115 U.S. 300 | SCOTUS | 1885
MERRICK'S EXECUTOR & Another
v.
GIDDINGS.
Supreme Court of United States.
*305 Mr. John Selden for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Attorney-General and Mr. Fletcher P. Cuppy for defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts in the language above reported, he continued:
The instruction to find a verdict for the defendant must be tested by the same rules that apply in the case of a demurrer to evidence. Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 362, 373; Richardson v. City of Boston, 19 How. 263, 268; Schuchardt v. Allens, 1 Wall. 359, 370. If, therefore, the facts established, and the conclusions which they reasonably justify, do not disclose a valid cause of action against the defendant, the judgment must be affirmed; otherwise reversed.
It must be conceded that the claim of Merrick and Durant to be entitled, under their contract, to receive for their services an amount equal to twenty per cent. of the bonds and coupons, and their proceeds, recovered by the defendant in England, finds strong support in the facts which the evidence, as we are informed by the bill of exceptions, tended to establish; for, not only does that recovery seem to have been the immediate result of the legal proceedings instituted and conducted by the attorneys, but the evidence justifies the conclusion that it was in the minds of all the parties, including the governor of Texas and the defendant, that the attorneys should be deemed to have participated in any collections made in England, provided it appeared that those collections were the result of the suit last instituted in this court.
*306 In this view of the evidence, and under all the circumstances of the case, it may be that the promise by the defendant not to part with the bonds and coupons, or their proceeds, which might be recovered in England, until the fees of the attorneys were settled, was not inconsistent with the relations which he and they respectively held to the State. And it may also be that, for the violation of that promise, the defendant was responsible to them in damages. But, in our opinion, the attitude of the parties towards each other, and the whole aspect of the case, was changed when the attorneys, with information as to the amount collected by defendant, and with knowledge that their claim of twenty per cent. of such collections was controverted, came to a final settlement with the State upon the basis of $8,000 as full compensation for all services rendered in and about the recovery of the bonds and coupons, or their proceeds. That settlement, we are constrained to hold, swept away the very foundation of their demand against the defendant; for, in establishing that demand, it was necessary to show that the State was actually indebted to them for legal services rendered. But how could such indebtedness be shown to exist, and how could the attorneys be said to have been damaged, within the meaning of the law, when, prior to any suit against defendant for violation of his agreement, the attorneys voluntarily submitted to a compromise, by which, in consideration of a named sum, they released the State from all further liability to them? Their suit proceeds upon the distinct ground that defendant's failure to keep his promise deprived them of the opportunity to obtain such amount as the State owed them for their services. But that breach by defendant of his promise could not be made the basis of an action for damages, after they stipulated with the State to receive, and did receive, a specified sum in full discharge of all claims for legal services in respect of the bonds and coupons, or their proceeds. And this view of the rights of the parties is not at all affected by the fact that the attorneys were, at the time of their settlement with the State, ignorant of the existence of the contract of June 2, 1874, or of its subsequent modification. To that contract they were not parties, and it was entirely *307 competent for the State and her agents to modify it without notice to or consultation with others. The attorneys had their separate contract with the State, made at the time of their employment, under which they proceeded against Chiles in respect of his individual claim to the securities, or their proceeds, held in England. The defendant was not bound by his relations with them to disclose the terms of the contract which he and his partner had with the State. The attorneys were in possession of all the facts essential to their determination of the question whether they would stand upon their own contract or accede to the proposition made by the governor to pay them, in full of all demands, a specified sum. With information as to the amount actually recovered for the State, and as to the amount claimed by, and allowed to, the defendant and his partner for their services, the attorneys made a final settlement with her upon the basis already indicated. That settlement, we repeat, precluded them from making any further claim upon the fund which came to the hands of the defendant as agent of the State, and, consequently, precludes them from recovering damages by reason of the defendant having surrendered that fund in advance of the payment of their fees, retaining only what was allowed to him and his partner for their services.
Touching the suggestion that the defendant and his partner were not justly or equitably entitled to receive more than the attorneys who conducted the litigation, it is sufficient to say that the former did not receive more than the State agreed to pay them, while the attorneys have received what they agreed to accept in full discharge of their claim against the State.
For these reasons, and without reference to other considerations pressed upon our attention, it was proper to instruct the jury to find for the defendant.
Judgment affirmed.
