Merritt v. Raven Co.Merritt v. Raven Co.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Con-nor, J.), entered January 19, 1999 in Greene County, which, inter alia, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
On May 10, 1991, plaintiff Arthur Merritt, Jr. (hereinafter
After Gypsum filed for bankruptcy, plaintiffs moved to sever the third-party action. Defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the entire complaint. Although Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for severance, it denied defendant’s cross motion, finding the existence of questions of fact regarding the defective design and common-law negligence causes of action, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ concession as to the nonviability of the breach of warranty and strict products liability claims for a defect in manufacturing. This appeal by defendant ensued.
Aside from the above concessions, we note that plaintiffs also did not oppose that part of the cross motion that sought dismissal of their cause of action for strict products liability for failure to warn. In the absence of any opposition, that cause of action should have been dismissed as well (see, Springer v Clark Publ. Co.,
To establish a prima facie case of strict products liability alleging a design defect, “the plaintiff must show that the manufacturer breached its duty to market safe products when it marketed a product designed so that it was not reasonably safe and that the defective design was a substantial factor in causing [the] plaintiffs injury” (Voss v Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
To satisfy the burden of establishing entitlement to judg
Inasmuch as defendant sustained its burden of demonstrating that the trailer was reasonably safe for its intended use as designed, “leaving the ultimate determination to the user of the equipment” (Vannucci v Raymond Corp.,
In our view, this proffer was woefully inadequate to raise a triable issue as to the design defect claim. Gaudreau’s resume is not included in the record; his qualifications to render an opinion with respect to flatbed trailers were limited to his status as a licensed professional engineer and an investigator of accidents resulting from “product failure.” He tendered no evidence of any practical experience in the field of truck and trailer design and relied only upon “good common practice in design” and engineering.
With no contention establishing a failure to abide by applicable industry regulations or that the trailer, as designed, was not in the condition reasonably contemplated by the ultimate consumer or that it was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use, we find that Gypsum was in the best position to make the decision as to whether handrails or stairs were necessary for its purposes (see, Vannucci v Raymond Corp., supra; Pigliavento v Tyler Equip. Corp., supra; Jackson v Bomag GmbH, supra; Fallon v Hannay & Son, supra). Accordingly, dismissal of this cause of action was warranted.
As to the allegation of common-law negligence in the design of the bulkhead, we again find no indication that defendant “acted unreasonably in designing the product” (Voss v Black & Decker Mfg. Co., supra, at 107). Since the bulkhead was manufactured and delivered in accordance with Gypsum’s specific instructions and the record discloses that the bulkhead could have been manufactured and delivered with optional steps and handholds, we cannot find that the conduct of defendant in designing the product was unreasonable or in violation of any duty of care (see, id., at 107).
Mercure, J. P., Spain, Carpinello and Graffeo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, motion denied, cross motion granted, summary judgment awarded to defendant and complaint dismissed.
Notes
On appeal, plaintiffs concede that there are no viable claims with respect to those theories.