MICHAEL L. MERRITT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE; LEO SCHMITZ, Director of State Police; and THE CONCEALED CARRY LICENSE REVIEW BOARD, Defendants-Appellants.
NO. 4-15-0661
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT
July 8, 2016
2016
Honorable Paul G. Lawrence, Judge Presiding.
Appeal from Circuit Court of McLean County No. 14MR718
PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Turner and Pope concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Michael L. Merritt, filed a petition in the circuit court of McLean County, seeking judicial review of a decision by the Concealed Carry License Review Board (Board) denying him a license to carry a concealed firearm. Before the circuit court, Merritt and defendants, the Department of State Police, Leo Schmitz (its Director), and the Board, disputed the type of judicial review that court may undertake in considering Merritt‘s claims. Merritt maintained section 87(a) of the Firearm Concealed Carry Act (Act) (
¶ 2 In June 2015, defendants filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to
“Is the denial of an application for a concealed carry permit by the [Board] a ‘final appealable decision’ under subsection
430 [ILCS] 66/87(b) [(West 2014)] and only subject to judicial review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law, or may the the [sic] aggrieved party petition the Circuit Court in the county of his or her residence for a hearing upon the denial, pursuant to430 [ILCS] 66/87(a) [(West 2014)] of the [Act]?”
Because of the wording of the question, we cannot choose one of the framed alternatives. Both subsections apply. An aggrieved party may petition the circuit court for judicial review of the Board‘s decision (
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On November 24, 2014, Merritt filed a complaint alleging his application for a license to carry a concealed firearm was improperly denied. According to the complaint, Merritt met the requirements for a concealed-carry license and filed an application with the Illinois State Police. A law enforcement agency objected to Merritt‘s application, resulting in the matter being referred to the Board. The Board informed the Illinois State Police it determined Merritt posed a danger to himself or others or was a threat to public safety. Merritt alleged at no point before the Board‘s determination was he notified of the objecting agency‘s identity or the content or nature of the objection.
¶ 5 Merritt asserted he was entitled to a hearing before the circuit court pursuant to section 87(a) of the Act (
¶ 6 Merritt attached copies of the final order of the Board and the October 21,
¶ 7 Summons for the case was issued on December 2, 2014. The Illinois State Police received summons for this case six days later.
¶ 8 In January 2015, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Defendants asserted the Administrative Review Law applied to Merritt‘s action. Defendants further maintained, in part, Merritt‘s complaint must be dismissed because Merritt failed to comply with section 3-103 of the Code of Civil Procedure (
¶ 9 In May 2015, the trial court denied the State‘s motion to dismiss. The record contains a copy of the written order, which provides no explanation for the basis of the denial.
¶ 10 Defendants filed a motion for interlocutory appeal, asking the trial court to certify a question for interlocutory review under
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
¶ 13 We consider de novo questions of law certified under
B. Overview of the Act
¶ 15 An individual seeking a license to carry a concealed weapon must apply in writing to the Illinois State Police or Department of State Police (Department), as defined by the Act (
¶ 16 Section 20 of the Act created the Board.
¶ 17 When considering an objection by the Department or law enforcement agency, the Board may request additional information from the law-enforcement agency, the Department, or the applicant.
¶ 18 If the Board has ruled to deny a concealed carry permit to an applicant, the applicant may appeal that decision under section 87 of the Act (
Ҥ 87. Administrative and judicial review.
(a) Whenever an application for a concealed carry license is denied, whenever the Department fails to act on an application within 90 days of its receipt, or whenever a license is revoked or suspended as provided in this Act, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Director for a hearing upon the denial, revocation, suspension, or failure to act on the application, unless the denial was made by the [Board], in which case the aggrieved party may petition the circuit court in writing in the county of his or her residence for a hearing upon the denial.
(b) All final administrative decisions of the Department or the [Board] under this Act shall be subject to judicial review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law. The term ‘administrative decision’ is defined as in Section 3-101 of the [Administrative Review Law].” Id.
Section 3-101 of the Administrative Review Law defines “administrative decision” as follows:
“[A]ny decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.”
735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2014).
C. The Interpretation of Section 87
¶ 20 When interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. McVey v. M.L.K. Enterprises, LLC, 2015 IL 118143, ¶ 11, 32 N.E.2d 1112. The most reliable indicator of that intent is the language of the statute. Id. Statutory language is to be given its plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning and afforded its fullest meaning. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308, 776 N.E.2d 218, 223 (2002). We read the statutory provisions in concert and harmonize them, avoiding an interpretation rendering part of the statute superfluous. Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer, 2013 IL 115130, ¶ 25, 998 N.E.2d 1227. When statutory language is unambiguous, we must apply the language as written, without looking to other statutory-interpretation tools. McVey, 2015 IL 118143, ¶ 11; see also In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 339, 924 N.E.2d 961, 967 (2010).
¶ 21 Merritt contends section 87(a) gives the circuit court jurisdiction to conduct an evidentiary hearing following a decision of the Board denying a petitioner a concealed-carry license. Merritt maintains the legislature intended section 87(a) to permit a circuit court to review de novo denials based on a determination the applicant “is a danger to himself or herself or others, or a threat to public safety.”
¶ 22 In contrast, defendants argue a plain reading of section 87 as a whole establishes an applicant who is denied a license may seek review in a circuit court, but such review must be undertaken pursuant to the Administrative Review Law. According to defendants, section 87(a) provides the steps for review and section 87(b) provides the type of review to which an applicant is entitled.
¶ 23 We agree with defendants. The plain and ordinary meaning of the language in section 87 establishes the legislature intended the Administrative Review Law to apply to the judicial review of either the Board‘s decision to deny an application for a concealed-carry license or the Department‘s decision to deny. In some cases, the Department may deny an application for a concealed carry permit. The applicant may then appeal to the Director, who makes a final decision. However, if a law enforcement agency objects to the issuance of the license, the application goes before the Board and that Board makes the final decision. There are two tracks leading to the same remedy. In section 87(a), the legislature explained the route an applicant must take when his or her application is denied by the Board, telling those applicants they may file a petition in the circuit court for a hearing.
¶ 24 Merritt argues other provisions of the Act support a different interpretation. We are not persuaded. In support of his argument section 87(a) creates a separate process for the Board‘s decision finding an applicant “poses a danger to himself or herself or others, or is a threat to public safety,” Merritt maintains that particular Board decision is not a “final administrative decision” to which section 87(b) applies. Merritt acknowledges the Board weighs the evidence to determine whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes the applicant poses a danger to himself or herself or others, or is a threat to public safety (
¶ 25 Under section 3-101 of the Administrative Review Law (
¶ 26 Also in support of his argument section 87(a) applies to denials, Merritt contends section 87(b) applies to other final administrative decisions of the Board, such as the Board‘s decisions to request additional information from law enforcement agencies, the Department or the applicant, or to allow testimony (see
¶ 27 Merritt‘s argument establishes the legislature intended both sections to apply when an applicant seeks to review the Board‘s decision to deny an application. Section 87(a) applies to the Board‘s decision denying an application.
¶ 28 Merritt further challenges defendants’ interpretation of section 87 by asserting such interpretation creates a situation where an applicant will not learn of the Board‘s decision in time to comply with the 35-day deadline to file with the circuit court. Merritt states the Board‘s decisions, with limited exceptions, must be made within 30 days (
¶ 29 Merritt‘s argument misstates the law. An applicant does not have 35 days from the Board‘s final administrative decision, but 35 days from the service of the final administrative decision. See
¶ 30 Citing section 20(d) of the Act (
¶ 31 Merritt‘s argument ignores the final words in the section 20(d): “except upon order of a court.” Id. The Act provides a means by which a party can seek such information if necessary for judicial review.
¶ 32 Merritt last raises the argument the constitutional nature of the right to possess and carry firearms should necessitate giving “this statute the fullest, rather than narrowest, possible meaning to which it is susceptible.” Merritt emphasizes the constitutional right to keep and bear arms and maintains this right cannot be denied without due process of law. Merritt maintains the process provided in the Act does not provide due process.
¶ 33 We decline Merritt‘s invitation to consider the applicability of due process requirements when interpreting section 87. The language of section 87 is clear and unambiguous. This court must apply it as written, without employing other tools of statutory interpretation. McVey, 2015 IL 118143, ¶ 11; J.L., 236 Ill. 2d at 339. In addition, the constitutionality of the Act is not a question certified to us on interlocutory appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the reasons stated, we answer the certified question as permitting judicial review of a decision denying a concealed-carry license by the Board by a circuit court according to the provisions of the Administrative Review Law and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 36 Certified question answered; cause remanded.