These two actions were tried together. The judge ruled in favor of the defendant in the first, and for the plaintiff in the second. The second is defended on the same grounds in substance on which the first is brought, and it follows that if the ruling for the defendant in the first action was right, then that in the second was also. The first is an action to recover the amount paid by the plaintiff after notice to the defendant to settle a claim made upon it by the administratrix of one Murphy who died in consequence of injuries received from the bursting of a revolving basket,
The plaintiff does not .contend that anything was said about the size of the driving pulley when the order was originally given. It contends that the blue print amounted to an implied representation or warranty that the machine would have a driving pulley twenty-four inches in diameter, on which the mill architect was justified in relying in planning the connecting shafts and pulleys, and that the defendant is liable for any injuries that resulted in consequence of the pulley being fifteen inches in diameter instead of twenty-four.
We greatly doubt whether the blue print constituted an implied representation or warranty of the size of the'pulley. There is nothing to show that the defendant knew for what purpose the blue print was wanted, or that it did anything more than send it as requested. But, assuming that the pictorial representation of a driving pulley twenty-four inches in diameter contained in the blue print constituted under the circumstances an implied undertaking on the part of the defendant that the driving pulley would be of that size, it does not follow that the defendant is liable. In order to render the defendant liable the plaintiff not only must have relied upon the representation but the circumstances must have been such as to warrant it in so doing and to exonerate it from negligence on its part. We do not think that the evidence warranted a finding that the plaintiff was justified in relying on the representation or was free from negligence in so doing. The machine was put together and set up in the plaintiff’s works by its servants and employees. There was un contradicted evidence that they knew that the size of the pulley was not as represented on the blue print but was smaller and that the result would be to make the machine go much faster. There was also uncontradicted evidence that the bill of
Under such circumstances we think that the plaintiff was not justified in relying .on the representation, assuming that there was one, and that there was negligence on its part in putting in shafting and pulleys that would drive the basket at a faster rate than that designated. The case of Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, relied on by the plaintiff, differs materially from this. In that case the machine was sold to stand a working pressure of one hundred pounds to the square inch which it did not do in consequence of a defect in the construction which should have been discovered and remedied by the manufacturer. The plaintiff did not know, and had no reason to know as between it and the defendant, that the machine would not stand the pressure which it was warranted to stand and the court held that it was justified in relying on the representations of the defendant. The result is that the exceptions must be overruled in both cases.
So ordered.
The superintendent of the Merrimac Chemical Company in testifying defined the appliance as follows : “ The basket of a centrifugal drier is a perforated pot arrangement on a vertical shaft, and the centrifugal force forces out the moisture through the perforations.”