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Merlino v. Borough of Midland Park
796 A.2d 203
N.J.
2002
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*1 796 A.2d MERLINO, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, ANTHONY v. BOROUGH PARK, OF MIDLAND MAYOR AND THE COUNCIL OF BOR PARK, DUGAN, OUGH OF MIDLAND F. MICHELLE BOROUGH ADMINISTRATOR, HEEREMA, DAVID CONSTRUCTION OFFI CIAL, BUILDING CODE SUB OFFICIAL AND BUILDING IN SPECTOR, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,JOHN DOE II (FICTITIOUS PERSONS), X THROUGH DEFENDANTS. Argued November 2001 Decided March 2002. *3 B. Regan argued Thomas Hanrahan and T. Robert the cause (.Hanrahan Regan, and Robertelli and Mr. appellants attor- neys). A.

Paul argued Massaro respondent. the cause for opinion by of the Court was delivered LaVECCHIA, J. 52:27D-126(b), appeal meaning

At issue in this is the of N.J.S.A. governing a statute the of conferral tenure on construction code particularly, officials. More we are called on to determine wheth- Anthony Merlino achieved tenure as the Official er Code Borough four-year a term Park when he served second of Midland day he not. in service. hold that did after a ten break We

I. complaint a in lieu The case arose when Merlino filed Park prerogative against Borough writs officials of the of Midland body) (collectively governing alleging unlawful termination employment employment code breach of his his as official and essence, he claimed that achieved tenure contract. Merlino improperly was fired. following

A which were established. trial ensued at facts appointed four-year as May Merlino was to a term On official, official, inspec- building building construction sub-code body. began His term 1990 and tor June expire expiration of Merlino’s was to on June 1994. As the appeared public meeting govern- at a approached, term he ing body reappointed. At the and indicated his desire to be only governing body specific meeting, one member of voiced However, majori- complaints regarding performance. Merlino’s performance ty Merlino’s of the members were not convinced that no should receive tenure. there was was such he Because job, an to other candidate for because four-year give opportuni- without tenure would it the second term ty changes performance recognize improvements Merlino’s occurred, they governing body proposed compromise. if Braunius, governing body According Councilperson dis- pros performance and cussed the and cons of Merlino’s decided *4 give by allowing giving hiatus him him a second chance before Councilperson Walker stated new without tenure. ... it “not matter choice. no [Merlino had] that was choice a take leave it[ it or it situation.” ][was] meeting, Councilper- After the issue at the closed was discussed Duffy plan Specifically, plan son related the to Merlino. 3,1994, day provided resign Merlino effective June that would expired appointed his term of office and he would be to a new Couneilperson term to commence Duffy on June 1994. testi- plan grateful. fied that Merlino understood the and appeared to be Although equivocated Merlino over trial whether he understood appointed sign that he would not if be to a new term he did not resignation, acknowledged rejected he he could have plan and awaited the results of the vote.

Merlino that he testified consented the terms of the Council. Duffy He did Couneilperson admitted that he not ask for more plan attorney time think about the or to seek from advice an p.m., other At Couneilperson Duffy advisor. about 11:00 after Merlino, plan joined meeting discussed the with in both Approximately Council governing Chambers. ten members of the body present. They explained were to Merlino that he lacked support reappointment proposed resigna- as a his solution subsequent appointment four-year tion and to a new term after a trial, At acknowledged hiatus. Merlino that he realized that his resignation Indeed, would him not to cause be afforded tenure. date, expiration we note that because an Merlino’s initial term had resignation actually purpose his served no discernible other than concerning to eliminate doubt his lack of “holdover” status. governing Merlino body insisted the vote in resolution guarantee years order to that he would receive as a four more signed resignation. code official before he the letter of 121-94B, governing body May enacted Resolution No. dated provides, pertinent part: there will exist a WHEREAS, vacancy of Construction Official as of position 13,1994; June IT NOW, THEREFORE, BE RESOLVED, Merlino be and Anthony (4) as Construction for a four term, Official hereby appointed year pursuant N.J.S.A. 52:27D-136 term [sic], effective June which will on June expire 12,1998; resolution, body passed After the signed Merlino resignation my hereby resign position the letter of that stated: “I Official, 3,1994.” of Construction effective June *5 began the Bor- his term as Merlino new On June years. for the next four ough’s and worked Construction Official term, requested that his expiration of Merlino that Prior the for placed the schedule discus- appointment be on Council’s third 1998, body governing met to discuss May the sion. On meeting. present was at the Vari- reappointment. He Merlino’s body complaints regard- addressed governing ous members discussion, the members ing performance and after the Merlino’s reappoint him. Merlino received unanimously determined not to in a governing body’s letter notice of the determination written letter, stating had May responded that he 1998. He dated hearing. or a tenure and demanded either reinstatement achieved lawsuit followed. This trial, in favor the the the trial court ruled

At the conclusion of entirety, body complaint Merlino’s in its governing and dismissed court that: prejudice. with The found gave governing suggested it the the relief that this body plaintiff primary plan, his was then shame was If relief wanted, he that reappointment. primary having agenda. governing was But the plan that hidden body’s plaintiff [sic] in what it would it’s intent was do; unmistakable it would deprive, deprive obtaining But he a valuable tenure at that time. received appoint- the plaintiff chance____ given exchange he was the second therefore, ment in overborne, Mr. was that undue or unfair pressure I not find that Merlino’s will do brought risk risk, was in some of a the was to bear. This settlement respects being governing in the not to that would vote the absence of and vote body plan the obtaining he was aware he was Plaintiff obtained certainty; reappoint. night, coercion, he out to that was no obtained what set obtain there he certainty, obligation was no on the duress, municipality there was no there part him more time have consult with it, that if want you you may you may advise an attorney. although .,. bargaining [P]laintiff not in a unfair because materially was position, governing makes could have body decision[,] plaintiff it’s true that the along go [It not and let’s where the votes fall. time said I do with see plan being would have out the Mr. Merlino wanted he way plus, plus turned may] in would have had tenure. have been without break service and he reappointed that____ have known But could nobody I abstract as was neither intra conclude ... plan implemented Mr. did have vires, vires nor ultra Merlino therefore not tenure May not to discretionary June and the decision of the body reappoint not not of either the unreasonable, him was was violative arbitraiy, capricious],] regulations, State Uniform Construction Code its Act, law, state common federal *6 organic common federal or constitutional law, law[,] nor statutory any provision any natural law. appealed. published opinion, Merlino In a Borough v. Merlino Park, 436, (2001), Midland 338 N.J.Super. 769 A.2d 1077 the of Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Merlino’s claims for of punitive damages, reasoning breach contract and that continuing no employment contract of had been established and no punitive damages factual case for was offered state under or 441, However, federal Id. at panel law. 769 A.2d 1077. the reversed finding the trial court’s that Merlino did not have tenure. Educ., 63, Relying Spiewak Ibid. v. Bd. 90 N.J. Rutherford of 76, (1982), 447 A. 2d 140 Appellate the Division that if held the Legislature specific employment establishes a or condition term of discretion, with negotiation fully no room for is preempted. Mer lino, 439, Further, supra, N.J.Super. 338 at 769 A.2d 1077. parties’ court trump plain stated that contract could not 52:27D-126(b) terms of N.J.S.A. confer on a Code tenure (1) long official so as two are met: conditions to a (2) term; second consecutive fifth consecu commencement of a year 440, tive Appellate of service. Id. at 769 A.2d 1077. The Division employment history found Merlino’s both satisfied 440-41, statutory requirements. Finally, Id. at 769 A.2d 1077. Appellate Division employed by characterized the mechanism governing body having potential frustrating as entirely “the of 52:27D-126(b)” enacting legislative design manifest N.J.S.A by forestalling 441, indefinitely. conferral of at tenure Id. 769 A.2d court 1077. The remanded the matter for a determination of dismissed, attorney’s whether Merlino was entitled to fees as moot, challenge ruling testimony to an evidential that barred the Department Community of a of Affairs official. Ibid. governing body petition filed a for certification limited to

two issues: whether Merlino achieved tenure and whether he is granted entitled to fees. counsel We certification. 169 N.J. (2001). 782 A.2d 424

8

II. entirely by governed “The tenure created and right to is Dist., State-Operated v. Sch. 286 statute.” Breitwieser 633, 637, (citing supra, 90 (App.Div.1996) Spiewak, 670 A.2d 73 State, 72-73, 140); Dept. 447 A.2d see also Lukas v. N.J. of (1986) (“It Services, 1123 is Human 103 N.J. A.2d Jersey right tenure is statuto that in New well-established essential.”). rights ry. legislative Like A source statutory aspects public employment, terms condi other agreement in employment precedence take over side tions of See, Union, County e.g., contravention the statute. Golden (2000) (holding A.2d statute 163 N.J. county governing appointment prosecutors trumps of assistant *7 prosecutor prosecutor) contract assistant and implied between 1, 15, (1996) State, A.2d 988 (citing N.J.Super. v. 290 674 Walsh (Skillman, dissent, 595, J.A.D., dissenting), on 147 N.J. 689 rev’d (1997), County DiPaolo v. Passaic Bd. A.2d 131 and Chosen of Freeholders, 487, 493, N.J.Super. (App.Div.1999), 322 731 A.2d 519 (2000)). o.b., only N.J. 745A.2d 162 540 Tenure attaches aff'd precise in compliance with the conditions articulated the rele Educ., legislative Picogna v. vant enactment. Board 143 N.J. of (1996); 391, 400, of Educ., 671 A.2d 1035 Zimmerman v. Board 38 (1962), denied, 65, 72, 183 A.2d25 cert. 371 N.J. U.S. 83 S.Ct. (1963). Compliance L. Ed.2d be 9 502 must absolute statutory methodology from affect deviations can entitlement 273, 278, Tp., 220 Washington to tenure. DeStefano (Law Div.1987). 531 A.2d1090 III. 126(b) states, pertinent part: 52:27D in N.J.S.A construction official or subcode official in a noncivil A service shall be municipality 4 second shall, for term of to a consecu- years appointed upon or on or of a fifth service, tive term after the commencement consecutive year including job of service in an title held to the of the years equivalent prior adoption granted Code, Construction be tenure and shall not be State Uniform removed just hearing. from office for cause after a fail- and except impartial

9 parties agree purport The that of that statute is at the heart of governing body argues ease. this The Merlino did not serve two consecutive within meaning terms N.J.S.A. 52:27D- 126(b) interruption because of the his between first and second terms; it prohibit- that the took relative actions to Merlino are not statute; by ed that if those actions are deemed ultra vires discourage problem by it would solving public creative entities to good. the detriment public Merlino he provid- counters that met both standards statute; achieved, waived, ed in the that once tenure cannot be over; bargained forfeited governing body’s and that the action requiring ten-day in reappoint- break service as a condition of public ment policy undermining violates code enforcement and subjecting political pressure. code officials meaning

“It is fundamental ‘the a statute must framed, ... sought language be act which the is and if plain that is ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’” Russell v. Brook Saddle Restaurant 186, 188, Corp., 199 N.J.Super. (App.Div.1985) A.2d Co., (quoting 548, 556, Sheeran v. Nationwide Mutual 80 N.J. Ins. (1979)). language 404 A.2d 625 If the of the statute is clear and unambiguous, beyond is- no there need to look its terms to Butler, legislative determine intent. State v. 89 N.J. (1982) (citations omitted).

A .2d399 52:27D~126(b) straightforward. first clause of N.J.S.A. It provides four-year official appointed a code is to be for a *8 Likewise, language term. the of the clause of the second stat- “shall, upon appointment to a term ... second consecutive be ute — 52:27D-126(b). granted unequivocal. If tenure” —is N.J.S.A the official, body to confer the chooses tenure on code it by reappointing does so him or her to a “second consecutive” four- year term.

The notion of what consecutive is well-settled. It means break.” without “an interval or Webster’s Third New Internation- 10 (1993). Indeed, City Dictionary in Casamasino

al 482 of 333, (1999), specifically 730 we Jersey City, 158 A .2d 287 N.J. “any be break in acquire tenure there cannot service noted that to re-appointment,” initial and the between the “[ajbsent assessors, jus- statutory provision, holdover tax like a re-appointed judges, not and confirmed tices who have been day full must the office.” Id. the of their first term vacate last added). words, 353, (emphasis acquire other at 730 A.2d 287 statutory provision, in of a holdover there must the absence gap from or transition term to term without be seamless provision in interruption. is no holdover the statute. Here there instance, Moreover, in this the to eliminate all doubt Council’s position vacancy existed the because resolution declared that 1994, 3, four-year expired term Merlino’s initial had as of June and, resigned day the last his position he his effective June 3rd of term, vacancy of a confirming position. an act the existence second, separate four-year ap- The term to which Merlino was satisfy pointed, precise fails then the effective June acquisition criteria of tenure under this clause because it four-year was not “consecutive” to his former term. meaning of next of the statute is less evident: clause

A official be for a term 4 and shall ... on construction ... shall of appointed years including or a fifth of service, after the commencement of consecutive of year years job in an title held to the service State Uniform equivalent prior adoption tenure____ granted Construction be Code, added).] [(emphasis Westwood, Borough In Cutler v. 295 of (1996), denied, 349-50, A.2d 44 A.2d 149 N.J. 693 certif. (1997), identify parsed language, the Appellate Division ing ambiguity “on after”. an of an in the term On examination statute, history legislative of court found that Legislature “grandfather” was concerned about the need to offi performed equivalent jobs prior cials who the enactment of Thus, interpreted A.2d “on UCCA. Id. 44. court service,” year or after the commencement a fifth consecutive years applying only as “if if it includes in an service

n words, 348-50, job 44. In other equivalent title.” Id. at 685 A.2d year” language the “fifth consecutive is not a holdover route to tenure, grandfather allowing prior but rather a limited clause appointment service to be factored into the tenure calculation on agree analysis We with the Cutler and con- under UCCA. that, appointment by body, that clause clude merely preserves longevity rights who were of individuals job serving equivalent in an at the time of enactment of the title applicability only UCCA. It has no this case. The road tenure for Merlino was an to a second consecutive term.

By dating reappointment days after Merlino’s to take effect ten term, parties mutually agreed to a the end of his first break appointment. preventing acquisition upon of tenure service legitimacy challenges Merlino now and effectiveness of First, actually action. he claims that he achieved tenure under Spieivak. disagree. Spieivak, We the Board of Education negotiated special contracts with teachers that denied education although they fully statutory them tenure had satisfied the stan- 18A:28-5, provides: which dard for tenure under N.J.S.A. teaching all ... be under tenure ... after The services of staff members shall (a) [tjhree in such or such for: consecutive calendar district board employment by employing which board for such or shorter be fixed years, any may period (b) together with [t]hree or consecutive academic years, employment purpose; (c) beginning succeeding [t]he of more of the next academic equivalent year; than three academic within a four consecutive academic any years, years period added).] [(emphasis tenure on those teach We held that N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5 conferred ing right the statute made tenure staff members as of because years mandatory term and condition of after three of service a Thus, members, fully employment. teaching staff who satisfied statute, regardless prerequisites the factual achieved tenure renouncing agreements they may have made their side specific statutory rights. Legislature “[i]f For establishes employment that leaves no room for discre term or condition of action, fully preempted.” tionáry negotiation then on the term is IFPTE (citing 447 A.2d 140 In re Spiewak, supra, 90 N.J. at *10 (1982)). 403, State, 393, A.2d 187 This 443 Local 195 v. 88 N.J. wholly Spiewak. case is unlike

Here, prerequisites for tenure were not satisfied the factual term. appointed to a second consecutive Merlino was not because days was out of office for ten expired, and he His first term Thus, and he vacancy. a break between terms occurred creating a sure, if Merlino satisfy requirements. To be not the tenure did term, i.e., reappointed to a second consecutive merely had been ended, Spiewak this would be a case beginning when the first one have failed. It is the hiatus any to avert tenure would and effort that makes the difference. body argues governing

Alternatively, Merlino with him power negotiate to the break service lacked the employ and conditions of governing the terms because statute tenure, ment, trumps any agreement including acquisition side Golden, 431, supra, 749 A.2d it. 163 N.J. that controverts See (1997). Walsh, 842; supra, 147 N.J. at 689 A.2d 131 nothing argument there is about a problem with that is contrary facially “negotiated” that is N.J.S.A. break-in-service 52:27D-126(b). Walsh, legislative terms and In Golden service) (i.e., sought to be employment at —will were conditions of employment It was the clash abrogated by implied contracts. required be vitiated. that those contracts with the statute Here, nothing suggest that a break in there is the statute to otherwise, Indeed, service, negotiated would contravene it. vacancy in reappoint or to create a office is vested decision to entirely require negotiation It not with in the Council. did vacancy bring vacancy in office. The would about a Merlino 3,1994 expired he the moment his term on June have existed reappointed. was not remaining argument is that the action of the

Merlino’s body creating public violates a hiatus between his terms enforcement, subjecting policy by undermining code code officials setting stage political pressure, for wholesale avoidance by governing disagree. of tenure bodies. We view, in service was not violative of our Merlino’s break public policy of the state and was effective to avert the conferral underlying undermining purposes no tenure. We see 52:27D-126(b) Act of which N.J.S.A. Uniform Construction Code part. guarantees of licensed The UCCA professional municipal building and ensures that code officials politics. Voges tenure in local their office is not influenced Falls, 279, 286-87, Borough 633 A.2d 566 Tinton (App.Div.1993), (citing DeStefano, supra, N.J.Super. at (1994). 1090), denied, 531 A .2d 135 N.J. 640 A.2d 848 certif. reason, For that achievement of tenure under the UCCA creates a just right than for after not to be removed from office other cause 52:27D-126(b); impartial hearing. DeStefano, a fair and N.J.S.A. *11 However, supra, N.J.Super. 220 at 531 A.2d 1090. N.J.S.A. 52:27D-126(b) job protection on all code officials. does not confer Otherwise, appointment. upon tenure would attach initial Until term, four-year appointed the official is to a second consecutive no Thus, resolving employment guarantees in whether Merlino exist. tenure, nothing goals underlying the achieved there in the is points contrary to the intent of the UCCA that to an outcome terms, averting acquisition of parties to allow a hiatus between in tenure Merlino 1994. solely selecting be-

What occurred was that rather than here granting letting tween the Hobson’s choice of Merlino tenure or body go, governing him decided to allow Merlino another deserving opportunity demonstrate he was of tenure. That to four-year helped choice Merlino because he received a second service, Arguably, period public of with a chance future tenure. interests, only not because the decision also served Midland Park’s appear in the there does not to have been another candidate wings, potential for Merlino to correct his but because of the deficiencies, learning allow Midland Park to avoid the curve of employee. a new consent, separate,

By parties agreed to a second mutual Merlino, thereby effecting appoint- four-year his term of office for acquisition There without of tenure. ment as Official Construction preclude that of the statute to nothing the four corners within noted in a different context: Appellate Division action. As meaning involving a we must construe the statute, plain ease application meaning of a statute first must be it to the facts. The of the statute and apply language sought if it is our sole function is to and, in in which it is framed plain, according to enforce it its terms. (1990) (internal A.2d 335 Mastropasqua, [Dempsey omitted).] citations statute, language respects plain Our decision sure, matter, general a there should be implements it. To be as designed provide to an additional a break in service no need for cases, majority years gain large In the four tenure. four-year body within the first term governing will know well tenure. will be the whether the code official should receive It Further, is deferred. we do unusual situation which a decision governing body ruling creating an incentive for a not view this as Certainly not even the record here does to circumvent tenure. “effectively abolishing tenure.” suggest actions tantamount Moreover, unlikely 212. we consider it Post at 796 A.2d at body governing that a would choose route could result litigation. future

Finally, disagree impact on the we with the dissent’s view 5:23-4.4(a). service, regulation A that allows form of N.J.AC. acquisi- not “acting appointment,” wit an that does count toward tenure, body’s recognizes need tion of in our view flexibility supports our conclusion.

IV. ruling that Merlino did not achieve tenure makes it unnec- Our essary for us to address the counsel fee issue. For the reasons stated, judgment Appellate we reverse the of the Division. COLEMAN, and Justice and Justices

Chief PORITZ join opinion. in VERNIERO Justice LaVECCHIA’s separate dissenting opinion in which Justice LONG filed a join. ZAZZALI Justices STEIN and J., LONG, dissenting.

n my colleagues Merlino’s sole route to agree with that I agree term. I also appointment to a second consecutive was an 344, N.J.Super. 685 A.2d Borough of Westwood, 295 that Cutler v. (1997), denied, 149 N.J. 693 A.2d (App.Div.1996), certif. year” language correctly interpreted the “fifth consecutive in grandfather clause with no relevance these a limited statute as majority in part company from the I circumstances. Where recog meaning I of the word “consecutive.” connection with an interval or import of the word is “without nize that the common majority However, 'complex notion is more than break.” make an interval or break that would What constitutes believes. depends purpose non-consecutive members of a series two Thus, might example, a law bar a underlying requirement. serving terms. In those from two consecutive public official limits, circumstances, underlying light purposes term in ten-day in suggest that a break person would no reasonable by the same individual render a second term served service would non-consecutive. majority analysis that is absent from the

That is the kind of case, holds'essentially meets hiatus opinion which this terms of office standard and renders two the “break or interval” regardless the break’s purposes non-consecutive for tenure view, oversimplification my gross length purpose. that is a enacting analysis: the tenure proper whether of what is the UCCA, legislature a scheme like intended provisions of body pass muster. To answer that crafted underly- scrutiny. purpose requires question, the UCCA professional highly ing the creation of a cadre that statute is in the subject political influence officials not construction code federal, applicable duties under performance of their mandated codes, statutes, regulations, ordi- state, county, municipal Washington Tp., 220 nances. DeStefano Div.1987). (Law directly goal is related both That 531 A .2d 1090 ' provision. The four- four-year term and the tenure to the initial *13 year political pressure a term insulates code official from for a temporal period governing body period and allows the that performance. grant assess the official’s of tenure insulates political pressure code official from provides future conti- nuity experience in code enforcement. sure, governing body deny be reappointment

To is free to unsatisfactory employee. an goals Such action advances the professionalism by removing inadequate However, code officials. employee once an acquitted is found to have enough himself well reappointed term, legislative to be to a second consecutive tenure goals by providing job advances the security, UCCA thus ensuring high quality, experienced persons will remain as 27D-126(b) why code officials. That is N.J.S.A. is cast in manda- tory permissive shall, and not terms: “A construction official ... upon appointment to a granted second consecutive term ... be added). (Emphasis Clearly, tenure.” Legislature did not governing body intend that a statutory could evade simply tenure by imposing gap days of a few regular four-year between terms. reading language Such a of the “consecutive” of the act would completely Legislature’s undermine the intent to insulate con- struction political Moreover, officials from the change. winds of it effectively permit would employment indefinite of a code protection official without the attaching. tenure ever There is nothing majority’s in the opinion prevent governing body from placing “gaps” reappointments, minuscule thereby between all its effectively abolishing majority’s bright-line tenure. Given rule gaps permissible prevent such are attaching, tenure from prediction its holding its will create no incentive to circum- vent governing body tenure because a would not “choose a route litigation” that could rings result opinion, hollow. After this nothing there litigate. is left to view, my statutory Merlino met the standard for tenure. Hence, Spiewak Education, Board 90 N.J. Rutherford (1982),

447 A.2d holding with agreements its that side cannot statutory terms, Further, vitiate applicable. I note that *14 City ruling would violate Casamasino nothing in such a of (1998). held A .2d 287 That case 730 Jersey City, 158 N.J. by reappointed and confirmed who has not been employee that an office. Id. at must vacate the day of his first term the last indeed, Merlino, prior to the last reappointed was 730 A.2d 287. term, The fact on June 1994. day full which ended of his first days ten later was of no to be effective reappointment that his was consequence to tenure. argu- addition, majority’s public policy respect the with provides governing bodies

ment, already exists that a mechanism in the necessary the concerns raised flexibility to address with the 5:23-4.4(a)(6)1 procedure a tem- provides a for opinion. N.J.A.C. may or be extended appointment of a code official porary Community Department of approval of the with the renewed expiration of an after the temporary appointment, Affairs. Such term, nor grant him tenure four-year would neither official’s first if he obviate tenure interruption that would gap constitute term. That a second consecutive appointed to was thereafter improves employee who deal with the methodology is available to requires a first term and end of his near the or deteriorates advantage of That scheme has period of observation. further Affairs, Community by Department of providing oversight for responsibility for code ultimate agency charged with the provision in our law for deliber- simply no There enforcement. four-year terms interruptions between full ately imposing gaps or 5:23-4.4(a)(6) 1 states: NJ.A.C. acting construction

Acting shall an A appoint municipality appointments: of such official would time the absence or subcode official official any Code and other of the Uniform Construction administration impede orderly Acting be accom- shall appointments duties mandated municipality. by providing, how- to the mechanism municipality; acceptable plished by any be to the shall shall be Notice ever, Department that a written record kept. than is made for more time an within seven days any provided longer Acting for than 60 not be made days, may appointments days. unless or renewed days specific be extended beyond nor they may granted writing to do so is by Department. authority Kestin, purpose avoiding Judge writing for the tenure. As for Division, correctly Appellate stated: frustrating The mechanism that was has the employed potential entirely 52:27D-126(b). législative design enacting manifest N.J.S.A. If the statutory grant could be so evaded, could forestall the easily any municipality employing conferral of tenure the same mechanism indefinitely simply by every denigrating finding four Without the tidal court’s that no years. duress occurred given we observe official faced with here, the choice simply plaintiff the end of his first term would be hard to refuse the offer and for the pressed opt guarantee of office over the of continued relinquishment an employment ensuing term. four-year judgment making the unfettered If, those not decision, had plaintiff earned to his second it was term, incumbent the decision- reappointment upon makers so to no declare. There were to the denial of a second term. impediments choosing, grant good in a By instead, term, second even faith effort to plaintiff *15 defer the tenure issue, and council came within mayor the terms of squarely the statute and, law, conferred tenure by operation upon plaintiff. Any him effort to remove needed to conform with subsequent statutory requirements: just hearing.” “for cause after a fan- and impartial Borough [Merlino v. Park, Midland 769 A.2d 1077 (citations omitted).] (App.Div.2001) reasons, For those I dissent. join

Justices STEIN and ZAZZALI in this dissent. For reversal —Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices COLEMAN, AND VERNIERO LaVECCHIA —4.

For STEIN, LONG and ZAZZALI —3. affirmance —Justices

Case Details

Case Name: Merlino v. Borough of Midland Park
Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Date Published: Mar 27, 2002
Citation: 796 A.2d 203
Court Abbreviation: N.J.
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