252 F. 507 | 4th Cir. | 1918
The District Court awarded $100,000 to Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Company, on a claim of $600,-000 for salvage service to the British steamship Kia Ora. The libel-ant appealed alleging the award to be grossly inadequate. The Kia Ora on February 24, 1917, reached the Crooked Island Passage in the Bahama Islands on her way from Melbourne, Australia, to London, via the Panama Canal. In the evening of that day, the vessel struck a coral reef and grounded thereon from about amidships nearly to the bow. In response to her wireless call, the Wrecking Company, from its office at Kingston, directed its salvage ship, Relief, to go to the steamer’s assistance. The Relief started at 5 p. m. on Saturday, February 26, and reached the Kia Ora 360 miles distant at 6 a. m. Tuesday, February 27. The master of the Relief, under agreement with the master of the Kia Ora, immediately took charge of tire stranded vessel and began the work of rescue. Continuous and skillful work resulted in releasing the Kia Ora at 3:45 p. m. Saturday, March 3, in such condition that, although somewhat injured, she was able to proceed without assistance to Newport News.
“Before the ad’ of 1875, this court, upon an appeal in a case of salvage, gave the same weight, and no more, to the decree of the court helow, that a court of common law would allow to the verdict of a jury, and might revise that decree for manifest error in matter of fact, even, if no violation of the just principles which should govern the. subject was shown. Post v. Jones, 19 How. 150, 160 [15 L. Ed. 618]. Since the act of 1875, in cases of salvage, as in other admiralty cases, this court may revise the decree appealed from for matter of law, but for matter of law only, and should not alter the decree for the reason that the amount awarded appears to be too large, unless the excess Is so great that, upon any reasonable view of the facts found, the award cannot be justified by the rules of law applicable to the case.”
This language, together with the following statement in The Ariadne, 13 Wall. 475—479 (20 L. Ed. 542), expresses as accurately as the nature of the ^subject will admh the limits to be observed by appellate courts in reviewing findings of fact of trial courts:
“We are not unmindful that both the Circuit and District Court came to a conclusion different from ours as to the alleged fault of the steamer. Their judgments ore entitled to, and have received, our most respectful consideration. Their concurrence raises a presumption, prima facie, that they are correct. Mere doubts should not be permitted to disturb them. But the presumption referred to may he rebutted. The right of appeal to this court is a substantial right, and not a shadow. It involves examination, thought, and judgment. Where our convictions are clear, and differ from those of the learned judges below, we may not abdicate the performance of the duty which the law imposes upon us by declining to give our own judicial effort.”
A doubt, or even a decided inclination to differ, does not warrant interference with the finding of fact of the trial court, and this is especially true as to the amount to be allowed in salvage cases; but when a careful examination of the evidence in all of its bearings results in a clear and certain conviction of the appellate court, differing from the finding of the trial court, it is the duty of the appellate court to follow that conviction.
|3J Examination of the many cases with their varying facts gives a general sense of the proportion which the award ought to bear to the risk and expense incurred, the skill employed, the value of the property saved and the property lost, the peril of the vessel and cargo, the investment and enterprise of the salvor, the liberality of the allowance for profit in order to encourage enterprise in assisting' and saving vessels in peril. Bul no formula can he derived which will meet the justice of every case. The per cent, basis is no longer followed, because its application to the large values of modern times would lead to obvious injustice. Post v. Jones, 19 How. 150, 15 L. Ed. 618. In view of these rules, we consider the strong and perspicuous opinion of the District Judge.
The well-considered case of The St. Paul (D. C.) 82 Fed. 104, and 86 Fed. 340, 30 C. C. A. 70, is most nearly analogous. The St. Paul, a ship worth $2,000,000, with a cargo of equal value, was stranded on the Jersey coast, and was rescued by wrecking vessels of the value of $400,000. The award was $131,000 for the vessel and $29,-000 for the cargo. It is true that several tugs and 207 men were occupied 11 days, while here one vessel and 70 men were engaged 6 days. It is also true that the vessel and all the cargo were saved, while goods in the Kia Ora of the value of $428,310 were lost. Eut over against this is to be set the fact that more than one-half of the value of the cargo of the St. Paul was gold, and that this, and it seems all the cargo, could have beeti taken off, even if the vessel had been lost, while the larger part of the cargo of the Kia, Ora necessarily would have-been lost with the vessel. In this view, we reach the conclusion that the benefit of the services to the Kia Ora was therefore at least equal to that rendered the St. Paul. Looking at the case in the light of the award in the case of the St. Paul, comparing the awards made in various other cases, American and British, and considering the great value and the great peril of the ship and cargo, the preparation for the work, the skill and dispatch of the service, 1he importance of time to the Kia Ora, the perishable nature of a large part of her cargo, and the decreased value of money, and giving due weight to the strong opinion of the learned and experienced District Judge, the majority of this court cannot escape the clear and strong conviction that the award should he increased to $150,000.
Modified.
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