Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal RevenueMerrill Lynch & Co., Inc., and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. & Subsidiaries (“Merrill Group”) appeal from a decision of the United States Tax Court (Marvel, J.), holding that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the “Commissioner”) correctly assessed deficiencies in Merrill Group’s payment of income tax for the tax years 1987 and 1988. Merrill Group contends that a series of transactions that it undertook in order to rid itself of a subsidiary increased its basis in the subsidiary and allowed it to take a large capital loss that was used to reduce capital gains in the 1987 and 1988 tax years. 1 ' The Commissioner does not share Merrill Group’s view of the tax consequences of these transactions.
We affirm the conclusions of the tax court on the issues it reached and remand for the court to consider an interpretation of one section of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) that was advanced for the first time on appeal.
BACKGROUND
“The avoidance of taxes is the only intellectual pursuit that carries any reward.”
• — John Maynard Keynes
A. Merrill Lynch’s Transactions
Before any of the transactions at issue in this appeal took place, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (“Merrill”) served as a parent corporation to a number of wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Merrill Lynch Capital Resources (“Resources”), Merrill Lynch Realty (“Realty”), Merrill Lynch Asset Management (“Management”) and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (“MLPFS”). Although a number of these subsidiaries held subsidiaries of their own, only those held by Resources are relevant to this appeal. Due to the parent-subsidiary relationships that existed among all of these companies, Merrill Group filed a consolidated tax return under the designation “Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. & Subsidiaries” for each of the tax years at issue in this appeal.
Resources, the subsidiary at the center of this dispute, was a mid-market leasing business created by Merrill to facilitate the expansion of Merrill’s brokerage-service business into the mid-market and small business sectors. In early 1987, Merrill’s management decided that Resources had served its purpose and that it was time to sell its multi-million dollar leasing portfolio, given that leasing was outside of Merrill’s core competency and that the portfolio of leases had begun to generate taxable income. Because Resources held a large number of relatively small leases, Merrill decided that in order to divest itself of Respurces’ leasing assets it made practical sense to sell its stock in Resources instead of trying to sell each of the leases individually. However, Resources did hold some assets that Merrill wanted to keep, and by February 17, 1987, a draft memorandum identified the assets that Resources would continue to hold at the time it was sold.
On March 13, 1987, Merrill created a project team to handle the Resources divestiture and named Theodore D. Sands chief negotiator. The apparent focus of this team was to maximize Merrill’s return on this transaction, taking into account everything from the purchase-price received to the tax benefits it would generate. During the month of March, the team took the first step of organizing the creation of a multi-volume offering memoran
On March 30, 1987, Resources sold its stock in five of its subsidiaries to Realty for $53,972,607 and the stock in another of its subsidiaries to Management for $160,000,000. On April 3, 1987, Resources sold all of its stock in a final subsidiary to MLPFS for $119,819,690. 2 As the tax court did, we refer to the subsidiaries Resources sold as the Issuing Corporations and to the three transactions as the Cross-Chain Sales. Upon completing the Cross-Chain Sales, Resources had transferred all of the assets Merrill wished to keep to its sibling subsidiaries. Resources was now ready to be sold.
Meanwhile, by March 4, 1987, Merrill had identified ninety-three potential buyers for Resources and was gauging their interest in the transaction. Neither GATX Leasing Corporation (“GATX”) nor BCE Development, Inc. (“BCE”), the companies that eventually purchased Resources, were referred to by name at that time. However, on March 23, 1987, a copy of the March Memorandum was sent to GATX (but not BCE) along with a confidentiality agreement. Nevertheless, no negotiations took place between Merrill and GATX until the confidentiality agreement was executed and returned, which had not yet happened as of April 2, 1987, several days after the first of the Cross-Chain Sales had been conducted and one day before they were to be completed. Eventually, five or six companies, including GATX (with BCE as a partner), were interested enough in Resources to submit bids, which were received on April 21,1997.
On April 23, 1987, Merrill management presented the potential sale of Resources and its probable tax consequences to the Merrill board. While the definitive buyer had not been established, Merrill’s CFO identified GATX/BCE as the likely purchaser, based on the initial bids. This presentation described the Cross-Chain Sales as a step taken in anticipation of the future sale of Resources in order to maximize Merrill’s tax benefits. After the board meeting, Merrill conducted another round of bidding and GATX/BCE was left as the only potential purchaser. For an additional two months, Merrill negotiated exclusively with GATX/BCE, during which time due diligence was conducted. Eventually, on June 25, 1987, the parties executed a purchase agreement, whereby GATX/BCE agreed to buy Resources for $57,363,817 (down from their $66 million final bid due to concerns raised by the results of the due diligence).
B. The Tax Treatment of the Transactions
In calculating its 1987 tax liability, Merrill took advantage of the consolidated return regulations that were in place at the time to claim a long-term capital loss from the sale of Resources. Its ability to take this loss was governed by the rule set forth in
Woods Investment Co. v. Commissioner,
Merrill determined that it could increase its basis in Resources by classifying the Cross-Chain Sales as dividends, based on an interpretation of the interaction between
Merrill’s view was that the Cross-Chain Sales did not meet the requirements of
The Commissioner rejected Merrill’s basis adjustments and entered deficiencies for 1987 and 1988. The Commissioner took a different view of how
Merrill Group challenged this determination before the United States Tax Court. The tax court sided with the Commissioner after a review of its prior cases, in particular
Niedermeyer v. Commissioner,
DISCUSSION
We review the legal conclusions of the tax court de novo and its factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard.
Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Comm’r,
A. Review of the Tax Court’s Integration Analysis
While the statutory backdrop to this case is daunting, it did not form the heart
Our court has yet to adopt a test for the integration of transactions in the
There is no question that any test we adopt must allow certain transactions to be integrated for the purposes of
While the parties both adopt the firm and fixed plan test as the framework for their respective arguments, they disagree over how the test is to be applied in this case. Not surprisingly, there is little relevant precedent applying the firm and fixed plan test. Merrill Group contends that the court must evaluate the plan to sell Resources at the time the Cross-Chain Sales were executed. It argues that Merrill’s plan to sell Resources was not firm and fixed because it had not yet settled on a final buyer for Resources at the time of the Cross-Chain Sales. Thus, Merrill Group challenges the result reached by the tax court, suggesting that the court misapplied the firm and fixed plan test by resting its ruling on intent alone. The Commissioner does not challenge Merrill Group’s assertion that the plan’s status must be evaluated at the time of the Cross-Chain Sales. However, he argues that Merrill’s failure to identify a final buyer for Resources at that time does not prevent the plan from being firm and fixed. The Commissioner suggests that the tax court properly looked for objective evidence of an overall plan by Merrill to terminate its interest in Resources, and that this evidence sufficiently supported a finding that the Cross-Chain Sales were an integrated step in Merrill’s overall plan to sell Resources. Therefore, he concludes that the tax court properly found that a firm and fixed plan existed, even though all of its details were not finalized at the time of the Cross-Chain Sales.
Niedermeyer
was the first case to identify the firm and fixed plan test by name. In that case, the taxpayers owned common and preferred stock in American Timber & Trading Co., Inc. (“AT & T”). In an attempt to divest themselves of their AT
&
T holdings, the taxpayers sold all of their common stock to Lents Industries, Inc., a company that was principally owned by their children.
Niedermeyer,
Merrill Group cites the language in Niedermeyer suggesting that the plan must be binding on the taxpayer to support Merrill Group’s position that the plan to sell Resources was not firm and fixed because Merrill Group did not have a buyer who was locked in. However, this ignores the subsequent language of the opinion, which explains that whether a plan is absolutely binding is merely one factor in the firm and fixed plan analysis. Id. Indeed, the other factors identified in Niedermeyer tend to suggest that a firm and fixed plan was in place. First, the Commissioner has identified ample written documentation of Merrill Group’s plan, supporting the tax court’s conclusion that Merrill Group knew at the time that the Cross-Chain Sales were conducted that it would also be selling Resources. The most convincing document is the printout of the slides used in the presentation to Merrill’s board on April 23, 1997, which explains that the Cross-Chain Sales were conducted in order to increase Merrill’s return on its sale of Resources. Concededly, this printout is dated after the Cross-Chain Sales were made, calling into question its relevance to a review that is theoretically conducted at the time the Cross-Chain Sales were completed. Nevertheless, the relevance of the board presentation is bolstered by the offering materials that were distributed to potential purchasers before the Cross-Chain Sales were completed and did not include the assets transferred in the Cross-Chain Sales, demonstrating that the plan had been in place at that time. In addition, these offering materials could arguably satisfy the factor requiring communication of the plan to third parties. After all, they made clear that a number of assets that Resources currently held would no longer be there at the time of its sale. Finally, while the plan was not binding in a legal sense, it certainly was binding economically. Because the Cross-Chain Sales took place between the members of Merrill Group, they did not create any economic benefit to Merrill Group as a whole absent the subsequent sale of Resources and probably gave rise to a significant level of transaction costs. Without the Resources sale, there would appear to be no economically beneficial purpose to the rearrangement of assets between Merrill’s subsidiaries.
Bleily
is the second case that we find useful. In that case, the majority shareholder of a company wanted to buy out the minority shareholder.
The situation with which we are presented bears a very close resemblance to that presented in
Bleily,
in that Merrill did not know exactly when its divestiture of Resources was going to take place and did
Merrill Group identifies
Paparo
as the case best supporting its position. In that case, the taxpayers were shareholders of two women’s apparel manufacturers (“Nashville and Jasper”), and House of Ronnie, Inc. (“HR”), a design and marketing company that distributed the clothing made by Nashville and Jasper.
Paparo,
The taxpayers argued that the redemp-tions qualified as sales and not dividends under
Merrill suggests that this case stands for the rule that intent alone is insufficient to integrate transactions that occur on different dates.
See id.
at 705. In addition, Merrill draws our attention to the following language from the opinion: “[w]hile [the Paparos] apparently intended that subsequent public offerings be made in futuro, there was no promise to sell any particular amount of stock between the underwriter and [the Paparos] at any particular price.”
Id.
Taken out of context, this language does suggest that for a plan to exist, there must be a deal with another identified entity in place at the time of the first transaction. However, because the underwriter was a central figure in the transactions performed by the Paparos, having arguably more control over the transactions than the Paparos did, its lack of awareness of the Paparos’ plan effectively proved that they had no plan in place. Thus, the lack of evidence surrounding the Paparos’ understanding with the underwriter was affirmative evidence that the Paparos had no firm and fixed plan. Therefore, we understand this case to set forth a rule that self-serving testimony on intent will not be sufficient to support a conclusion that a firm and fixed plan existed for
B. Review of the Tax Court’s Factual Findings
Merrill Group takes issue with a number of the tax court’s factual findings. Many of these challenges are meritless, particularly those attacking the tax court’s finding that the presentation to Merrill’s board was evidence of a plan to make the Cross-Chain Sales and then sell Resources, which is corroborated by documents dated before the Cross-Chain Sales. However, Merrill is correct that the tax court clearly erred in finding that GATX/BCE had submitted a “cash purchase price” and had been allowed to conduct due diligence before the Cross-Chain Sales took place, and that Merrill’s board authorized the sale of Resources to GATX/BCE at the April 23, 1987 meeting. Nevertheless, these errors pertain to facts that are immaterial to our analysis. Therefore, they do not prevent us from affirming the decision of the tax court.
C. Merrill Group’s Statutory Challenge
For the first time on appeal, Merrill Group makes the alternative argument that the Cross-Chain Sales and the sale of Resources did not terminate its interest in the Issuing Corporations within the meaning of
In general, “a federal appellate court does not- consider an issue not passed upon below.”
Singleton v. Wulff,
CONCLUSION
We adopt the firm and fixed plan test as the appropriate method for determining whether two transactions conducted at different times may be integrated for the purposes of
Notes
. The decision also affirmed a deficiency assessed for the 1986 tax year that was not challenged by-appellants.
. In addition, Resources distributed some other assets as dividends in three transactions that the Commissioner has not challenged.
. This interpretation of the effect of
. As we discuss below, when the analysis is performed is crucial in determining whether the integration is proper.