JEROME MERRITT, Appellant, - vs - OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, OFFICE OF LEGAL AND ACQUISITION SERVICES, Appellee.
CASE NO. CA2019-09-160
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BUTLER COUNTY
4/27/2020
[Cite as Merritt v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2020-Ohio-2674.]
Case No. CV2018-12-2798
sb2, Inc., Nicholas A. Kulik, 1426 N. Third Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 5400, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110, for appellant
David A. Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Theresa R. Dirisamer, 30 E. Broad Street, 26th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for appellee
M. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Jerome Merritt (“Merritt“) appeals from the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services’ denial of Merritt‘s request for a state hearing to review the denial of his Medicaid application. For the reasons that follow, this court reverses the common pleas court‘s decision.
{¶ 3} The denial letter informed Merritt of his right to request a state hearing and have a hearing officer of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS” or, “the agency“) review the local agency‘s decision. The notice further informed Merritt of his right to have someone else request a state hearing on his behalf, if he sent ODJFS his signed authorization.
{¶ 4} In October 2018, attorney Amy Baughman of the law firm “sb2, Inc.” (“sb2“) sent a 36-page document to the agency‘s Bureau of State Hearings. The document consisted of a two-page correspondence and three attachments labeled as exhibits. Baughman wrote that Merritt was a resident of Heritagespring of Westchester, that Elizabeth Ferris at Heritagespring was the authorized representative of Merritt with respect to his right to pursue Medicaid benefits and that “Elizabeth Ferris/Heritagespring” had retained sb2 to pursue a state hearing on Merritt‘s behalf. Baughman further wrote that the letter was an appeal and request for a fair hearing on BCDJFS’ denial of Merritt‘s Medicaid application.
{¶ 5} Baughman‘s letter referenced the three exhibits, which were included to demonstrate Ferris’ and Heritagespring‘s authorization to request the hearing on Merritt‘s behalf. The first exhibit consisted of a form titled “designation of authorized representative” (“DAR form“). The DAR form indicated that Merritt had authorized Ferris at Heritagespring to be his authorized representative for Medicaid application purposes. The document further identified Heritagespring as the “facility” and expressed that Merritt was also
{¶ 6} The second exhibit consisted of a set of two powers of attorney, i.e., a healthcare power of attorney (“healthcare POA“) and a “statutory form,” general power of attorney (“general POA“). Merritt had signed the healthcare POA, but the portion of the document designating an agent was blank. The general POA was signed by Merritt and was notarized. The general POA designated Merritt‘s son, Glenn Merritt (“Glenn“), as his agent. The general POA granted Glenn broad powers over Merritt‘s financial affairs, including those related to “Benefits from Governmental Programs.”
{¶ 7} The final exhibit consisted of a letter written on Heritagespring letterhead and signed by a licensed social worker at Heritagespring. It expressed that “Heritagespring is the authorized representative for Jerome Merritt” and that sb2 represented Heritagespring. The letter indicated that if the agency had any questions it should contact attorney Baughman.
{¶ 8} The agency denied the request for a state hearing. In a correspondence explaining the decision, the agency wrote to Merritt that “[a]n individual or organization filed a state hearing request on your behalf, and we do not have any record or written authorization from you that the individual or organization can act as your representative.”
{¶ 9} Merritt appealed the denial through an agency administrative appeal. In a letter to the agency, an sb2 attorney reiterated that sb2 represented Heritagespring in conjunction with Merritt‘s right to pursue Medicaid benefits. The attorney argued that the DAR form established that Heritagespring, as well as its employees, agents, and attorneys, were authorized to request the hearing on Merritt‘s behalf and that sb2 was again, on behalf of Ferris, requesting a state hearing.
{¶ 11} Merritt appealed to the common pleas court. He subsequently filed a “notice of supplemental exhibit.” The exhibit consisted of a document entitled “conflict of interest acknowledgement and waiver” (“conflict letter“). In it, Glenn, as power of attorney, indicated that he had requested that sb2 represent Merritt in all appeals in conjunction with Merritt‘s application for Medicaid benefits. Glenn further acknowledged that sb2 represented Heritagespring in their effort to collect an outstanding debt from Merritt for long term care services. Glenn waived any conflict.
{¶ 12} After briefing by both sides, the court issued its decision affirming the denial of the request for a state hearing. The court discussed the conflict letter, which it described as a “form appointing SB2 as POA for [Merritt].”1 The court found that until the filing of the
{¶ 13} Merritt appeals, raising three assignments of error.
{¶ 14} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 15} THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE APPELLEE‘S DECISION BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE PROPER AUTHORIZATIONS WERE SUBMITTED TIMELY, AS THAT WAS NOT THE BASIS FOR THIS APPEAL.
{¶ 16} Merritt argues that the common pleas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide this case because the court premised its decision on the conflict letter, which was not submitted in conjunction with the request for the state hearing. Merritt contends that the court only had “subject-matter jurisdiction” over the three exhibits submitted along with sb2‘s letter requesting a state hearing.
{¶ 17} “‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits’ and ‘defines the competency of a court to render a valid judgment in a particular action.‘” Cheap Escape Co. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, ¶ 6, quoting Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 (1972). Whether a court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is a matter of law that this court reviews de novo. Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 34. See Powers-Urteaga v. Urteaga, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-08-109, 2015-Ohio-2465, ¶ 15.
{¶ 18} Merritt‘s argument conflates subject-matter jurisdiction with the appropriate scope of review by the common pleas court. Without question, the common pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal from an agency administrative appeal
The court may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record and any additional evidence the court has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. In the absence of this finding, it may reverse, vacate, or modify the order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} Regardless, the common pleas court‘s decision was not based upon the conflict letter. The court based its decision on the initial documents submitted to the agency. The court concluded that sb2 was required to establish that it was Merritt‘s authorized representative and that it had not done so in the documents submitted to the agency. Accordingly, this court overrules Merritt‘s first assignment of error.
{¶ 20} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 21} EVEN IF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DID HAVE JURISDICTION, IT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT DID NOT SUBMIT THE PROPER AUTHORIZATION FORMS WITHIN ITS REQUEST FOR A STATE HEARING.
{¶ 22} Merritt contends that the common pleas court erred because the DAR form authorized Heritagespring to request the state hearing on his behalf. In an administrative appeal pursuant to
{¶ 23} The relevant provisions of the Ohio Administrative Code provide that a request for a state hearing “is defined as a clear expression, by the individual or authorized representative, to the effect that he or she wishes to appeal a decision * * * .”
{¶ 24} With respect to state hearing requests made on behalf of an individual, the Administrative Code provides that “[w]ritten authorization including, but not limited to letters of guardianship or power of attorney, must accompany all requests made on an individual‘s behalf by an authorized representative.”
{¶ 25} Written authorization is not transferable.
{¶ 26} The agency‘s Bureau of State Hearings can only deny a state hearing request
{¶ 27}
{¶ 28} The initial letter from attorney Baughman informed the agency that Elizabeth Ferris of Heritagespring was Baughman‘s client and that Ferris was the authorized representative of Jerome Merritt. This letter, from a licensed attorney, was supported by documentation confirming sb2‘s legal representation of Ferris/Heritagespring and establishing that Glenn was Merritt‘s power of attorney with sufficient powers under the general POA to designate Ferris as Merritt‘s authorized representative. Specifically, the general POA granted Glenn broad rights to control his father‘s financial affairs, including obtaining “Benefits from Governmental Programs.”
{¶ 29} The DAR form, which was signed by Glenn as power of attorney, identified
{¶ 30} Based upon the correspondence, the DAR form, and the general POA, the agency should have granted the request for a state hearing. These documents established that Ferris was Merritt‘s authorized representative and that she was requesting a hearing on his behalf. Furthermore, the agency should have granted the state hearing request on the basis that it had been requested by Heritagespring.4
{¶ 31} As stated previously, the Administrative Code permits an organization to be an authorized representative.
{¶ 32} Contrary to the agency‘s argument on appeal, the grant of authority to Heritagespring and its employees and attorneys did not violate the rule that a written designation of an authorized representative is nontransferable. Baughman‘s request for a state hearing was not a transfer of authority but an exercise of authority by an attorney on behalf of a client i.e., Ferris/Heritagespring.
{¶ 33} The agency argues that this court should follow the decision of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, which affirmed an agency denial on similar
{¶ 34} This court rejects the rationale of the administrative appeal decision and Gaines. There is no provision within the Administrative Code that requires legal counsel for an authorized representative to establish that they too are an authorized representative.5 An authorized representative “[s]tands in the place of the individual.”
{¶ 36} If the agency concluded that that the documents forwarded by Baughman were insufficient or created confusion as to the identity of Merritt‘s authorized representative, then the agency should have undertaken some effort to obtain clarification. Such action would be consistent with the requirement that the agency act in such a way as to support the applicant in his or her attempt to obtain a state hearing, not interfere with the right to a hearing, and that the agency not act as an adversary to the applicant. The initial denial by the agency was inconsistent with the provisions of
{¶ 37} The common pleas court‘s decision was apparently premised on its agreement with the rationale of Gaines. For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that the common pleas court abused its discretion in denying Merritt‘s appeal from the administrative appeal decision. This court sustains Merritt‘s second assignment of error and remands this matter to ODJFS, Bureau of State Hearings, with orders that the agency grant Merritt a state hearing on BCDJFS’ July 19, 2018 notice denying his application for Medicaid benefits.
{¶ 38} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 39} EVEN WITHOUT THE EXISTENCE OF A DAR, HERITAGESPRING COULD STILL LEGALLY ADVOCATE FOR THE APPELLANT IN HIS APPLICATION FOR
{¶ 40} Merritt argues that even without the DAR form, Heritagespring could assist him in requesting the state hearing pursuant to other Ohio Administrative Code sections. Based upon this court‘s resolution of the second assignment of error, this assignment of error is moot and need not be addressed.
{¶ 41} Judgment reversed and remanded.
S. POWELL and PIPER, JJ., concur.