CHRISTINA M. MERRITT, Plaintiff, v. TERRANCE E. DUNLAP, JAMES LYMAN, BENEDICT RAVIDA, JAMES DECAPRIO, LENNIE DANIELS, GREG SAGER, KIM KLUCK, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Defendants.
1:01-CV-1487 (HGM/RFT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
January 4, 2006
HOWARD G. MUNSON Senior United States District Judge
Case 1:01-cv-01487-HGM-RFT Document 35 Filed 01/04/06 Page 1 of 19
SCIOCCHETTI, PARISI & SACCOCIO, PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
670 Franklin Street
Schenectady, New York 12207-2924
HONORABLE GLENN T. SUDDABY
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Attorney for Defendants
James T. Foley United States Courthouse
445 Broadway, Room 218
Albany, New York 12207
OF COUNSEL:
L. JOHN VAN NORDEN, ESQ.
JAMES C. WOODS
Assistant United States Attorney
MEMORANDUM - DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Christina M. Merritt, brings this Bivens-styled action against seven law enforcement agents for alleged violations of her constitutional rights.1 Plaintiff sets forth claims for:
BACKGROUND
In September of 1999, based on information provided to them by a confidential source, the Catskill Police Department and the Capital District Drug Enforcement Task Force (“CDDETF“) (collectively “Task Force“) began an investigation into the distribution of narcotics and crack cocaine by Michael and Jeffrey Chowka. See Dkt. No. 28, Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts at ¶ 1. Sager is a member of the Catskill Police Department and the other remaining individual
The Task Force escorted Jeffrey Chowka, accompanied by plaintiff, back to his residence, where he was read his Miranda rights, and the Task Force explained the import of the Federal Search Warrant to all those present at the residence, including plaintiff, Jeffrey Chowka, Jeffrey Chowka‘s mother, Joan Chowka, and Joan Chowka‘s boyfriend, Charles Ribokas, who was defendants’ confidential source. See id. at ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 27, Defs.’ Mem. of Law, Ex. 1, at 10. Thereafter, while Dunlap and Sager sequestered plaintiff, Jeffrey Chowka, Joan Chowka and Ribokas in the kitchen, Lyman, Ravida and DiCaprio conducted a search of the premises where they discovered crack cocaine in Jeffrey Chowka‘s upstairs bedroom in a top dresser-drawer. See id. at ¶ 7. Defendants
Just prior to her arrest, Task Force members began to interrogate plaintiff, and Jeff Chowka
After her release, plaintiff obtained the contents of the top dresser drawer from which the defendants claimed to have removed a quantity of cocaine, and she transferred the contents to her attorney. See id. at ¶ 7. A photograph of the contents reveals, inter alia, the following: two screwdrivers, a Norelco electric razor, a bottle of calcium tablets, Mineral Ice rub, glasses, three rolls of photographic film, skin lotion, a wrist watch, and adhesive tape. Noticeably absent from the
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Dismiss Standard
When matters outside the pleadings are presented in connection with a motion pursuant to
It appears to the court that defendants drafted their motion as one seeking summary judgment and that plaintiff tailored her opposition to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court will analyze defendants’ motion as one seeking summary judgment.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
The standard for summary judgment is familiar and well-settled.
III. Defendants Ulisis DelGado, Andrew Peterson, Matthew White, Kim Kluck, and Lennie Daniels
As a preliminary matter, defendants have advised that on May 17, 2002, the parties agreed by stipulation to dismiss defendants Ulisis DelGado, Andrew Peterson, and Matthew White from the complaint. See Dkt. No. 17, Voluntary Dismissal. Defendants have also advised that plaintiff has not yet served defendant Special Agent Kim Kluck in this action.
Additionally, plaintiff has advised that defendant Lennie Daniels apparently had no role in her arrest or subsequent prosecution and therefore requests that he be dismissed from this action. See Dkt. No. 29, Merritt Aff. at ¶ 9. Defendants have no objection.4 The court, therefore, dismisses
IV. FTCA
In her third cause of action, plaintiff asserts a claim against the United States pursuant to the FTCA alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution claims in violation of the
Within
IV. False Arrest
In her first cause of action, plaintiff states a claim for false arrest and unlawful seizure alleging that her arrest was unreasonable and without probable cause in violation of the
Here, it is clear that defendants intended to confine plaintiff, that plaintiff was aware of her confinement, and that plaintiff did not consent to the confinement. Thus, plaintiff easily satisfies the first three elements. Police officers, however, are empowered to effect a warrantless arrest based on probable cause, and “the existence of probable cause to arrest . . . is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.” Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 157 (2d Cir.2001). When an arrest is made without a warrant and probable cause is raised as a defense, the government bears the burden to demonstrate the existence of probable cause. See Wu v. City of New York, 934 F.Supp. 581, 586 (S.D.N.Y.1996).
Probable cause to arrest is present when law enforcement officers “have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a
V. Malicious Prosecution
In her second cause of action, plaintiff states a claim for malicious prosecution alleging that defendants caused her continued prosecution without probable cause and acted with malice and/or reckless disregard for her rights. The elements of malicious prosecution under
A. Initiation of Criminal Proceedings
Defendants concede that they commenced criminal proceedings against plaintiff, and thus plaintiff has established the first element of her malicious prosecution claim.
B. Malice
To demonstrate malice, plaintiff need not prove that defendants were motivated by spite or hatred, although such proof would indeed satisfy the element. In this context, malice “means that the defendant must have commenced the prior criminal proceeding due to a wrong or improper motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of justice served.” Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 630 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Nardelli v. Stamberg, 44 N.Y.2d 500, 502-03, 406 N.Y.S.2d 443, 445, 377 N.E.2d 975, 976 (1978)). “New York courts recognize that actual malice can rarely be established through direct evidence and thus may be proven though circumstantial evidence.” Rounseville, 13 F.3d at 630-31 (citing Martin v. City of Albany, 42 N.Y.2d 13, 17, 396 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614-15, 364 N.E.2d 1304, 1306-08 (1977)). In light of the circumstantial evidence present here-that the Task Force‘s arrest of plaintiff came on the heels of her refusal to answer their questions-it would not be unreasonable for a fact-finder to infer that the defendants acted with a wrong or improper motive. Summary judgment is not appropriate based upon this element.
C. Termination of the Proceeding in Plaintiff‘s Favor
While both parties recognize this element, they fail to analyze whether the proceedings in fact terminated in plaintiff‘s favor. The Second Circuit has held that a plaintiff “must alleg[e] and prov[e] that the prosecution terminated in some manner indicating that the person was not guilty of
Certain dismissals “that do not result from an adjudication of the merits have generally been held not sufficiently favorable to the accused to be indicative of innocence.” Murphy, 118 F.3d at 948 (citing Heaney v. Purdy, 29 N.Y.2d 157, 159-60, 324 N.Y.S.2d 47, 49, 272 N.E.2d 550 (1971) (dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); MacFawn, 88 N.Y.2d at 860, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 487 (dismissals pursuant to
D. Probable Cause
Even assuming plaintiff demonstrated that the proceedings terminated in her favor, as with her claim for false arrest, she must clear the probable cause hurdle because the existence of probable cause entitles defendants to summary judgment, see Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456-57, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 92-93, 335 N.E.2d 310 (1975). Because the “probable cause determination relevant to a malicious prosecution claim differs from that relevant to a false arrest claim,” Mejia v. City of New York, 119 F.Supp.2d 232, 254 (E.D.N.Y.2000), the court considers the issue anew, if only briefly. The Second Circuit has clarified that in order for the probable cause that existed at the time of arrest to “dissipate” prior to commencement of prosecution, “the groundless nature of the charge must be made apparent [to the defendants] by the discovery of some intervening fact.” See Kinzer v. Jackson, 316 F.3d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 83 F.3d 563, 571 (2d Cir.1996)).
The court has already found that defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and the record reveals that no intervening fact emerged to dissipate the probable cause that existed at the arrest stage prior to the commencement of the prosecution. Thus, the court similarly finds that defendants had probable cause to commence a criminal prosecution. See Kinzer, 316 F.3d at 144. Because defendants had probable cause to institute the criminal proceedings against plaintiff, summary judgment is appropriate on this basis as well.
Therefore, defendants’ summary judgment motion as to plaintiff‘s malicious prosecution claim is GRANTED.
VI. Qualified Immunity
The court‘s probable cause finding as to plaintiff‘s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims also informs the court‘s decision as to whether the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted in good faith and in accordance with the law.
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The question is whether defendants’ actions were “objectively reasonable” in light of the circumstances. Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “qualified immunity will be denied only if a reasonable official should have known that the challenged conduct violated that established right“). The Supreme Court has held:
The concern of the [qualified] immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer‘s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). “Officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause . . . and in those situations courts will not hold that they have violated the Constitution.” Id. at 206. Therefore, in situations where an officer may have reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable cause existed, the officer is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. See Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 423 (2d Cir.1995) (“‘[I]t is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials . . . should not be held personally liable.‘“) (quoting
In the case at bar, given the facts and circumstances that confronted the individual defendants, the court finds their actions objectively reasonable and finds that officers of reasonable competence could certainly disagree on whether the probable cause test was met to arrest plaintiff. Therefore, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, after careful consideration of the file in this matter including the parties’ submissions, oral argument, and the applicable law, the court hereby
DISMISSES Lennie Daniels and Kim Kluck from the complaint;
GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff‘s claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution and DISMISSES plaintiff‘s complaint in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 30, 2005
Syracuse, New York
Howard G. Munson
Senior U.S. District Judge