Baker v. Tulsa est. alimony. The Nantz support ously decreed 45, (1937). 432, Ass’n, 66 P.2d 179 Okl. un- here—is hence exception—inapplicable opinion in the Nantz This Court concluded for invocation. available support alimony was termina- that because granted, previously certiorari On modifiable, right vested is not ble and Appeals is accord- the Court opinion of decree, only at the but at the time of post- the trial court’s ingly and vacated due. time each becomes is affirmed.52 decree order long has been contem- That this result in the case of plated is reflected DOOLIN, Stanfield V.C.J., SIMMS, HODGES, and 56, 912, P. Stanfield, v. Okl. SUMMERS, HARGRAVE, and KAUGER holds: That case JJ., in Part II. concur a wife in a divorce is Alimony decreed to LAVENDER, J., in Part II concurs debt, the decree is re- as much a until decisis. reason of stare judgment for modified, any as called or is, authority to the money and there WILSON, J, dissents from Part ALMA of Mrs. the decree favor effect that II. an indebted- operated to cause Stanfield HARGRAVE, SIMMS, KAUGER and in her favor as each install- ness to arise III, IV, SUMMERS,JJ., V concur Parts due. ment of fell and VI. majority opinion The LAVENDER, support for its declara- V.C.J., cites HODGES, Stanfield support ali- equating judgment a for WILSON, JJ., tion dissent ALMA DOOLIN and money judgment. para- mony to a III, IV, V, and VI. Parts from ex- quoted clearly shows that graph above Justice, DOOLIN, dissenting part. contemplated. ceptions are my stated in I dissent for the reasons majority to attempt of the spite In of the 297, Smith, 652 P.2d dissent in Smith alimony to mon- equate support orders (Okl.1982). contrary law to the ey judgments, case opinion that modification of I am of the exists: subject are support alimony awards payment of order for the [A]n since reme on a “needs basis” modification possesses different characteristics Congress by the U.S. legislation dial designed ordinary since it is debt Legislature.2 the Oklahoma legal duty in performance of a secure the has an interest. public which the WILSON, Justice, dissenting: ALMA Tillman, P.2d Grattan v. opinion is majority linchpin (Okla.1957), Bragg, quoting Commons majority uses the the term “vested.” 122, 80 P.2d 183 Okl. sup- opinion. If term ten times within has held that the The fact that this Court right, port alimony is not assuring adequate public has an interest argument collapses. structure spouses, de- and that for divorced only the right,” are analyzing phrase “vested crees for the ex- Nantz, equivalent money judgments the case of Nantz judgment 1. 10 U.S.C.A. court will affirm correct 52. This regardless court’s reasons for its of the trial Keller, rendition. Benham O.S.1981, 1289(E). 2. 12 (1983); Nat. Bank and Trust v. Assoc. Utica Prod., Okl., (1981); Thomp- Inman, Okl., son v. due, has become that an installment

tent orders MILLER, it clear that such Ray Appellant, should make Harold represent do not “vested decrees divorce money represent rights” judgments for rights. such Oklahoma, Appellee, STATE opinion attempts confine majority No. F-88-570. fact, majori- when in to its facts Nantz overruling spite ty is Nantz. opinion Appeals Court of Criminal Oklahoma. opinions, two attempts to reconcile the Feb. neither reconciled nor distin- they can be guished. holds that divorce decrees Nantz do

containing support orders rights. majority represent

opinion in case at holds to bar receiv-

contrary. party holds that a Nantz

ing only can a settled have

expectation support, continued and to be

consistent, party paying only expectation of

could have a settled

continuing pay a amount. The certain holds opinion the case at bar

majority constitutionally

that the amount is

shielded, “impervious and invulnerable A

tinkering by legislation.”

review of the dissent Nantz reveals simply is dissent case at bar the Nantz clear, nothing If it should

revisited. else incompati-

be clear that these two cases are by

ble be and should a divorce declaring

explicitly to be overruled. Nantz I

Concerning the asserted “Clifton Bar” expressed already my views of

have

opinion Clifton, in the dissent. Clifton (Okla.1990). The sections opinion majority in the case at bar

addressing regarding property divi- Clifton awards, those of the ma- sion sections

jority opinion addressing support stating can

awards best summarized Congress has

that what the United States

provided Former in the Uniformed Services Act, leg-

Spouse’s Protection and what the has en-

islature of the State Oklahoma O.S.Supp.1987, in 12 the Su- acted

preme of Oklahoma has vetoed Court

judicial and the fiat. case Clifton opinion in the at bar have majority case

effectively killed the case bleed- Nantz

ing legal upon away the rationale which Accordingly, respect- I

Nantz was based.

fully dissent. this notes and 34. See State Constitu- also in connection Rights, tions and the Protection of Individual held the terms of 12 49. In the court Nantz 489, Rotunda, (1977); J. R. No- Harv.L.Rev. 1289(G) free constitution- Young, wak & on Constitutional Law: J. Treatise 1289(G)—enacted infirmity. al Section after 1.6(c) Substance and Procedure at 31-32. lodged, appeal provides was Nantz n 1289(D) ground "voluntary cohabitation” Brock, Reynolds 43. v. Okl. 250 P. See modify applied to modification (1926); Regents v. Swatek Board of D's effective awards rendered before subsection Colleges, supra Oklahoma note 37. date. Nantz, State, supra Draper supra at note 47 at court v. note 39 is termina- "[s]ince stated that modifiable, right is not vested ble and then Bd., Resources Reherman Oklahoma Water decree, only at time at the time but State, 1302; Draper supra supra note 39 at due.” The court treats each becomes 1146; Shevin, note at see also Fuentes only portions the decreed obli- the accrued 92 S.Ct. at 1999 n. 407 U.S. gation rights. embodying Illinois, quoting Stanley U.S.

Case Details

Case Name: Messenger v. Messenger

Court Name: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Date Published: Feb 18, 1992

Citation: 827 P.2d 865

Docket Number: 71388

Court Abbreviation: Okla.