Opinion by
By way of preliminary objection in this eminent domain case, Irvin Merlin challenged the formal condemnation of his property by Lower Merion Township in 1975 on the ground that its adoption of a floodplain ordinance in 1973 had earlier constituted a de facto taking of his unimproved lots, thereby entitling him to have compensation computed as of, and from, 1973. 1
The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas dismissed Mr. Merlin’s preliminary objection because he failed to prove that Lower Merion’s adoption of the flood plain ordinance interfered with his use and enjoyment of the property; we affirm on other grounds. 2
Our decisions in
Kraiser v. Horsham Township,
Mr. Merlin did not challenge the validity of the 1973 zoning ordinance. Because we must rule out a de facto taking by the regulatory ordinance as of 1973, as a matter of law, we affirm the common pleas court’s dismissal of his preliminary objection.
Order
Now, February 11, 1983, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, No. 76-12725, is hereby affirmed.
Notes
The common pleas court also held that, under its eminent domain authority, Lower Merion formally condemned Mr. Merlin’s property in 1975.
We may affirm the decision of a trial court if the result is correct on any ground, apart from the ground that the trial court itself relied upon.
E. J. McAleer
& Co.,
Inc. v. Iceland Products, Inc.,
Act of June 22, 1964, Special Sess., P.L. 84, as amended, 26 P.S. §§1-101-1-903.
Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805,
as amended,
53 P.S. §§10101 — 11202. As we noted in
Wyoming Borough,
the Supreme Court of California reached a similar holding in
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24
Cal. 3d 266,
